Hicks Airfield Pilots Association v. Barbara Ann Brunson, Kevin Brunson, Rio Concho Aviation, Inc., Southlake Hospitality, Inc. D/B/A Wing It Café!, and Barbie Land Development, Inc.

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: June 11, 2026
• Docket: 02-25-00177-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-25-00177-CV ___________________________

HICKS AIRFIELD PILOTS ASSOCIATION, Appellant

V.

BARBARA ANN BRUNSON; KEVIN BRUNSON; RIO CONCHO AVIATION, INC.; SOUTHLAKE HOSPITALITY, INC. D/B/A WING IT CAFÉ!; AND BARBIE LAND DEVELOPMENT, INC., Appellees

On Appeal from the 96th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 096-316827-20

Before Bassel, Womack, and Wallach, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

This appeal follows an eight-day bench trial between Appellant Hicks Airfield

Pilots Association (HAPA) and Appellees Barbara Ann Brunson; Kevin Brunson; Rio

Concho Aviation, Inc.; Southlake Hospitality, Inc. d/b/a Wing it Café!; and Barbie

Land Development, Inc. (collectively, Appellees). At the heart of the trial were issues

relating to whether a restaurant (the Café) and an overnight facility and event center

(the Lodge) located at Hicks Airfield (the Airfield) presented safety concerns at the

Airfield, whether the Café and the Lodge constituted “airport-related commercial

businesses” within the meaning of the governing covenants, and whether HAPA had

tortiously interfered with various contracts and breached certain fiduciary duties by its

actions concerning the Café and the Lodge. Following trial, the trial court issued

numerous declarations related to the Café, the Lodge, and the parties’ respective

rights; it granted permanent injunctions in favor of Appellees; it awarded damages to

Appellees based on their tortious-interference claims and breach-of-fiduciary duty

claims; and it awarded attorney’s fees to Appellees.

In five issues on appeal, HAPA argues that the trial court erred by (1) issuing

certain declarations as part of its declaratory judgment, (2) issuing permanent

injunctive relief, (3) finding HAPA liable for tortious interference and breach of

fiduciary duty, (4) making various findings of fact and conclusions of law, and

(5) awarding attorney’s fees in favor of Appellees.

2 We will sustain some of HAPA’s complaints regarding the trial court’s

declaratory-judgment rulings and the permanent injunction; we will sustain HAPA’s

complaints regarding Appellees’ tortious-interference and breach-of-fiduciary duty

claims; we will overrule HAPA’s complaints regarding the trial court’s findings of fact

and conclusions of law, except its complaint regarding Finding of Fact No. 25, which

we sustain; and we will sustain HAPA’s complaint regarding the award of attorney’s

fees. Accordingly, we will affirm in part, reverse and render in part, and reverse and

remand in part.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background1

The Airfield is a privately owned, public use airport in Tarrant County and is

managed by HAPA, a nonprofit entity. HAPA is governed by its bylaws and by

certain Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CCRs). The original CCRs were

executed in 1985, and they have been amended several times since that time. HAPA

is itself managed by a board (the Board), the members of which serve two-year terms.

The property on which the Airfield sits was originally owned by Hicks Airfield,

Inc., who was the declarant (the Declarant) listed in the original CCRs—a fact that is

relevant to an issue that will be addressed later. There are approximately 452 lots on

1 The majority of the facts will be discussed under the pertinent sections of the opinion analyzing HAPA’s complaints. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.

3 the Airfield. Various Airfield lots have been sold since the execution of the original

CCRs.

In 1995, Rio Concho—an entity owned by the Brunsons—purchased a lot on

the Airfield from North Fort Worth Aviation, Inc. The lot purchased by Rio

Concho—which is the largest lot on the Airfield—is also known as Area H. Article I,

Section 9 of the original CCRs contained the following provision concerning Area H:

The portions of the Property designated by the symbol H shall be maintained, owned[,] and operated by Declarant, its successors or assigns, at their option, as an area for the administration building for [the] Airfield, the sale of fuel . . . for aircraft and motor vehicles . . . , for parking of motor vehicles by Declarant, its agents, customers[,] and other invitees, and/or for any other lawful purpose. The water tank for [the] Airfield will also be maintained in this area.

Rio Concho took the Area H lot subject to any and all restrictions, covenants,

and conditions of record. Certain provisions in the then-applicable CCRs contained

restrictions pertaining to a lot owner’s use of its property. They included the Fifth

Amendment to the CCRs which stated that the relevant lots “may only be used for

aircraft hangars, general office use, airport related commercial business, and Common

Areas[2] related to the use thereof.”

The Fifth Amendment acknowledged that certain owners of the relevant lots

were “presently using their Lots for other than aircraft hangars, general office use[,]

and airport related commercial business”; stated that “the existing Owners of those

The CCRs indicated that the “Common Areas” included “the runway, the 2

grass[-]covered open area, the taxiway[s]/roadways, and the safety zone.”

4 Lots shall have the right to continue to operate or use their Lots for their present

purposes”; and said that “this right shall be personal to the Owners of said Lots” and

shall “no longer be valid” upon “the sale, lease, transfer[,] or other disposition . . . of

such Lot.” The Fifth Amendment contained another provision stating that the

owners of the relevant lots “shall have the right to use their Lots for general office use

and for all airport related commercial businesses, provided, however, that such uses

are consistent with the maintenance of the Property[3] as a first class private airfield.”

A few months after purchasing its lot, Rio Concho leased4 the lot to individuals

desiring to open a restaurant at the location. The restaurant was called the Beacon,

and it began operating around November 1995. In June 2020, the Beacon ceased

operations. During the almost twenty-five years that the Beacon operated as a

restaurant, the Board did not send any notice of violation indicating that the Beacon

was not an airport-related commercial business.

In late 2019, Barbie Land—whose president is Ms. Brunson—began operating

the Lodge near the Beacon.5 The Lodge is available to rent for overnight guests and

The term “Property” has a convoluted meaning in the CCRs, which we need 3

not detail for purposes of our opinion. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.

A witness at trial estimated that approximately forty percent of the businesses 4

located at the Airfield were operated by tenants.

According to one witness at trial, the Lodge is located approximately a 5

hundred yards to the north of the Café.

5 also hosts “special events,” including things like seminars, rehearsal dinners, bridal

showers, and birthday parties.

Around February 2022, Rio Concho entered into a lease with Southlake

Hospitality that allowed Southlake Hospitality to operate a restaurant in the location

formerly occupied by the Beacon. Southlake Hospitality opened a new restaurant—

the Café—in August 2022.

Airfield lot owners—some of whom reside in their hangars—use the taxiways

to drive to and from their respective lots, as do the lot owners’ customers. Due to the

design of the Airfield, customers of the Café and the Lodge must drive on the

taxiways to reach those locations.

Due to safety concerns, Rio Concho submitted plans to the Board’s

Architectural Control Committee (ACC) to construct a fence on Area H. Rio Concho

ultimately put up the fence, although the Board maintained that the constructed fence

differed from the planned fence that was submitted to the ACC.6 Rio Concho and

the Café also placed signs around the Airport directing the public to the Café. The

Board contended that these signs were placed without first seeking approval by the

ACC.

Michael Forseth, a pilot who runs a flight school at the Airfield, testified that 6

the fence improved safety at the Airfield, stating that “every instructor really appreciates it.”

6 The Airfield has two gates—a south gate (the South Gate) and a north gate (the

North Gate). Customers of the Café use both the South Gate and the North Gate.

Around May 1, 2020, HAPA placed access-control measures on the use of the South

Gate.7

B. Procedural Background

In May 2020, Rio Concho sued HAPA after HAPA began placing restrictions

on the access to the South Gate. In its original petition, Rio Concho brought a

tortious-interference claim alleging that HAPA was interfering with a lease between

Rio Concho and the operators of the Beacon, and it also sought certain declaratory

and injunctive relief relating to the South Gate access. In the same month the lawsuit

was filed, the trial court entered a temporary restraining order that required HAPA to

keep the South Gate open from 6:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m. but allowed for access control

from 9:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.8

HAPA answered Rio Concho’s lawsuit and later filed a counter-petition against

Rio Concho and Southlake Hospitality. In its counter-petition—which was filed in

July 2022, around one month before the Café opened—HAPA alleged that Rio

Concho and Southlake Hospitality had violated the CCRs, and it sought certain

In 2014, HAPA placed access-control measures on the use of the North Gate. 7

See Hicks Airfield Pilots Ass’n v. Hicks Asset Partners, LLC, No. 02-22-00291-CV, 2023 WL 4007353, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 15, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Rio Concho and HAPA later entered into a Rule 11 Agreement to allow the 8

South Gate to remain open from 6:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m. during the course of litigation.

7 declaratory and injunctive relief regarding the operation of the Café. Specifically,

HAPA alleged that the “[u]se of the subject lot as a restaurant does not constitute an

‘airport related commercial business’” as required by the CCRs and that the operation

of the Café posed “a danger to the lives of HAPA’s members, lot owners, and

potential patrons of the restaurant” given that such patrons will “drive or walk on

runways, block taxiways, or impede aircraft takeoffs and landings.” HAPA sought a

declaration that Southlake Hospitality’s operation of the Café violated the CCRs, and

HAPA sought injunctive relief preventing Rio Concho and Southlake Hospitality

from operating the Café.

Through a later amended petition, the Brunsons were added as plaintiffs in the

lawsuit against HAPA.9 In their live pleading, Rio Concho and the Brunsons sought,

among other things, (1) various declarations regarding the parties and their rights,

(2) damages stemming from HAPA’s alleged tortious interference with Rio Concho’s

contract concerning the operation of the Café, (3) damages stemming from HAPA’s

alleged breach of its fiduciary duty owed to Rio Concho, and (4) certain permanent

injunctive relief.

In February 2024, Barbie Land filed a petition in intervention. In that petition,

Barbie Land brought claims against HAPA for tortious interference and breach of

fiduciary duty and sought declaratory and injunctive relief pertaining to the access to

9 At that same time, the members of HAPA’s Board were named as defendants in their individual capacities, although they were later nonsuited.

8 the South Gate and HAPA’s authority to impose fines on Barbie Land and remove

persons from the Lodge.

A bench trial led to a final judgment, and later, an amended final judgment. In

the amended final judgment, the trial court declared that

• the Café and the Lodge are airport-related businesses consistent with the maintenance of the Airfield as a first-class private airfield and Rio Concho and Barbie Land are using their respective lots in accordance with the CCR provisions;

• neither the Café nor the Lodge is an annoyance or a nuisance to other Airfield lot owners;

• HAPA board members may not serve as members on the ACC and no valid ACC existed at the time of the design and construction of the safety barrier on Area H;

• Rio Concho is the assignee of the Airfield’s “Declarant as to all rights and privileges of the Declarant on Area H as stated in the Original Declaration,” which limits HAPA’s authority over Area H;

• certain signage restrictions in the CCRs apply only to lots with hangars or T- hangars, and because Area H has never had such a hangar or T-hangar, the signage restrictions do not apply to Area H;

• HAPA abandoned its restriction that lots must be used only for aircraft hangars, general office use, or airport-related commercial businesses;

• HAPA interpreted and applied the CCRs in an arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory manner toward Rio Concho, Southlake Hospitality, and Barbie Land; and

• the CCRs do not permit HAPA the authority to exclude the customers, invitees, or guests of the Airfield’s lot owners and tenants.

9 The trial court also permanently enjoined HAPA from changing or restricting

access via the South Gate, permanently enjoined HAPA from assessing certain fines

against Rio Concho or Southlake Hospitality, and ordered HAPA to “undertake a

traffic safety study conducted by a qualified firm to recommend changes designed to

prevent land vehicles from making dangerous incursions onto the runway.”

In the amended final judgment, the trial court also found that HAPA had

tortiously interfered with Rio Concho’s and Barbie Land’s “respective contracts with

tenants, customers, or invitees.” It awarded Rio Concho damages of $34,276 and

Barbie Land damages of $500 stemming from HAPA’s tortious interference. The trial

court also found that HAPA had breached its fiduciary duty owed to Rio Concho and

Barbie Land, awarding Rio Concho damages of $26,000 and Barbie Land damages of

$16,000. The trial court awarded Rio Concho and Barbie Land their joint attorney’s

fees in the amount of $396,628 and Southlake Hospitality its attorney’s fees in the

amount of $19,418. The trial court also entered findings of fact and conclusions of

law. This appeal followed.10

10 After HAPA filed its notice of appeal, Rio Concho filed a cross-notice of appeal. Rio Concho later moved to dismiss its cross-appeal, and we granted the motion and dismissed the cross-appeal. See Hicks Airport Pilots Ass’n v. Brunson, No. 02-25-00177-CV, 2025 WL 2626864, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 11, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.).

