Hill v. NYC Dept. of Health & Mental Hygiene

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided October 17, 2022·No. 1:22-cv-07203·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK VIVIAN HILL, Plaintiff, -against- 22-CV-7203 (LTS) NYC DEPT. OF HEALTH & MENTAL ORDER TO AMEND HYGIENE; MENTAL HYGIENE LEGAL SERVICES, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff Vivian Hill, who is appearing pro se, brings this action asserting claims against the Department of Health & Mental Hygiene of the City of New York (“DOHMH”)1 and New York State’s Mental Hygiene Legal Service (“MHLS”). She alleges that Defendants violated her rights in connection with an Assisted Outpatient Treatment (“AOT”) plan and during proceedings in which MHLS has represented her. Plaintiff seeks an emergency order barring DOHMH from enforcing her AOT plan and interacting with her. She also seeks an order barring MHLS from representing her as her attorney. Finally, she requests that the Court grant her application requesting the appointment of pro bono counsel in this action. By order dated August 24, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against MHLS under the Eleventh Amendment and grants Plaintiff 60 days to file an amended complaint against DOHMH. The Court also denies Plaintiff’s request

1 DOHMH has the capacity to be sued under the New York City Charter. See N.Y. City Charter ch. 22, § 564. for injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as her request for the appointment of pro bono counsel. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND The following allegations are drawn from the complaint.2 Since 2017, Defendants have

“illegally withheld Vivian Hill’s medical records . . . denying HIPAA and Patients Rights petitions[.]” (ECF 2, at 8.) Defendants also “maliciously denied discovery and prohibited Vivian an agent’s support and legal document rights . . . [which] precluded an adequate defense, getting able counsel, and prevented proper medical treatment and monitoring – adversely affecting Plaintiff’s health and welfare.” (Id.) She asserts that “defendant’s petitioners didn’t establish (a good/valid clinical or legal relationship) and never met the Plaintiff in the first instance.” (Id. at 9.) “At other times, attorneys amongst the defendants fraudulently alleged to represent Plaintiff without her permission – to the detriment and benefit of her adversaries.” (Id.) Plaintiff contends that she was “discriminated against and (retaliated) by the defendants for filing written complaints and seeking justice from racial discrimination based upon her being

Afro-American, elderly, and partially disabled.” (Id.) Plaintiff previously brought a similar complaint, alleging many of the same allegations. See Ann (Hill) v. Wiviott, ECF 1:21-CV-9210, 2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2022). The Court granted Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. See ECF 1:21-CV-9210, 6. Plaintiff did not file an amended pleading, and the Court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See ECF 1:21-CV-9210, 7.

2 All grammar, spelling and punctuation are as in the original. DISCUSSION A. Mental Hygiene Legal Service MHLS is “a state-funded legal services agency under the direction of the New York State Office of Court administration.” Fiske v. Letterman, 401 F. Supp.2d 362, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). “[A]s a general rule, state governments may not be sued in federal court unless they have waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity, or unless Congress has abrogated the states’ Eleventh

Amendment immunity[.]” Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 366 (2d Cir. 2009). “The immunity recognized by the Eleventh Amendment extends beyond the states themselves to state agents and state instrumentalities that are, effectively, arms of a state.” Id. New York has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit in federal court, and Congress did not abrogate the states’ immunity in enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm’n, 557 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1977). Eleventh Amendment immunity bars claims for monetary damages, injunctive relief, and retrospective declaratory relief. See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 72-74 (1985); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101-02 (1984). MHLS enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity from lawsuits because the Office of Court Administration “is an arm of

the state,” Posr v. Court Officer Shield No. 207, 180 F.3d 409, 414 (2d Cir. 1999).

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