MURPHY, Chief Judge.
In the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Kevin Wilson, appellee, filed a medical malpractice action against Dr. Hugh Hill and Emergency Associates, Inc., appellants.1 A jury [476]*476(Hon. Thomas Noel presiding) returned a verdict in favor of appellee, and appellants now present the following questions for our review:
I. Did the trial court err in permitting impeachment testimony by Dr. Hill regarding Dr. Hill’s lectures and writings related to risk management and did the trial court err by denying a new trial on that basis?
II. Did the trial court err by excluding testimony of appellants’ expert witness, Dr. Orlando, regarding appellee’s broken chair, because the trial court erroneously determined that the matter had not been discussed in Dr. Orlando’s deposition, and did the trial court err by denying appellants’ motion for a new trial?
III. Did the trial court err by failing to grant appellants’ motion for summary judgment regarding appellee’s contributory negligence, and did it further err by denying appellants’ motion for judgment, motion for a new trial and judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the issue?
IV. Did the trial court err by giving a jury instruction regarding the patient’s ability to rely on statements by a doctor that were not a complete statement of the law, because it did not state that a patient’s reliance must be reasonable and justified in order for a patient to satisfy his obligation to exercise reasonable care in safeguarding his own health and safety?
For the reasons that follow, we shall answer “no” to each question and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
Factual Background
Appellee has been paralyzed from the waist down since 1987. On August 30, 1994, he went to the emergency room at Good Samaritan Hospital, complaining of nausea, cloudy urine, and an ulcer on his lower back. Dr. Hill was his emergency room physician. According to appellee, Dr. Hill did not [477]*477inquire about the duration or history of the ulcer, did not “manually palpate or otherwise touch the ulcer,” and made an incorrect diagnosis on the basis of an inadequate examination. Appellee testified that Dr. Hill merely lifted the bandage that appellee had placed on the ulcer at home, glanced at the sore and placed the bandage back on, commenting to appellee that the ulcer was “not your problem.”
Dr. Hill had no independent recollection of appellee’s visit, and his testimony was based on the notes he wrote on appellee’s chart at that time. According to Dr. Hill, his examination revealed that appellee had a “large sacral ulcer without surrounding erythema,” and he diagnosed appellee as suffering from a urinary tract infection. He prescribed antibiotics to last 10 days, and instructed appellee to (1) make an appointment with a plastic surgeon “when available” for treatment of the ulcer, (2) obtain a reculture of the urine in two weeks, and (3) “see your doctor if worse.” Even though appellee’s record contained no express reference to what kind of examination was performed, Dr. Hill testified that he performed a complete evaluation of appellee because his standard practice is to perform such an evaluation.
Appellee testified that he followed Dr. Hill’s advice. When he got home, he made an appointment with a plastic surgeon, Dr. Orlando, whose first available appointment was two weeks away. He also took the prescribed medicine and cleaned and dressed the ulcer every day. Approximately a week after his emergency room visit,2 appellee noticed that an unusual odor was coming from the ulcer.3 He returned to the hospital on September 14,1994.
[478]*478Upon his arrival, appellee was diagnosed as suffering from a severe infection,4 and was then admitted. Due to complications from the infection, above the knee amputations had to be performed on both of appellee’s legs.
Discussion
I. Impeachment of Dr. Hill
Appellants assert that Judge Noel erred in allowing appellee’s counsel to cross-examine Dr. Hill about certain of his writings and lectures.5 Dr. Hill is the author of a chapter, in a risk management manual for doctors, and has also lectured on how emergency room medical charts should be prepared and documented from a “risk management or a legal perspective.” Appellants filed a Motion in Limine to prohibit the admission of these materials, asserting that the materials were (1) not relevant, and (2) prejudicial to appellants’ case. Judge Noel concluded that the materials would be admissible for impeachment purposes, and perhaps on the issue of appellee’s contributory negligence, but could not to be used to prove that Dr. Hill breached the standard of care in his treatment of appellee.
During Dr. Hill’s cross-examination, several bench conferences took place, the first occurring when Dr. Hill was being cross-examined with respect to his medical credentials. Judge Noel concluded that (1) he was going to deal with the issues raised by the materials on a question to question basis, and (2) appellee’s counsel could inquire about the contents of the [479]*479writings. Appellee’s counsel could not, however, use the writings to establish the requisite standard of care, and could not inform the jury that the writings were primarily directed at the goal of avoiding lawsuits.
