UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
HOA DUC NGUYEN,
No. 1:25-cv-01592-TLN-CSK Petitioner,
v. ORDER MARCOS CHARLES, et al., Respondents.
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Hoa Duc Nguyen’s (“Petitioner”) request for injunctive relief.1 (ECF No. 1.) Respondents Marcos Charles, Pamela Bondi, Kristi Noem, and Todd Lyons (collectively “Respondents”) filed an opposition. (ECF No. 12.) Petitioner replied. (ECF No. 13.) For the reasons set forth below, Petitioner’s motion is GRANTED and the Court issues a preliminary injunction.2
1 Initially, Petitioner filed this action pro se. (ECF No. 1.) Although the Court has since appointed the Federal Defender to represent him (ECF Nos. 9–11), the Court liberally construes Petitioner’s initial pro se filing. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
2 Petitioner requested immediate injunctive relief as a part of his petition for writ of habeas corpus filed November 19, 2025. (ECF No. 1). On November 21, 2025, the Court notified the parties that it construed Petitioner’s request for injunctive relief as a motion for temporary restraining order and set a briefing schedule. (ECF No. 6.) In their opposition brief, Respondents waived a hearing and stated they have no objection to converting the instant motion into a preliminary injunction. (ECF No. 12 at 1 nn.1–2.) The parties have fully briefed the issues and, as discussed below, the standard for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining orders are the same. Thus, the Court treats the instant motion as one for preliminary injunction. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3 Petitioner is a 59-year-old citizen and native of Vietnam. (ECF No. 12 at 1, 34.) In 1975, in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, Petitioner was admitted to the United States as a refugee and became a lawful permanent resident. (Id. at 30.) In 1997, Petitioner left the United States to elude criminal charges. (Id. at 30, 37.) Upon his return in 2003, the Department of Homeland Security deemed his permanent residency status abandoned, and he was paroled into the country to face criminal charges. (Id.) Ultimately, Petitioner pleaded guilty to various crimes committed between 1993 and 1996 and served his sentence. (Id. at 8–10.) As a result of his criminal convictions, Petitioner was placed into removal proceedings as an “inadmissible” non-citizen under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) §§ 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) and 212(a)(2)(B). (Id. at 31, 37–38.) On June 17, 2024, Petitioner received a final order of removal to Vietnam and was taken into immigration custody. (Id. at 12; ECF No. 1 at 3.) Petitioner was detained for exactly six months before he was released back into the United States on December 17, 2024, by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) on an order of supervision. (ECF No. 12 at 30.) On June 16, 2025, ICE revoked Petitioner’s release and detained Petitioner that same day. (Id.) ICE’s Notice of Revocation of Release (“Notice of Revocation”) appears to have been given to Petitioner at the time he was being detained. (Id. at 26 (addressed to Petitioner at the ICE field office on the date of detention).) The Notice of Revocation states that ICE’s decision to revoke his release was based on “a review of your file and/or your personal interview on account of changed circumstances in your case,” but does not identify what the “changed circumstances” were or what information led ICE to that determination. (Id.) Four months into his detention, Petitioner was given an informal interview on October 20, 2025. (Id. at 31.) Also in October, Respondents submitted a “travel packet” within the United States government to an agency “who coordinates the request for a travel document from Vietnam” for Petitioner’s removal. (Id.) To date, Vietnam has not issued travel documents for Petitioner and Petitioner contends Vietnam has
