Higgins v. State St. Corp.

323 F. Supp. 3d 203
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedAugust 17, 2018
DocketCivil Action No. 17-12150-NMG
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 323 F. Supp. 3d 203 (Higgins v. State St. Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Higgins v. State St. Corp., 323 F. Supp. 3d 203 (D.D.C. 2018).

Opinion

Nathaniel M. Gorton, United States District Judge

This case involves allegations of Steven Andrew Higgins ("Higgins" or "plaintiff"), proceeding pro se, against State Street Corporation ("State Street" or "defendant"). Higgins asserts that State Street 1) violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 etseq. and 2 ) unlawfully discriminated against him based on age in violation of M.G.L. c. 151B § 4.

Defendant moves to dismiss the complaint.

I. Background

Higgins is 63 years old and has more than four decades of experience working in the financial sector. He holds an MBA in finance and accounting and multiple professional certifications and licenses. He applied for jobs with State Street 14 times prior to January, 2015, and twice more in 2015. Higgins sought positions as a Senior Audit Manager and Senior Auditor but did not receive an invitation to interview for either job. He alleges that State Street knew he was older than 40 years of age based on the information contained in his resume.

In November, 2015, plaintiff filed a complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination ("MCAD"). That complaint was dismissed in October, 2017 and Higgins then filed this suit in November, 2017. Pending before the Court is defendant's motion to dismiss.

II. Analysis

Defendant has filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). In considering the merits of a motion to dismiss, the Court may look only to the facts alleged in the pleadings, documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference in the complaint and matters of which judicial notice can be taken.

*206Nollet v. Justices of Trial Court of Mass., 83 F.Supp.2d 204, 208 (D. Mass. 2000), aff'd, 248 F.3d 1127 (1st Cir. 2000). Furthermore, the Court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Langadinos v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 68, 69 (1st Cir. 2000). If the facts in the complaint are sufficient to state a cause of action, a motion to dismiss the complaint must be denied. See Nollet, 83 F.Supp.2d at 208.

Although a court must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in a complaint, that doctrine is not applicable to legal conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Threadbare recitals of the legal elements which are supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice to state a cause of action. Id. Accordingly, a complaint does not state a claim for relief where the well-pled facts fail to warrant an inference of any more than the mere possibility of misconduct. Id. at 1950.

A. Timeliness

Plaintiff concedes, as he must, that any claims related to the 14 applications prior to January 17, 2015, are time-barred. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1)(B) ; M.G.L. c. 151B, § 5. Accordingly, only the two 2015 applications are actionable in this case.

B. Age discrimination standard

Under both state and federal law, it is an unlawful practice for a private sector employer to discharge an employee because of his age or gender. 29 U.S.C. § 621 etseq. ; M.G.L. c. 151B § 4 ; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e etseq. ; M.G.L. c. 151B § 4.

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff must demonstrate that

(1) [he is] a member of a protected class; (2) [he is] qualified for [his] job; (3) [he] suffer[ed] an adverse employment action at the hands of [his] employer; and (4) [there is] some evidence of a causal connection between [his] membership in a protected class and the adverse employment action.

Garmon v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 844 F.3d 307, 313 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Bhatti v. Trs. of Bos. Univ., 659 F.3d 64, 70 (1st Cir. 2011) ); Knight v. Avon Products, Inc., 438 Mass. 413, 423, 780 N.E.2d 1255 (2003) (requiring a "logical connection between each element of the prima facie case and the illegal discrimination") (quoting O'Connor v.

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Bluebook (online)
323 F. Supp. 3d 203, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/higgins-v-state-st-corp-dcd-2018.