Hoa Duc Nguyen v. Marcos Charles, et al.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: December 4, 2025
• Docket: 1:25-cv-01592
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8

9 HOA DUC NGUYEN, 10

No. 1:25-cv-01592-TLN-CSK 11 Petitioner,

12 v. ORDER 13 MARCOS CHARLES, et al., 14 Respondents. 15

16 This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Hoa Duc Nguyen’s (“Petitioner”) request for 17 injunctive relief.1 (ECF No. 1.) Respondents Marcos Charles, Pamela Bondi, Kristi Noem, and 18 Todd Lyons (collectively “Respondents”) filed an opposition. (ECF No. 12.) Petitioner replied. 19 (ECF No. 13.) For the reasons set forth below, Petitioner’s motion is GRANTED and the Court 20 issues a preliminary injunction.2 21

22 1 Initially, Petitioner filed this action pro se. (ECF No. 1.) Although the Court has since appointed the Federal Defender to represent him (ECF Nos. 9–11), the Court liberally construes 23 Petitioner’s initial pro se filing. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).

24 2 Petitioner requested immediate injunctive relief as a part of his petition for writ of habeas corpus filed November 19, 2025. (ECF No. 1). On November 21, 2025, the Court notified the 25 parties that it construed Petitioner’s request for injunctive relief as a motion for temporary restraining order and set a briefing schedule. (ECF No. 6.) In their opposition brief, Respondents 26 waived a hearing and stated they have no objection to converting the instant motion into a 27 preliminary injunction. (ECF No. 12 at 1 nn.1–2.) The parties have fully briefed the issues and, as discussed below, the standard for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining orders are 28 the same. Thus, the Court treats the instant motion as one for preliminary injunction. 1 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3 2 Petitioner is a 59-year-old citizen and native of Vietnam. (ECF No. 12 at 1, 34.) In 1975, 3 in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, Petitioner was admitted to the United States as a refugee 4 and became a lawful permanent resident. (Id. at 30.) In 1997, Petitioner left the United States to 5 elude criminal charges. (Id. at 30, 37.) Upon his return in 2003, the Department of Homeland 6 Security deemed his permanent residency status abandoned, and he was paroled into the country 7 to face criminal charges. (Id.) Ultimately, Petitioner pleaded guilty to various crimes committed 8 between 1993 and 1996 and served his sentence. (Id. at 8–10.) 9 As a result of his criminal convictions, Petitioner was placed into removal proceedings as 10 an “inadmissible” non-citizen under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) 11 §§ 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) and 212(a)(2)(B). (Id. at 31, 37–38.) On June 17, 2024, Petitioner received 12 a final order of removal to Vietnam and was taken into immigration custody. (Id. at 12; ECF No. 13 1 at 3.) Petitioner was detained for exactly six months before he was released back into the 14 United States on December 17, 2024, by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement 15 (“ICE”) on an order of supervision. (ECF No. 12 at 30.) 16 On June 16, 2025, ICE revoked Petitioner’s release and detained Petitioner that same day. 17 (Id.) ICE’s Notice of Revocation of Release (“Notice of Revocation”) appears to have been given 18 to Petitioner at the time he was being detained. (Id. at 26 (addressed to Petitioner at the ICE field 19 office on the date of detention).) The Notice of Revocation states that ICE’s decision to revoke 20 his release was based on “a review of your file and/or your personal interview on account of 21 changed circumstances in your case,” but does not identify what the “changed circumstances” 22 were or what information led ICE to that determination. (Id.) Four months into his detention, 23 Petitioner was given an informal interview on October 20, 2025. (Id. at 31.) Also in October, 24 Respondents submitted a “travel packet” within the United States government to an agency “who 25 coordinates the request for a travel document from Vietnam” for Petitioner’s removal. (Id.) To 26 date, Vietnam has not issued travel documents for Petitioner and Petitioner contends Vietnam has 27