10 III. DISCUSSION

A. HAPA’s Complaints Regarding the Declaratory Judgment

In its first issue, HAPA argues that the trial court erred by issuing certain

declarations in the amended final judgment because the court either improperly

interpreted the CCRs or its declarations were supported by legally or factually

insufficient evidence.

1. Standard of Review

When a declaratory judgment is rendered after a bench trial, we review the trial

court’s conclusions of law de novo. City of Forest Hills v. Benson, 555 S.W.3d 284, 288

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, no pet.). We review a trial court’s findings of fact

under the same legal and factual sufficiency standards that we use for jury questions.

Walterscheid v. Walterscheid, 557 S.W.3d 245, 257 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, no

pet.).

We may sustain a legal-sufficiency challenge—that is, a no-evidence

challenge—only when (1) the record bears no evidence of a vital fact, (2) the rules of

law or of evidence bar the court from giving weight to the only evidence offered to

prove a vital fact, (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere

scintilla, or (4) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of a vital fact. Gunn

v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645, 658 (Tex. 2018). In determining whether legally sufficient

evidence supports the challenged finding, we must consider evidence favorable to the

finding if a reasonable factfinder could, and we must disregard contrary evidence

11 unless a reasonable factfinder could not. Cent. Ready Mix Concrete Co. v. Islas,

228 S.W.3d 649, 651 (Tex. 2007); City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex.

2005). We indulge “every reasonable inference deducible from the evidence” in

support of the challenged finding. Gunn, 554 S.W.3d at 658 (quoting Bustamante v.

Ponte, 529 S.W.3d 447, 456 (Tex. 2017)).

When we reverse the trial court’s judgment because the evidence is legally

insufficient, we must explain our analysis with specificity; we cannot merely say that

we have reviewed all the evidence and reached a conclusion contrary to the

factfinder’s. Citizens Nat’l Bank in Waxahachie v. Scott, 195 S.W.3d 94, 96 (Tex. 2006).

Generally, we must render judgment when the evidence is legally insufficient. Tex. R.

App. P. 43.3; Vista Chevrolet, Inc. v. Lewis, 709 S.W.2d 176, 176 (Tex. 1986); Nat’l Life

& Acc. Ins. v. Blagg, 438 S.W.2d 905, 909 (Tex. 1969).

When reviewing an assertion that the evidence is factually insufficient to

support a finding, we set aside the finding only if, after considering and weighing all

the pertinent record evidence, we determine that the credible evidence supporting the

finding is so weak, or so contrary to the overwhelming weight of all the evidence, that

the finding should be set aside and a new trial ordered. Pool v. Ford Motor Co.,

715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986) (op. on reh’g); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176

(Tex. 1986); Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. 1965).

12 2. Applicable Law

A restrictive covenant is a negative covenant that limits permissible uses of

land. Tarr v. Timberwood Park Owners Ass’n, Inc., 556 S.W.3d 274, 279 (Tex. 2018).

Restrictive covenants should be liberally construed to give effect to their purpose and

intent. Tex. Prop. Code § 202.003(a); Buckner v. Lakes of Somerset Homeowner’s Ass’n,

Inc., 133 S.W.3d 294, 297 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied). But “[n]o

construction, no matter how liberal, can construe a property restriction into existence

when the covenant is silent as to that limitation.” Tarr, 556 S.W.3d at 285; see Hazel v.

Lonesome Ranch Prop. Owners Ass’n, 656 S.W.3d 468, 491 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, no

pet.) (“[T]o validly limit a property owner’s use, a covenant must plainly prohibit the

use.”).

Restrictive covenants are subject to the general rules of contract construction.

Pilarcik v. Emmons, 966 S.W.2d 474, 478 (Tex. 1998); Hazel, 656 S.W.3d at 491. Our

paramount concern when construing restrictive covenants is to give effect to the

objective intent of the drafters of the covenant as it is reflected in the language

chosen. Tarr, 556 S.W.3d at 280. The words in a restrictive covenant “may not be

enlarged, extended, stretched[,] or changed by construction.” Wilmoth v. Wilcox,

734 S.W.2d 656, 657 (Tex. 1987). “If the covenant has a definite or certain meaning,

it is unambiguous as a matter of law.” Raman Chandler Props., L.C. v. Caldwell’s Creek

Homeowner’s Ass’n, Inc., 178 S.W.3d 384, 391 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, pet.

denied).

13 A party seeking to enforce a restrictive covenant has the burden at trial of

demonstrating that the restriction is valid and enforceable. Gillebaard v. Bayview Acres

Ass’n, Inc., 263 S.W.3d 342, 347 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied).

A trial court’s interpretation of restrictive covenants is a legal question that we review

de novo. Raman Chandler Props., L.C, 178 S.W.3d at 390.

3. The Trial Court’s Declarations

Through its first issue, HAPA attacks eight different declarations made by the

trial court in the amended final judgment. We will address each of the challenged

declarations in turn.

a. The Trial Court’s Declaration that the Café and the Lodge Are Airport-Related Businesses Consistent with the Maintenance of the Airfield as a First-Class Private Airfield

In the amended final judgment, the trial court declared that the Café and the

Lodge are “airport-related businesses consistent with the maintenance of [the] Airfield

as a first-class private airfield.”

In its brief, HAPA argues that the trial court erred by declaring that the Café

and the Lodge are airport-related commercial businesses. HAPA’s complaint is one

of factual insufficiency, as HAPA contends that “[t]he credible evidence admitted into

evidence is too weak to support the court’s finding that [the Café] and [the Lodge] are

airport-related commercial businesses consistent with [the] maintenance of [the]

Airfield as a first-class private airfield and the finding is so against the great weight and

preponderance of the credible evidence contrary to the finding that it should be

14 overturned.” Notably, neither “airport-related commercial business” nor “first-class

private airfield” is defined in the CCRs.

In addressing this issue, both sides point to the following CCR provisions that

relate to the use of an Airfield lot:

Use of the Silverado Tract and Phase I. [The relevant lots] may only be used for aircraft hangars, general office use, airport related commercial business, and Common Areas related to the use thereof. [HAPA] and Silverado acknowledge that certain Owners of [the relevant lots] are presently using their Lots for other than aircraft hangars, general office use[,] and airport related commercial businesses. With respect thereto, the existing Owners of those Lots shall have the right to continue to operate or use their Lots for their present purposes (i.e., the purposes for which said lots are presently being used as of the date of filing of this Fifth Amendment); however, this right shall be personal to the Owners of said Lots and upon the sale, lease, transfer[,] or other disposition of any nature by the present Owner of such Lot to any other person or entity, such use shall . . . no longer be valid or in accordance with the provisions of this Fifth Amendment, and [HAPA] shall have the right to require the new Owner or user of the Lot, as the case may be, to cease using the Lot for any purpose other than as herein permitted pursuant to this Section 6(c).

....

Uses. All rights to use the Common Areas of [the] Airfield, including but not limited to the runway, are strictly reserved to [HAPA] and shall be restricted in accordance with the operation of a private airfield, with such uses being restricted to the owners of lots . . . and not to any other person or entity . . . . Notwithstanding anything contained in the [CCRs] to the contrary, the Owners of Lots . . . shall have the right to use their Lots for general office use and for all airport related commercial businesses, provided, however, that such uses are consistent with the maintenance of the Property as a first class private airfield.

HAPA points to testimony from numerous witnesses to support its argument

that the Café and the Lodge are not airport-related commercial businesses. First,

15 HAPA highlights testimony from its expert witness, Jeffrey Price, a professor of

aviation at the Metropolitan State University of Denver. Price stated that he had

around thirty years’ experience in the aviation industry and that he was “a commercial

pilot with an instrument rating and a remote pilot certificate.” Price described the

Airfield as a “general aviation public use airport.” He acknowledged that he did not

personally visit the Airfield, stating that he had made observations of it using Google

Earth.

As it relates to the Café, Price maintained that the Café was “ill-placed on the

[A]irfield” and that it was located near a “hotspot,” a location he described as “an area

on the airport where an incident of some sort is likely to or has frequently occurred.”

Price stated that “the location of the restaurant itself is [in] very close proximity to the

active runway” and that “there does not seem to be any method to get to the

restaurant that would not put somebody driving on a taxiway that an aircraft would

also be taxiing on.” He also said that “the access to the taxiway is too close for where

the restaurant is located” and that it is “too easy for somebody to inadvertently get

out to the runway.”

Price testified that he had never seen another airport in which “the general

public had access to the airfield via its taxiways in order to get to a restaurant.” Price

maintained that, in his opinion, the Airfield’s restaurant should be closed to public

access as long as the public had to drive on the taxiways to reach it. Price

acknowledged, however, that the public’s use of the taxiways was not unique to the

16 Café’s customers, noting that because of the way the Airfield is laid out, many lot

owners have to use the Airfield’s taxiways to reach their locations.

In Price’s view, an airport-related business was a business that “serve[d] the

airport in some way, shape, or form.” He also believed that an airport-related

business “really just means” a business that is located on an airport. He indicated that

airport businesses are typically classified by their land use as either aeronautical land

use or nonaeronautical land use. Nonaeronautical businesses included things like

concessions, which he stated were “incidental to the operation of the airport but not

essential.” Price testified that the Café was a concession. Price acknowledged,

however, that “there’s nothing that says airport-related business must equal

aeronautical business.” He said that the Café was an airport-related business “[o]nly

in the sense that it’s located on an airport and the name of the business is associated

with aviation, but it’s not essential to the operation of the airport.” He testified that

the building where the Café is located is not consistent with an aeronautical need of

the airport because “[it] provides no service that facilitates aviation.”

As it relates to the Lodge, Price said that an event center that holds events for

up to sixty people is not necessarily an airport-related business just because it is

located at an airport. Price admitted, however, that he did not know where the Lodge

was located on the Airfield.

17 HAPA next points to testimony from another of its experts, Randy Coller.11

Coller stated that he had been a licensed pilot since 1970, that he had previously

managed five airports, and that he had worked as an airport inspector for thirty-seven

years. Coller explained that he performed an inspection on the Airfield in 2022 and

that he had made a report of his inspection. When talking about his report, Coller

stated that he had “remark[ed] that there was a substantial amount of nonaeronautical

vehicle traffic going to the restaurant.”

Coller testified that he was aware that the only means of ingress and egress to

“the restaurant” was via the Airfield’s taxiways and opined that this created a

dangerous condition. He said that the Café was located at a hotspot, although he

acknowledged that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had not designated the

area as a hotspot. Coller indicated that it was “not typical for the general public

to drive on . . . taxiways to access [a] restaurant.” However, he admitted that

customers of other businesses located at the Airfield use the Airfield’s taxiways to

travel around the Airfield. Coller also stated that he was not aware of any accidents

between planes and vehicles at the Airfield.

HAPA also points to testimony from several lay witnesses in an attempt to

prove that the Café and the Lodge are not “airport-related commercial businesses.”

John Unangst—a licensed pilot, an Airfield lot owner, and the President of HAPA’s

HAPA cites to Coller’s testimony at a 2023 temporary injunction hearing. A 11

transcript of that hearing was admitted into evidence at trial.

18 Board—testified that the Café and the Lodge were not airport-related commercial

businesses. He stated that the Café was a concession and that it was not required for

the operation and maintenance of the Airfield. In his opinion, the events held at the

Lodge were not necessary for the operation of the Airfield. Unangst maintained that

the operation of the Café and the Lodge were not consistent with the maintenance of

the Airfield as a first-class private airfield.12 He indicated, however, that a first-class

private airfield should have a community restroom for pilots, and he acknowledged

that if the Café stopped operating, the Airfield would no longer have a community

restroom.

Ronald Wasson, a pilot and an Airfield lot owner, stated that the Café was not

an airport-related commercial business and that the operation of the Café was not

consistent with the maintenance of the Airfield as a first-class private airfield. Wasson

also said that the operation of the Lodge as an event center and overnight lodging

location was not consistent with the maintenance of the Airfield as a first-class private

airfield. Wasson acknowledged, however, that an airport that does not offer restroom

facilities is not a first-class airfield.

