Hibbard v. Baker

104 N.W. 399, 141 Mich. 124, 1905 Mich. LEXIS 761
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 24, 1905
DocketDocket No. 47
StatusPublished
Cited by26 cases

This text of 104 N.W. 399 (Hibbard v. Baker) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hibbard v. Baker, 104 N.W. 399, 141 Mich. 124, 1905 Mich. LEXIS 761 (Mich. 1905).

Opinion

Ostrander, J.

An instrument purporting to be the last will of William Baker is claimed by his son, Payette L. Baker, to be invalid, because the testator lacked mental competency to make it, and because undue influence over him was exercised by his wife, and by others aiding and assisting her. William Baker was a farmer. He died February 27, 1903, at the age of 83 years. He had had two children — the son, Payette, born in 1850, and a daughter who died, leaving a daughter. This granddaughter from her infancy lived with decedent as his own child. Payette remained at home until he was 25 years of age, working the last four years for wages. Thereafter, for 19 years, he worked his father’s farm on shares. He had five children, all born on his father’s farm. In 1893 Payette sold to his father his crops, personal property, and a house he had built for himself on the farm, and in January, 1894, removed to Idaho, where he has since resided. There remained on the farm then decedent, his wife, and the granddaughter. On April 25, 1897, decedent’s wife died. Payette was at home during a part of the time his mother was ill. Thereafter decedent and the grandchild composed the household until August 20,1899, when she mar[126]*126ried, and, with, her husband, lived some seven miles distant from decedent. Having been informed of the approaching marriage of his granddaughter, decedent proposed marriage to an elderly and respectable lady of his acquaintance, living in Battle Creek, and she declined his offer. Later, after the granddaughter had married and gone away, decedent arranged with Mary Hibbard, a widow, who then lived in Augusta, who for 30 years had lived within a half mile of decedent, to go to his farm and act as housekeeper. She went to decedent’s farm on the last day of August, 1899. Two days later, on Saturday, at the breakfast table, decedent proposed marriage, and brought up the subject again on the succeeding Tuesday, at which time Mrs. Hibbard agreed to marry him. On Friday, September 8th, they, together, visited a lawyer in Battle Creek, who had some acquaintance with Mrs. Hibbard, and none with decedent. Decedent informed the lawyer of the contemplated marriage, and that he wanted a deed of his farm made in such way that he should have control of it as long as he lived, and, if Mrs. Hibbard outlived him, the farm should become hers after his death; if he survived her, it should remain his. He was advised that such disposition could not be made before the marriage; that after marriage a deed to them as husband and wife could be made. He was further advised, upon his inquiry, that an antenuptial contract could be entered into, and one was prepared and executed, and left with the lawyer for safe-keeping. As drawn, this contract not only covers the ground stated, but contains also a promise on the part of Mrs. Hibbard to execute a will in favor of decedent, devising him all realty of which she might die seised for his life. On Sunday, September 17, 1899, the parties were married. The granddaughter was not invited to attend, nor was she present. She had not been married at her grandfather’s house, nor did she invite him to her wedding. On September 20, 1899, decedent and his wife executed a deed of the farm to a third person, who on the same day executed a deed to decedent [127]*127and his wife as tenants by entireties, containing also the words, “ and to the survivor of them and his or her heirs, forever.” These deeds were both duly recorded. Decedent also on the same day made his last will, by the terms of which, after directing payment of his debts, he bequeathed to the five children of his son (naming them) $900, to his granddaughter $100, and the residue of his estate was bequeathed and devised to his wife. The value of this residuary legacy does not appear. We infer from all the facts appearing that it is of small value. Frank L. Hibbard, a foster son of his wife, was named executor. His wife also executed her will in accordance with the terms of the antenuptial agreement, making her foster son her residuary legatee and devisee. At the date of his last marriage, decedent was 79 and his wife 66 years of age. Mrs. Hibbard-Baker owned a house and lot in Augusta, to which, after decedent had sold off his personal effects at auction, they removed in November, 1901. In 1890 decedent had an acute attack of sickness, the nature of which does not appear, during which he was subject to delusions. In the spring of 1902, delusions recurred and continued at intervals until he died. The probate court, in which the contest was instituted, admitted the will to probate. Contestant appealed to the circuit court, where a jury found a general verdict against its validity. The substance of all the testimony given in the circuit court is in the bill of exceptions.

Counsel for proponent strongly insists that there is no evidence of the mental incompetency of decedent at the time the will was executed, and that the court should have, as it was requested to do, so instructed the jury. Determination of this contention has required the reading of the entire record. Most of the testimony introduced to show mental incompetency is aimed at establishing, by possible inference, senile dementia — a progressive condition attendant in some cases upon advancing age, and a condition which, if existing, affords opportunity for the exercise of influence by way of direction and suggestion, [128]*128|Which does not attend, to such degree, at least, most forms of dementia. In other words, if decedent was ; afflicted as it is claimed he was, no test can well be applied to determine lucidity and disposing power at any particular time or during any particular interval. It may well be said, and our examination of the record convinces us that it should be said, that, if decedent was competent to make the disposition of his property which he did make, no separate question of undue influence is involved. There is no direct testimony and none from which it can be reasonably inferred, that decedent was improperly influenced or persuaded to make the disposition he did make, if he was legally competent to make a will. We have reached the conclusion that there is no evidence in this record impeaching the validity of this will. In reaching this conclusion, we eliminate entirely, as improperly admitted, the testimony received over objection relative to the illness decedent had in 1890. It is true that the testimony relating to this sickness shows that decedent had delusions. It also shows an acute malady, from which he recovered. It is undisputed that after that time he attended to his business as usual. He visited the World’s Fair in 1893, made visits to New York and Boston in 1891, and sold land. He was more feeble physically.

The persons best acquainted with decedent to the time when the will was made were his son and his granddaughter. They are most concerned about the disposition of his property. It is true that the son (contestant) left the farm, and did not afterwards see very much of his father. He left the place in January, 1894.

“ When my father was in his prime, he was not overly large in stature, but he was a very strong, wiry man, with great endurance, physically and mentally. He was a man that had a great deal of will power, and a strong mind of his own — very—as near as I can describe it. I went away from there before mother died.
Q. Will you state to the jury how you came to go west ?
A. Well, I had lived there until I was forty-five years [129]*129old.

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Bluebook (online)
104 N.W. 399, 141 Mich. 124, 1905 Mich. LEXIS 761, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hibbard-v-baker-mich-1905.