Counsel for appellee also used the materials to question Dr. Hill on the issue of contributory negligence.6 In the materials, Dr. Hill had commented that directions to the patient to see your physician for follow-up “as necessary” or “as worse” were insufficient because of a lack of understanding by the patient as to the specific time frame. Because of the notes that Dr. Hill made in appellee’s chart, Judge Noel allowed Dr. Hill to be questioned on the apparent inconsistency between what he had documented and what he had advised others to document. Judge Noel explained:
I cannot let this jury not hear this examination. I think it would be patently unfair to just say that it was written based upon a theory of risk management; therefore, the jury should not hear it. If for no other bottom line reason is that it would demonstrate the defendant’s knowledge in this area alone. And on that basis alone, I think it becomes admissible ... Also, when someone writes something in an area, I think it only fair that they be held accountable to what they write. Now, if [counsel for appellants] wants to have this jury advised of the purpose of the writing, its intent, the fact that it was written for risk management, and have your client or witness explain it, you can do so. If you prefer the jury not hear anything about the distinction between risk management and standard of care, then I can advise counsel not to delve into that area. But I don’t see that once someone writes something that they can say, ‘Well, I am not going to have a trier of fact be privy to my writings because I wrote it with a different intent in my mind.’ It is the doctor’s owm writing, and I [480]*480think it only appropriate that he be permitted to be cross-examined on what he has written.
(Emphasis added).
We agree with that analysis. During her closing argument, counsel for appellee stated:
Frankly, what I really think Dr. Hill is saying is that he hopes he gave more elaborate discharge instructions than what are written on this record because that is what he should have done. He testified, you’ll remember, that he gives lectures and talks to other doctors, and what he tells them is that no patient understands the instruction, ‘see your doctor if worse,’ or ‘see your doctor if not better.’ He tells them that discharge instructions must be time and action specific, and he tells them that they should document these time and action specific instructions. But though he tells other doctors that no patient can be expected to understand instructions of the type he gave in this case, he asks you to impose that expectation on Mr. Wilson.
There is nothing unfair in that argument.
Appellants claim that the materials were not relevant. Relevant evidence is “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or-less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Md.Rule 5-401. The materials were relevant to the issue of credibility.
A witness generally may be cross-examined on any matter relevant to the issues, and the witness’s credibility is always relevant.
DeLilly v. State, 11 Md.App. 676, 681, 276 A.2d 417 (1971). The DeLilly Court went on to state that it is proper to allow “any question which reasonably tends to explain, contradict, or discredit any testimony given by the witness in chief, or which tends to test his accuracy, memory, veracity, character or credibility.” Id. Furthermore, the “scope, range and extent of such interrogation rests in the sound discretion of the trial court.” Kruszewski v. Holz, 265 Md. 434, 440, 290 A.2d 534 (1972) (citing Shupe v. State, 238 Md. 307, 311, 208 A.2d 590 [481]*481(1965)). We “will only reverse upon finding that the trial judge’s determination was ‘both manifestly wrong and substantially injurious.’ ” Lomax v. Comptroller of Treasury, 88 Md.App. 50, 54, 591 A.2d 1311 (1991) (internal citations omitted).
Judge Noel did not err or abuse his discretion in allowing Dr. Hill to be impeached by his own prior statements, as they were relevant to his credibility as a witness. Maryland law provides that
... upon the laying of a proper foundation ... the credit of a witness may be impeached by showing that he has made statements which contradict his testimony in respect to material facts.
Jenkins v. State, 14 Md.App. at 5, 285 A.2d 667. As Dr. Hill wrote the manual and lectured accordingly, there was nothing unfair about impeaching him with his own words.
II. The “Broken” Wheelchair Testimony
Dr. Orlando examined appellee on September 16, 1994. During that examination, Dr. Orlando noticed that several ulcers had developed at numerous locations on appellee’s body.7 During his deposition, Dr. Orlando opined that the infected ulcer that necessitated the amputations “developed from a bar which ran across the back of [appellee’s] wheelchair.” Dr. Orlando was prepared to testify at trial that appellee’s wheelchair was “broken.” Judge Noel ruled, however, that Dr. Orlando “may comment that the bar rubbed [appellee’s] back causing the lumbar ulcer [but could not opine] that the chair was broke.”