3 The parties largely agree on the factual and procedural history. (See ECF No. 13 at 1.) not agreed to accept him. (ECF No. 1 at 1, 13–14.) Petitioner has now been in continuous ICE detention awaiting removal for 5.5 months. (Id. at 3.) Since his 2024 order of removal, Petitioner has been in ICE detention for a total of 11.5 months. A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy. Courts consider whether a petitioner has established: “[1] that he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Petitioner must “make a showing on all four prongs” of the Winter test. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). In evaluating a petitioner’s motion, a district court may weigh a petitioner’s showings on the Winter elements using a sliding-scale approach. Id. A stronger showing on the balance of the hardships may support issuing a preliminary injunction even where there are “serious questions on the merits . . . so long as the [petitioner] also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the public interest.” Id. Simply put, a petitioner must demonstrate, “that [if] serious questions going to the merits were raised [then] the balance of hardships [must] tip[ ] sharply” in petitioner’s favor in order to succeed in a request for a preliminary injunction. Id. at 1134–35. The Court considers each of the Winter elements with respect to Petitioner’s motion. A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits Petitioner argues: (1) ICE unlawfully revoked his release when it failed to follow its own regulations; (2) his continued detention violates due process because his removal is not reasonably foreseeable as required under Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001); and (3) ICE’s current policy and procedures relating to third-country removals are unconstitutional. (ECF No. 1.) The Court addresses the likelihood of success for each claim. i. Due Process for Revocation of Release Respondents have the authority to detain non-citizens with final orders of removal to effectuate deportation. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231; Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 697. But when a non-citizen has been released from immigration detention, certain ICE regulations govern how and when the agency may revoke that release and re-detain the non-citizen. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.13(i), 241.4(l) (“ICE Regulations”). These procedures protect important due process rights owed to non- citizens.4 See Nguyen v. Hyde, 788 F. Supp. 3d 144, 152 (D. Mass. 2025) (noting that 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i) was “promulgated to protect a fundamental right derived from the Constitution”). “ICE, like any agency, ‘has the duty to follow its own federal regulations.’” Rombot v. Souza, 296 F. Supp. 3d 383, 388 (D. Mass. 2017) (quoting Haoud v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 201, 205 (1st Cir. 2003)); see also United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954) (reversing dismissal of habeas petition where Board of Immigration Appeals failed to follow its own regulations). “Where an immigration ‘regulation is promulgated to protect a fundamental right derived from the Constitution or a federal statute,’ like the opportunity to be heard, ‘and [ICE] fails to adhere to it, the challenged [action] is invalid.” Rombot, 296 F. Supp. 3d at 388 (quoting Waldron v. I.N.S., 17 F.3d 511, 518 (2d Cir. 1993)); Hoac v. Becerra, No. 2:25-cv- 01740-DC-JDP, 2025 WL 1993771, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2025) (“Because there is no indication that ICE Regulations were followed . . . [petitioner’s] re-detainment was unlawful.”). Petitioner’s revocation of release was governed by 8 C.F.R § 241.13(i). (See ECF Nos. 1 at 16 and 12 at 26.) In considering Petitioner’s claim that Respondents failed to comply with ICE Regulations thereby violating due process, the Court assesses 8 C.F.R § 241.13(i)(2) (determination requirements) and 8 C.F.R § 241.13(i)(3) (procedures) in turn. a) Determination to Revoke Release Under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2) Under the ICE Regulations governing revocation of release, ICE may re-detain non- citizens “if, on account of changed circumstances, [ICE] determines that there is a significant likelihood that the [non-citizen] may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” 8 C.F.R.