28 3 The parties largely agree on the factual and procedural history. (See ECF No. 13 at 1.) 1 not agreed to accept him. (ECF No. 1 at 1, 13–14.) Petitioner has now been in continuous ICE 2 detention awaiting removal for 5.5 months. (Id. at 3.) Since his 2024 order of removal, Petitioner 3 has been in ICE detention for a total of 11.5 months. 4 II. STANDARD OF LAW 5 A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy. Courts consider whether a petitioner 6 has established: “[1] that he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer 7 irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his 8 favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 9 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Petitioner must “make a showing on all four prongs” of the Winter test. 10 Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). 11 In evaluating a petitioner’s motion, a district court may weigh a petitioner’s showings on 12 the Winter elements using a sliding-scale approach. Id. A stronger showing on the balance of the 13 hardships may support issuing a preliminary injunction even where there are “serious questions 14 on the merits . . . so long as the [petitioner] also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable 15 injury and that the injunction is in the public interest.” Id. Simply put, a petitioner must 16 demonstrate, “that [if] serious questions going to the merits were raised [then] the balance of 17 hardships [must] tip[ ] sharply” in petitioner’s favor in order to succeed in a request for a 18 preliminary injunction. Id. at 1134–35. 19 III. ANALYSIS 20 The Court considers each of the Winter elements with respect to Petitioner’s motion. 21 A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 22 Petitioner argues: (1) ICE unlawfully revoked his release when it failed to follow its own 23 regulations; (2) his continued detention violates due process because his removal is not 24 reasonably foreseeable as required under Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001); and (3) ICE’s 25 current policy and procedures relating to third-country removals are unconstitutional. (ECF No. 26 1.) The Court addresses the likelihood of success for each claim. 27 i. Due Process for Revocation of Release 28 Respondents have the authority to detain non-citizens with final orders of removal to 1 effectuate deportation. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231; Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 697. But when a non-citizen 2 has been released from immigration detention, certain ICE regulations govern how and when the 3 agency may revoke that release and re-detain the non-citizen. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.13(i), 241.4(l) 4 (“ICE Regulations”). These procedures protect important due process rights owed to non- 5 citizens.4 See Nguyen v. Hyde, 788 F. Supp. 3d 144, 152 (D. Mass. 2025) (noting that 8 C.F.R. § 6 241.13(i) was “promulgated to protect a fundamental right derived from the Constitution”). 7 “ICE, like any agency, ‘has the duty to follow its own federal regulations.’” Rombot v. 8 Souza, 296 F. Supp. 3d 383, 388 (D. Mass. 2017) (quoting Haoud v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 201, 205 9 (1st Cir. 2003)); see also United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954) 10 (reversing dismissal of habeas petition where Board of Immigration Appeals failed to follow its 11 own regulations). “Where an immigration ‘regulation is promulgated to protect a fundamental 12 right derived from the Constitution or a federal statute,’ like the opportunity to be heard, ‘and 13 [ICE] fails to adhere to it, the challenged [action] is invalid.” Rombot, 296 F. Supp. 3d at 388 14 (quoting Waldron v. I.N.S., 17 F.3d 511, 518 (2d Cir. 1993)); Hoac v. Becerra, No. 2:25-cv- 15 01740-DC-JDP, 2025 WL 1993771, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2025) (“Because there is no 16 indication that ICE Regulations were followed . . . [petitioner’s] re-detainment was unlawful.”). 17 Petitioner’s revocation of release was governed by 8 C.F.R § 241.13(i). (See ECF Nos. 1 18 at 16 and 12 at 26.) In considering Petitioner’s claim that Respondents failed to comply with 19 ICE Regulations thereby violating due process, the Court assesses 8 C.F.R § 241.13(i)(2) 20 (determination requirements) and 8 C.F.R § 241.13(i)(3) (procedures) in turn. 21 a) Determination to Revoke Release Under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2) 22 Under the ICE Regulations governing revocation of release, ICE may re-detain non- 23 citizens “if, on account of changed circumstances, [ICE] determines that there is a significant 24 likelihood that the [non-citizen] may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” 8 C.F.R.