Appellants contend that Judge Noel should not have prohibited Dr. Orlando from testifying that appellee’s wheelchair was “broken.” They recognize the well established rule that a trial judge has the power to exclude trial testimony that constitutes a material departure from what the witness testi[482]*482fied to at deposition. They argue, however, that this rule does not apply to the “broken” wheelchair testimony because (1) appellee never filed a motion to compel discovery of the basis for Dr. Orlando’s opinions, and/or (2) although Dr. Orlando did not use the word “broken” during his deposition, “he did tell [appellee’s counsel] that the wheelchair was broken.” Judge Noel did not agree with those arguments. Neither do we.
Appellee’s interrogatories requested that appellants provide the factual basis for any contentions that “any act or omission of Kevin Wilson in any way contributed to the damages he now complains of in this action.” Appellants’ response asserted that appellee “caused and /or contributed to his alleged injuries by his failure to follow the instructions given to him by his physicians.” This answer was never supplemented to include a contention that appellee’s injuries were caused by a broken wheelchair.8 Appellees also propounded the following interrogatory to Dr. Hill:
Interrogatory No. 11: The Defendant is to state the name and professional address of each expert who may be called at the hearing and/or trial hereof, attaching to these Answers copies of each experts curriculum vitae, as well as copies of all reports received. Further, the Defendant is to indicate the specialty and/or subspecialty of each expert named. With respect to each and every expert named, the Defendant is to state in detail the subject matter on which each such witness will testify, the substance of the facts considered and opinions held by each such expert, and the ground/or basis for each opinion.
Dr. Hill answered that
[t]he naming of expert witnesses will be done in accordance with the Scheduling Order of this Court.
Thereafter Dr. Hill filed a DESIGNATION OF EXPERT WITNESSES in which he advised that
[483]*483Dr. Orlando is a plastic surgeon who is expected to provide factual testimony and offer opinions on causation. He is expected to testify that there were two separate wounds on Plaintiffs back, that the wounds were not connecting with one another and that the sacral ulcer present on 8/30/94 was not in the same location as the Stage V ulcer found in September, 1994. He will additionally opine that the second ulcer on the iliac crest could have developed between the period when the Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Hill on 8/30/94 and his presentation in September of 1994.
Rather than move for an order compelling discovery of the “ground and/or basis for” Dr. Orlando’s opinions, appellee noted Dr. Orlando’s deposition. During his discovery deposition, however, Dr. Orlando never testified that the wheelchair was “broken” or in poor condition.9
[484]*484Prior to the introduction of Dr. Orlando’s testimony, appel-lee’s counsel expressed concern that the doctor was going to testify to matters not raised in deposition or otherwise disclosed during discovery.10 This request for a ruling that would confine the witness to opinions expressed during his deposition was the functional equivalent of a motion to sanction appellants for their failure or refusal to provide discover[485]*485able information requested in Interrogatory No. II.11 “[I]t has long been recognized in Maryland that ‘substance rather than the form of the pleading is the controlling consideration.’ ” Payne v. Payne, 132 Md.App. 432, 439, 752 A.2d 1209 (2000), (citing Lapp v. Stanton, 116 Md. 197, 199, 81 A. 675 (1911))(internal citations omitted). During a bench conference on this issue, the following discussion took place:
[COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:] Your honor ... [counsel for appellants] intends to call Dr. Orlando. Dr. Orlando was named as an expert witness in this case, and his deposition was taken. [Counsel for appellants] has hinted that the testimony she expects to elicit from him on the witness stand is somewhat different and more expansive than the testimony he offered under oath at deposition. I have no idea what she is talking about. I object to that. And I think that it would violate fundamental rules of fairness as well as the rules of discovery....
[COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS:] I talked to Dr. Orlando. There are issues that will come to light at the witness stand that [counsel for appellee] frankly didn’t ask about. And I don’t think I’m obligated to say, “Hey. [Counsel for appel-lee], you forgot an issue.” He was specifically identified as a fact witness, and a witness to testify on causation, the evolution of decubitus ulcer....
THE COURT: [to counsel for appellee] Well, what is the area that you contend that we’ll [sic] be explored that was not dealt with in deposition?
[486]*486[COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:] I don’t know. Your Hon- or, that is my problem. I have no idea what it is except [counsel for appellants] has hinted very broadly that there will be additional different testimony other than that covered at deposition.....
THE COURT: [to counsel for appellants] Is there anything that he [Dr. Orlando] is going to talk about or try to talk about that he didn’t talk about in the deposition?
[COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS:] In a generic sense, he talked about it all in his deposition. He will expand— THE COURT: Well, in a specific sense, can you tell me the difference?
[COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS:] Well, I’ll tell you what he’ll say if that helps the Court and [counsel for appellee]. THE COURT: I’d like to know.
[COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS:] Okay. And that’s what I’ll do. He’s going to come in here. He’s going to tell exactly what happened to Kevin Wilson during that admission. He’s going to testify as to what he saw and what he did. He’ll testify to what calls he made to get additional assistance for him. He’s [sic] testify as to the evolution of a decubitus ulcer, how it goes from start to finish. He’ll testify that there were two ulcers on this gentleman’s low back, which is exactly what he said in his deposition. He’ll testify that the sacral ulcer was not infected. He’ll testify that they did not communicate with one another, and he’ll tell the jury why. He will testify that, in his opinion, the sacral ulcer was older than the lumbar ulcer. He will testify how the lumbar ulcer got to be there in the first place.
THE COURT: Were all these areas covered in the deposition?
[COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:] Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Well, let’s see what happens then instead of trying to go through this, and I’ll deal with it accordingly.
During Dr. Orlando’s direct examination, the following transpired when he used the word “broken” for the first time:
[487]*487[COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS:] Doctor, please, if you will, what I’d like you to do is express an opinion to a reasonable degree of medical probability as to what happened to Mr. Wilson....
[DR. ORLANDO:] ... his wheelchair was broken when I saw it on the 16th. There was no—
[COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:] Objection, Your Honor. Judge Noel ultimately ruled as follows:
“There will be no further testimony in this case whatsoever that the chair was broken.. .. [To Dr. Orlando:] You are not to make another reference or comment to the effect that the chair was broken. You may comment that the bar rubbed his back causing the lumbar ulcer. But you cannot say under any circumstances that the chair was broke.”
Judge Noel subsequently engaged in the following conversation with appellants’ counsel regarding the “broken” wheelchair theory:
THE COURT: Did you know that Dr. Orlando was going to offer testimony yesterday that the wheelchair was broken?
[COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS]: Did I know that the wheelchair was—
THE COURT: Yes.... Did you know yesterday [the date of the first bench conference quoted above] that Dr. Orlando was going to offer testimony that the wheelchair was broken?
[COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS]: Yes, I did.
THE COURT: When I asked you yesterday [at the first bench conference] to disclose to me if there was anything that he would testify to beyond that which was covered in the deposition, why didn’t you advise me of that then?
[COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS]: Because from my perspective, in reading his deposition, he did tell them that the wheelchair was broken. From my perspective, in reading the medical records, that information is readily available in the medical records. As a matter of fact, I recall [appellee’s counsel] asking a question of one of the experts as to [488]*488whether it’s important to look at the environmental factors such as whether or not there’s a problem with the wheelchair; I, in a million years, did not suspect that they did not know that fact. The man testified in his deposition that he was astounded. When he testified in his deposition, he explained to [appellee’s counsel] that the rod was rubbing into his back. That’s the point, that’s the only point that I wanted to make with that issue, not that he was somehow contributorily negligent.
THE COURT: My question again to you is did you know that he was going to say the wheelchair is broken, not that the rod was protruding into his back, but that the wheelchair was broken?
[COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS]: To me, that’s one in the same.
THE COURT: Did you know when I asked you if he was going to offer any testimony beyond that which was in the deposition, did you know then that he was going to offer testimony that the wheelchair was broken?
[COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS]: Yes. And that was the same testimony from my perspective that had been elicited during his deposition. If [appellee’s counsel] did not understand that concept when Dr. Orlando explained that the rod was going into his back, I’m sorry. I didn’t think in a million years that I needed to articulate that any better than Dr. Orlando did. I understood that.
THE COURT: I have listened to every portion of that deposition, I believe, that there was a statement relative to that wheelchair. And from my perspective, to say that there was a problem with the rod on the back of the wheelchair rubbing against his back does not connote that the wheelchair was broken. I don’t think that the average person would interpret the problem with the wheelchair was that there was a rod rubbing into his back to mean that it was broken. I think that that is a completely different topic, and I am most concerned about it.
[489]*489You know the integrity of this process is extremely important to me ...