4 It is fundamental that “the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including [non-citizens], whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693 (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596–598 & n.5 (1953); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369, (1886); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953)). § 241.13(i)(2). The “on account of” language means that the “changed circumstances” are a prerequisite to revocation. Id.; see also Tran v. Noem, No. 25-cv-2391, 2025 WL 3005347, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2025) (“§ 241.13(i)(2) requires that this determination is made before the removable [non-citizen] has had his release revoked.”) (emphasis added). “Significant likelihood” requires something more than a mere possibility. See Vu v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv- 01366-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 3114341, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2025). The burden is on ICE to first establish changed circumstances that make removal significantly likely. See Vu, 2025 WL 3114341, at *7; see also Escalante v. Noem, No. 9:25-cv- 00182, 2025 WL 2206113, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2025) (“Imposing the burden of proof on [a non-citizen] each time he is re-detained would lead to an unjust result and serious due process implications.”). As an initial matter, ICE has failed to meet its burden to show that Petitioner’s revocation of release was proper “on account of changed circumstances.” See 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2). Respondents do not directly address this requirement, and the Notice of Revocation merely concludes that circumstances have changed for Petitioner, but it does not state reasons or the facts underlying the determination. (ECF No. 12 at 26.) Neither have Respondents identified any event or fact to infer that Petitioner’s circumstances changed between his release on December 17, 2024, and the revocation on June 17, 2025. The only new fact Respondents present is that ICE has submitted a travel packet to a United States government agency to begin a process of requesting travel documents from Vietnam. (ECF No. 12 at 3, 31.) Even if submitting a travel packet within the Government gave rise to “changed circumstances” sufficient to revoke release, ICE submitted the travel packet four months after Petitioner’s release was revoked. It is not possible that the submission of a travel packet on October 17, 2025, could possibly be the prerequisite for re-detention on June 16, 2025. Without any other facts to rely on, this Court must find that there were no changed circumstances in Petitioner’s case to warrant the revocation of his release under ICE Regulations. 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2). Thus, ICE improperly revoked Petitioner’s release. ICE has also failed to meet its burden to show that Petitioner’s deportation is significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2) (showing required under ICE Regulations to properly revoke release). Petitioner contends that Vietnam has not issued Petitioner’s travel documents and will not accept him, so it cannot be significantly likely that he will be removed there. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) Respondents argue that Petitioner’s deportation is “imminent” and again seem to rely only on the submitted travel packet to meet its burden. (ECF No. 12 at 3–4.) The Court cannot glean any other basis from Respondent’s brief or evidence to support the likelihood of removal.5 While submission of the travel packet may nominally increase the likelihood of Petitioner’s removal now, as stated above, it could not have possibly supported an agency determination at the time Petitioner’s release was revoked on June 17, 2025. Even if the travel packet had been submitted at the time of Petitioner’s re-detention — rather than four months after the fact — it is not sufficient to show a significant likelihood that removal is reasonably foreseeable. The packet was submitted within the Government to “coordinate” a request to Vietnam. There is no evidence that the request for travel documents has even been submitted to Vietnam, nor that Vietnam has agreed to accept Petitioner, and Respondents do not provide an estimate of when Vietnam might respond or issue travel documents. It has been 1.5 months since the travel packet was submitted and Respondents do not provide any evidence of progress within that time. At this stage, Petitioner’s removal is nothing more than a mere possibility. See Vu, 2025 WL 3114341, at *7. Indeed, numerous courts, including in this district, have held that requests for travel documents from Vietnam, alone, are insufficient to show a “significant likelihood” of removal under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2). See, e.g., Tran v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-01523-TLN-CKD, 2025 WL