25 4 It is fundamental that “the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including [non-citizens], whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or 26 permanent.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693 (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982); Mathews 27 v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596–598 & n.5 (1953); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369, (1886); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. 28 Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953)). 1 § 241.13(i)(2). The “on account of” language means that the “changed circumstances” are a 2 prerequisite to revocation. Id.; see also Tran v. Noem, No. 25-cv-2391, 2025 WL 3005347, at *2 3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2025) (“§ 241.13(i)(2) requires that this determination is made before the 4 removable [non-citizen] has had his release revoked.”) (emphasis added). “Significant 5 likelihood” requires something more than a mere possibility. See Vu v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv- 6 01366-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 3114341, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2025). 7 The burden is on ICE to first establish changed circumstances that make removal 8 significantly likely. See Vu, 2025 WL 3114341, at *7; see also Escalante v. Noem, No. 9:25-cv- 9 00182, 2025 WL 2206113, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2025) (“Imposing the burden of proof on [a 10 non-citizen] each time he is re-detained would lead to an unjust result and serious due process 11 implications.”). 12 As an initial matter, ICE has failed to meet its burden to show that Petitioner’s revocation 13 of release was proper “on account of changed circumstances.” See 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2). 14 Respondents do not directly address this requirement, and the Notice of Revocation merely 15 concludes that circumstances have changed for Petitioner, but it does not state reasons or the facts 16 underlying the determination. (ECF No. 12 at 26.) Neither have Respondents identified any 17 event or fact to infer that Petitioner’s circumstances changed between his release on December 18 17, 2024, and the revocation on June 17, 2025. 19 The only new fact Respondents present is that ICE has submitted a travel packet to a 20 United States government agency to begin a process of requesting travel documents from 21 Vietnam. (ECF No. 12 at 3, 31.) Even if submitting a travel packet within the Government gave 22 rise to “changed circumstances” sufficient to revoke release, ICE submitted the travel packet four 23 months after Petitioner’s release was revoked. It is not possible that the submission of a travel 24 packet on October 17, 2025, could possibly be the prerequisite for re-detention on June 16, 2025. 25 Without any other facts to rely on, this Court must find that there were no changed circumstances 26 in Petitioner’s case to warrant the revocation of his release under ICE Regulations. 8 C.F.R. § 27 241.13(i)(2). Thus, ICE improperly revoked Petitioner’s release. 28 ICE has also failed to meet its burden to show that Petitioner’s deportation is significantly 1 likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2) (showing required under ICE 2 Regulations to properly revoke release). Petitioner contends that Vietnam has not issued 3 Petitioner’s travel documents and will not accept him, so it cannot be significantly likely that he 4 will be removed there. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) Respondents argue that Petitioner’s deportation is 5 “imminent” and again seem to rely only on the submitted travel packet to meet its burden. (ECF 6 No. 12 at 3–4.) The Court cannot glean any other basis from Respondent’s brief or evidence to 7 support the likelihood of removal.5 While submission of the travel packet may nominally 8 increase the likelihood of Petitioner’s removal now, as stated above, it could not have possibly 9 supported an agency determination at the time Petitioner’s release was revoked on June 17, 2025. 10 Even if the travel packet had been submitted at the time of Petitioner’s re-detention — 11 rather than four months after the fact — it is not sufficient to show a significant likelihood that 12 removal is reasonably foreseeable. The packet was submitted within the Government to 13 “coordinate” a request to Vietnam. There is no evidence that the request for travel documents has 14 even been submitted to Vietnam, nor that Vietnam has agreed to accept Petitioner, and 15 Respondents do not provide an estimate of when Vietnam might respond or issue travel 16 documents. It has been 1.5 months since the travel packet was submitted and Respondents do not 17 provide any evidence of progress within that time. At this stage, Petitioner’s removal is nothing 18 more than a mere possibility. See Vu, 2025 WL 3114341, at *7. 19 Indeed, numerous courts, including in this district, have held that requests for travel 20 documents from Vietnam, alone, are insufficient to show a “significant likelihood” of removal 21 under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2). See, e.g., Tran v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-01523-TLN-CKD, 2025 WL 22