[Appellants’ counsel], it seems to me that there could have been more candor to the Court in your disclosure when I asked the question. Because saying that there was a problem with the rod or that the rod rubbed against his back does not connote to me that something is broken. There may be many situations that would affect a person in a particular way, but it doesn’t say that something is broken. I think that’s really stretching the situation.
When the question is whether there is a material variance between what the witness testified to at deposition and what the witness will testify to at trial, the trial judge’s finding of fact will be affirmed on appeal unless the reviewing court is persuaded that the trial judge’s finding is clearly erroneous. We are not persuaded that Judge Noel was clearly erroneous in finding that Dr. Orlando’s deposition testimony about the condition of appellee’s wheelchair “does not connote that the wheelchair was broken.” When the question is whether the trial court selected an appropriate remedy for the type of discovery violation found in this case,12 the trial court’s remedy of choice will be affirmed on appeal unless the reviewing court is persuaded that the trial court abused its discretion. Colter v. State, 297 Md. 423, 426, 466 A.2d 1286 (1983). “Our review of the trial court’s resolution of a discovery dispute is quite narrow; appellate courts are reluctant to second-guess the decision of a trial judge to impose sanctions for a failure of discovery. Accordingly, we may not reverse unless we find an abuse of discretion.” Klupt v. Krongard, 126 Md.App. 179, 193, 728 A.2d 727, cert. denied, 355 Md. 612, 735 A.2d 1107 (1999).
[490]*490Having applied the abuse of discretion standard to the ruling at issue, we are persuaded that Judge Noel made a “reasoned decision based on the weighing of various alternatives.” Judge v. R and T Construction Co., 68 Md.App. 57, 60, 509 A.2d 1286 (1986), cert. denied, 307 Md. 433, 514 A.2d 1211 (1986). This is simply not a case in which “no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.” North v. North, 102 Md.App. 1, 13, 648 A.2d 1025 (1994). According to the Court of Appeals, for a discretionary ruling to be reversed,
[t]he decision under consideration has to be well removed from any center mark imagined by the reviewing court and beyond the fringe of what that court deems minimally acceptable.
In Re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. 295, 313, 701 A.2d 110 (1997) (quoting North, supra, 102 Md.App. at 14, 648 A.2d 1025). See also Metheny v. State, 359 Md. 576, 604, 755 A.2d 1088 (2000).
In this case, appellants were entitled to — and did— assert that a bar on the back of appellee’s wheelchair was the cause of a “second ulcer” that developed after appellee had been examined by Dr. Hill.13 Appellants’ expert witness was not prohibited from testifying at trial to everything that he had testified to in his deposition.14 We are persuaded that [491]*491appellants were not unfairly prejudiced by the ruling that prohibited Dr. Orlando from using a term that he had not used during his deposition.
III. Contributory Negligence
Appellants also assert that the trial court erred in failing to grant their motions for (1) summary judgment, (2) new trial, and (3) judgment notwithstanding the verdict, because appellee was contributorily negligent. Appellants contend that appellee was contributorily negligent “as a matter of law.” According to appellants, appellee “recognized that his condition had gotten dramatically worse and failed to return for further medical care despite his training and despite being given explicit instructions to return if his condition did get worse.” They were entitled to — and did — present that argument to the jury, but we agree with Judge Noel that appellants were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.15
[492]*492“Ordinarily, the question of whether a plaintiff was contributorily negligence or assumed the risk is one for the fact finder, not the court.” Campbell v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 73 Md.App. 54, 64, 533 A.2d 9 (1987), cert. denied, 311 Md. 719, 537 A.2d 273 (1988). The issue of contributory negligence is generally “for the jury as long as there is a conflict of evidence as to material facts relied on to establish contributory negligence, or more than one inference may be reasonably drawn therefrom.” Id. In order for appellee to be contributorily negligent as a matter of law
the evidence must show some prominent and decisive act which directly contributed to the accident and which was of such a character as to leave no room for difference of opinion thereon by reasonable minds.
Id. (Citing Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Flippo, 348 Md. 680, 703, 705 A.2d 1144 (1998); Reiser v. Abramson, 264 Md. 372, 378, 286 A.2d 91 (1972)).
