Hill 068563 v. Arizona Department of Corrections

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: January 21, 2021
• Docket: 2:19-cv-05693
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO SC 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Isiah Romont Hill, No. CV 19-05693-PHX-JAT (MTM) 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER 12 Arizona Department of Corrections, et 13 al., 14 Defendants.

15 I. Procedural Background 16 On August 20, 2019, Plaintiff Isiah Romont Hill, who is in the custody of the 17 Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC), filed a “State Court Complaint” in Maricopa 18 County Superior Court case #CV 2019-004926 against several Defendants, including 19 ADC. (Doc. 1-3 at 3-6.)1 In his Complaint, Plaintiff asserted violations of his First through 20 Fourteenth Amendment rights allegedly stemming from the use of excessive force and 21 restrictions on seeing one of his children. The State of Arizona was served on October 30, 22 2019.2 On November 27, 2019, the State and ADC removed the case to this Court based 23 upon federal question subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. 1.) 24 On December 5, 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion to strike the notice of removal 25

26 1 The citation refers to the document and page number generated by the Court’s 27 Case Management/Electronic Case Filing system. 28 2 Although the State of Arizona was not a named Defendant, it was served with the Complaint and has noted that, to the extent Plaintiff seeks relief against ADC, the State is the real party in interest. 1 (Doc. 4), which the Court construed as a motion to remand to state court. On December 9, 2 2019, Plaintiff filed two notices (Docs. 5 and 6). On December 12, 2019, Defendants filed 3 a response to Plaintiff’s motion to strike (Doc. 7). On December 18, 2019, Plaintiff filed 4 a motion to proceed (Doc. 8) and a motion to suppress (Doc. 9). On January 2, 2020, 5 Plaintiff filed an objection to Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) review (Doc. 10) and 6 another notice (Doc. 11). On January 8, 2020, Plaintiff filed a motion to stay (Doc. 12), 7 and on January 14, 2020, he filed a motion for ruling on his motion to suppress (Doc. 13). 8 In a January 28, 2020 Order, the Court overruled Plaintiff’s objection to PLRA 9 review of his Complaint,3 denied his notices to the extent that any relief was sought and 10 denied his motions (Doc. 14). The Court also dismissed the Complaint with leave to file a 11 first amended complaint on the court-approved form within 30 days.4 (Id.) 12 On February 3, 2020—apparently before he had received the Court’s January 28, 13 2020 Order—Plaintiff filed a motion for the status of his motion to suppress (Doc. 15). In 14 a February 5, 2020 Order (Doc. 16), the Court granted the motion for status to the extent 15 the February 5 Order informed him of the status of this action and his motion to suppress. 16 Plaintiff then filed a “Motion to Strike/or Impeach Submitted Notice of Judged Fact Rule 17 201” (Doc. 18). In that motion, Plaintiff asked the Court to strike the removal of this action 18 from the record, which the Court denied (Doc. 21). 19 On February 20, 2020, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (Doc. 23) but did 20 not comply with the Order to use the court-approved form. Plaintiff also filed, among other 21 motions, a motion for entry of default judgment (Doc. 26). In an April 20, 2020, Order, 22 the Court dismissed the First Amended Complaint for failure to comply with court orders 23 and denied Plaintiff’s motions. The Court granted Plaintiff an additional opportunity to 24 file an amended complaint using the court-approved form (Doc. 30). 25