5 Respondents also reference and attach to their motion the November 21, 2020 Memorandum of Understanding between United States and Vietnam (“MOU”), which created a process for deporting Vietnamese citizens who entered the United States before 1995. (ECF No. 12 at 16–21.) Respondents do not state the purpose for which it is referenced, but the Court presumes Respondents endeavor to show that removal is possible under the MOU. The Court cannot infer something more because the MOU does not confer any rights or obligations between the countries. See Nguyen, 788 F. Supp. 3d at 151 (the Government “may only request his removal; Vietnam has total discretion whether to issue a travel document to any individual.”). Additionally, the 2020 MOU pre-dates Petitioner’s 2024 order of removal and is not a “changed circumstance” or an event increasing the likelihood of Petitioner’s removal. 3268491, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2025) (assertion that Government was “actively working on obtaining a travel document for Petitioner to Vietnam” was insufficient to show removal was reasonably foreseeable); Phan v. Beccerra, No. 2025 WL 1993735, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2025) (“Respondents’ intent to complete a travel document request for Petitioner does not make it significantly likely he will be removed in the foreseeable future”); Hoac, 2025 WL 1993771, at *4 (“Respondents have not provided any details about why a travel document could not be obtained in the past, nor have they attempted to show why obtaining a travel document is more likely this time around.”); Hyde, 788 F. Supp. 3d at 152 (“[N]o clear information as to whether or when [Petitioner’s] request was submitted to Vietnam, whether Vietnam has even acknowledged receipt of the request or otherwise responded to [Petitioner’s] request, or the anticipated wait time for a response from Vietnam.”). ICE did not make the requisite sufficient showing that Petitioner’s removal was significantly likely in the foreseeable future based on changed circumstances at the time it revoked his release under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2). Accordingly, the Court finds that ICE improperly revoked Petitioner’s release in violation of its own regulations and due process. b) Procedures to Revoke Release Under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3) The ICE Regulations also lay out procedures for revocation of release. 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3). ICE must provide notice to the non-citizen of the reasons for revocation, “conduct an initial informal interview promptly after his or her return to [ICE] custody to afford the [non- citizen] an opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation[,]” and provide review of the determination. Id. Petitioner alleges that ICE did not follow these procedures. (ECF No. 1 at 17–18.) Respondents do not squarely address whether ICE complied with its regulations, but they do provide ICE’s Notice of Revocation with generic form language and state that ICE provided Petitioner with an informal interview on October 20, 2025, over four months after his release was revoked. (ECF No. 12 at 26, 31.) If the October interview was the mandated “initial informal interview” — which is required to be conducted “promptly” upon Petitioner’s re-detention — then ICE has seriously violated its procedures for revocation. See Phan, No. 2025 WL 1993735, at * 3–4 (failure to provide informal interview rendered revocation of release unlawful). In fact, in the Notice of Revocation, ICE stated, “[i]f you are not released after the informal interview, you will receive notification of a new review, which will occur within approximately three months of the date of this notice.” (Id. at 26 (emphasis added).) By ICE’s own statements, a second interview should have been conducted within the timeframe in which ICE seems to have conducted the initial interview. Thus, on the facts currently before this Court, Petitioner is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim that ICE also failed to follow 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3) for the revocation of his release. ii. Due Process for Continued Detention Petitioner further argues that his continued detention is unlawful because he has been in custody for a total of 11.5 months since his final order of removal and his removal is not reasonably foreseeable as required under Zadvydas. (ECF No. 1 at 13–14 (citing 533 U.S. 678).) Respondents again do not directly respond, but state that Petitioner’s current period of detention is less than the six-month presumptively reasonable period established in Zadvydas. (ECF No. 12 at 4.) In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court considered prolonged immigration detention after a final order of removal. 533 U.S. 678 (2001). Although the Government has statutory authority to detain non-citizens for removal, “once removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute.” Id. at 699. The Court established a burden-shifting framework to determine whether continued immigration detention is lawful and adopted a presumption that immigration detention is reasonable for a period of up to six months, after the final order of removal, when the detention is related to effectuating removal. Id. at 701. “After this 6–month period, once the [non-citizen] provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id. Respondents imply that the Zadvydas presumptive period should start over with each period of detention. That suggestion is wrong. The Zadvydas presumptive period “does not reset when the government detains [a non-citizen] under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), releases