Maryland “has adopted a very restrictive rule about taking cases from the jury in negligence actions.” Campbell v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 73 Md.App. 54, 62, 533 A.2d 9 (1987). In fact, Maryland case law suggests that submission to the jury was proper “if there be any evidence, however slight, legally sufficient as tending to prove negligence, and the weight and value of such evidence will be left to the jury.” Id. at 62-63, 533 A.2d 9. Moreover, we must “give due consideration not only to all inferences of fact tending to support the opposite view, but also to the important presumption that [the plaintiff] exercised ordinary care for [his] safety.” Saponari v. CSX Transportation, 126 Md.App. 25, 37-38, 727 A.2d 396 (1999) (citing Pachmayr v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 157 Md. 256, 262, 145 A. 611 (1929)). This Court has also stated that “... even if the act done [by the plaintiff as claimed as his contributory negligent action] turns out to be an error of judgment, this alone does not make the act negligent if an ordinarily prudent person may have made the same error.” Faith v. Keefer, 127 Md.App. 706, 747, 736 A.2d 422, cert. denied, 357 Md. 191, 742 A.2d 521 (1999) (citing Sanders v. Williams, 209 Md. 149, 120 A.2d 397 (1956)).
[493]*493In support of their contention that appellee’s failure to go back to the hospital or seek medical attention during the two week period between when Dr. Hill saw him and his admittance to the hospital was something that “a person of ordinary prudence would [not] do under the circumstances,” appellants rely upon cases that are readily distinguishable on their facts. For example, in Chudson v. Ratra, 76 Md.App. 753, 548 A.2d 172, cert. denied, 314 Md. 628, 552 A.2d 894 (1989), the plaintiff was also told by her doctor to see him again if her condition got worse, and she noticed changes in her medical condition between the time of her appointment with her doctor and when she ultimately sought treatment. The lapse of time in that case, however, was over one year rather than two weeks. In the present case, appellee’s failure to go to the hospital one week before his next scheduled appointment does not establish that he was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Reasonable minds could differ on the level of understanding of the instructions given to appellee by Dr. Hill as well as on the time frame of his worsened condition.
Moreover, there are other material facts in serious dispute. Appellants claim that appellee had several different ulcers on his back, and that he contributed to his own condition by waiting a week to seek medical care. On the other hand, appellee asserts that his infection was caused by the one ulcer he had as of his first visit, and that his legs would not have been amputated if Dr. Hill had not breached the standard of care. Giving due consideration to the facts tending to “support the opposite view,” we are persuaded that appellee was not contributorily negligent as a “matter of law.” Thus, Judge Noel’s decision to deny summary judgment was “legally correct.”
Similarly, Judge Noel did not err in denying appellants’ Motions for Judgment and Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict “tests the legal sufficiency of the evidence and is reviewed under the same standard as a motion for judgment made during trial.” Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Tufts, 118 Md.App. 180, 190, 702 A.2d 422 (1997), cert. denied, 349 Md. [494]*494104, 707 A.2d 89 (1998) (citing Houston v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 109 Md.App. 177, 182-3, 674 A.2d 87 (1996), rav’d on other grounds, 346 Md. 503, 697 A.2d 851 (1997)). Therefore, the appropriate standard of review is: “If there exists any legally competent evidence, however slight, from which the jury could have found as it did, we must affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion.” Id. at 191, 674 A.2d 87 (internal citations omitted). On review, we are to “assume the truth of all credible evidence and all inferences of fact reasonably deductible from the evidence supporting the party opposing the motion.” Id. at 190, 674 A.2d 87. We hold that there was “legally competent evidence from which the jury could have found as it did.” Assuming the truth of the evidence from the position of appellee, there was “sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude as it did.”
We are also persuaded that Judge Noel did not err or abuse his discretion in denying appellants’ Motion for a New Trial. “The question whether to grant a new trial is within the discretion of the trial court.” Aron v. Brock, 118 Md.App. 475, 511, 703 A.2d 208, cert. denied, 346 Md. 629, 697 A.2d 913 (1997) (citing Buck v. Cam’s Broadloom Rugs, Inc., 328 Md. 51, 612 A.2d 1294 (1992)(internal citations omitted)). The nature of Judge Noel’s discretion on whether to grant appellants’ motion was “the broadest range” of discretion:
The emphasis has consistently been upon granting the broadest range of discretion ... whenever the decision ... depended upon ... evaluation of the character of the testimony and of the trial when the judge is considering the core question of whether justice has been done.
Id. Judge Noel was the presiding judge at the trial, had the opportunity to evaluate both the credibility of the witnesses and the evidence, and was thus in the best position to decide whether “justice had been done.”
