Hawthorne v. Dunn

177 N.W. 393, 210 Mich. 176, 1920 Mich. LEXIS 386
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedApril 28, 1920
DocketDocket No. 60
StatusPublished
Cited by22 cases

This text of 177 N.W. 393 (Hawthorne v. Dunn) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hawthorne v. Dunn, 177 N.W. 393, 210 Mich. 176, 1920 Mich. LEXIS 386 (Mich. 1920).

Opinions

Fellows, J.

(after stating the facts). We realize full well the advantage possessed by the trial judge, due to the fact that he sees the witnesses and is able to better judge their credibility than can we by an examination of the printed record. But we hear chancery cases de novo with a duty of reaching an independent conclusion aided as we must be by the conclusions of the trial judge but not controlled by them. There is no evidence in this case in the slightest degree tending to show that any fraud or undue influence was practiced on the deceased, nor is there any claim that fraud or undue influence is established. The decree must rest and solely rest upon the ground that John Dunn was mentally incompetent to transact the business in hand when he executed the deed in question. The learned chancellor nowhere in his opinion directly states that he found deceased was incompetent to transact business. He was led to make the decree appealed from because the deceased in the [180]*180latter years of Ms life made four different deeds of Ms property. From tMs fact and from tMs fact alone he concluded, not that deceased was a mental incompetent, but that he did not have a “sane or rational conception of the meaning of a warranty deed.” Not only is this the basis of this decree, but it is the only basis upon which a decree could be entered. There is in this case no proof of a single irrational act of the deceased when he was sober in his entire life of 74 years. If we were considering a will contest and the proof showed that the testator had drank liquor, even excessively, and some 14 or 15 years ago had had delirium tremens, had taken treatment for the habit, but returned to it, and during the last 7 or 8 years of his life had made 4 different wills, and the last one was made when he was perfectly sober, and upon such testimony it was asked to have the will set aside, would this court hesitate for a moment in saying that there was no testimony to take the case to the jury and that a verdict should be directed? We think not. While frequent changes in the disposition of property may tend to show instability of purpose, and, where undue influence is proved or fraud is established, or there is independent proof of mental incapacity, may be considered ; such changes in the disposition of one’s property standing alone do not make a case of mental incapacity warranting the voiding of deeds or wills..

We are convinced by the testimony in this record, by that of the plaintiffs, as well as that of the defendants, that the deceased was mentally competent when he executed the deed in question, that he fully understood its effect, that he deliberately executed it, that by it the property went as he wanted it to go, and that deceased had good reason to prefer Ms brother William over at least some of these plaintiffs. We shall briefly consider some of the testimony which impels this conclusion.

[181]*181That John Dunn, called by his immediate friends Jack Dunn, was a drinking man and became intoxicated on occasions, this record establishes. That such occasions were as frequent as claimed by one side or as infrequent as claimed by the other, I very much doubt. There is testimony, largely from interested witnesses, that he had delirium, tremens, but that was 14 or 15 years before the transaction in question. That he was fully aware of his own frailty this record discloses. He knew better than any one else his condition when under the influence of liquor, and on occasions expressed apprehension that he might, when intoxicated, sign some papers that would deprive him of his property, and it is possible that we might infer that on some of the occasions when deeds were made by him his purpose was to place the title to his real estate in others to insure against such a happening. Doubtless John Dunn was not familiar with our statute of uses and trusts (3 Comp. Laws 1915, § 11565, et seq.). He stated to one witness that he had deeded his property before and had always gotten it back and that he could do so after the last deed. But the fear expressed by him to several witnesses that when he was under the influence of liquor he might sign some papers causing him to lose his property is quite convincing that he knew the meaning of a deed.

Deceased in his lifetime executed “five deeds conveying these premises to members of his family. If we include the whole number they covered a period of 36 years, the first one being in 1876. The last four deeds cover a period of 5 years, from 1907 to 1912. In 3 of these 4 deeds defendant William was a grantee. It is a significant fact that on the very day John Dunn executed the deed in question the plaintiff Catherine Hawthorne had executed a deed of the property to him. If her brother was then a mental incompetent, if he was so enfeebled mentally as to be incapable of [182]*182handling and managing his property and could not be trusted with it because of his mental condition, the question at once arises, Why did this sister put the title to that property back in him?

Upon the argument considerable was made of the fact that deceased thought he had to deed his property away in order' to become an inmate of the Soldiers’ Home. If the deceased did entertain that idea it was not a delusion. The act creating the Michigan Soldiers’ Home makes it a home for those “who have no adequate means of support” (1 Comp. Laws 1915, § 1674), and whatever we may think of the public policy of permitting one to divest himself of his property in order to obtain a home and support at the expense of the State, it is not evidence of a diseased mind, on the contrary, as applied to this case, it shows that Mr. Dunn knew the effect of a deed. Deceased was not an inmate of the Soldiers’ Home at the time of his death, as stated by the trial judge; for 14 months he had lived with and been cared for by the defendants until 8 days before his death when he was taken, to Harper’s. Hospital in Detroit where he died.

The record does not clearly and satisfactorily disclose the relations between deceased and his brother Frank, one of the plaintiffs here. It does show the relations between him and his brother Terrence, another one of the plaintiffs, were unfriendly and had been so for a great many years. Delisle Hawthorne, a son of plaintiff Catherine Hawthorne and one of the plaintiffs’ witnesses, testifies:

“My uncle Terry and John had not been on good terms for quite a number of years — 30 years, something like that. They hadn’t spoken. They had some trouble a number of years ago.”

And Mary Dunn, wife of Terrence and one of plaintiffs’ witnesses, says:

“Have always lived in Troy township. Our home [183]*183is right across the home of William Dunn. Knew John Dunn in his lifetime. Saw him around there the last year before he died. I have known him ever since I was. married. Never spoke to him much. The last year he was here several times at my house. He did not call at our house very often unless Bill sent him over. Brought over some liver and one day some meat. He never came unless Bill sent him.”

There is much other testimony which corroborates that of these two witnesses as to the want of harmony between these two brothers.

The record discloses that the nephew, Francis Dunn, one of the plaintiffs, acquired his farm either by will or descent from his parents or one of them.

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Bluebook (online)
177 N.W. 393, 210 Mich. 176, 1920 Mich. LEXIS 386, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hawthorne-v-dunn-mich-1920.