Mike Olson—a HAPA Board member, an Airfield lot owner, and a pilot—

testified that the Café was not an airport-related commercial business. He said that if

12 Unangst testified that, in his view, “a first-class private airfield would be an airfield [where] people . . . can enjoy their properties and use of their aircraft without fear of reprisal or having any undue safety issues or worries that they’re going to have a safety issue.”

19 the Café were used exclusively for “aviation-related people who are on the airport and

have knowledge of airplanes and the risks that go along with [that],” the Café could be

an airport-related commercial business. Olson also indicated that the operation of the

Café was not consistent with the maintenance of the Airfield as a first-class private

airfield. He stated that the Café was located near a hotspot and that he was unaware

of any other airfield that had a restaurant open to the general public that was located

near a hotspot.

Thomas Boback—a licensed pilot, HAPA Board member, and Airfield lot

owner—averred that the Café was not required for the operation of the Airfield. He

also maintained that the Café was not an airport-related commercial business and that

its operation and location on the Airfield was not consistent with the maintenance of

the Airfield as a first-class private airfield. Boback believed that the operation of the

Lodge as an event center and an overnight lodging facility and its location on the

Airfield were not consistent with the maintenance of the Airfield as a first-class

private airfield.13

Andrew Duff, a pilot and an Airfield lot owner, testified that the Café was not

an airport-related commercial business. He also said that the operation of the Café

and the Lodge and their respective locations on the Airfield were not consistent with

the maintenance of the Airfield as a first-class private airfield.

Boback acknowledged that the CCRs do not define the term “airport-related 13

commercial business,” nor do they define the term “first-class private airfield.”

20 Other witnesses, however, suggested that the Café and the Lodge were

important to other Airfield lot owners and to those visiting the Airfield. Eric

Faulkner, the owner of Southlake Hospitality, stated that in May 2023, approximately

eighty percent of the Café’s weekday customers resided or worked on the Airfield and

that approximately fifty percent of the Café’s weekend customers resided or worked

on the Airfield. By the time of the August 2024 trial, Faulkner believed that those

numbers had changed, noting that the Café had been receiving less customers “off the

Airfield.” He indicated that around eighty percent of the Café’s total customers were

comprised of “airport people.” Faulkner testified that pilot schools had used the Café

for meetings, as had a “senior pilot group.” Faulkner stated that feeding pilots and

members of the Airfield community was essential to airport operations. According to

Faulkner, if the Café were not allowed to operate on the Airfield, pilots and lot

owners would have to leave the Airfield to get food, which would necessitate them

driving on the Airfield’s taxiways.

Ms. Brunson testified that people who live on the Airfield use the Lodge for

special events. As an example, she mentioned that an aircraft mechanic had his

birthday party at the Lodge, that the Lodge had been used by “FAA officials,” and

that it had “hosted safety committee meetings.” Ms. Brunson maintained that “[a]

lot” of the Lodge’s customers were people who had an aviation background or who

were “fond of general aviation.” She stated that several of the Lodge’s overnight

21 guests had flown into the Airfield for their visit, although she admitted that the

majority of customers had driven into the Airfield.

Ms. Brunson believed that the Lodge was an airport-related commercial

business because it “provides a place for a pilot to park his plane and to stay the

night.” In her opinion, a first-class private airfield would provide a place for food and

restrooms, as well as a place for pilots to stay and hangar their airplanes. Ms. Brunson

stated that she opened the Lodge after receiving phone calls from out-of-state pilots

who wanted to use the Airfield’s hangars and who would ask her for information

about the closest hotel. She thought “it would be nice to put in an Airbnb where

pilots could fly, keep their plane there, do their business, and then take off the next

day.” Ms. Brunson testified that the Lodge helps maintain the Airfield as a first-class

private airfield.

Mr. Brunson acknowledged that the CCRs do not contain a definition of the

phrase “airport-related business.” In his opinion, the phrase means a business “that

supports the primary functions of the airport.” He said that the definition would

include businesses that “provide a place for people to meet,” ones that provide “a

place for pilots or visitors to the airport to have a place to use the restroom,” and

ones that “have a place for [pilots or visitors to the airport] to have refreshments or

food.” He maintained that the Café was the “heart of the airport,” explaining that

numerous lots had been bought and sold at the restaurant and that “it was the de

facto meeting place for a lot of the respective owners of lots at the airport.” Mr.

22 Brunson also indicated that other private airfields utilized a similar design to the

Airfield whereby vehicles and airplanes shared roadways and taxiways.

Tim Bero, a lot owner and former Board member, testified that the Café added

value to the Airfield and the people who live on the Airfield. He maintained that the

Café was an airport-related commercial business, noting that the Airfield needs a place

for fuel, a restaurant, and restrooms. Bero said that if the definition of airport-related

commercial business meant that the business had to be essential for the operation of

the Airfield, he did not think that any business at the Airfield met that definition.

Bero also indicated that he had visited multiple airports in other states that utilized a

design where visitors had to drive on the airport’s taxiways to navigate around the

airport.

Forseth, the pilot who runs the flight school at the Airfield, testified that the

Café helps the Airfield’s “representation” and “prestige.” He maintained that the

Café was a convenient place for his flight instructors to meet with students and that

the operation of the Café improved his enjoyment of the Airfield. Forseth stated that,

just as the Café’s customers use the Airfield’s taxiways to reach the Café, his students

use the Airfield’s taxiways to reach his hangar.

Philip Perez—a pilot, retired air-traffic controller, and long-time Airfield

resident—testified that the Café added “value” to the Airfield, noting that “it gives

pilots an opportunity to gather together, to actually interact” and that it helped attract

pilots to the Airfield.

23 As noted above, the CCRs do not define the phrase “airport-related

commercial business.” There does not seem to be any dispute that the Café and the

Lodge are “commercial businesses.” Rather, the dispute centers around whether they

are “airport related.” We thus look to the common definitions of the words “airport”

and “related” so that we can give effect to the objective intent of the drafters of the

language. See Tarr, 556 S.W.3d at 280; see also Pharr-San Juan-Alamo Indep. Sch. Dist. v.

Tex. Pol. Subdivisions Prop./Cas. Joint Self Ins. Fund, 642 S.W.3d 466, 474 (Tex. 2022)

(“To determine the common, ordinary meaning of undefined terms used in contracts,

statutes, and other legal documents, we typically look first to their dictionary

definitions.” (internal quotation omitted)); In re Davenport, 522 S.W.3d 452, 457 (Tex.

2017) (orig. proceeding) (“Courts may look to dictionaries to discern the meaning of a

commonly used term that the contract does not define.”).

“Airport” is defined as “a place from which aircraft operate that usually has

paved runways and maintenance facilities and often serves as a terminal.” Airport,

Merriam-Webster.com, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/airport (last

visited June 9, 2026). “Related” is defined as “connected by reason of an established

or discoverable relation.” Related, Merriam-Webster.com, https://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/related (last visited June 9, 2026).

With those definitions in mind, there is sufficient credible evidence to support

the trial court’s conclusion that the Café and the Lodge are “airport-related

commercial businesses consistent with the maintenance of the Airfield as a first-class

24 private airfield.” As recounted above, Faulkner testified that approximately eighty

percent of the Café’s total customers were people who resided or worked on the

Airfield. Numerous witnesses recounted how the Café was a central meeting place for

the Airfield and its lot owners, describing how pilots ate there, pilot schools met

there, Airfield lots were bought and sold there, and pilots gathered to interact there.

Other witnesses described how the Café provided a place for pilots and the general

public to use the restroom, something they thought was necessary for the

maintenance of the Airfield as a first-class private airfield.14

As to the Lodge, as recounted above, Ms. Brunson described how the Lodge

had been used for special events by people who resided on the Airfield as well as by

“FAA officials” and persons hosting an Airfield “safety committee meeting.” She

also said that overnight guests had flown into the Airfield to visit the Lodge.

Moreover, according to Ms. Brunson, the Lodge provided a place for pilots to park

their planes and stay the night, something she indicated was needed for the Airfield to

be a first-class private airfield.

Although other witnesses suggested—often in a conclusory fashion—that the

Café and the Lodge are not airport-related commercial businesses, given the other

14 Unangst, the President of HAPA’s Board, admitted that a first-class private airfield should have a community restroom for pilots and acknowledged that if the Café stopped operating, the Airfield would no longer have a community restroom. Wasson similarly admitted that an airport that does not offer restroom facilities is not a first-class airfield.

25 evidence demonstrated above, we cannot say that the trial court’s finding that the

Café and the Lodge are “airport-related” commercial businesses consistent with the

maintenance of the Airfield as a first-class private airfield was contrary to the great

weight and preponderance of the evidence. See Pool, 715 S.W.2d at 635; Eggemeyer v.

Hughes, 621 S.W.3d 883, 890 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, no pet.) (op. on reh’g)

(stating that, in the context of a factual-sufficiency review of bench-trial findings, an

appellate court “must respect that the trial court as the fact[]finder was the sole judge

of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony”);

Sunrise Helicopters, Inc. v. Nw. Airport Mgmt., Inc., No. 14-99-00274-CV, 2001 WL

253591, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 15, 2001, pet. denied) (not

designated for publication) (rejecting sufficiency challenge to trial court’s implied

finding that aircraft-part sales constituted “commercial aviation activity” when

evidence included airport operator’s testimony that he understood the term to mean

“anything that could reasonably be associated with aviation” and another witness

testified that parts stored in airport hangar had been used in “commercial aircraft

activity”); see also Fantasy Ranch, Inc. v. City of Arlington, 193 S.W.3d 605, 613 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied) (affirming trial court’s declaration, after bench

trial, regarding whether cabaret met “conforming use” definition under city’s adult-

entertainment ordinance based on plain language of term when ordinance did not

define term). Accordingly, we hold that there was factually sufficient evidence to

support the trial court’s declaration that the Café and the Lodge are airport-related

26 commercial businesses consistent with the maintenance of the Airfield as a first-class

private airfield. We overrule this part of HAPA’s first issue.

b. The Trial Court’s Declaration that Neither the Café Nor the Lodge Is an Annoyance or a Nuisance

In the amended final judgment, the trial court declared that “[n]either the

[Lodge] nor [the Café] is an annoyance or nuisance to other Hicks Airfield lot

owners.” In a three-sentence argument section in its brief, HAPA contends that the

trial court erred by making this declaration.15

A nuisance is “a condition that substantially interferes with the use and

enjoyment of land by causing unreasonable discomfort or annoyance to persons of

ordinary sensibilities attempting to use and enjoy it.” Crosstex N. Tex. Pipeline, L.P.,

15 In its entirety, HAPA’s argument states: “Lot owners Ron Wasson [citations to reporter’s record given]; Thomas Boback [citations to reporter’s record given]; Andrew Duff [citations to reporter’s record given]; John Unangst, individually and on behalf of HAPA’s board [citations to reporter’s record given][,] all testified the Hangar Lodge and Café are an annoyance and nuisance, due in part to the businesses[’] inviting unknown members of the general public onto the Airfield. The general public driving on active taxiways constitutes an abnormally dangerous activity. See Crosstex N. Tex. Pipeline, L.P. v. Gardiner, 505 S.W.3d 580 (Tex. 2016).” That threadbare argument is wholly lacking in substantive analysis, and accordingly, we hold that HAPA has waived its complaint regarding this challenge due to inadequate briefing. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i); In re J.R., No. 02-23-00071-CV, 2024 WL 191211, at *11 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 18, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding that appellant waived her argument when she failed to provide any substantive analysis in support of it). Nevertheless, in the interest of justice, we will address HAPA’s complaint. See Y.A. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03- 22-00342-CV, 2022 WL 17255458, at *3 n.4 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 29, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that appellant waived issue on appeal due to inadequate briefing but nevertheless addressing issue in interest of justice).

