Lenk v. Hunt-Lasher Co.

14 F.2d 335, 1926 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1327
CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedAugust 2, 1926
DocketNo. 2472
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 14 F.2d 335 (Lenk v. Hunt-Lasher Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Lenk v. Hunt-Lasher Co., 14 F.2d 335, 1926 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1327 (D. Mass. 1926).

Opinion

BREWSTER, District Judge.

This is a suit for infringement of claims 6, 14,15, and 16 of letters patent No. 1,551,069, issued to the plaintiff, as assignee of one Stanley Stanczyk, for an improvement in automatic blow torches, in which alcohol is used as a fuel, and [336]*336which are adapted for use by jewelers, electricians, and others, for soldering and brazing. The blow torch consists of a flame cylinder and a pressure-producing cylinder, both adapted to contain the fuel. At the upper end of the flame cylinder is inserted a wick plug, with feeder wick depending therefrom, designed to provide a flame area, and at the same time to obviate any leakage when the torch is tipped. The pressure or blast cylinder is shorter than the flame cylinder. Into this cylinder is introduced a jet tube, which goes nearly to the bottom of the cylinder. The upper end of the tube is curved in such a manner that it normally overhangs the plug wick in the flame cylinder. In this tube is a wick, twisted about a copper wire; the wick and wire extending to the lower end of the blast chamber. The two cylinders are joined in an adjustable manner by means of a clamp. In operation the plug wick is ignited, and the heat from the flame fe applied to the jet tube, and transmitted to the alcohol in the blast chamber, causing vaporization therein, and producing a pressure of gas which, when forced through the small opening at the end of the jet tube and across the flame, gives a needle-pointed flame which the operator can use in soldering or brazing.

Claims 6 and 15 are sufficiently illustrative of the alleged patentable novelty claimed for the torch. They are as follows:

“6. In a blow torch of the class described, comprising a flame cylinder and a blast cylinder operably connected in an adjustable manner; a tube in said blast cylinder having an externally extended curved portion; a feed wick in said tube; and a heat transmitting medium in said tube.”

“15. In a blow torch of the class described, a lamp comprising a fuel receptacle; a permeable plug in said receptacle composed of absorbent material adapted to present a flame area at the exposed portion thereof; and held therein under compression whereby an effective barrier to free leakage of fuel is provided; a feed wick depending from said plug adapted to feed fuel to said flame area; and means coaeting with said lamp adapted to create a gaseous blast.”

The plaintiff has manufactured and sold to the trade á considerable number of the patented blow torches.

The defendant is manufacturing and selling an automatic blow torch, known as “Self-blo,” which in external appearance is nearly an exact copy of plaintiff’s torch, and in its structure it differs only in two or three particulars, but the defendant contends that these departures are sufficient to enable it to maintain its defense of noninfringement. This contention demands a comparison between the so-called “plug wick” in plaintiff’s torch and that in defendant’s. Plaintiff’s wick plug is a short piece of large cylindrical wieking, with a braided jacket through which is drawn a double strand of ordinary wieking as a feeder wick. Defendant’s is made by folding a long piece of strand wieking into a cylindrical wad and compressing this into the lamp cylinder, leaving one end of the strand hanging from the bunch to form the feeder wick. In my opinion the language of claim 15 of plaintiff’s patent covers the plug wick made and used by the defendant. I agree with the plaintiff that this difference in mode of making and assembling, involving no difference in function or relationship, is in law no difference at all. The other point of difference lies in the manner of constructing the pressure-producing member. Defendant’s jet tube does not extend below the top of the blast cylinder, and, as originally sold by the manufacturer, no heat-eondueting wire is inserted in the tube. But each torch sold is accompanied by printed instructions to users to “insert two ordinary pipe cleaners in the tube” in place of the wireless wick, when that wick becomes charred. In these pipe cleaners is a metal center, which, while not as efficacious as the copper wire used by the plaintiff, nevertheless embodies the same principle, and, when used, clearly infringes claim 6 of the patent. On these facts the patentee is entitled to invoke two well-established principles of patent law. As to claims 14,15, and 16, he may invoke the doctrine of “equivalents.” Imhaeuser v. Buerk, 101 U. S. 647, 25 L. Ed. 945; Duff Mfg. Co. v. Forgie, 59 F. 772, 8 C. C. A. 261; Hardison v. Brinkman, 156 F. 962, 87 C. C. A. 8; Gill v. Wells, 89 U. S. (22 Wall.) 1, 22 L. Ed. 699; Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co. v. Starrett Co. (D. C.) 225 F. 997.

In Manton-Gaulin Mfg. Co. v. Dairy Machinery & Construction Co., Inc. (D. C.) 238 F. 210, it was said that infringement was not avoided by joining two elements in a patented machine into one integral part, accomplishing the purpose of both, and no more, so long as the same results are accomplished.

The plaintiff, as to claim 6, may also rely upon the doctrine of contributory .infringement. Canda v. Michigan Malleable Iron Co., 124 F. 486, 61 C. C. A. 194; Jockmus v. W. W. Gale & Co., Inc. (D. C.) 295 F. 208; Goodyear Shoe Machinery Co. v. Jackson, 112 F. 146, 50 C. C. A. 159, 55 L. R. A. 692.

[337]*337On the evidence, I find that the substitution of pipe cleaners for the regular wicks was actually made by the user, and the intent on the part of the defendant to assist in this infringement is clearly shown. Such contributory infringement has long been recognized as ground for injunctive relief. Wallace v. Holmes, Fed. Cas. No. 17,100, 9 Blatchf. 65; Thomson-Houston v. Kelsey, 75 F. 1005, 22 C. C. A. 1; Electro Bleaching Gas Co. v. Paradon Engineering Co., Inc. (C. C. A.) 12 F.(2d) 511.

It follows, therefore, that the plaintiff must prevail in this suit, unless the patent be declared invalid on one or more of the grounds urged against its validity in defendant’s answer. The grant of the monopoly to plaintiff to manufacture and sell the device carries with the patent a presumption of its validity. Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co. v. Formica Insulation Co., 266 U. S. 342, 45 S. Ct. 117, 69 L. Ed. 316.

The defendant has undertaken to overcome this presumption by offering evidence tending to show:

First, that, if the torch possesses patentable novelty, plaintiff’s assignor, Stanczyk, was not the one who first made the discovery;

Second, that the device is anticipated in the prior patented art. The defendant also contends that the patent is void for want of invention.

Taking up these defenses in order, a proper consideration of the question of priority of discovery necessitates at least a brief review of the events leading up to the issuance of the patent in suit, as I gather them from the evidence offered by both plaintiff and defendant, which evidence is not wholly free from eonfiiet.

Lasher, president of the defendant corporation, was, up to June, 1921, associated with the plaintiff in the manufacture of mouth blow torches, known to the trade as the “Supreme” torch.

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Bluebook (online)
14 F.2d 335, 1926 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1327, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/lenk-v-hunt-lasher-co-mad-1926.