23 5 Respondents also reference and attach to their motion the November 21, 2020 Memorandum of Understanding between United States and Vietnam (“MOU”), which created a 24 process for deporting Vietnamese citizens who entered the United States before 1995. (ECF No. 12 at 16–21.) Respondents do not state the purpose for which it is referenced, but the Court 25 presumes Respondents endeavor to show that removal is possible under the MOU. The Court cannot infer something more because the MOU does not confer any rights or obligations between 26 the countries. See Nguyen, 788 F. Supp. 3d at 151 (the Government “may only request his 27 removal; Vietnam has total discretion whether to issue a travel document to any individual.”). Additionally, the 2020 MOU pre-dates Petitioner’s 2024 order of removal and is not a “changed 28 circumstance” or an event increasing the likelihood of Petitioner’s removal. 1 3268491, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2025) (assertion that Government was “actively working on 2 obtaining a travel document for Petitioner to Vietnam” was insufficient to show removal was 3 reasonably foreseeable); Phan v. Beccerra, No. 2025 WL 1993735, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 4 2025) (“Respondents’ intent to complete a travel document request for Petitioner does not make it 5 significantly likely he will be removed in the foreseeable future”); Hoac, 2025 WL 1993771, at 6 *4 (“Respondents have not provided any details about why a travel document could not be 7 obtained in the past, nor have they attempted to show why obtaining a travel document is more 8 likely this time around.”); Hyde, 788 F. Supp. 3d at 152 (“[N]o clear information as to whether or 9 when [Petitioner’s] request was submitted to Vietnam, whether Vietnam has even acknowledged 10 receipt of the request or otherwise responded to [Petitioner’s] request, or the anticipated wait time 11 for a response from Vietnam.”). 12 ICE did not make the requisite sufficient showing that Petitioner’s removal was 13 significantly likely in the foreseeable future based on changed circumstances at the time it 14 revoked his release under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2). Accordingly, the Court finds that ICE 15 improperly revoked Petitioner’s release in violation of its own regulations and due process. 16 b) Procedures to Revoke Release Under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3) 17 The ICE Regulations also lay out procedures for revocation of release. 8 C.F.R. 18 § 241.13(i)(3). ICE must provide notice to the non-citizen of the reasons for revocation, “conduct 19 an initial informal interview promptly after his or her return to [ICE] custody to afford the [non- 20 citizen] an opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation[,]” and provide review of the 21 determination. Id. 22 Petitioner alleges that ICE did not follow these procedures. (ECF No. 1 at 17–18.) 23 Respondents do not squarely address whether ICE complied with its regulations, but they do 24 provide ICE’s Notice of Revocation with generic form language and state that ICE provided 25 Petitioner with an informal interview on October 20, 2025, over four months after his release was 26 revoked. (ECF No. 12 at 26, 31.) If the October interview was the mandated “initial informal 27 interview” — which is required to be conducted “promptly” upon Petitioner’s re-detention — 28 then ICE has seriously violated its procedures for revocation. See Phan, No. 2025 WL 1993735, 1 at * 3–4 (failure to provide informal interview rendered revocation of release unlawful). In fact, 2 in the Notice of Revocation, ICE stated, “[i]f you are not released after the informal interview, 3 you will receive notification of a new review, which will occur within approximately three 4 months of the date of this notice.” (Id. at 26 (emphasis added).) By ICE’s own statements, a 5 second interview should have been conducted within the timeframe in which ICE seems to have 6 conducted the initial interview. Thus, on the facts currently before this Court, Petitioner is likely 7 to succeed on the merits of his claim that ICE also failed to follow 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3) for the 8 revocation of his release. 9 ii. Due Process for Continued Detention 10 Petitioner further argues that his continued detention is unlawful because he has been in 11 custody for a total of 11.5 months since his final order of removal and his removal is not 12 reasonably foreseeable as required under Zadvydas. (ECF No. 1 at 13–14 (citing 533 U.S. 678).) 13 Respondents again do not directly respond, but state that Petitioner’s current period of detention 14 is less than the six-month presumptively reasonable period established in Zadvydas. (ECF No. 12 15 at 4.) 16 In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court considered prolonged immigration detention after a final 17 order of removal. 533 U.S. 678 (2001). Although the Government has statutory authority to 18 detain non-citizens for removal, “once removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued 19 detention is no longer authorized by statute.” Id. at 699. The Court established a burden-shifting 20 framework to determine whether continued immigration detention is lawful and adopted a 21 presumption that immigration detention is reasonable for a period of up to six months, after the 22 final order of removal, when the detention is related to effectuating removal. Id. at 701. “After 23 this 6–month period, once the [non-citizen] provides good reason to believe that there is no 24 significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must 25 respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id. 26 Respondents imply that the Zadvydas presumptive period should start over with each 27 period of detention. That suggestion is wrong. The Zadvydas presumptive period “does not reset 28 when the government detains [a non-citizen] under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), releases him from 1 detention, and then re-detains him again.” Sied v. Nielsen, 2018 WL 1876907, at *6 (N.D. Cal. 2 Apr. 19, 2018); see also Siguenza v. Moniz, 2025 WL 2734704, at *3 (D. Mass. Sept. 25, 2025) 3 (“Most courts to consider the issue have concluded that the Zadvydas period is cumulative, 4 motivated, in part, by a concern that the federal government could otherwise detain noncitizens 5 indefinitely by continuously releasing and re-detaining them.”). Finding the presumptive period 6 resets with each detention would allow the Government to circumvent basic due process 7 protections, the reasonable foreseeability requirement under Zadvydas, and federal regulations. 