Hildenbrand Appeal

176 A.2d 900, 405 Pa. 579, 1962 Pa. LEXIS 387

• Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: January 2, 1962
• Docket: Appeal, 314
• Status: Published

Opinions

Opinion by

Mr. Chief Justice Bell,

Helen M. Hildenbrand, an unwed mother, gave birth prematurely to a baby boy on September 9, 1959. She could not bring the baby to her mother’s home and had neither a place of her own nor the financial resources to care for him. She got in touch with the Children’s Aid Society of Pennsylvania and made arrangements to formally surrender the child. All of the facts and factors regarding relinquishment of the child were explained to her by a representative of the Society. On September 11, 1959, she signed a temporary agreement giving custody of the child to the Society and the child was taken by the Society from the hospital on September 14, 1959. On October 29, 1959, she signed a peti-. tion relinquishing forever her parental rights to her child and after a hearing thereon was held in the Municipal (now County) Court of Philadelphia, that Court awarded the child to the Children’s Aid Society of Pennsylvania in accordance with the Act of 1953, infra. Thereafter, in March, 1960, Miss Hildenbrand requested the Society to return the child to her, but the Society refused. On May 18, 1960, she filed a petion in the Municipal Court to set aside the aforesaid decree which it had entered sur her petition for voluntary relinquishment of her child and after hearings on this petition, the petition was dismissed by the Court. This appeal followed.

The Act of April 4, 1925, P. L. 127, as added by the Act of August 26, 1953, P. L. 1411, §2, 1 PS §1.1, provides: “When any person under the age of eighteen years has been in the care of an approved agency or institution for a minimum period of thirty (30) days, the parent or parents of such person may petition the court, in the county in which is located that office of the approved agency or institution having the custody of such person, for permission to relinquish forever all parental rights to such person

*. . .

“The court shall thereupon fix a time for hearing, which shall be not less than ten days after such petition is presented. The hearing shall be private. At such hearing the court, by examination under oath of the parties to the petition, shall ascertain the truth of the facts set forth in the petition and its execution, and if satisfied as to the truth thereof and that the petition should be granted, it shall issue its decree so finding, and (1) directing the transfer of the custody of the person to the approved agency or institution, and (2) authorizing such agency or institution to give consent to the adoption of such person without further consent of or notification to the parent or parents.”

Prior to the enactment of this amendment, and even now, unless the voluntary relinquishment procedure is' followed, consent by the natural parents to adoption may be withdrawn at any time before the entry of the final decree of adoption: Harvey Adoption Case, 375 Pa. 1, 7, 99 A. 2d 276; Susko Adoption Case, 363 Pa. 78, 69 A. 2d 132. Thus, the prospective adopting parents had to assume the risk of a change of mind by the natural parents before the adoption could be legally accomplished, with resulting heartbreaks to several persons and possible harm to the child.

Following a two year study by the Governor’s Committee on Child Welfare of the serious social problems arising under the Act of April 4, 1925, supra, as amended, the Assembly enacted the 1958 amendment: In summarizing the recommendations of the Governor’s Committee the Court below aptly said: “The Committee saw the then requirement that a child be in an adoption home six months, with the parents signing consents following placement, as a prolonging of the natural parents’ indecision and turmoil, and also as a period of uncertainty [and often heartbreak] for the adoption parents. It also envisioned that the knowledge by the natural parents of the identity of the adoptive parents could present problems in later years. To remove that uncertainty in the placement phase of the adoption machinery and to assure anonymity between natural and adoptive parents, the Committee recommended, after a two-year study, that there be a preliminary judicial hearing, prior to placement, for use of those parents desiring to relinquish parental rights and responsibilities.”

Although fairness to adopting parents and the recommendations of many welfare agencies throughout the State probably and naturally influenced the Legislature, the basic reason for the Act was, as it should be, the best interest and welfare of the child.

All the statutory requirements above set forth were complied with, and under all the facts and circumstances here present we cannot say that the lower Court abused its discretion.

Order affirmed.

Italics throughout, ours.