27 505 S.W.3d at 593; Holubec v. Brandenberger, 111 S.W.3d 32, 37 (Tex. 2003). To rise to

the level of a nuisance, the interference must satisfy two requirements: it must (1) be

“substantial” in light of all the circumstances and (2) cause “discomfort or

annoyance” that is objectively “unreasonable.” Crosstex N. Tex. Pipeline, L.P.,

505 S.W.3d at 595.

The substantiality requirement “sets a minimum threshold that confirms that

the law does not concern itself with trifles, or seek to remedy all of the petty

annoyances and disturbance[s] of every[-]day life in a civilized community even from

conduct committed with knowledge that annoyance and inconvenience will result.”

Id. (internal quotation omitted). In determining whether interference is substantial,

courts may consider the extent of the interference and how long the interference lasts

or how often it recurs. Id. at 595–96. As for whether it causes “unreasonable”

annoyance, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the effects of the substantial interference

are unreasonable, not that the defendant’s conduct or land use was unreasonable.

Enter. Crude GP LLC v. Sealy Partners, LLC, 614 S.W.3d 283, 300 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.) (citing Crosstex N. Tex. Pipeline, L.P., 505 S.W.3d at

597). In addition, whether the effects of interference are unreasonable is governed by

an objective standard, accounting for numerous circumstance-based factors. Id. That

determination is generally a question of fact. Id.

In support of its argument that the trial court erred by declaring that neither the

Café nor the Lodge was an annoyance or a nuisance to other Airfield lot owners,

28 HAPA points to testimony from Wasson, Boback, Duff, and Unangst. The testimony

from these individuals regarding whether the Café or the Lodge posed an annoyance

or a nuisance was markedly similar.

Wasson testified that the Café’s customers caused increased traffic on the

Airfield’s taxiways and that the increased traffic was annoying. Wasson also said that

the use of the Lodge as an event center and overnight lodging facility was annoying,

noting that the Lodge “[p]robably” increased traffic on the Airfield’s taxiways.

Boback averred that the Café’s customers caused an increase in traffic on the

Airfield’s taxiways and that the increased traffic was bothersome. He similarly stated

that when the Lodge hosts events, there is an increase in the amount of traffic on the

Airfield’s taxiways and that the increased traffic is irritating.

Duff stated that the Café’s customers caused an increase in traffic on the

Airfield’s taxiways and that the increased traffic was annoying. He also testified that

the use of the Lodge as an event center and overnight lodging facility was annoying to

him as a lot owner. In his opinion, the Beacon’s traffic had also annoyed him when it

was in operation.

Unangst testified that the increased traffic on the Airfield’s taxiways by the

Café’s customers as well as the Lodge’s customers was irritating to him as a property

owner. Unangst said that the Café and the Lodge “create an undue additional burden

on our taxiways and once in a while a runway.” He acknowledged that the additional

29 burden “may be minor” but said that “it’s still an increase[d]” burden and substantially

interfered with his use and enjoyment of his property.

Other witnesses downplayed the traffic concerns noted by HAPA. Forseth

stated that the typical interaction between a vehicle and an airplane on the Airfield’s

taxiways posed just a “slight annoyance,” noting that there is usually a delay of

“maybe a couple of seconds” while the vehicle gets out of the airplane’s way. In his

opinion, most of the traffic issues at the Airfield are caused by Amazon delivery

drivers. Forseth further indicated that the Airfield had not experienced a noticeable

increase in traffic since the Café opened.16 He also maintained that the Café was

doing a better job than the Beacon had done promoting safety.

Stephen Phy, a crash reconstructionist and former police officer, testified that it

would not be difficult for a typical passenger vehicle to get around an aircraft on the

taxiway that was primarily used by customers traveling to and from the Café.

According to Phy, the pavement of the taxiway is thirty feet wide “edge to edge” and

the aprons are fifteen feet wide “between the edge of the taxiway and the hangars”

and therefore provide a total of sixty feet of pavement in those areas where there is an

apron or a driveway on either side of the taxiway. In his opinion, that is “more than

sufficient space for - - a small aircraft and typical passenger vehicle.” Phy also

indicated that he would not expect there to be a sudden encounter between an aircraft

To that end, Unangst testified that the Café was not as busy as the Beacon 16

had been.

30 and a vehicle on the Airfield’s taxiways, noting that he would expect the aircraft to be

visible to the vehicle’s driver.

While several of the witnesses referenced by HAPA spoke of isolated incidents

involving vehicles on the Airfield’s taxiways and runaways, most of those incidents

involved vehicles being driven by individuals not associated with the Café or the

Lodge. For example,

• Wasson mentioned an incident in which one of the Beacon’s customers was pulling on the propeller of his airplane while another of the Beacon’s customers took photographs.

• Wasson acknowledged that his wife once stopped just short of driving onto the runway, noting that there can be confusion between whether one is driving on a taxiway or the runway.

• Unangst spoke of an incident when one of the Beacon’s customers drove onto the runway.

• Boback testified about an incident in which several vehicles left the Café’s parking lot at around 11:30 p.m. traveling toward the runway, and one of the vehicles drove on the runway. Boback acknowledged, however, that the Café had closed at either 2:00 p.m. or 3:00 p.m. that day and that he had no reason to believe that the vehicles were driven by the Café’s customers.

• Duff testified about an incident involving a vehicle driving on the runway, although he acknowledged that the driver was someone associated with Uber Eats and that he had no knowledge whether the driver had stopped at the Café.17

The owner of Southlake Hospitality testified that the Café had never used 17

Uber Eats as a delivery service.

31 Based on the above testimony, we hold that there is credible evidence to

support the trial court’s conclusion that neither the Café nor the Lodge was an

“annoyance or a nuisance” to other lot owners, and we will not substitute our

judgment for that of the trial court. See Hall v. Lewis, 639 S.W.3d 197, 205 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.) (“In a bench trial, the trial court is the sole

judge of the witnesses’ credibility, and the court may choose to believe one witness

over another.”); George Joseph Assets, LLC v. Chenevert, 557 S.W.3d 755, 765 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) (stating that, in assessing the

sufficiency of the evidence on review of a judgment following a bench trial, the

appellate court “do[es] not act as a factfinder” and “may not pass on the credibility of

the witnesses or substitute [its] judgment for that of the factfinder”); see also Crosstex

N. Tex. Pipeline, L.P., 505 S.W.3d at 609 (noting that “the questions of whether an

interference with the use and enjoyment of property is substantial, whether the effects

of such an interference on the plaintiffs are unreasonable, whether the defendant

intentionally or negligently created the interference, and whether the interference

results from abnormally dangerous activities generally present questions of fact” for

the factfinder to decide).

The trial court could have determined that the issues caused by the operation

of the Café and the Lodge caused, at best, only a minor increase in the Airfield’s

traffic, something that falls far short of the “substantial” interference and

“unreasonable” discomfort or annoyance needed to prove a nuisance claim. See

32 Crosstex N. Tex. Pipeline, L.P., 505 S.W.3d at 595; Holubec, 111 S.W.3d at 37; see also

Dealer Comput. Servs., Inc. v. DCT Hollister Rd, LLC, 574 S.W.3d 610, 623 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.) (affirming summary judgment as to nuisance

claim in which plaintiff alleged that heavy truck traffic “clog[ged] the streets” and

“caused significant deterioration of the infrastructure in the community” because such

allegations did not establish that defendant “engaged in abnormally dangerous

conduct that created a high risk of serious injury”); City of Laredo v. R. Vela Exxon, Inc.,

966 S.W.2d 673, 681 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. denied) (reversing nuisance

judgment and holding that although “the diversion of traffic from another designated

truck route may have increased the traffic on [the] street, no intentional action by the

City caused the traffic congestion” and that rather than being caused by the City’s

actions, the problem was caused by “the use of the truck route by an ever-increasing

number of trucks”).

In short, we cannot say that the evidence conclusively established that the Café

and the Lodge are an “annoyance or a nuisance” to other lot owners. See Gunn,

554 S.W.3d at 658; Crosstex N. Tex. Pipeline, L.P., 505 S.W.3d at 595; Holubec,

111 S.W.3d at 37. Nor can we say that the trial court’s finding that the Café and the

Lodge are not an “annoyance or a nuisance” was contrary to the great weight and

preponderance of the evidence. See Pool, 715 S.W.2d at 635; Crosstex N. Tex. Pipeline,

L.P., 505 S.W.3d at 595; Holubec, 111 S.W.3d at 37. Accordingly, we hold that there

33 was both legally and factually sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s

declaration.

We overrule this part of HAPA’s first issue.

c. The Trial Court’s Declaration that Board Members May Not Serve as Members of the ACC and that No Valid ACC Existed at the Time of the Design and Construction of the Area H Fence

In the amended final judgment, the trial court declared that “HAPA board

members may not serve as members of the [ACC] and that no valid [ACC] existed at

the time of the design and construction of the safety barrier on Area H.” In its brief,

HAPA argues that this declaration “has no basis in law or fact.” Appellees counter

that Property Code Section 209.00505(c)—as it existed at the time of trial18—

provided the legal basis for the trial court’s declaration. See Tex. Prop. Code

§ 209.00505(c).

Chapter 209 of the Property Code is the Texas Residential Property Owners

Protection Act. Id. § 209.001. As effective at the time of trial, Section 209.00505(c)

provides that “[a] person may not be appointed or elected to serve on an architectural

review authority if the person is: (1) a current board member; (2) a current board

member’s spouse; or (3) a person residing in a current board member’s household.”

18 Section 209.00505(c) has been redesignated and amended as Property Code Section 209.00506. See Tex. Prop. Code §§ 209.00505(c), .00506.

34 Id. § 209.00505(c). Section 209.00505 “applies only to a property owners’ association

that consists of more than 40 lots.” Id. § 209.00505(b)(1).

A “[p]roperty owners’ association” is defined in Chapter 209 as “an

incorporated or unincorporated association” that (1) “is designated as the

representative of the owners of property in a residential subdivision,” (2) “has a

membership primarily consisting of the owners of the property covered by the

dedicatory instrument for the residential subdivision,” and (3) “manages or regulates

the residential subdivision for the benefit of the owners of property in the residential

subdivision.” Id. § 209.002(7). A “[r]esidential subdivision” is “a subdivision, planned

unit development, townhouse regime, or similar planned development in which all

land has been divided into two or more parts and is subject to restrictions that”

(1) “limit a majority of the land subject to the dedicatory instruments . . . to residential

use for single-family homes, townhomes, or duplexes only”; (2) “are recorded in the

real property records of the county in which the residential subdivision is located”;

and (3) “require membership in a property owners’ association that has authority to

impose regular or special assessments on the property in the subdivision.” Id.

§ 209.002(9).

HAPA contends that “[t]here is no evidence in the record that [the] Airfield is a

residential subdivision, and no party has argued otherwise.” Appellees suggest that

this argument fails because “numerous issues of the Flappings newsletter (HAPA’s

monthly newsletter) entered into evidence refer to HAPA as a homeowners’

35 association.” We have reviewed the Flappings19 newsletters admitted into evidence at

trial and have not found any references to HAPA being a homeowners’ association.

More importantly, we have found no evidence—nor have Appellees cited us to

any evidence—establishing that the Airfield is a “residential subdivision.” To that

end, we have found no evidence indicating that the Airfield is bound by restrictions

that “limit a majority of the land subject to its dedicatory instruments . . . to residential

use for single-family homes, townhomes, or duplexes only.” See id. § 209.002(9)(A).

To the contrary, the record reflects that the Airfield is a privately owned, public use

airport and that the Airfield’s lots are “all zoned commercial.” Accordingly, Section

209.00505(c) did not provide the trial court with a basis for declaring that “HAPA

board members may not serve as members of the [ACC] and that no valid [ACC]

existed at the time of the design and construction of the safety barrier on Area H.”

Because this was the sole legal basis for the challenged declaration, we reverse the

declaration and sustain this part of HAPA’s first issue. See AVCO Corp. v. Interstate

Sw., Ltd., 251 S.W.3d 632, 664 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied)

(reversing trial court’s declaration that was not supported by evidence).

Unangst stated that Flappings is an official publication of HAPA. 19

36 d. The Trial Court’s Declaration that Rio Concho Is the Assignee of the Airfield with All Rights and Privileges of the Declarant Concerning Area H

In the amended final judgment, the trial court declared that “Rio Concho is the

assignee of [the] Airfield’s Declarant as to all rights and privileges of the Declarant on

Area H as stated in the Original Declaration” and that such rights and privileges

“result in HAPA having limited authority over Area H.”