26 3 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 27 4 The Court granted Plaintiff 30 days to file a first amended complaint using this Court’s approved form complaint for use by prisoners. (Id.) The Court expressly warned 28 Plaintiff that failure to use the court-approved form complaint could result in an amended complaint being ordered stricken. (Id. at 3-4.) 1 On June 1, 2020, Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial of his 2 motion for entry of default judgment (Doc. 34). In an Order filed on June 8, 2020, the 3 Court denied the motion for reconsideration (Doc. 35) but granted Plaintiff a 30-day 4 extension of time to file a second amended complaint using the court-approved order. 5 (Doc. 35.) 6 On June 11, 2020, Plaintiff filed a motion, apparently prior to receiving a copy of 7 the Court’s June 8 Order, for an extension of time to file an amended complaint because 8 he was on a locked-down yard (Doc. 36). Plaintiff also requested the status of his “default 9 motion.” On June 15, 2020, Plaintiff filed a motion to stay all proceedings “until his 10 Declaration for entry of default [wa]s decided.” (Doc. 37.) Plaintiff also filed an 11 application for entry of default (Doc. 38). Plaintiff subsequently filed another motion to 12 stay (Doc. 39), a motion for entry of default judgment (Doc. 41), a motion for a permanent 13 injunction (Doc. 42), a request for the court-approved form complaint (Doc. 43), an 14 amended motion for default judgment (Doc. 44), a declaration in support of his amended 15 motion for default judgment (Doc. 45), a motion for status of his motion for default 16 judgment and other filings (Doc. 46), an objection to the PLRA (Doc. 48), a motion for 17 default judgment (Doc. 49) and supporting declaration (Doc. 50), a Second Amended 18 Complaint (Doc. 51), a motion to nullify Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 52), a motion 19 to stay Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 54), an extended reply (Doc. 54) to Defendant’s 20 notice of non-response, and an extended reply (Doc. 55) to Defendants’ notice of non- 21 response. 22 In an Order filed on July 23, 2020, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motions except to 23 the extent that the Court addressed the status of filings and dismissed the Second Amended 24 Complaint with leave to amend (Doc. 56). On July 29, 2020, Plaintiff filed an objection 25 (Doc. 57), a motion for reconsideration (Doc. 58), and a motion for clarification (Doc. 59). 26 The Court overruled Plaintiff’s objection and denied the motions (Doc. 61). 27 II. Pending Filings 28 On August 3, 2020, Plaintiff filed a “Motion for the Record and to Report Judicial 1 Misconduct and a Violation of due process/Render Void” (Doc. 60). On August 10, 2020, 2 Plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss his August 3 Motion (Doc. 62). The motion to dismiss 3 will be granted. 4 In addition, Plaintiff filed yet another motion for entry of default (Doc. 63) and 5 motion for entry of default judgment (Doc. 64), a motion for clarification (Doc. 65), a Third 6 Amended Complaint (Doc. 66), a motion to amend the Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 7 67) and a one-page attachment to the Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 68), a notice of 8 PLRA (Doc. 69), a notice of filing habeas corpus case (Doc. 70), a motion for entry of a 9 permanent injunction (Doc. 71), a motion for status of his motion for entry of a permanent 10 injunction (Doc. 72), a supplement to the motion for permanent injunction (Doc. 73), a 11 motion for status of default (Doc. 74) and amended motion for status of default (Doc. 75) 12 (which moots the motion at Doc. 74), and a motion for hearing (Doc. 78). 13 The Court will grant Plaintiff’s motions for status to the extent discussed herein and 14 will otherwise deny those motions. The Court will deny Plaintiff’s notices to the extent 15 that any relief is sought therein. 16 The Court will deny the motions for entry of default, entry of default judgment, and 17 for clarification. The Court has previously denied Plaintiff’s motions for entry of default, 18 entry of default judgment, and reconsideration of those denials. The Court declines to 19 again reconsider those decisions. 20 In his motion for a permanent injunction and supplement,5 Plaintiff claims this Court 21 agreed to enter an injunction in response to his motion for a permanent injunction (Doc. 22 42). He claims the Court invalidated his conviction and sentence and that “the Defendant” 23 admitted as much; neither statement is true. Plaintiff also inaccurately claims the Court 24 ordered him to file a petition for habeas corpus.6 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for a 25

26 5 In his supplement, Plaintiff seeks a three-judge panel to address the motion. There is no basis for referring this matter to a three-judge panel. 27 6 With respect to filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus, the Court informed Plaintiff that he could not obtain release in a § 1983 case and that such relief was only 28 available in federal court in a habeas corpus case. The Court in no way indicated that the mere filing of a habeas corpus petition would result in release, merely that Plaintiff could 1 permanent injunction, as supplemented, will be denied, as will his motion for hearing. 2 Plaintiff has filed a motion for leave to amend his Third Amended Complaint to add 3 largely unidentified persons or entities as defendants and to allege additional claims 4 concerning events occurring since 2008.7 Local Rule of Civil Procedure 15.1 requires a 5 party seeking leave to amend to submit a proposed amended pleading. Plaintiff has not 6 submitted a proposed fourth amended complaint. Accordingly, the Court will deny the 7 motion for leave to amend. 8 The Court will dismiss the Third Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim 9 and dismiss this case. 10 III. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 11 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 12 against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 13 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 14 has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which 15 relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 16 such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2). 17 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 18 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does 19 not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the- 20

