Hill v. Riverside Church

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMay 9, 2023
Docket1:23-cv-00059
StatusUnknown

This text of Hill v. Riverside Church (Hill v. Riverside Church) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hill v. Riverside Church, (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK VIVIAN ANN HILL, Plaintiff, 23-CV-0059 (LTS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND RIVERSIDE CHURCH.ORG; REVEREND ADRIENE THORNE, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action alleging that on November 3, 2022, Defendants Riverside Church.org and the Reverend Adriene Thorne prevented her from voting. She asserts that her claims arise under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. By order dated January 10, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.

BACKGROUND The following facts are drawn from the complaint. On November 3, 2022, Plaintiff “proceeded to the former[ ] Citibank 111 Street and Broadway in Manhattan . . . to vote.”1 (ECF 2, at 4.) She noticed “voting sticker signs on the east side of the sidewalk that directed one to the exact location in order to cast a ballot to vote at said site.” (Id.) Plaintiff contends, however, that “this location was intentionally closed due to their most recent knowledge that I sought to vote there.” (Id.) Moreover, “[t]he Riverside staff that manned this voting location were aware of my

1 Election Day in 2022 was November 8. Either the complaint provides the wrong date, or Plaintiff attempted to cast her vote early. stance regarding GAY RIGHTS,” which Plaintiff “consider[s] [to be] . . . overkill.” (Id.) Plaintiff also contends that “Riverside Church is known and . . . professes that voting rights is a privilege; however, I was denied this right on November 3, 2022 by Riverside Church staff that manned this voting location.” (Id.) Plaintiff seeks $1,000,000 in damages. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff alleges that, on November 3, 2022, she was unable to vote at her polling station. She suggests that individuals at the polling station, who worked at Riverside Church in Manhattan, prevented her from voting because of her political views. Accordingly, the Court construes the complaint as asserting a claim, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that her fundamental right to vote was violated by staff at a polling station. To state a claim under Section 1983, Plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). It is well-established that “voting is of the most fundamental significance under our constitutional structure.” Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173,

184 (1979). Where a plaintiff alleges that an individual violated this fundamental right to vote, she first must show that the individual acted under color of state law because the Constitution regulates only government actors, not private parties. Fabrikant v. French, 691 F.3d 193, 206 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). A private entity’s activity can be attributed to the state if the state has delegated a public function to the entity. Id. at 207. For example, a poll watcher may be deemed a state actor “because . . . the poll-watcher’s function is to guard the integrity of the vote.” Tiryak v. Jordan, 472 F. Supp. 822, 824 (E.D. Pa. 1979). In Tiryak, the district court held that “[p]rotecting the purity of the electoral process is a state responsibility and the poll-watcher’s statutory role in providing that protection involves him in a public activity[.]” Id. Having concluded that “[n]o activity is more indelibly a public function than the holding of a political election,” the court in Tiryak determined that if a poll watcher’s “conduct is made possible by state election law, and if one sequela of their conduct is to further the purity of an exclusive state concern, [that is], elections, then their actions are for [Section] 1983 purposes properly attributable to the state.” Id. For these reasons, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

permitted the plaintiff in that case to proceed with his Section 1983 action: “Their conduct was made possible only because defendants were clothed with the authority of state law and a [Section] 1983 action is appropriate redress for the misuse of that power.” Id. at 824-25. Here, the complaint differs from Tiryak in two respects.

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
West v. Atkins
487 U.S. 42 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Fabrikant v. French
691 F.3d 193 (Second Circuit, 2012)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Tiryak v. Jordan
472 F. Supp. 822 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 1979)
Cuoco v. Moritsugu
222 F.3d 99 (Second Circuit, 2000)
Salahuddin v. Cuomo
861 F.2d 40 (Second Circuit, 1988)

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Bluebook (online)
Hill v. Riverside Church, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hill-v-riverside-church-nysd-2023.