Article I, Section 9 of the original CCRs stated:

The portions of the Property designated by the symbol H shall be maintained, owned and operated by Declarant, its successors or assigns, at their option, as an area for the administration building for [the] Airfield, the sale of fuel . . . for aircraft and motor vehicles . . . , for parking of motor vehicles by Declarant, its agents, customers[,] and other invitees, and/or for any other lawful purpose. The water tank for [the] Airfield will also be maintained in this area.

The “Declarant” listed in the original CCRs was Hicks Airfield, Inc.20

In its brief, HAPA argues that Rio Concho is not the assignee of the

Declarant’s rights concerning Area H, pointing out that the original Declarant was

Hicks Airfield, Inc. and that Rio Concho acquired its lot from North Fort Worth

Aviation, Inc. HAPA contends that there is no evidence that Hicks Airfield, Inc.’s

Declarant rights were ever transferred to Rio Concho.

Appellees respond by arguing that “North Fort Worth Aviation, Inc. became

Hicks Airfield, Inc.’s successor as Declarant.” To support that proposition, Appellees

20 The original CCRs were signed by Sam G. McCall, Jr., as president of Hicks Airfield, Inc.

37 point to the “Declaration of Don Davis” that was attached as an exhibit to a

summary-judgment motion that was filed by Appellees in the trial court.21

Notably, while that declaration is contained in the clerk’s record, it was not

admitted as an exhibit at trial, so it is not evidence for us to consider. See Loredo v.

Williams, No. 03-25-00052-CV, 2025 WL 2325166, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 13,

2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Items in the clerk’s record . . . are not evidence unless

they were admitted as exhibits at trial or judicially noticed by the trial court.”); Guerinot

v. Wetherell, No. 01-12-00194-CV, 2013 WL 2456741, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] June 6, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Documents attached to pleadings are not

evidence unless they are offered and admitted as evidence by the trial court.”); Nat’l

Med. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist., 150 S.W.3d 901, 905 (Tex. App.—Dallas

2004, no pet.) (“For exhibits to be considered at trial, they must be properly admitted

as evidence, even if already attached to pleadings.”).

Appellees also point to Davis’s testimony at a temporary-injunction hearing to

support their position. Portions of Davis’s testimony from that hearing were

admitted into evidence at trial, and we will consider those portions. Davis testified

that he was one of the original developers of the Airfield, that he was the Declarant

21 In that declaration, Davis stated that he was a shareholder of Hicks Airfield, Inc.; that “[i]n the early 1990s, North [Fort Worth] Aviation acquired all of [Hicks Airfield, Inc.’s] assets, becoming the Declarant’s assignee and successor, with all rights and privileges assigned under the CCRs”; and that “[i]n June 1995, North [Fort Worth] Aviation sold real property, including Area ‘H’ to Rio Concho.”

38 for the Airfield, and that he assigned his rights to Area H to Rio Concho. Missing

from that testimony is any link from Hicks Aviation, Inc. to North Fort Worth

Aviation, Inc. to Rio Concho. Indeed, the testimony fails to mention North Fort

Worth Aviation, Inc.—the very entity that sold Rio Concho its lot.22

Moreover, other trial evidence does not support Appellees’ position. Mr.

Brunson acknowledged that the original Declarant was Hicks Airfield, Inc. and that

Hicks Airfield, Inc. is a separate entity from North Fort Worth Aviation, Inc. Mr.

Brunson admitted that he was unaware of any document whereby Hicks Airfield, Inc.

transferred any rights to North Fort Worth Aviation, Inc. While Mr. Brunson

maintained that North Fort Worth Aviation, Inc. had become the Declarant when Rio

Concho purchased its lot in 1995, he did not know when (or how) North Fort Worth

Aviation, Inc. acquired those rights.

Ms. Brunson also acknowledged that Hicks Airfield, Inc. was the original

Declarant in the CCRs, and she testified that she did not know whether North Fort

Worth Aviation, Inc. had ever been assigned Hicks Airfield, Inc.’s Declarant rights.

Moreover, when the Fifth Amendment to the CCRs was executed in 1998—three

22 Moreover, it is unclear who Davis was speaking of when he stated that he was the Declarant for the Airfield and that he had assigned his rights to Area H to Rio Concho. If Davis was suggesting that he owned the Declarant’s rights on an individual basis, it does not explain how Davis obtained the rights from Hicks Airfield, Inc. And if he was suggesting that North Fort Worth Aviation, Inc. owned the Declarant’s rights, it similarly does not explain how North Fort Worth Aviation, Inc. obtained the rights from Hicks Airfield, Inc.

39 years after Rio Concho purchased its lot from North Fort Worth Aviation, Inc.—the

Declarant was still listed as Hicks Airfield, Inc. Indeed, Hicks Airfield, Inc. signed a

consent document whereby it confirmed and approved the Fifth Amendment. Davis,

acting as the president of Hicks Airfield, Inc., signed that consent on its behalf. Ms.

Brunson also signed the Fifth Amendment.

Given the foregoing, we hold that there was no evidence for the trial court’s

declaration that “Rio Concho is the assignee of [the] Airfield’s Declarant as to all

rights and privileges of the Declarant on Area H as stated in the Original Declaration”

and that such rights and privileges “result in HAPA having limited authority over

Area H.” We thus reverse the trial court’s declaration and sustain this part of HAPA’s

first issue. See AVCO Corp., 251 S.W.3d at 664 (reversing trial court’s declaration that

was not supported by evidence).

e. The Trial Court’s Declaration that the CCR Signage Restrictions Apply Only to Lots with Hangars or T-Hangars and Not to Area H

In the amended final judgment, the trial court also declared that “the signage

restrictions in the CCRs apply only to lots with hangars or T-hangars” and that

“[b]ecause Rio Concho’s lot, Area H, does not have, and has never had, either type of

structure erected on it, such restrictions do not apply to Area H.” HAPA seemingly

attacks that declaration in three short sentences in its brief. Those sentences read:

The CCRs First Amendment, Def’s_Exh._50, subparagraph J. states: Except as permitted by the association, no signs shall be constructed on the Property. Commercial enterprises may, however, construct a sign

40 indicating the name of the business. RR6_16:20–24. Mr. Brunson agreed Plf’s Exh. 35 gave Rio Concho notice Area H was subject to the CCRs. RRVol 5_142:7–11.

The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure require adequate briefing, and the

failure to comply with those rules can result in waiver. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1;

Bertucci v. Watkins, 709 S.W.3d 534, 541 (Tex. 2025); Ross v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp.,

462 S.W.3d 496, 500 (Tex. 2015). Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1 requires

that an appellant’s brief contain, among other things, a clear and concise argument for

the contentions made, with appropriate citations to legal authority and to the record.

Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i); see ERI Consulting Eng’rs, Inc. v. Swinnea, 318 S.W.3d 867, 880

(Tex. 2010) (recognizing that “[t]he Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure require

adequate briefing”). Merely uttering brief, conclusory statements unsupported by

citation to legal authorities does not satisfy briefing requirements. Jimison v. MAEDC-

Hulen Bend Senior Cmty., L.P., No. 02-23-00206-CV, 2024 WL 3282544, at *8 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth July 3, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.); Valadez v. Avitia, 238 S.W.3d

843, 845 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007, no pet.). Indeed, “[f]ailure to cite legal authority

or provide substantive analysis of the legal issue presented results in waiver of the

complaint.” Valadez, 238 S.W.3d at 845.

Although we construe appellate briefs liberally and require only substantial

compliance with the briefing rules, see Tex. R. App. P. 38.9; Horton v. Stovall,

591 S.W.3d 567, 569–70 (Tex. 2019), “[w]e are not responsible for identifying possible

trial court error, searching the record for facts favorable to a party’s position, or

41 conducting legal research to support a party’s contentions.” In re J.O.A.M., No. 01-

23-00691-CV, 2024 WL 1169432, at *23 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 19,

2024, no pet.) (mem. op.). Nor are we required to “become advocates for a particular

litigant” by performing our own research and developing arguments for that litigant.

Perkins v. Hicks, No. 02-19-00207-CV, 2020 WL 7393334, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth Dec. 17, 2020, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.) (quoting Tello v. Bank One,

N.A., 218 S.W.3d 109, 116 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.)); see

Ihnfeldt v. Reagan, No. 02-14-00220-CV, 2016 WL 7010922, at *9 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth Dec. 1, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“It is an appellant’s burden to discuss

his assertions of error, and appellate courts have no duty—or even the right—to

perform an independent review of the record and the applicable law to determine

whether there was error.”). “Were we to engage in such activities, we would be

abandoning our role as judges and taking on the role of advocate for that party.”

J.O.A.M., 2024 WL 1169432, at *23 (citing Valadez, 238 S.W.3d at 845).

Having reviewed HAPA’s scant reference to this issue, we cannot ascertain the

substance of its complaint. In the complained-of declaration, the trial court found

that “the signage restrictions in the CCRs apply only to lots with hangars or T-

hangars” and that such restrictions do not apply to Rio Concho because Area H does

not have a hangar or a T-hangar. Yet in its three short sentences criticizing the trial

court’s declaration, HAPA does not discuss whether the signage restrictions apply

only to lots with hangars or T-hangars, does not address whether Area H has a hangar

42 or a T-hangar,23 and does not cite to any legal authority. We thus hold that HAPA

has not provided substantive analysis of the legal issue presented and that it has

waived this issue due to inadequate briefing. See J.O.A.M., 2024 WL 1169432, at *23;

Valadez, 238 S.W.3d at 845; see also In re Guardianship of Onyebuchi, No. 02-13-00401-

CV, 2014 WL 4463114, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 11, 2014, pet. denied)

(mem. op.) (recognizing that “arguments raised on appeal that are unsupported by

analysis or appropriate citation to legal authority and to the record present nothing for

us to review”); Huey v. Huey, 200 S.W.3d 851, 854 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.)

(holding that “[f]ailure to cite applicable authority or provide substantive analysis

waives an issue on appeal”).

f. The Trial Court’s Declaration that HAPA Abandoned the Restriction that Lots Must Be Used Only for Aircraft Hangars, General Office Use, or Airport-Related Commercial Businesses

In the amended final judgment, the trial court declared that “HAPA [had]

abandoned its restriction that lots must be used only for aircraft hangars, general

office use, or airport-related commercial businesses.” HAPA argues that the trial

court erred by making this declaration, pointing out that the CCRs contain a

nonwaiver provision and that, in any event, the trial evidence did not establish that

HAPA had abandoned its ability to enforce that restriction. As to the nonwaiver

23 Multiple witnesses at trial testified that Area H did not contain a hangar.

43 provision, the CCRs state that the “failure by [HAPA] or any Owner to enforce any

covenants, conditions[,] and restrictions herein contained shall in no event be deemed

a waiver of the right to do so thereafter.”

Two areas of law converge in our analysis of this issue—first, the law

concerning whether a restrictive covenant may be abandoned, and second, the law

concerning whether a nonwaiver clause may be waived. As to the first area, in the

seminal case of Cowling v. Colligan, the Texas Supreme Court declared that a court may

refuse to enforce a restrictive covenant “because of the acquiescence of the lot

owners in such substantial violations within the restricted area as to amount to an

abandonment of the covenant or a waiver of the right to enforce it.” 312 S.W.2d 946,

945 (Tex. 1958). “Cases subsequent to Cowling illustrate that, in the context of

restrictive covenants, the concepts of abandonment and waiver go hand in hand—a

finding that a restriction has been abandoned is essentially the same, and must have

the same evidentiary support, as a finding that the right to enforce the covenant has

been waived.” Musgrove v. Westridge Street Partners I, LLC, No. 2-07-281-CV, 2009 WL

976010, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 9, 2009, pet. denied) (per curiam) (mem.

op.) (collecting cases).

As we noted in Musgrove, “[t]o establish the affirmative defense of

abandonment or waiver, the defendant ‘must prove that the violations are so great as

to lead the mind of the average man to reasonably conclude that the restriction in

question has been abandoned.’” Id. (quoting Tanglewood Homes Ass’n, Inc. v. Henke,

44 728 S.W.2d 39, 43 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.)). Courts

assess the question of waiver in this context by weighing the number, nature, and

severity of then-existing violations; any prior acts of enforcement; and whether it is

still possible to realize to a substantial degree the benefits intended through the

covenant. Id.; Tanglewood Homes Ass’n, Inc., 728 S.W.2d at 43.