21 not obtain release via a § 1983 case. Specifically, the Court stated: 22 Plaintiff may not obtain release from incarceration in a civil rights 23 case. Generally, “[c]hallenges to the validity of any confinement or to particulars affecting its duration are the province of habeas corpus,” whereas 24 a civil rights action is the proper channel for “requests for relief turning on circumstances of confinement.” Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 25 (2004); see Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 579 (2006); Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 643 (2004). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for an 26 injunction will be denied without prejudice to Plaintiff filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 27 (Doc. 56 at 4 (addressing Plaintiff’s motion for a permanent injunction, Doc. 42.)) 28 7 As he previously has, Plaintiff claims that he has immunity, he was never properly convicted, and he is being illegally incarcerated. 1 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 2 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 3 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 4 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 5 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 6 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content 7 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 8 misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 9 relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 10 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual 11 allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there 12 are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681. 13 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts 14 must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 15 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less stringent 16 standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 17 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 18 IV. Third Amended Complaint 19 In his three-count Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts claims for excessive 20 force, cruel and unusual punishment, false imprisonment, and violation of associational 21 rights. Plaintiff sues Charles Ryan, the former ADC Director, South Unit Sergeant David 22 Dickey, and Corrections Officers (COs) DeFeo and Slade. Plaintiff seeks compensatory 23 and punitive relief. 24 In Count I, which Plaintiff designates as an excessive force claim, Plaintiff asserts 25 that being forced to report “by my illegally given illegal living area” constitutes excessive 26 physical force. (Doc. 66 at 3.) As his injury, Plaintiff asserts attempted suicide, mental 27 harm, insomnia, illness, stress, and a “broken heart.” 28 In Counts II and III, Plaintiff purports to assert the same “facts” and injuries against 1 the same Defendants as Count I and asks the Court to see “attached Complaint CV# 2019- 2 4926,” i.e., his original Complaint. Plaintiff claims Defendants admitted the facts alleged 3 pursuant to “Rule 8(B)(6),” apparently referring to Rule 8(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of 4 Civil Procedure. (Doc. 66 at 4, 5.) 5 In a “case summary” attached to the Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiff refers to 6 page eight of his original Complaint8 which, according to Plaintiff, Defendants admitted 7 under Rule 8(b)(6). Plaintiff states this Court screened his Second Amended Complaint 8 and claims, incorrectly, that the Court found his sentence and conviction in his state 9 criminal case, CR 2006-009614, were void. He further claims that Heck v. Humphrey, 520 10 U.S. 477, 486-87, 490 (1994), does not bar his claims. Plaintiff states that he is dropping 11 a basic necessities claim and asserting an Eighth Amendment claim for cruel and unusual 12 punishment. (Id. at 7.) 13 In the second attached page, Plaintiff asserts “all defendants” were or are violating 14 his Fourth Amendment rights by restraining him from leaving prison grounds. (Id. at 8.) 15 He claims that his arrest, conviction, and sentence constitute an illegal seizure that prevents 16 him from returning home and seeing his daughter. He claims Defendants admitted they 17 failed to indict him for a crime, and he claims he has “immunity to move about” at will. 18 (Id.) He claims Defendants had no right to restrain him and prevent his children from 19 seeing him by guarding the prison perimeter fences. He claims excessive force is being 20 used in preventing him from leaving prison and forcing him and his daughter to comply 21 with inapplicable policies to see each other. He claims that no Defendant has legal 22 authority over him or his daughter, but they are nevertheless preventing him and his 23 daughter from seeing each other. 24 In a third attached page, Plaintiff asserts that he is like a slave on a plantation and is 25 “illegally” told what to do, which he characterizes as cruel and unusual punishment and 26 false imprisonment. (Id.at 9.) Plaintiff asserts that Ryan is a “direct defendant” in 27 Plaintiff’s criminal case and is therefore “clearly aware” that Plaintiff has immunity.

