Hettinger v. Thiele

113 P. 121, 15 Cal. App. 1, 1910 Cal. App. LEXIS 25
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedDecember 13, 1910
DocketCiv. No. 767.
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 113 P. 121 (Hettinger v. Thiele) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hettinger v. Thiele, 113 P. 121, 15 Cal. App. 1, 1910 Cal. App. LEXIS 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1910).

Opinion

COOPER, P. J.

This action was brought to recover the amount claimed to be due to the contractor under the terms of a contract for a building which was in the course of construction and uncompleted on the eighteenth day of April, 1906, at which time it was wholly destroyed by the great earthquake. The ease was tried with a jury, to whom special issues were submitted, and upon the verdict as to such special issues judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff.

No serious question is raised as to the sufficiency of the evidence to justify the finding of the jury upon any question submitted to it. Some questions of law are discussed, particularly as to instructions given to the jury, or offered by the defendant and refused.by the court, but they all depend upon the main question as to the construction to be placed upon the contract; and as the ease turns upon such construction we will discuss that and nothing more.

The contract was one by which the plaintiff agreed to build for defendant a building therein described in the town of Palo Alto for the price of $21,965. It undertook to provide for the apportionment of the loss as between the owner and the contractor in case the building, during its progress and before completion, should be destroyed by earthquake; and it is the *3 construction of its provisions upon this question that we are called upon to decide.

The only provisions of the contract bearing upon the question are the fifth and twelfth clauses, which are as follows:

“Fifth.—The owner agrees, in consideration of the performance of this agreement by the contractor, to pay or cause to be paid to the contractor, his legal representatives or assigns, the sum of twenty-one thousand nine hundred^and sixty-five (21,965) dollars in United States gold coin, at the times and in the manner following, to wit: Seventy-five per cent of the said twenty-one thousand nine hundred and sixty-five dollars as the work progresses, twenty-five per cent of the said twenty-one thousand nine hundred and sixty-five dollars thirty-five days after the acceptance of the building.
“Provided, That when each payment or installment shall become due, and at the final completion of the work, certificates in writing shall be obtained from said O. E. Branson, stating that the payment or installment is due or work completed, as the ease may be, and the amount then due; and the said C. E. Branson shall at said times deliver said certificates under his hand to the contractor, or, in lieu of such certificates, shall deliver to the contractor in writing, under his hand, a just and true reason for not issuing the certificates, including a statement of the defects, if any, to be remedied, to entitle the contractor to the certificate or certificates. And in the event of the failure of the architect to furnish and deliver said certificates, or any of them, or in lieu thereof the writing aforesaid, within three days after the times aforesaid, and after demand therefor made in writing by the contractor, the amount which may be claimed to be due by the contractor, and stated in the said demand made by him for the certificate shall, at the expiration of said three days, become due and payable, and the owner shall be liable and bound to pay the same on demand.
“In case the architect delivers the writing aforesaid in lieu of the certificates, then a compliance by the contractor with the requirements of said writing shall entitle the contractor to the certificate.”
“Twelfth.—In case said work herein provided for should, before completion, be wholly destroyed by fire, defective soil, earthquake or other act of God which the contractor could *4 not have reasonably foreseen and provided for, then the loss occasioned thereby shall be sustained by the owner to the extent that he has paid installments thereon, or that may be due under the fifth clause of this contract; and the loss occasioned thereby and to be sustained by the contractor shall be for the uncompleted portion of said work upon which he may be engaged at the time of the loss, and for which no payment is yet due under said fifth clause of this contract. ...”

It was intended that as the work was performed by the contractor he should be entitled to seventy-five per cent of the value of the work so performed, measured by the contract price, that is, for example, when the contractor had placed materials and labor in the building in accordance with the plans and specifications of the value of $1,000, he should be entitled to a payment of $750, and so on from time to time. As the work progressed, and as fast as it progressed and from day to day, the contractor was entitled to seventy-five per cent of its value. Of course, it would have been unreasonable for the contractor to have claimed and demanded the amount due from day to day, and insisted upon the architect giving him a certificate from day to day as to the amount that had become due. It must be presumed that the parties intended the contract to be reasonably construed, and that with such view the contractor would only require payment to be made at reasonable intervals as the work progressed, so as to enable him to pay for his materials, and to pay the wages of carpenters and artisans employed by him. In fact this must have been the course pursued, because no question appears to. have been made as to the payment of installments up to the time of the earthquake, which payments amounted to $8,800. The twelfth clause of the contract makes provision for loss in case the building should be wholly destroyed by earthquake. It was evidently in the mind of the parties that in such case the contract would end; that the contractor would not be required to commence again and build an entire new building, nor would the owner be required to pay for a new building. The provision as to the loss shows that in case the building should before completion be wholly destroyed, the parties intended that the owner should lose all payments that he had made to the contractor and all the sums that had become due under the contract. On the other *5 hand, the contractor was to lose all sums that had not become due for the uncompleted portions of the work. If the parties had in mind that they should, after adjusting their losses in accordance with the contract, be bound by the same contract to rebuild, on the same terms as under the original contract which had ended for the building which had been destroyed, and to contract as to such building, they could easily have said so; but they seem ex industria to have made no such provision. There are many reasons why they did not do this. The owner of the building after his losses may not have been able to pay for another building of the same cost. The contractor may have been unable to rebuild on the same terms. The ground on which the building was located may have been so changed as to its surface, or the immediate vicinity in which the building was being erected so changed as a business location, that it would be an absolute loss to the owner to have paid for another building. We therefore conclude that the contract provides a rule as to the loss that was to be borne by each party by reason of the earthquake, and that it does not contemplate any rebuilding by the contractor.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
113 P. 121, 15 Cal. App. 1, 1910 Cal. App. LEXIS 25, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hettinger-v-thiele-calctapp-1910.