As to the second area of law—the area concerning whether a nonwaiver clause

may itself be waived—we begin by noting that “[w]aiver is ‘an intentional

relinquishment of a known right or intentional conduct inconsistent with claiming

that right.’” EIS Dev. II, LLC v. Buena Vista Area Ass’n, 715 S.W.3d 689, 699

(Tex. 2025) (quoting Teal Trading & Dev., LP v. Champee Springs Ranches Prop. Owners

Ass’n, 593 S.W.3d 324, 334 (Tex. 2020)). It is a question of intent, examining whether

a party’s conduct, in light of the surrounding facts and circumstances, is unequivocally

inconsistent with claiming a right. Id. As noted by the Texas Supreme Court, “Given

Texas’s strong public policy favoring freedom of contract, there can be no doubt that,

as a general proposition, nonwaiver provisions are binding and enforceable.” Shields

Ltd. P’ship v. Bradberry, 526 S.W.3d 471, 481 (Tex. 2017). Indeed, “[n]onwaiver

provisions have been enforced in the context of restrictive covenants.” Vance v.

Popkowski, 534 S.W.3d 474, 479 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied)

(collecting cases).

In Musgrove, we addressed the issue of whether a nonwaiver provision in a

restrictive covenant may be waived. See Musgrove, 2009 WL 976010, at *4. We stated

45 that we had not uncovered any Texas case that specifically addressed the question of

“whether a nonwaiver provision in a restrictive covenant is waived when the

restrictions have been abandoned.” Id. We agreed with the holding of an Arizona

court of appeals on the issue, which concluded that a “non[]waiver provision would

be ineffective if a complete abandonment of the entire set of [r]estrictions has occurred.”

Id. (quoting Burke v. Voicestream Wireless Corp. II, 87 P.3d 81, 87 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004))

(emphasis added). We held that to decide whether a trial court erred by holding that a

nonwaiver provision had been waived, we must examine the record “to see if there is

evidence of . . . violations so pervasive that the trial court could reasonably have

determined that the fundamental character of the neighborhood had been destroyed.”

Id.

Here, Appellees argue that HAPA has waived its ability to enforce the

restriction that lots must be used only for “aircraft hangars, general office use, or

airport-related commercial businesses” because “it acquiesced to a restaurant being

operated on the property for 25 years.” That argument, however, necessarily assumes

that the Café (or the Beacon before it) is not an “airport-related commercial business”

within the meaning of the CCRs. The trial court found that the Café is an “airport-

related commercial business,” and we have affirmed that finding. Thus, the mere fact

that HAPA allowed a restaurant to operate so long without interference at the Café’s

location is no evidence of abandonment of HAPA’s ability to enforce restrictions

against non-“airport-related commercial businesses.”

46 Appellees also point to Boback’s testimony that two- to three-dozen

“businesses or commercial businesses” operate at the Airfield. But Boback’s

testimony did not establish whether the two- to three-dozen businesses were “airport-

related commercial businesses” or non-“airport-related commercial businesses.”24

And, of course, if the businesses were “airport-related commercial businesses,”

HAPA would have no need to enforce its restriction against the use of the lots for

non-“airport-related commercial business.”

Appellees next point to testimony that certain businesses have been allowed to

operate at the Airfield, including an auto-body shop, a repair shop, a firearm

manufacturer, an industrial manufacturer, and short-term rental properties. We have

reviewed the testimony cited by Appellees. While witnesses did testify that the

Airfield included such businesses, there was virtually no testimony to establish what

these businesses did, whether they could be considered “airport-related commercial

businesses,” and whether HAPA had attempted to enforce any CCR provisions

against them.

Moreover, there was testimony that the Airfield contained 452 lots. So, even if

the evidence reflected that a handful of non-“airport-related commercial businesses”

24 Appellees similarly argue in their brief that “a variety of commercial businesses have opened and operated at [the] Airfield over the past 25 years.” But the number of commercial businesses that have operated at the Airfield is not necessarily the same as the number of non-“airport-related commercial businesses” that have operated at the Airfield.

47 were allowed to freely operate at the Airfield, such isolated occurrences would fail to

demonstrate that HAPA abandoned its ability to enforce the provision requiring that

lots be used only for “aircraft hangars, general office use, or airport-related

commercial businesses.”25 See City of Houston v. Revels, No. 14-99-00139-CV, 2001 WL

699546, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 21, 2001, pet. denied) (not

designated for publication) (“Texas courts have found that violation rates ranging

from 1.9% to 8.9% were not sufficient to support waiver and abandonment, while a

violation rate of nearly 27% was sufficient to find waiver and abandonment.”

(footnote omitted)); Finkelstein v. Southampton Civic Club, 675 S.W.2d 271, 278 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“Finkelstein’s affidavit proof of

two fronting violations reflects, at best, isolated instances of breach of the restriction.

We hold that they are insufficient as a matter of law in number, nature, or severity to

constitute waiver of the restrictive covenant’s benefits and enforceability.”).

And more importantly, for the nonwaiver provision to have been waived, there

must be “evidence of . . . violations so pervasive that the trial court could reasonably

The trial court admitted a list compiled by Ms. Brunson of forty-nine 25

businesses ostensibly operating at the Airfield. That list included businesses such as “Alliance Awards,” “Industrial Shredders,” “TNW Firearms [M]anufacturing,” “Auto Maintenance Shop,” “Lab Resources Medical Equipment,” “Stated Value Ramsey Auto Restoration,” “Ray Taggert – Accounting Firm,” and “Trevor Howell Berkshire Hathaway HomeServices Ally Real Estate.” Ms. Brunson acknowledged that by the time of trial, the list was “a year and a half old” and several of the businesses had changed. She also stated that she had not visited the businesses to confirm the nature of the businesses.

48 have determined that the fundamental character of the [Airfield] had been destroyed”

and that the “entire set” of restrictions had been abandoned. See Musgrove, 2009 WL

976010, at *4. The scant, cursory trial evidence regarding abandonment does not

come close to reaching this threshold. See Location, Location, Location, Ltd. v. Home

Depot USA, Inc., No. 07-21-00036-CV, 2022 WL 215131, at *4 (Tex. App.—Amarillo

Jan. 25, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“To establish waiver by abandonment of a

restrictive covenant running with the land, where there is a nonwaiver provision, a

property owner must prove that the existing violations are so great and the violations

so pervasive, that they have destroyed the fundamental purpose of the restrictions and

have caused the average person to conclude that the entire set of restrictions in question

have been abandoned.” (emphasis in original)); Vance, 534 S.W.3d at 481 (reversing

jury finding that deed restrictions had been abandoned when evidence did not

conclusively establish “complete abandonment of the entire set of [the deed

restrictions] so pervasive that the fundamental character of the neighborhood was

destroyed”).

Given the foregoing, we hold that the trial court did not have an evidentiary

basis for declaring that “HAPA [had] abandoned its restriction that lots must be used

only for aircraft hangars, general office use, or airport-related commercial businesses.”

We thus reverse the trial court’s declaration and sustain this part of HAPA’s first

issue. See Location, Location, Location, Ltd., 2022 WL 215131, at *4; Vance, 534 S.W.3d

at 481; Musgrove, 2009 WL 976010, at *4.

49 g. The Trial Court’s Declaration that HAPA Interpreted and Applied the CCRs in an Arbitrary, Capricious, and Discriminatory Manner Toward Rio Concho, Southlake Hospitality, and Barbie Land

In the amended final judgment, the trial court declared that “HAPA has

interpreted and applied the CCRs in an arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory

manner toward Rio Concho, Southlake [Hospitality], and Barbie Land.”26

In its brief, HAPA argues that it did not interpret and apply the CCRs in an

arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory manner toward Rio Concho, Southlake

Hospitality, or Barbie Land, pointing to the fact that it had issued violation notices to

entities other than Rio Concho, Southlake Hospitality, and Barbie Land. Specifically,

HAPA cites testimony from Bero—a lot owner and former Board member27—who

stated that the Board had sent violation notices to businesses that were not considered

to be “airport-related commercial businesses” when he was serving on the Board.

Bero, however, could not identify any of the businesses who had been sent these

violation notices.28

26 Pursuant to Section 202.004(a) of the Property Code, “An exercise of discretionary authority by a property owners’ association or other representative designated by an owner of real property concerning a restrictive covenant is presumed reasonable unless the court determines by a preponderance of the evidence that the exercise of discretionary authority was arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory.” Tex. Prop. Code § 202.004(a).

Bero indicated that he was on the Board around 2021. 27

Bero testified that he was aware that after he left the Board, the Board had 28

sent violation notices to other businesses stating that the businesses were in violation

50 Moreover, Bero stated that “it was very selective on who the [B]oard would

send the letters to” and that the violation notices were “not done per the CCRs or

anything else” but that they were “done on who you like and who you’re politically

connected to.” Bero also testified that the Board had a “vendetta against Rio

Concho.”29 He further opined that he “felt that the power of the [B]oard was being

manipulated for those that were friends of the [B]oard,” that “the [B]oard members

themselves that were in violation [went] after other people that [were] members,” and

that the violation notices were the result of “selective persecution by the [B]oard

against certain people.” Indeed, Bero stated that while he served on the Board, the

Board’s “main focus was ex[]acting a vendetta against Rio Concho” and that exacting

that vendetta “was most of what [the] meetings were about.”

HAPA also points to testimony from Ms. Brunson to demonstrate that HAPA

had issued other violation notices. Ms. Brunson testified that businesses other than

ones associated with her had been sent violation notices by HAPA, including notices

to two individuals and one entity. However, Ms. Brunson did not offer any

explanation as to why those violation notices were sent, and she stated that those

of the CCRs because they were not “airport-related commercial businesses.” Bero, however, did not state when those notices were sent, and he did not identify which businesses were sent the notices other than one of them being “a mechanic shop next to [his] building.” 29 Multiple Board members testified that they did not have a personal vendetta against Appellees.

51 violation notices had only been sent in the “last couple of months.” Ms. Brunson

opined that she felt singled out when Barbie Land received its violation notice

because she was “not aware of anyone else having received a notice of violation for

these type of violations of operating a nonairport-related business.” Ms. Brunson

maintained that the Board was unfairly targeting Rio Concho. Thus, Ms. Brunson’s

testimony does not support HAPA’s argument.

HAPA suggests that its actions with respect to Rio Concho, Southlake

Hospitality, and Barbie Land were warranted because those entities are operating in an

area “adjacent to a hotspot” on the Airfield. But the record reflects that the Beacon

had operated in the same location and that it had not received any violation notice

from the Board. Moreover, while several witnesses stated that Area H was near a

hotspot, witnesses also confirmed that the location had not been designated as a

hotspot on any aeronautical charts for the Airfield. And while some witnesses

testified about traffic incidents involving customers of the Café and the Lodge, the

traffic incidents were not unique to customers of those businesses. To that end,

witnesses testified about many other traffic incidents at the Airfield involving a myriad

of other persons and businesses, such as the Beacon’s customers, Amazon delivery

drivers, Uber Eats drivers, and others.

Having reviewed the record, we hold that there is credible evidence to support

the trial court’s conclusion that HAPA interpreted and applied the CCRs in an

arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory manner toward Rio Concho, Southlake

52 Hospitality, and Barbie Land. Bero’s testimony in particular supported the trial

court’s conclusion, and it was the trial court’s prerogative to believe him; we will not

substitute our judgment for the trial court. See Dao v. Mission Bend Homeowners Ass’n

Inc., 667 S.W.3d 304, 318 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, no pet.) (reviewing

trial court’s ruling with respect to whether homeowners’ association acted in arbitrary,

capricious, and discriminatory manner, and noting that factfinder was the sole judge

of witness credibility and the weight to be given their testimony).

Moreover, the record reflects that the Beacon was allowed to operate as a

restaurant in the same location as the Café without any interference from the Board.

See Sierra Crest Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Villalobos, 527 S.W.3d 235, 248 (Tex. App.—El

Paso 2016, no pet.) (affirming jury finding that homeowners’ association acted

arbitrarily, capriciously, and discriminatorily and noting that “[e]ven the cold words on

the written page scream animosity” between association and homeowner); Nolan v.

Hunter, No. 04-13-00072-CV, 2013 WL 5431050, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio

Sept. 25, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (affirming jury finding that architectural control

committee had acted in an arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory manner by

rejecting homeowner’s plan for wooden privacy fence when other similar wooden

privacy fences were allowed in the subdivision).

In sum, we cannot say that the evidence conclusively established that HAPA

did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or in a discriminatory manner toward Rio Concho,

Southlake Hospitality, or Barbie Land. See Gunn, 554 S.W.3d at 658; Sierra Crest

53 Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 527 S.W.3d at 248; Nolan, 2013 WL 5431050, at *4. Nor can

we say that the trial court’s finding that HAPA so acted was contrary to the great

weight and preponderance of the evidence. See Pool, 715 S.W.2d at 635; Sierra Crest

Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 527 S.W.3d at 248; Nolan, 2013 WL 5431050, at *4.

Accordingly, we hold that there was both legally and factually sufficient evidence to

support the trial court’s declaration that HAPA interpreted and applied the CCRs in

an arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory manner toward Rio Concho, Southlake

Hospitality, and Barbie Land.

h. The Trial Court’s Declaration that the CCRs Permit Tenants to Operate Businesses on the Airfield and that HAPA May Not Exclude Customers and Tenants

In the amended final judgment, the trial court declared that “the CCRs in effect

permit the use of [the] Airfield lots for aircraft hangars, general office use, and all

airport-related commercial businesses” and that “[t]he CCRs do not grant HAPA the

authority to exclude the customers, invitees, and guests of [the] Airfield’s lot owners

and tenants.”

HAPA attacks this declaration in one paragraph in its brief. It argues that the

trial court erred by making the declaration because “[n]o provision in the CCRs exist

which permit a tenant to own or operate a business on the Airfield.” HAPA points to

the Fifth Amendment to the CCRs, which provides, in pertinent part, that the subject

54 property “may only be used for aircraft hangars, general office use, airport[-]related

commercial business, and Common Areas related to the use thereof.”

The Fifth Amendment goes on to say that HAPA acknowledged that certain

lot owners were then “presently using their Lots for other than aircraft hangars,

general office use[,] and airport[-]related commercial business” and that “the existing

Owners of those Lots shall have the right to continue to operate or use their Lots for

their present purposes.” However, “this right shall be personal to the Owners of said

Lots and upon the sale, lease, transfer[,] or other disposition of any nature by the

present Owner of such Lot . . . , such use shall . . . no longer be valid.”

According to HAPA, this last provision—that “this right shall be personal” and

that it should no longer be valid upon the lease of the lot—somehow equates to a

blanket prohibition on a tenant’s ability to operate a business on the Airfield. We

disagree. That section of the Fifth Amendment begins by specifically providing that a

lot may be used for an “airport[-]related commercial business.” The section then

mentions that some lot owners had been using their lots for things other than aircraft

hangars, general office use, and airport-related commercial businesses, and notes that

those lot owners shall “have the right” to continue using the lots for their then-

“present purposes.” However, the provision states that “this right”—i.e., the right of

the lot owners to use their lots for something other than aircraft hangars, general

office use, and airport-related commercial businesses—“shall be personal” and no

longer valid upon the sale or lease of the lot. Thus, the context of the Fifth

55 Amendment confirms that the language stating that “this right shall be personal” was

not speaking of the right to use a lot for airport-related commercial businesses but

rather was speaking of the right of lot owners who had been using their lots for other

than aircraft hangars, general office use, and airport-related commercial business to

continue doing so.

Having reviewed the CCRs, we have found no provision in them that prohibits

a tenant from using its lot for aircraft hangars, general office use, or an airport-related

commercial business. Indeed, Unangst—the Board’s President—was asked at trial

whether there was “a prohibition on leasing property at [the Airfield].” Unangst

responded, “There is not.” And absent such a provision, the Airfield lot owners are

free to lease their lots. See Calcasieu Lumber Co. v. Harris, 13 S.W. 453, 454 (Tex. 1890)

(“The ownership of land, when the estate is a fee, carries with it the right to use the

land in any manner not hurtful to others; and the right to lease it to others, and

therefore derive profit, is an incident of such ownership.”); City of Grapevine v. Muns,

651 S.W.3d 317, 346 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2021, no pet.) (op. on reh’g) (“Property

ownership includes the right to lease to others.”); Zaatari v. City of Austin, 615 S.W.3d

172, 190 (Tex. App.—Austin 2019, pet denied) (“The ability to lease property is a

fundamental privilege of property ownership.”).

The trial court did not err by declaring that “the CCRs in effect permit the use

of [the] Airfield lots for aircraft hangars, general office use, and all airport-related

commercial businesses” and that “[t]he CCRs do not grant HAPA the authority to

56 exclude the customers, invitees, and guests of [the] Airfield’s lot owners and tenants.”

See Calcasieu Lumber Co., 13 S.W. at 454; City of Grapevine, 651 S.W.3d at 346; Zaatari,

615 S.W.3d at 190.

We overrule this final part of HAPA’s first issue.

B. HAPA’s Complaints Regarding the Permanent Injunction

In its second issue, HAPA argues that the trial court erred by issuing its

permanent injunction.

We review a trial court’s decision to grant a permanent injunction for an abuse

of discretion. Operation Rescue-Nat’l v. Planned Parenthood of Hous. & Se. Tex., Inc.,

975 S.W.2d 546, 560 (Tex. 1998); Gilbreath v. Horan, 682 S.W.3d 454, 542 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g). A trial court abuses its

discretion when it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner or without reference to

any guiding rules or principles. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238,

241–42 (Tex. 1985). When a trial court grants a permanent injunction that is not

supported by the pleadings or the evidence, the trial court abuses its discretion.

Gilbreath, 682 S.W.3d at 543 (citing Webb v. Glennbrook Owners Ass’n, Inc., 298 S.W.3d

374, 391 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.) (op. on reh’g)). On the other hand, there

is no abuse of discretion if the trial court heard conflicting evidence and there is

evidence in the record that reasonably supports the trial court’s decision. Id. We may

57 not substitute our own judgment for the trial court’s judgment on matters within the

trial court’s discretion. Id.

2. Enjoining HAPA to Perform a Traffic Safety Study

In the amended final judgment, the trial court permanently enjoined HAPA by

ordering it “to undertake a traffic safety study conducted by a qualified firm to

recommend changes designed to prevent land vehicles from making dangerous

incursions onto the runway.” In its brief, HAPA argues that the trial court abused its

discretion by enjoining it to undertake a traffic safety study because Appellees’

pleadings did not seek that relief.

Under Texas law, a trial court cannot issue a permanent injunction granting

relief that is not requested in a party’s pleadings. Holubec, 111 S.W.3d at 40; Livingston

v. Livingston, 537 S.W.3d 578, 588 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.).

Indeed, “whe[n] the injunctive relief granted exceeds the relief requested by the

applicant in the petition, the trial court exceeds its jurisdiction.” Harbor Perfusion, Inc.

v. Floyd, 45 S.W.3d 713, 718 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2001, no pet.).

Here, Appellees’ pleadings did not contain any request for injunctive relief

pertaining to a traffic safety study. Accordingly, the trial court was without authority

to make any injunction concerning a traffic safety study, and it abused its discretion by

issuing such an injunction. See Holubec, 111 S.W.3d at 40; Gilbreath, 682 S.W.3d at 543;

Livingston, 537 S.W.3d at 588; see also Tex. Health Huguley, Inc. v. Jones, 637 S.W.3d 202,

223 n.42 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2021, no pet.) (“Because [the appellee] did not

58 request an injunction compelling [the appellant] to grant [the doctor] ICU privileges,

the trial court could not issue the temporary injunction.”); Harbor Perfusion, Inc.,

45 S.W.3d at 718 (holding that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by entering any

injunctive relief beyond enjoining appellant from enforcing a covenant not to

compete when appellee’s petition requested only that appellant be enjoined from

enforcing said covenant). We sustain this part of HAPA’s second issue, and we

reverse the portion of the amended final judgment containing injunctive relief relating

to the traffic safety study.30

30 Within HAPA’s discussion of its second issue—its issue concerning the trial court’s issuance of a permanent injunction—HAPA devotes two pages to arguing that “[n]o membership vote is required for the [B]oard [to] make the Airfield’s gates access controlled.” It is unclear, however, what portion of the trial court’s amended final judgment is being attacked by this complaint. HAPA does not point to any portion of the amended final judgment or any other ruling by the trial court in its discussion of this argument. We have reviewed the trial court’s permanent injunction, and we have found no injunction within it regarding a membership vote. Moreover, HAPA does not explain how its argument regarding the membership vote would necessitate the reversal of some other aspect of the trial court’s amended final judgment.

Accordingly, to the extent that HAPA intended for its discussion of membership voting on access control to raise a separate appellate issue, we hold that HAPA has inadequately briefed this portion of its second issue. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i); Valadez, 238 S.W.3d at 845; see also In re J.D., No. 02-24-00515-CV, 2025 WL 2810523, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 2, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that appellant inadequately briefed appellate issue when she did not provide record references to support her complaint and failed to provide any explanation as to how her complaint would necessitate a reversal of trial court’s order); Huey, 200 S.W.3d at 854 (holding that failure to provide substantive analysis waived issue on appeal).

59 3. The Permanent Injunction Against HAPA

In the amended final judgment, the trial court permanently enjoined HAPA

from “asserting, sending notices, or assessing fines based on allegations that Rio

Concho or Southlake [Hospitality] violated the CCRs by permitting unapproved

signage on Area H, erecting all current additions and improvements to the former

administration building on Area H, and constructing the safety barrier on Area H.”

In its brief, HAPA argues that this injunction was improperly granted because

“Rio Concho was never assigned [the] Declarant’s (Hicks Airfield, Inc.[’s]) rights via

its purchase from North Fort Worth Aviation, Inc.” In response, Appellees point to

their previous argument that Rio Concho is the assignee of the Declarant’s rights to

Area H. Thus, both parties seem to agree that our disposition of this issue hinges on

one we have already addressed: our holding that the trial court erred by declaring that

“Rio Concho is the assignee of [the] Airfield’s Declarant as to all rights and privileges

of the Declarant on Area H as stated in the Original Declaration” and that such rights

and privileges “result in HAPA having limited authority over Area H.” See supra

Section III.A.3.d.

Because we have held that the trial court erred by making such a declaration,

we likewise hold that the trial court abused its discretion by entering this permanent

injunction. We sustain this part of HAPA’s second issue, and we reverse the portion

of the amended final judgment permanently enjoining HAPA from “asserting,

sending notices, or assessing fines based on allegations that Rio Concho or Southlake

60 [Hospitality] violated the CCRs by permitting unapproved signage on Area H, erecting

all current additions and improvements to the former administration building on Area

H, and constructing the safety barrier on Area H.”

C. HAPA’s Complaints Regarding the Trial Court’s Findings of Tortious Interference and Breach of Fiduciary Duty

In its third issue, HAPA argues that the trial court erred by finding that it had

tortiously interfered with contracts between Rio Concho and Southlake Hospitality

and between Barbie Land and its customers. HAPA also argues that the trial court

erred by finding that it had breached fiduciary duties owed to Rio Concho and Barbie

Land.

1. Tortious Interference

The elements of a tortious-interference claim are (1) the existence of a contract

subject to interference, (2) the occurrence of an act of interference that was willful

and intentional, (3) the act was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s damage, and

(4) actual damage or loss occurred. Inwood Nat’l Bank v. Fagin, 706 S.W.3d 342, 347

(Tex. 2025).

