Hobby v. District of Columbia Government

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: November 16, 2010
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2010-1954
• Status: Published

Opinion

FILED

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NQV 1 5 2010 FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA clerk u s District & 8 courts fo} ina assume ma ) Geraldine Talley Hobby, ) ) Plaintiff, ) 1 > 5 v. ) Civil Action No. 9 4 ) The District of Columbia ) Govemment et al., ) ) Defendants. ) ) MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on its initial review of plaintiffs pro se complaint and application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint upon a determination that it, among other grounds, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

The complaint, not a model of clarity, arises from plaintiffs former employment with the District of Co1umbia public school system from 1967 to 1992 and her alleged wrongful termination in 1995. This Court previously dismissed, as time-barred, plaintiffs complaint based on the same events forming the basis of this action. See Hobby v. District of Columbia, No. 07-1()61 (RMC) (D.D.C. Nov. 29, 2007) (Memorandum Opinion [Dkt. # 19]). Under the principle of resjudicata, a final judgment on the merits in one action "bars any further claim based on the same ‘nucleus of facts’. . . ." Page v. Um`ted States, 729 F.2d 8l8, 820 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (quoting Expert Elec., Inc. v. Levine, 554 F.2d 1227, 1234 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). Res judicata bars the relitigation "of issues that were or could have been raised in [the prior] action." Drake

v. FAA, 291 F.3d 59 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (emphasis in original) (quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S.

90, 94 (1980)); see I.A.M Nat’l Pension Funa' v. Indus. Gear Mfg. C0., 723 F.2d 944, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (noting that res judicata "forecloses all that which might have been litigated previously").

Buried in plaintiffs lengthy, un-paginated submission is her request to be reinstated so that she can collect a pension to which she claims entitlement. Consideration of the claim for reinstatement would necessarily require the litigation of barred issues. Moreover, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs pension claim, which must be pursued, if at all, under the District’s Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act ("CMPA"). See D.C. Code § l-601.01(2) (covering "benefits relating to appointments, promotions, discipline, separation, pay, unemployment compensation, health, disability and death benefits, leave, retirement, insurance, and veterans preference"); Osekre v. Gage, 698 F. Supp. 2d 209, 211 (D.D.C. 2010) ("With few exceptions, the CMPA is the exclusive remedy for a District of Columbia public employee who has a work-related complaint of any kind.") (quoting Robinson v. District of Columbia, 748 A.2d 409, 411 (D.C. 2000)) (other citation omitted); McManus v. District of Columbia, 530 F. Supp. 2d 46, 77 (D.D.C. 2007) (concluding that "to the extent that Counts 1 through 2 [of the complaint] purport to substantively challenge [p]laintiffs' alleged terminations or the denial of their workers' compensation claims, those claims may only be asserted via the mechanisms

provided by the CMPA, and not in an action before this Court."). A separate Order of dismissal

prevail £/4/

llnited Stateé District Juclge Date: November , 2010

accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.