him from detention, and then re-detains him again.” Sied v. Nielsen, 2018 WL 1876907, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2018); see also Siguenza v. Moniz, 2025 WL 2734704, at *3 (D. Mass. Sept. 25, 2025) (“Most courts to consider the issue have concluded that the Zadvydas period is cumulative, motivated, in part, by a concern that the federal government could otherwise detain noncitizens indefinitely by continuously releasing and re-detaining them.”). Finding the presumptive period resets with each detention would allow the Government to circumvent basic due process protections, the reasonable foreseeability requirement under Zadvydas, and federal regulations. Here, Respondents have detained Petitioner for a total of 11.5 months since his final order of removal on June 17, 2024, well beyond six months. Thus, they have lost the benefit of the Zadvydas presumption. This Court has found there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, therefore, Petitioner has met his burden. As a result, Respondents must produce evidence rebutting Petitioner’s showing for his continued detention to be lawful. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. However, Respondents provide no credible evidence that removal is reasonably foreseeable. Respondents have had nearly 18 months to effectuate Petitioner’s removal while he was in ICE detention or under an order of supervision awaiting removal. Respondents do not provide an explanation as to why removal was not effectuated last year but is now both possible and “imminent.” A request for travel documents within the Government does not meaningfully move Petitioner’s case toward removal. See id. (finding indefinite immigration detention is unlawful and “for detention to remain reasonable, as the period of . . . confinement grows, what counts as the ‘reasonably foreseeable future’ conversely would have to shrink.”). In sum, the Court finds that Petitioner’s removal is not reasonably foreseeable and his continued detention is unlawful. iii. Third-Country Removal Finally, Petitioner argues ICE’s new policies and procedures related to third-country removal are unlawful and he may be subjected to such removal. (ECF No. 1 at 3–6, 14–16.) Respondents do not address these arguments and do not provide assurances that they are not seeking third-country removal for Petitioner. (See ECF No. 12.) Third-country removals involve deportation to countries that are not identified in a final removal order and to which the non-citizen has no connection. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2)(E)(vii). ICE’s July 9, 2025 guidance on this issue provides that if the United States has received credible diplomatic assurances from a target third country that the non-citizen will not be persecuted or tortured, then they may be removed “without the need for further procedures.” Vu, 2025 WL 3114341, at *8 (quoting ICE July 9, 2025 third-party removal policy) (emphasis added). Where diplomatic assurances are not secured, ICE will provide notice to the non-citizen, but removal could occur within as little as six hours and ICE “will not affirmatively ask whether the [non- citizen] is afraid of being removed to the country of removal.” Id. If ICE follows this policy for Petitioner’s removal, he would have no meaningful opportunity to seek relief in any court before he is removed to a third country. See id. Numerous courts in this Circuit have held that ICE’s third-country removal policy is unconstitutional and this Court agrees with those well-reasoned decisions. See, e.g., Vu, 2025 WL 3114341, at *9; Scott, 2025 WL 2419288, at *18–23; Zakzouk v. Becerra, No. 25-cv-06254- KAW, 2025 WL 2899220, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2025); Baltodano v. Bondi, No. C25- 1958RSL, 2025 WL 2987766, at *2–3 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 23, 2025). “The Fifth Amendment guarantees due process in deportation proceedings.” Torres-Aguilar v. I.N.S., 246 F.3d 1267, 1270 (9th Cir. 2001). “Failing to notify individuals who are subject to deportation that they have the right to apply for asylum in the United States and for withholding of deportation to the country to which they will be deported violates the constitutional right to due process.” Andriasian v. I.N.S., 180 F.3d 1033, 1041 (9th Cir. 1999). “In the context of country of removal designations, last minute orders of removal to a country may violate due process if an immigrant was not provided an opportunity to address his fear of persecution in that country.” Nguyen v. Scott, No. 2:25-cv-01398, 2025 WL 2419288, at *18 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 21, 2025) (quoting Najjar v. Lynch, 630 Fed. App’x 724 (9th Cir. 2016)). Thus, Petitioner is likely to succeed on the merits of his third-country removal claim. B. Irreparable Harm The Ninth Circuit has recognized that there may be numerous “irreparable harms imposed on anyone subject to immigration detention,” such as “subpar medical and psychiatric care in ICE detention facilities [and] the economic burdens imposed on detainees and their families as a result of detention.” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 999 (9th Cir. 2017). Petitioner has been in ICE custody for a total of 11.5 months awaiting removal. (ECF No. 1 at 2–3.) Respondents argue that Petitioner has not suffered irreparable harm because his current detention period has not yet reached six months and such a period of detention is “appropriate where removal is probable.” (ECF No. 12 at 4.) However, the Court has found that Petitioner’s removal is not reasonably foreseeable — in fact, it is not known to this Court whether Vietnam will ever issue travel documents for Petitioner. Therefore, Petitioner is being unlawfully detained and will be a risk indeterminate detention absent a preliminary injunction. Moreover, “[i]t is well established that the deprivation of constitutional rights ‘unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 994 (quoting Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012)). “When an alleged deprivation of a constitutional right is involved, most courts hold that no further showing of irreparable injury is necessary.” Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 1001–02 (9th Cir. 2005). In addition to harms imposed by lengthy immigration detention, Petitioner has shown he is likely to succeed on the merits of his constitutional claims. Thus, the Court finds Petitioner has suffered irreparable harm. C. Balance of Equities and Public Interest As to the final two Winter factors, “[w]hen the government is a party, the analysis of the balance of the hardships and the public interest merge.” Nat’l Urban League v. Ross, 484 F. Supp. 3d 802, 807 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (citing Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 1073, 1092 (9th Cir. 2014)). Respondents “cannot reasonably assert that [they are] harmed in any legally cognizable sense by being enjoined from constitutional violations.” Zepeda v. U.S. I.N.S., 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F. 3d 1127, 1145 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[The government] cannot suffer harm from an injunction that merely ends an unlawful practice[.]”). The public also has a strong interest in ensuring its government follows the law and the Ninth Circuit has recognized that the “costs to the public of immigration detention are staggering[.]” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 996 (9th Cir. 2017); see also Index Newspapers LLC v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 977 F.3d 817, 838 (9th Cir. 2020) (“It is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s constitutional rights.”) As discussed above, Petitioner has shown he is likely to succeed in proving that Respondents have violated federal laws depriving him of his constitutional rights and his liberty. Additionally, Respondents are not harmed by their sworn duty to follow the law. See Zepeda, 753 F.2d at 727. Thus, the balance of equities and public interest factors weigh in Petitioner’s favor. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s motion and issues the preliminary injunction set forth below. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 1. Petitioner’s motion for injunctive relief (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED. 2. To return to the status quo ante, Respondents must IMMEDIATELY RELEASE Petitioner under the same conditions he was released previously on his December 2024 order of supervision. See Yang v. Kaiser, No. 2:25-cv-02205-DAD-AC, 2025 WL 2791778, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2025) (status quo ante is “the last uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.”). Respondents must file a notice certifying compliance with this provision of the Court’s Order by December 5, 2025. 3. Respondents are ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from re-detaining Petitioner unless they obtain a travel document for his removal to Vietnam and until they follow all procedures set forth in 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4(l), 241.13(i), and any other applicable statutory and regulatory procedures. 4. Respondents are ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from removing Petitioner to any country other than Vietnam, unless they provide the following process: a. written notice to both Petitioner and Petitioner’s counsel in a language Petitioner can understand; b. following the notice, Petitioner must be provided a meaningful opportunity, and a minimum of ten days, to raise a fear-based claim for protection under the Convention Against Torture prior to removal; c. if Petitioner is found to have demonstrated “reasonable fear” of removal to the designated country, Respondents must move to reopen Petitioner’s immigration proceedings; d. if Petitioner is not found to have demonstrated a “reasonable fear” of removal to the country, Respondents must afford Petitioner a meaningful opportunity, and a minimum of fifteen days, to seek to reopen his immigration proceedings. 5. The bond requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) is waived. See Diaz v. Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008, 1015 (9th Cir. 2011). Courts regularly waive security in cases like this one. See, e.g., Zakzouk v. Becerra, No. 25-cv-06254, 2025 WL 2899220, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2025). 6. This matter is referred to the United States Magistrate Judge for further proceedings. Date: December 4, 2025 7, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE