Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts,
In these appeals from the Commonwealth Court, we are called upon to determine the constitutionality of a statute which grants to three private organizations absolute authority to designate a controlling number of the members of a Commonwealth committee responsible for the disbursement of substantial public funds. The Commonwealth Court determined that the statute is valid. Because we conclude that the power to appoint persons to conduct governmental functions cannot be delegated to private organizations, we hold the selection procedures of the challenged statute unconstitutional. We reverse.
The challenged statutory provision is an amendment to section 16(e) of the Pennsylvania Harness Racing Act.1 It became law on September 20, 1972, when the [482]*482General Assembly enacted tbe amendment over tbe Governor’s veto.
Section 16 provides for the allocation of revenue collected pursuant to tbe Pennsylvania Harness Racing Act. After mandating certain disbursements, subsection (e) provides that half tbe remaining funds of $400,000, whichever is greater, shall be allocated for agricultural research projects selected by a committee of seventeen including six persons designated by the Pennsylvania Council of Farm Organizations, one person designated by the Pennsylvania Canners and Fruit Processors Association and one person designated by the Pennsylvania Association of County Fairs.
Following enactment of the amendment, the Secretary of Agriculture notified the Pennsylvania State Council of Farm Organizations of a scheduled meeting of the committee. The Council selected appellees as its designees. On April 4, 1973, one day prior to the scheduled session, the Pennsylvania Attorney General [483]*483issued Official Opinion No. 30 in which he advised the Secretary of Agriculture that the mandate of section 16(e) to include on the committee eight designees of private groups is unconstitutional. He further advised the Secretary that “you must refuse to recognize these persons as members of the Committee.” In compliance with this opinion, the Secretary of Agriculture refused to seat these designees.
Appellees filed three actions in the Commonwealth Court: an action in equity to enjoin the committee from meeting or taking action in appellees’ absence and separate actions in quo warranto and mandamus to obtain judicial enforcement of their appointments. Appellants filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer in each of the actions.
The Commonwealth Court overruled appellants’ objections.2 It held (1) that the statute did not violate the Constitution (2) that the Attorney General lacked the authority to unilaterally implement his opinion as to the unconstitutionality of a statute.3 These appeals ensued.4
In adjudicating the merits of these appeals, the standard of review is clear. “ ‘An Act of [the General] Assembly will not be declared unconstitutional unless it clearly, palpably and plainly violates the constitution.’ ” Daly v. Hemphill, 411 Pa. 263, 271, 191 [484]*484A.2d 835, 840 (1963); see also Absentee Ballots Case, 431 Pa. 178, 181-82, 245 A.2d 265, 267 (1968). The challenged statute does so.
A fundamental precept of the democratic form of government imbedded in our Constitution is that the people are to be governed only by their elected representatives. Section 16(e) violates this principle by surrendering to private organizations the power to select eight of seventeen members of a committee responsible for the disbursement of public funds. Neither the Legislature nor the Governor may reject the appointees of these private groups. And it is unclear that either could remove these designees, for the power to appoint governmental officials includes the power to remove them. Pa. Const, article VI, section 7.
In fact, the people of this Commonwealth, through their duly elected representatives, have no voice in the appointments of those selected by these three private groups. No opportunity is provided for the public interest to assert itself. Instead, private groups responsive only to the interests of their membership choose those charged with performing governmental functions.
This Court has previously held that governmental powers cannot be delegated to private individuals or organizations. For example, in Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. v. White Cross Stores, Inc., 414 Pa. 95, 199 A.2d 266 (1964), we invalidated the Pennsylvania Fair Trade Act’s “non-signers” provision. In that case, Mr. Justice Eagen, speaking for the Court stated: “Price regulatory power vests only in the elected legislative body. It may in limited ways be delegated to other responsible governmental agencies, such as public service or utility commissions .... However, it may not be delegated to private persons. The vesting of a discretionary regulatory power over [485]*485prices, rates or wages, in private persons violates the essential concept of a democratic society and is constitutionally invalid.” Id. at 98-99, 199 A.2d at 267-68.
We are equally concerned with the preservation of the “essential concepts of a democratic society” when the power delegated is the authority to make appointments to a committee exercising governmental functions. The power to select those who make public decisions is too vital a part of our scheme of government to be delegated to private groups. Olin Mathieson, supra; cf. Pa. Const. article IV, section 8.
Appellees contend, however, that because they represent a large number of Pennsylvania farmers, they are more aware of the needs of agriculture than are the popularly selected branches of government. No doubt the organization that designated appellees does have an understanding of farm problems. Nevertheless, claims of expertise do not sap the vitality of the fundamental principle that we are to be governed by our elected representatives in accordance with the Constitution.
In a similar context the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reasoned that expertise does not justify delegation of the appointment power to politically unresponsive groups: “Their [private interest groups’] memberships undoubtedly contain many individuals as well qualified as any who may be found to serve on the commission. But each individual is accountable solely to his own respective organization and has no connection with any branch of government in which the sovereign power is lodged by our Constitution.” Opinion of the Justices, 337 Mass. 777, 784, 150 N.E.2d 693, 698 (1958).
Appellees contend that the process by which they were appointed does not affect the validity of their appointments because the statute contains some stan[486]*486dards by which they must abide. See Chartiers Valley Joint Schools v. Allegheny County Board of School Directors, 418 Pa. 520, 211 A.2d 487 (1965); see also Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission v. Uniontown Area School District, 455 Pa. 52, 79 n.27, 313 A.2d 156, 170 n.27 (1973). This contention however misses the mark.
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Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts,
In these appeals from the Commonwealth Court, we are called upon to determine the constitutionality of a statute which grants to three private organizations absolute authority to designate a controlling number of the members of a Commonwealth committee responsible for the disbursement of substantial public funds. The Commonwealth Court determined that the statute is valid. Because we conclude that the power to appoint persons to conduct governmental functions cannot be delegated to private organizations, we hold the selection procedures of the challenged statute unconstitutional. We reverse.
The challenged statutory provision is an amendment to section 16(e) of the Pennsylvania Harness Racing Act.1 It became law on September 20, 1972, when the [482]*482General Assembly enacted tbe amendment over tbe Governor’s veto.
Section 16 provides for the allocation of revenue collected pursuant to tbe Pennsylvania Harness Racing Act. After mandating certain disbursements, subsection (e) provides that half tbe remaining funds of $400,000, whichever is greater, shall be allocated for agricultural research projects selected by a committee of seventeen including six persons designated by the Pennsylvania Council of Farm Organizations, one person designated by the Pennsylvania Canners and Fruit Processors Association and one person designated by the Pennsylvania Association of County Fairs.
Following enactment of the amendment, the Secretary of Agriculture notified the Pennsylvania State Council of Farm Organizations of a scheduled meeting of the committee. The Council selected appellees as its designees. On April 4, 1973, one day prior to the scheduled session, the Pennsylvania Attorney General [483]*483issued Official Opinion No. 30 in which he advised the Secretary of Agriculture that the mandate of section 16(e) to include on the committee eight designees of private groups is unconstitutional. He further advised the Secretary that “you must refuse to recognize these persons as members of the Committee.” In compliance with this opinion, the Secretary of Agriculture refused to seat these designees.
Appellees filed three actions in the Commonwealth Court: an action in equity to enjoin the committee from meeting or taking action in appellees’ absence and separate actions in quo warranto and mandamus to obtain judicial enforcement of their appointments. Appellants filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer in each of the actions.
The Commonwealth Court overruled appellants’ objections.2 It held (1) that the statute did not violate the Constitution (2) that the Attorney General lacked the authority to unilaterally implement his opinion as to the unconstitutionality of a statute.3 These appeals ensued.4
In adjudicating the merits of these appeals, the standard of review is clear. “ ‘An Act of [the General] Assembly will not be declared unconstitutional unless it clearly, palpably and plainly violates the constitution.’ ” Daly v. Hemphill, 411 Pa. 263, 271, 191 [484]*484A.2d 835, 840 (1963); see also Absentee Ballots Case, 431 Pa. 178, 181-82, 245 A.2d 265, 267 (1968). The challenged statute does so.
A fundamental precept of the democratic form of government imbedded in our Constitution is that the people are to be governed only by their elected representatives. Section 16(e) violates this principle by surrendering to private organizations the power to select eight of seventeen members of a committee responsible for the disbursement of public funds. Neither the Legislature nor the Governor may reject the appointees of these private groups. And it is unclear that either could remove these designees, for the power to appoint governmental officials includes the power to remove them. Pa. Const, article VI, section 7.
In fact, the people of this Commonwealth, through their duly elected representatives, have no voice in the appointments of those selected by these three private groups. No opportunity is provided for the public interest to assert itself. Instead, private groups responsive only to the interests of their membership choose those charged with performing governmental functions.
This Court has previously held that governmental powers cannot be delegated to private individuals or organizations. For example, in Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. v. White Cross Stores, Inc., 414 Pa. 95, 199 A.2d 266 (1964), we invalidated the Pennsylvania Fair Trade Act’s “non-signers” provision. In that case, Mr. Justice Eagen, speaking for the Court stated: “Price regulatory power vests only in the elected legislative body. It may in limited ways be delegated to other responsible governmental agencies, such as public service or utility commissions .... However, it may not be delegated to private persons. The vesting of a discretionary regulatory power over [485]*485prices, rates or wages, in private persons violates the essential concept of a democratic society and is constitutionally invalid.” Id. at 98-99, 199 A.2d at 267-68.
We are equally concerned with the preservation of the “essential concepts of a democratic society” when the power delegated is the authority to make appointments to a committee exercising governmental functions. The power to select those who make public decisions is too vital a part of our scheme of government to be delegated to private groups. Olin Mathieson, supra; cf. Pa. Const. article IV, section 8.
Appellees contend, however, that because they represent a large number of Pennsylvania farmers, they are more aware of the needs of agriculture than are the popularly selected branches of government. No doubt the organization that designated appellees does have an understanding of farm problems. Nevertheless, claims of expertise do not sap the vitality of the fundamental principle that we are to be governed by our elected representatives in accordance with the Constitution.
In a similar context the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reasoned that expertise does not justify delegation of the appointment power to politically unresponsive groups: “Their [private interest groups’] memberships undoubtedly contain many individuals as well qualified as any who may be found to serve on the commission. But each individual is accountable solely to his own respective organization and has no connection with any branch of government in which the sovereign power is lodged by our Constitution.” Opinion of the Justices, 337 Mass. 777, 784, 150 N.E.2d 693, 698 (1958).
Appellees contend that the process by which they were appointed does not affect the validity of their appointments because the statute contains some stan[486]*486dards by which they must abide. See Chartiers Valley Joint Schools v. Allegheny County Board of School Directors, 418 Pa. 520, 211 A.2d 487 (1965); see also Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission v. Uniontown Area School District, 455 Pa. 52, 79 n.27, 313 A.2d 156, 170 n.27 (1973). This contention however misses the mark. Statutory standards provide no substitute for the processes of representative government5 which requires that persons who make governmental decisions be either elected by the people or appointed by the representatives chosen by the people.
In the past, this Court has vigilantly guarded the right of the people to representative government. When the necessity arose, we struck down legislation designed to impermissibly delegate governmental policy making to private parties. See, e.g., State Board of Chiropractic Examiners v. Life Fellowship of Pennsylvania, 441 Pa. 293, 272 A.2d 478 (1971); Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. v. White Cross Stores, Inc., 414 Pa. 95, 199 A.2d 266 (1964). Now we must again hold invalid a statutory attempt to dilute the people’s right to be governed only by their constitutionally chosen representatives.
Courts of other states have also recognized the danger to constitutional government posed by delegation of public decisionmaking to private interest groups. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held unconstitutional a virtually identical provision. That court said: “We think that it would not be proper to authorize the selection of persons to expend publie funds by organizations or groups not themselves public bodies or made up of publie officers.” Opinion of the Justices, 337 Mass. 777, 784, 150 N.E.2d 693, 698 (1958). See also Corning Glass Works v. Ann & Hope, Inc., 294 N.E.2d 354, 362 (Mass. 1973).
[487]*487The Supreme Court of Delaware struck down a statute that granted to the chairman of a political party the power to appoint the members of a state agency. It concluded: “[T]he Legislature can not [sic] delegate to the State Chairman of a political party, which is a voluntary organization of individuals, accountable to no one except its own organization, having no connection with the three branches of government in which the sovereign power of government is lodged by the Constitution, the power to appoint the members of a state agency . . . .” State ex rel. James v. Schorr, 45 Del. 18, 25, 65 A.2d 810, 813 (1948).
See also Bayside Timber Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 20 Cal. App. 3d 1, 97 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1st Div. 1971); Zale-Las Vegas, Inc. v. Bulova Watch Co., 80 Nev. 483, 396 P.2d 683 (1964); Fink v. Cole, 302 N.Y. 216, 224-25, 97 N.E.2d 873, 876 (1951) (licensing power); State v. Watkins, 259 S.C. 185, 203, 191 S.E.2d 135, 143-44 (1972), vacated on other grounds, 413 U.S. 905, 93 S. Ct. 3053 (1973) (power to censor movies); The House of Seagram, Inc. v. Assam Drug Co., 85 S.D. 27, 176 N.W.2d 491 (1970).
Here as in Olin Mathieson, the Opinion of the Justices and James, it must be concluded that the Constitution prohibits delegation to private groups of the powrer to make governmental appointments. Since the process by which appellees were designated violates this principle, it is unconstitutional.
The order of the Commonwealth Court is reversed and the preliminary objections of the appellants are sustained.
Mr. Justice Mandebino joins in this opinion.
Mr. Justice Eagen concurs in the result.