8 Here, Respondents have detained Petitioner for a total of 11.5 months since his final order 9 of removal on June 17, 2024, well beyond six months. Thus, they have lost the benefit of the 10 Zadvydas presumption. This Court has found there is no significant likelihood of removal in the 11 reasonably foreseeable future, therefore, Petitioner has met his burden. As a result, Respondents 12 must produce evidence rebutting Petitioner’s showing for his continued detention to be lawful. 13 See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. However, Respondents provide no credible evidence that 14 removal is reasonably foreseeable. Respondents have had nearly 18 months to effectuate 15 Petitioner’s removal while he was in ICE detention or under an order of supervision awaiting 16 removal. Respondents do not provide an explanation as to why removal was not effectuated last 17 year but is now both possible and “imminent.” A request for travel documents within the 18 Government does not meaningfully move Petitioner’s case toward removal. See id. (finding 19 indefinite immigration detention is unlawful and “for detention to remain reasonable, as the 20 period of . . . confinement grows, what counts as the ‘reasonably foreseeable future’ conversely 21 would have to shrink.”). In sum, the Court finds that Petitioner’s removal is not reasonably 22 foreseeable and his continued detention is unlawful. 23 iii. Third-Country Removal 24 Finally, Petitioner argues ICE’s new policies and procedures related to third-country 25 removal are unlawful and he may be subjected to such removal. (ECF No. 1 at 3–6, 14–16.) 26 Respondents do not address these arguments and do not provide assurances that they are not 27 seeking third-country removal for Petitioner. (See ECF No. 12.) 28 Third-country removals involve deportation to countries that are not identified in a final 1 removal order and to which the non-citizen has no connection. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2)(E)(vii). 2 ICE’s July 9, 2025 guidance on this issue provides that if the United States has received credible 3 diplomatic assurances from a target third country that the non-citizen will not be persecuted or 4 tortured, then they may be removed “without the need for further procedures.” Vu, 2025 WL 5 3114341, at *8 (quoting ICE July 9, 2025 third-party removal policy) (emphasis added). Where 6 diplomatic assurances are not secured, ICE will provide notice to the non-citizen, but removal 7 could occur within as little as six hours and ICE “will not affirmatively ask whether the [non- 8 citizen] is afraid of being removed to the country of removal.” Id. If ICE follows this policy for 9 Petitioner’s removal, he would have no meaningful opportunity to seek relief in any court before 10 he is removed to a third country. See id. 11 Numerous courts in this Circuit have held that ICE’s third-country removal policy is 12 unconstitutional and this Court agrees with those well-reasoned decisions. See, e.g., Vu, 2025 13 WL 3114341, at *9; Scott, 2025 WL 2419288, at *18–23; Zakzouk v. Becerra, No. 25-cv-06254- 14 KAW, 2025 WL 2899220, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2025); Baltodano v. Bondi, No. C25- 15 1958RSL, 2025 WL 2987766, at *2–3 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 23, 2025). “The Fifth Amendment 16 guarantees due process in deportation proceedings.” Torres-Aguilar v. I.N.S., 246 F.3d 1267, 17 1270 (9th Cir. 2001). “Failing to notify individuals who are subject to deportation that they have 18 the right to apply for asylum in the United States and for withholding of deportation to the 19 country to which they will be deported violates the constitutional right to due process.” 20 Andriasian v. I.N.S., 180 F.3d 1033, 1041 (9th Cir. 1999). “In the context of country of removal 21 designations, last minute orders of removal to a country may violate due process if an immigrant 22 was not provided an opportunity to address his fear of persecution in that country.” Nguyen v. 23 Scott, No. 2:25-cv-01398, 2025 WL 2419288, at *18 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 21, 2025) (quoting 24 Najjar v. Lynch, 630 Fed. App’x 724 (9th Cir. 2016)). Thus, Petitioner is likely to succeed on the 25 merits of his third-country removal claim. 26 B. Irreparable Harm 27 The Ninth Circuit has recognized that there may be numerous “irreparable harms imposed 28 on anyone subject to immigration detention,” such as “subpar medical and psychiatric care in ICE 1 detention facilities [and] the economic burdens imposed on detainees and their families as a result 2 of detention.” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 999 (9th Cir. 2017). Petitioner has been in 3 ICE custody for a total of 11.5 months awaiting removal. (ECF No. 1 at 2–3.) Respondents 4 argue that Petitioner has not suffered irreparable harm because his current detention period has 5 not yet reached six months and such a period of detention is “appropriate where removal is 6 probable.” (ECF No. 12 at 4.) However, the Court has found that Petitioner’s removal is not 7 reasonably foreseeable — in fact, it is not known to this Court whether Vietnam will ever issue 8 travel documents for Petitioner. Therefore, Petitioner is being unlawfully detained and will be a 9 risk indeterminate detention absent a preliminary injunction. 10 Moreover, “[i]t is well established that the deprivation of constitutional rights 11 ‘unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 994 (quoting Melendres 12 v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012)). “When an alleged deprivation of a constitutional 13 right is involved, most courts hold that no further showing of irreparable injury is necessary.” 14 Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 1001–02 (9th Cir. 2005). In addition to harms imposed 15 by lengthy immigration detention, Petitioner has shown he is likely to succeed on the merits of his 16 constitutional claims. Thus, the Court finds Petitioner has suffered irreparable harm. 17 C. Balance of Equities and Public Interest 18 As to the final two Winter factors, “[w]hen the government is a party, the analysis of the 19 balance of the hardships and the public interest merge.” Nat’l Urban League v. Ross, 484 F. 20 Supp. 3d 802, 807 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (citing Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 1073, 1092 21 (9th Cir. 2014)). Respondents “cannot reasonably assert that [they are] harmed in any legally 22 cognizable sense by being enjoined from constitutional violations.” Zepeda v. U.S. I.N.S., 753 23 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F. 3d 1127, 1145 (9th Cir. 24 2013) (“[The government] cannot suffer harm from an injunction that merely ends an unlawful 25 practice[.]”). The public also has a strong interest in ensuring its government follows the law and 26 the Ninth Circuit has recognized that the “costs to the public of immigration detention are 27 staggering[.]” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 996 (9th Cir. 2017); see also Index 28 Newspapers LLC v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 977 F.3d 817, 838 (9th Cir. 2020) (“It is always in the 1 public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s constitutional rights.”) 2 As discussed above, Petitioner has shown he is likely to succeed in proving that 3 Respondents have violated federal laws depriving him of his constitutional rights and his liberty. 4 Additionally, Respondents are not harmed by their sworn duty to follow the law. See Zepeda, 5 753 F.2d at 727. Thus, the balance of equities and public interest factors weigh in Petitioner’s 6 favor. 7 IV. CONCLUSION 8 Therefore, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s motion and issues the preliminary injunction 9 set forth below. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 10 1. Petitioner’s motion for injunctive relief (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED. 11 2. To return to the status quo ante, Respondents must IMMEDIATELY RELEASE 12 Petitioner under the same conditions he was released previously on his December 2024 order of 13 supervision. See Yang v. Kaiser, No. 2:25-cv-02205-DAD-AC, 2025 WL 2791778, at *11 (E.D. 14 Cal. Aug. 20, 2025) (status quo ante is “the last uncontested status which preceded the pending 15 controversy.”). Respondents must file a notice certifying compliance with this provision of the 16 Court’s Order by December 5, 2025. 17 3. Respondents are ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from re-detaining Petitioner 18 unless they obtain a travel document for his removal to Vietnam and until they follow all 19 procedures set forth in 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4(l), 241.13(i), and any other applicable statutory and 20 regulatory procedures. 21 4. Respondents are ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from removing Petitioner to 22 any country other than Vietnam, unless they provide the following process: 23 a. written notice to both Petitioner and Petitioner’s counsel in a language Petitioner 24 can understand; 25 b. following the notice, Petitioner must be provided a meaningful opportunity, and a 26 minimum of ten days, to raise a fear-based claim for protection under the 27 Convention Against Torture prior to removal; 28 c. if Petitioner is found to have demonstrated “reasonable fear” of removal to the 1 designated country, Respondents must move to reopen Petitioner’s immigration 2 proceedings; 3 d. if Petitioner is not found to have demonstrated a “reasonable fear” of removal to 4 the country, Respondents must afford Petitioner a meaningful opportunity, and a 5 minimum of fifteen days, to seek to reopen his immigration proceedings. 6 5. The bond requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) is waived. See 7 | Diaz v. Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008, 1015 (9th Cir. 2011). Courts regularly waive security in cases 8 | like this one. See, e.g., Zakzouk v. Becerra, No. 25-cv-06254, 2025 WL 2899220, at *8 (N.D. 9 | Cal. Oct. 10, 2025). 10 6. This matter is referred to the United States Magistrate Judge for further 11 || proceedings. 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. 13 || Date: December 4, 2025 7, 14 15 TROY L. NUNLEY CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28