IV. Jury Instructions
Appellants contend that Judge Noel erred by giving an incomplete jury instruction involving appellee’s reliance on statements made by Dr. Hill. Appellee requested a specif[495]*495ic jury instruction based on this Court’s decision in Simmons v. Urquhart, 106 Md.App. 77, 664 A.2d 27 (1995). Judge Noel delivered the following instruction:
Now, in general, patients are entitled to rely on their physician’s advice. That reliance must be reasonable and justified. A patient is not in a position to diagnose his own ailments. As a consequence, it is not contributory negligence for a patient to follow a doctor’s instructions or rely on the doctor’s advice, to fail to consult another doctor, or to fail to diagnose his own illness.
Appellants objected to that instruction on the basis that it was incomplete in light of Simmons. Appellants’ counsel stated:
... I didn’t think it was complete. The case that she [appellee’s counsel] cites as the support for it actually had the words, “the reliance must be reasonable and justifiable in order for patients to satisfy their own obligations to exercise reasonable care in safeguarding their own health and safety.” And I would ask that that language be added.
Judge Noel noted and overruled that exception.
In DiLeo v. Nugent, 88 Md.App. 59, 592 A.2d 1126, cert. granted, 325 Md. 18, 599 A.2d 90 (1991), appeal dismissed, 327 Md. 627, 612 A.2d 257 (1992), the appellant contended that the trial court had erred in instructing the jury that
it is not contributory negligence for a patient to follow a doctor’s instructions or rely on his advice when that patient has no reason to suspect the doctor’s treatment or advice is the cause of the patient’s injury.
DiLeo, 88 Md.App. at 73, 592 A.2d 1126. This contention was rejected on the ground that “the instruction conforms precisely with Maryland law.” Id. Specifically, the DiLeo Court held:
fW]e have recognized in the past that a patient is not in a position to diagnose her own ailments, appreciate the risks of medication or evaluate whether the prescribed course of treatment is in her best interest. As a consequence, it is not contributory negligence for a patient to follow a doctor’s instructions or rely on the doctor’s advice, to fail to consult [496]*496another doctor when the patient has no reason to believe that- the doctor’s negligence has caused her injury, or to fail to diagnose her own illness.
Id. (Citing Santoni v. Moodie, 53 Md.App. 129, 138, 452 A.2d 1223 (1982), cert. denied, 295 Md. 527 (1983)).
In reviewing the adequacy of a specific jury instruction, we are required to ascertain whether the instruction “fairly and accurately set forth the law applicable to the case [and was] supported by testimony or evidence presented during the case.” Odenton Development Co. v. Lamy, 320 Md. 33, 43, 575 A.2d 1235 (1990). Maryland law provides that “a litigant is entitled to have his or her theory of the case presented to the jury if that theory is a correct exposition of the law and if there is evidence in the case which supports that theory.” Zeller v. Greater Baltimore Medical Center, 67 Md.App. 75, 80, 506 A.2d 646 (1986). The instruction given by Judge Noel also conformed with Maryland law. In reviewing whether Judge Noel was correct in denying appellants’ requested instruction, we must conduct a three part inquiry:
first, whether the requested instruction is a correct statement of the law, second, whether the law is applicable to the facts in the case, and third, whether the trial judge fairly covered with the same law by other instructions actually given.
Fearnow v. The Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Company of Maryland, 342 Md. 363, 385, 676 A.2d 65 (1996) (internal citations omitted). “If any one part of the test is not met, we will affirm the trial court’s denial of the request for instruction.” Id.
Maryland Rule 2-520(c) governs the manner in which jury instructions are to be given and provides:
The court may instruct the jury, orally or in writing or both, by granting requested instructions, by giving instructions of its own, or by combining any of these methods. The court need not grant a certain instruction if the matter is fairly covered by instructions already given.
[497]*497Md.Rule 2-520(c). Judge Noel’s instruction used the identical language that was sufficient in DiLeo, while adding the Simmons requirement “that [the patient’s] reliance must be reasonable and justified.” Therefore, the instruction at issue was a “correct statement of the law.” Moreover, because appellants’ trial counsel “could, and did, present the very arguments to the jury that [she] would have made had [the requested] instructions been given, the matter was fairly, and adequately, covered in the instructions actually given.” CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 343 Md. 216, 243, 680 A.2d 1082 (1996).
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED; COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANTS.
Dissenting Opinion by HOLLANDER, J.