28 8 Plaintiff’s Complaint contained only four pages. (Doc. 1-3 at 3-6.) 1 Plaintiff asserts that Ryan’s failure to train and supervise “all defendants,” is tantamount 2 to “aid[ing] and abet[ting] the excessive force/illegal seiz[ure].” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that 3 Ryan’s alleged acts were malicious and constituted cruel and unusual punishment and false 4 imprisonment. Plaintiff asserts that in prior cases, “all defendants were named . . . . Their 5 job is to be aware of what the[y’re] involved in as employees/adults representing the State.” 6 (Id.) He asserts their lack of concern and failure to act once they became aware of 7 Plaintiff’s false imprisonment was malicious and sadistic and caused harm. He contends 8 that “all defendants have illegally used excessive force on plaintiff” since 2008. (Id.) He 9 seeks $10-25 million a year from each Defendant. In the balance of the attachment, 10 Plaintiff purports to describe the outcomes of several previously filed cases. 11 V. Failure to State a Claim 12 To prevail in a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) acts by the defendants 13 (2) under color of state law (3) deprived him of federal rights, privileges or immunities and 14 (4) caused him damage. Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 15 2005) (quoting Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Idaho Fish & Game Comm’n, 42 F.3d 1278, 16 1284 (9th Cir. 1994)). In addition, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered a specific injury 17 as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant and he must allege an affirmative link 18 between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371- 19 72, 377 (1976). 20 A. Heck v. Humphrey 21 As the Court has previously informed Plaintiff, he may not seek damages in this 22 case for alleged violations of his constitutional rights during his criminal proceedings 23 unless and until his convictions and sentences have been invalidated. A prisoner’s claim 24 for damages cannot be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if “a judgment in favor of the 25 plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,” unless the 26 prisoner demonstrates that the conviction or sentence has previously been reversed, 27 expunged, or otherwise invalidated. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). 28 Plaintiff has failed to establish that his convictions or sentences have been invalidated, his 1 assertions to the contrary notwithstanding. Accordingly, to the extent that Plaintiff asserts 2 a claim for false arrest or malicious prosecution, such claims are barred as not having 3 accrued under Heck. 4 B. Excessive Force 5 Plaintiff asserts that by limiting his freedom and restricting what he may do while 6 incarcerated, “Defendants” have used excessive force, even if not physical. When a 7 prisoner claims that prison officials violated his Eighth Amendment rights by using 8 excessive physical force, the relevant inquiry is “whether force was applied in a good-faith 9 effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” 10 Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992). However, the Supreme Court has made it clear 11 that not every use of physical force violates the Eighth Amendment: 12 That is not to say that every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action. See Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d [1028, 1033 (2nd 13 Cir. 1973)] (“Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary 14 in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates a prisoner’s constitutional rights”). 15 16 Id. at 9. 17 Plaintiff asserts that his incarceration is unlawful and that merely being confined 18 within the prison perimeter, and being subject to prison rules, constitutes excessive force. 19 As discussed above and in previous orders, Plaintiff has not established that his convictions 20 or sentences have been invalidated and his vague assertions to the contrary do not alter the 21 status of his convictions and sentences.9 Consequently, Plaintiff cannot and has not alleged 22

23 9 Plaintiff wrongly claims to never have been indicted by a grand jury. On October 6, 2006, Petitioner was indicted in Maricopa County Superior Court on more than 80 24 counts, including conspiracy, illegal control of an enterprise, attempted illegal control of 25 an enterprise, operating or maintaining a house of prostitution, attempted pandering, kidnapping, sexual assault, attempted child prostitution, sexual abuse, use of wire 26 communication for electronic communication in drug related transactions, child 27 prostitution, threatening or intimidating, transporting persons for purposes of prostitution, and pandering. See Hill v. White, No. CV10-01339-PHX-GMS (LOA) (D. Ariz. Apr. 4, 28 2011) (Report and Recommendation), Doc. 45 at 1-2 (citing state court record), adopted on May 2, 2011, Doc. 54. 1 facts to support that he is illegally confined and subjected to prison rules.10 Plaintiff 2 otherwise fails to allege facts to support that anyone has used physical force against him, 3 much less excessive physical force. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for 4 excessive force. 5 C. Associational Rights 6 Plaintiff also appears to be asserting a violation of his right to family association. 7 The substantive due process right to familial association is well established. Rosenbaum 8 v. Washoe Cty., 663 F.3d 1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 2010).11 Parents possess a “fundamental 9 liberty interest” in companionship with their children. Id.; see Troxel v. Granville, 530 10 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (plurality opinion) (“the interest of parents in the care, custody, and 11 control of their children—is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests 12 recognized by this Court”). The extent to which this right survives incarceration is unclear. 13 See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003) (declining to determine the extent to 14 which familial association right survives incarceration because prison visitation limits were 15 rationally related to legitimate penological interests) (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 16 89 (1987)); Dunn v. Castro, 621 F.3d 1196, 1201, 1202 (9th Cir. 2010) (distinguishing 17 incarcerated plaintiff’s right to visits with his child from an “ordinary father[’s] . . . general 18 right to a relationship with his child”; finding instructive the Overton Court’s “hesitation 19 in articulating the existence and nature” of such a right in the context of visitation). 20 “Official conduct that ‘shocks the conscience’ in depriving parents of [a relationship with 21 their children] is cognizable as a violation of due process[.]” Capp v. County of San Diego, 22 940 F.3d 1046, 1060 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 554 (9th

23 10 Incarceration pursuant to a valid conviction does not violate the Thirteenth 24 Amendment. “The Thirteenth Amendment declares that ‘[n]either slavery nor involuntary 25 servitude, except as punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.’” 26 United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 942 (1988) (quoting Amendment XIII) 27 (Emphasis added)). “By its terms [the Thirteenth] Amendment excludes involuntary servitude imposed as legal punishment for a crime.” Id. at 943. 28 11 There are also First Amendment rights to familial association. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 685 (9th Cir. 2001). 1 Cir. 2010) (alteration in Capp)). “While the right [to familial association] is a fundamental 2 liberty interest, officials may interfere with the right if they provide the parents with 3 fundamentally fair procedures.” Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1236 (9th Cir. 2018) 4 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 5 Plaintiff fails to allege facts—other than his mere imprisonment—to support when 6 and how each Defendant violated his right of familial association. He also fails to allege 7 whether any Defendant provided a basis for his or her purported denial of visitation. 8 Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for denial of associational rights. 9 VI. Dismissal without Leave to Amend 10 Because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim in his Third Amended Complaint, the 11 Court will dismiss his Third Amended Complaint. “Leave to amend need not be given if 12 a complaint, as amended, is subject to dismissal.” Moore v. Kayport Package Express, 13 Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir. 1989). The Court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is 14 particularly broad where Plaintiff has previously been permitted to amend his complaint. 15 Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe v. United States, 90 F.3d 351, 355 (9th Cir. 1996). 16 Repeated failure to cure deficiencies is one of the factors to be considered in deciding 17 whether justice requires granting leave to amend. Moore, 885 F.2d at 538. 18 Plaintiff has made three efforts at crafting a viable complaint and appears unable to 19 do so despite specific instructions from the Court. The Court finds that further 20 opportunities to amend would be futile. Therefore, the Court, in its discretion, will dismiss 21 Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint without leave to amend. 22 IT IS ORDERED: 23 (1) Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 62) his “Motion for the Record and to 24 Report Judicial Misconduct and a Violation of due process/Render Void” is granted and 25 the “Motion for the Record” (Doc. 60) is dismissed. 26 (2) Plaintiff’s motion to add to his Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 67) and his 27 attachment to the Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 68) are denied to the extent that any 28 relief is sought. 1 (3) | The Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 66) and this action are dismissed for 2| failure to state a claim, and the Clerk of Court must enter judgment accordingly. 3 (4) Plaintiffs motion for status of his motion for a permanent injunction (Doc. 4| 72) is granted to the extent stated herein. 5 (5) Plaintiffs notices (Docs. 69, 70) are denied insofar as any relief is sought 6| therein. 7 (6) Plaintiffs remaining motions (Docs. 63, 64, 65, 67, 71, 75, and 78) are 8 | denied. 9 (7) | The docket shall reflect that the Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) 10 | and Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(3)(A), has considered whether an appeal 11 | of this decision would be taken in good faith and concludes that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. 13 Dated this 21st day of January, 2021. 14 15 a 3 16 7 James A. Teil Org Senior United States District Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28