Hillard v. Fisher Book Typewriter

159 F. 439, 86 C.C.A. 469, 1908 U.S. App. LEXIS 4093
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
DecidedJanuary 7, 1908
DocketNo. 88
StatusPublished
Cited by28 cases

This text of 159 F. 439 (Hillard v. Fisher Book Typewriter) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hillard v. Fisher Book Typewriter, 159 F. 439, 86 C.C.A. 469, 1908 U.S. App. LEXIS 4093 (2d Cir. 1908).

Opinion

COXE, Circuit Judge.

This is an infringement action founded on letters patent granted to the complainant for improvements in typewriter escapements. We do not understand that the defendants deny patentability, the defense, briefly stated, being that if the claims are construed in accordance with the statements of the specification and file wrapper, they are not infringed, and, on the other hand, if a construction broad enough to cover the defendants’ machines is placed upon the claims, they are for functions only and are anticipated by complainant’s prior patent and by the prior art. The patent deals with the most minute details and is exceedingly voluminous, containing 12 pages 8% inches long and 5% inches wide of description and claims and 4 pages of drawings, containing 20 figures. To attempt to describe the invention in detail would serve no useful purpose as the questions involved are of little general interest and are already thoroughly understood by the parties to this action. Should others [440]*440wish to familiarize themselves with the intricacies of the patent they will find its essential features, together with the claims involved, quoted in the opinion of the judge of the Circuit Court.

The main objects of the invention were to attain a uniform and certain feed at high speed by controlling the moment of release of the paper platen to avoid blurring caused by the movement of the paper at the instant of printing, and to secure an escapement which polishes its contacting surfaces. The invention covered by the claims in controversy “comprises, broadly, means for bringing the carriage-propelling power into action with the key while the key is depressed and for thereby employing the force of the propelling power to aid in lifting the key and re-engaging the disengaged members in the escapement and in restoring the printing member to normal position synchronously and in unison with the feed of the paper-carriage.” The gist of the invention is the employment of the mainspring, which had previously been used to move the paper-carriage only, to move the escapement rocker and key levers back to their normal positions, after the finger key is depressed by the stroke of the operator; thus insuring greater speed, accuracy and neatness in printing. The inventor says:

“My theory was that if X could arrest that depression (pushing the keys down too far) after the blow on the key had started the type bar to the printing cylinder with sufficient force so that its own momentum would cause it to complete its excursion to the cylinder, even after the depression of the key had been arrested, that then all the advantages of the reversed escapement could be utilized without incurring the defect in blurring.”

His improvement which he called “a repulser” on Webb’s reversed escapement (patented in No. 577,982) remedied, but did not cure the existing defects, and subsequently he succeeded in producing an escapement, designed to remedy some of these defects, which is covered by his patent No. 554,874.

The patent in suit, which, as we have seen, utilizes the mainspring to return the moving parts to their position of rest and relieves the key of its heavy action, was, as he says, “the culminating point” of his work up to that time. It is true that this use of the mainspring may be shown in the first four figures of No. 554,874, but it is not covered by the claims of that patent which are confined to the two features which the patentee regarded as the essence of his invention —the buckle-joint and the cam for camming the carriage back. The feature which gives vitality to the patent in suit was expressly carved’ out óf No. 554,874 and reserved for patenting in No. 580,281. The specification expressly says so. On page 8 at line 6 are these words:

“I do not in tbis specification make any claim specifically to tbe mechanism shown in Figs. 1 to 4 and 9 and '10, nor to any swinging-rack form of escapement * * * and tbe swinging-rack form is merely shown herein to present adequately the full scope of my invention. I claim these forms in my other application for typewriter escapements filed January 9, 1893” — the application for the patent in suit..

The patent is thus clearly within the protection of the rule followed by this court in Thomson-Houston Co. v. Elmira Co., 71 Fed. 396, 404, 18 C. C. A. 145.

[441]*441The patent granted to Arthur W. Cash December 30, 1902, is also relied on by the defendants. The application was filed September 1, 1880, 16 years and 3 months before the patent was granted. It is important, therefore, that the examination of what Cash accomplished should be restricted to a period anterior to January 9, 1893, the date of Hillard’suapplication. It is argued that Cash described a reversed escápeme* in which there can be no effective repulsion of the key by the mainspring because the rack rests upon the unsupported limber dog when the key is depressed. The Circuit Court so found and held that the Cash patent when limited to the original application did not disclose the Hillard invention. We incline to the opinion that this finding is correct, but even were it doubtful it would not aid the defendants. Statements in a prior application relied on to prove anticipation must he so clear and explicit that those skilled in the art will have no difficulty in ascertaining their meaning. • Where they are so vague, involved, intricate and contradictory that experts disagree radically as to their meaning and, following the instructions given, construct devices differing in fundamental features, it is safe to reject such a document as an anticipation. The question is — did Cash, prior to January 1893, invent a machine embodying1 the improvement of the Hillard claims in suit? We are, on this proof, unable to answer this question in the affirmative.

The same observation is applicable to the Hammond machines in evidence. Although it is argued by the defendants that the feature of which anticipation is predicated is present in the machine, it is admitted by their expert that it is not found in the specification. He says:

“I do not find in the specification of the said Hammond patent any reference to the said positive repulsion of the dog.”

Assuming Hillard’s improvement to be present in the machines in evidence, it is difficult to believe that Hammond had an intelligent conception of the invention and failed to make the slightest allusion to it in his patent. If the new function existed in the machines made under the patent, and this is vehemently disputed, it was accidental, unrecognized by the patentee and no disclosure thereof made to the public. Mr. Justice Bradley says:

“If the acids wore accidently and unwittingly produced, whilst: the operators were in pursuit of other and different results, without exciting attention and without its even being known what was done or how it was done, it would be absurd to say that this was an anticipation of Tilghman’s discovery.” Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U. S. 707, 711 (26 L. Ed. 270).

It is unnecessary to pursue the subject further as we agree with the judge of the Circuit Court that Hillard has made an invention of rather more than ordinary merit which has very materially improved the work of the typewriter, increased its speed and enhanced the neatness and accuracy of its work.

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Bluebook (online)
159 F. 439, 86 C.C.A. 469, 1908 U.S. App. LEXIS 4093, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hillard-v-fisher-book-typewriter-ca2-1908.