Among other arguments relating to the trial court’s tortious-interference

finding, HAPA contends that “there was no evidence presented to support a damage

award to Rio Concho of $34,276.00, or even any means of calculating this sum, or

61 that Barbie Land suffered $500.00 in damages.”31 Appellees do not respond to this in

their brief; they say nothing with respect to the evidence that Rio Concho suffered

$34,276 in damages or that Barbie Land suffered $500 in damages as a result of

HAPA’s tortious interference.32

We have scoured the record looking for evidence to support the trial court’s

awards of damages stemming from HAPA’s alleged tortious interference, but we have

found no such evidence. The record reveals that Rio Concho had a lease with

Southlake Hospitality allowing Southlake Hospitality to operate the Café. But the

record does not indicate that Rio Concho suffered damages—much less $34,276 in

damages—pertaining to HAPA’s alleged interference with that lease.33 Faulkner—

Southlake Hospitality’s owner—testified that he had not terminated the lease with Rio

Concho and that he had no intention of terminating the lease. Ms. Brunson similarly

31 This is a legal-sufficiency challenge. As noted above, we may sustain a legal- sufficiency challenge only when (1) the record bears no evidence of a vital fact, (2) the rules of law or of evidence bar the court from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla, or (4) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of a vital fact. Gunn, 554 S.W.3d at 658; see supra Section III.A.1. 32 In its reply brief, HAPA points out that Appellees’ brief fails to address the evidence pertaining to the trial court’s awards of damages stemming from HAPA’s alleged tortious interference. Even when Appellees later filed a sur-reply, the sur- reply still did not address the evidence pertaining to damages. 33 Faulkner testified that Southlake Hospitality paid the same amount of rent to Rio Concho both before and after the South Gate became subject to a gate access restriction.

62 testified that Rio Concho had not received any notice that Southlake Hospitality

intended to terminate the lease. Further, Faulkner testified that he had an agreement

with Rio Concho that neither Southlake Hospitality nor Rio Concho would seek

compensation from each other if either decided to terminate the lease.

As to Barbie Land’s damages, the record does not contain evidence of any

contract that Barbie Land had with a customer that was interfered with by HAPA,

much less any evidence to support the $500 awarded to Barbie Land.

Having found no evidence to support the trial court’s awards of damages for

tortious interference—and having not been pointed to any such evidence by

Appellees—we must reverse the trial court’s awards of damages stemming from

HAPA’s tortious interference and enter a take-nothing judgment on Appellees’

tortious-interference claims.34 See id.; see also Martin v. Beitler, No. 03-13-00605-CV,

2015 WL 4197042, at *5–6 (Tex. App.—Austin July 7, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(reversing jury’s awards of damages for tortious interference when there was no

evidence to support the awards).

34 Because HAPA’s legal-sufficiency argument regarding damages is dispositive of this issue, we need not address HAPA’s additional arguments pertaining to the trial court’s tortious-interference finding. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.

63 2. Breach of Fiduciary Duty

The elements of a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim are (1) the existence of a

fiduciary duty, (2) breach of the duty, (3) causation, and (4) damages. First United

Pentecostal Church of Beaumont v. Parker, 514 S.W.3d 214, 220 (Tex. 2017).

HAPA contends that “[t]here was no evidence that Rio Concho suffered

$26,000 in damages or that Barbie Land suffered $16,000.00 in damages for HAPA’s

alleged breach of fiduciary duty.”35 Again, Appellees do not respond to this portion

of HAPA’s issue.36

Again, we have searched the record looking for evidence to support the trial

court’s awards of damages stemming from HAPA’s alleged breach of fiduciary duty,

but we have found no such evidence. The record does not show that Rio Concho

suffered any damages—let alone $26,000 in damages—as a result of HAPA’s breach

of fiduciary duty. Further, the record does not show that Barbie Land suffered any

damages—let alone $16,000 in damages—as a result of HAPA’s breach of fiduciary

duty.

This is a legal-sufficiency challenge, and we will review it under the legal- 35

sufficiency standards discussed above. See Gunn, 554 S.W.3d at 658; supra Section III.A.1; supra note 31.

In its reply brief, HAPA points out that Appellees’ brief fails to address the 36

evidence pertaining to the trial court’s awards of damages stemming from HAPA’s alleged breach of fiduciary duty. But again, Appellees’ sur-reply still did not address the evidence pertaining to damages.

64 Having found no evidence to support the trial court’s awards of damages for

breach of fiduciary duty—and having not been pointed to any such evidence by

Appellees—we must reverse the trial court’s awards of damages stemming from

HAPA’s breach of fiduciary duty and enter a take-nothing judgment on Appellees’

breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims.37 See First United Pentecostal Church of Beaumont,

514 S.W.3d at 220; Swank v. Sverdlin, 121 S.W.3d 785, 799 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (holding evidence legally insufficient to support jury’s awards

for breach of fiduciary duty).

We sustain HAPA’s third issue.

D. HAPA’s Complaints Regarding the Trial Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

In its fourth issue, HAPA argues that the trial court erred by making certain

findings of fact and conclusions of law. More specifically, HAPA argues that there is

insufficient evidence to support twenty-seven of the trial court’s findings of fact38 and

that we should review twenty of the trial court’s conclusions of law de novo because

the conclusions drawn from the facts are incorrect.39

37 Because HAPA’s legal-sufficiency argument regarding damages is dispositive of this issue, we need not address HAPA’s additional arguments pertaining to the trial court’s breach-of-fiduciary-duty finding. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. 38 HAPA attacks Findings of Fact Nos. 5, 7–9, 11, 18–34, 36–40. 39 HAPA attacks Conclusions of Law Nos. 41–60.

65 As it relates to the trial court’s conclusions of law, HAPA’s entire argument is

contained in the following two sentences: “The court should review Conclusions of

Law Nos. 41–60 de novo as the conclusions drawn from the facts are incorrect. The

trial court’s judgment is not correct and requires reversal.” We hold that HAPA’s

cursory, global attacks on the trial court’s conclusions of law are waived due to

inadequate briefing. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i); Catamount Props. 2018, LLC v. Guild

Mortg. Co., LLC, No. 05-23-00585-CV, 2025 WL 1285856, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas

May 1, 2025, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding that appellant’s “global[] attacks” on

the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law that “ma[de] no effort to

demonstrate . . . how any specific finding diverged from the evidence presented at

trial” were “waived for failing to provide substantive briefing on the matter”); Payne v.

Highland Homes, Ltd., No. 02-14-00067-CV, 2016 WL 3569533, at *2 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth June 30, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Bare assertions of error, without

argument or authority, waive error.”); Helitrans Co. v. Rotorcraft Leasing Co., LLC,

No. 01-13-00145-CV, 2015 WL 593310, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

Feb. 12, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that appellant failed to adequately brief

challenge to conclusions of law when it only stated which conclusions it challenged

without providing argument demonstrating that the conclusions were erroneous).

HAPA’s challenges to twenty-seven of the trial court’s findings of fact do not

fare much better. With the exception of one challenge—a challenge to Finding of

Fact No. 25 that we will discuss below—HAPA’s challenges fail to provide

66 substantive analysis and fail to explain how our granting of the challenges would lead

to a reversible judgment.40 We hold that—with the exception of HAPA’s challenge to

Finding of Fact No. 25—HAPA’s cursory, bare-bones attacks on the trial court’s

findings of fact are waived due to inadequate briefing. See Hoskin v. Hoskin, No. 02-

24-00240-CV, 2025 WL 1909326, at *9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 10, 2025, no

40 As examples, HAPA’s brief includes such bare-bones challenges as the following:

• “Finding of Fact No. 18, is legally and factually insufficient. No 60% vote is required to secure Airfield gates.”

• “Finding of Fact No. 21, is factually and legally insufficient. Facilities of a 501(c)(7) should not be accessible or used for public accommodation.”

• “Finding of Fact No. 22, is factually and legally insufficient, finding HAPA prevented Appellees from sharing gate codes with the public. To maintain tax-exempt status HAPA’s gate codes should not be shared with the general public.”

• “Finding of Fact No. 23, is factually and legally insufficient, finding Southlake [Hospitality] did more to promote safety to the public than HAPA, as a 501(c)(7) social club, HAPA is not required to educate the general public.”

• “Finding of Fact No. 26, is legally insufficient in finding the listed businesses are airport-related commercial businesses. Rather the contrary was shown.”

• “Finding of Fact No. 30, is legally and factually insufficient. HAPA is a 501(c)(7) according to the IRS, and not a commercial property management association.”

• “Finding of Fact No. 33, is legally and factually insufficient, relating to a trophy company on the Airfield. The business was grandfathered with the Fifth Amendment.”

67 pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that appellant’s complaints regarding findings of fact were

inadequately briefed when appellant made “conclusory statements that [were]

unsupported by argument or citation”); Hollis v. Acclaim Physician Grp., Inc., No. 02-19-

00062-CV, 2019 WL 3334617, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 25, 2019, no pet.)

(per curiam) (mem. op.) (holding that briefing requirements are not met “by merely

uttering brief conclusory statements, unsupported by legal citations”); Helitrans Co.,

2015 WL 593310, at *3 (holding that appellant failed to adequately brief challenge to

findings of fact when it only stated which findings it challenged without providing

argument “demonstrating that the trial court’s findings of fact were without

evidentiary support in the record”); West v. Triple B Servs., LLP, 264 S.W.3d 440, 456

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (holding that appellant’s challenge to

finding of fact was inadequately briefed when it contained “no argument, analysis, or

legal authorities to support its assertion”).

As to Finding of Fact No. 25, HAPA complains that there was no evidence of

damages with respect to Rio Concho’s tortious-interference claim. As noted above,

we are reversing the trial court’s tortious-interference judgment because there was no

evidence of damages. Accordingly, we sustain HAPA’s complaint regarding Finding

of Fact No. 25, and we overrule HAPA’s remaining challenges to the trial court’s

findings of fact and conclusions of law.

68 E. HAPA’s Complaint Regarding the Trial Court’s Awards of Attorney’s Fees

In its fifth issue, HAPA argues that the trial court erred by awarding attorney’s

fees to Appellees. The complained-of awards were based on the trial court’s

declaratory-judgment rulings in favor of Appellees. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code

§ 37.009 (stating that, in any proceeding under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments

Act, “the court may award costs and reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees as are

equitable and just”).

Because we have sustained portions of HAPA’s first issue complaining about

the trial court’s declaratory-judgment rulings and are reversing some of the trial

court’s declarations, we must reverse the trial court’s awards of attorney’s fees and

remand the issue of attorney’s fees to the trial court. See Waldrop v. Waldrop,

552 S.W.3d 396, 411 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, no pet.) (en banc) (op. on reh’g)

(reversing award of attorney’s fees and remanding that issue to trial court after

reversing part of trial court’s declaratory-judgment ruling); Grohman-Kahlig v. Kahlig,

No. 04-07-00468-CV, 2008 WL 5377704, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 17,

2008, no pet.) (mem. op.) (op. on reh’g) (“[B]ecause we reverse the portion of the trial

court’s judgment granting the declaratory relief, we also reverse the award of

attorney’s fees and remand the cause to determine, in part, what award of attorney’s

fees, if any, is equitable and just in light of our holdings.” (internal quotation marks

omitted)).

We thus sustain HAPA’s fifth issue.

69 IV. CONCLUSION

Having sustained parts of HAPA’s first issue, we reverse the trial court’s

declarations that “HAPA board members may not serve as members of the [ACC]

and that no valid [ACC] existed at the time of the design and construction of the

safety barrier on Area H”; that “Rio Concho is the assignee of [the] Airfield’s

Declarant as to all rights and privileges of the Declarant on Area H as stated in the

Original Declaration” and that such rights and privileges “result in HAPA having

limited authority over Area H”; and that “HAPA [had] abandoned its restriction that

lots must be used only for aircraft hangars, general office use, or airport-related

commercial businesses.” We affirm the remaining declarations of the trial court in the

amended final judgment.

Having sustained parts of HAPA’s second issue, we reverse the trial court’s

injunction directing HAPA “to undertake a traffic safety study conducted by a

qualified firm to recommend changes designed to prevent land vehicles from making

dangerous incursions onto the runway” and enjoining HAPA from “asserting, sending

notices, or assessing fines based on allegations that Rio Concho or Southlake

[Hospitality] violated the CCRs by permitting unapproved signage on Area H, erecting

all current additions and improvements to the former administration building on Area

H, and constructing the safety barrier on Area H.” We affirm the remaining

injunctive relief in the amended final judgment.

70 Having sustained HAPA’s third issue and its fourth issue to the extent that it

challenged Finding of Fact No. 25, we reverse the trial court’s awards of damages

stemming from HAPA’s alleged tortious interference and breaches of fiduciary duties,

and we enter take-nothing judgments on Appellees’ tortious-interference and breach-

of-fiduciary duty claims.

Finally, having sustained HAPA’s fifth issue, we reverse the trial court’s awards

of attorney’s fees and remand the issue of attorney’s fees to the trial court.

All remaining portions of the amended final judgment are affirmed.

/s/ Dana Womack

Dana Womack Justice

Delivered: June 11, 2026