Herron v. Lackey

554 S.W.2d 708, 1977 Tex. App. LEXIS 3510
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedFebruary 24, 1977
DocketNo. 7788
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 554 S.W.2d 708 (Herron v. Lackey) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Herron v. Lackey, 554 S.W.2d 708, 1977 Tex. App. LEXIS 3510 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977).

Opinion

STEPHENSON, Justice.

Plaintiffs, Fred Herron and wife, Ruby, as owners, filed this suit against defendant, H. L. Lackey, as contractor for breach of a contract to build their home. Defendant filed a cross-action against plaintiffs for the balance due on the contract and for other relief. Trial was by jury and judgment was rendered upon part of the issues and disregarding part of the issues. Neither party was satisfied and both have appealed. The parties will be referred to here as they were in the trial court.

These parties entered into a written contract for the construction of a home, and plaintiffs also executed a note in the amount of $48,200 together with a Mechanics and Materialman’s Lien to secure its payment. Defendant assigned the note and lien to a Silsbee bank which advanced him $38,000 as the work progressed. The parties fell into general disagreement, and the contract was not completed. When the bank was not paid, it posted notices to sell the property involved. Plaintiffs paid the bank $40,957.06; and it reassigned to them their note together with defendants’ individual notes which he had given the bank as he drew money. The defendant filed a lien, and plaintiffs filed this suit.

Jury Findings

The jury made the following findings in substance:

1. $7,783 was the amount of money reasonably necessary to complete the improvements in substantial compliance with the plans and specifications.

2. Defendant failed to construct in a good and workmanlike manner any of the improvements on the home in question.

3. Such failure caused plaintiffs to be damaged in the sum of $375.

4. Defendant’s failure to complete the improvements directly resulted from the acts or omissions on the part of defendant, his employees or sub-contractors.

5. Defendant’s failure to complete the improvement on time damaged plaintiffs in the sum of $3,000.

[710]*7106. Defendant’s failure to complete the improvement directly resulted from extra work and material requested by plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ unduly and unreasonably interfering with plaintiffs’ work.

7. The acts and omission by plaintiffs resulted in added and extra expense to defendant.

8. $2,400 would fairly and reasonably compensate defendant for such added and extra general expense.

9. $3,800 would fairly and reasonably compensate defendant for extra work and material provided by defendant at plaintiffs’ request.

10. $7,500 was a reasonable attorney’s fee for plaintiffs’ attorney for services rendered in this case.

Judgment

The judgment provided for defendant to recover $6,597.36 from plaintiffs with interest at the rate of 6 percent from the date of the judgment until paid.

Such judgment recited that $6,972.36 was for labor and material furnished by defendant to plaintiffs, after deducting $375 for damages to plaintiffs as found by the jury for defendant’s unworkmanlike construction.

Such judgment also provided that plaintiffs should not recover the damages found by jury because defendant did not complete the improvements on time because the jury also found such delay was caused by plaintiffs.

The court denied any recovery for defendant’s attorneys’ fee and divided the cost one-half to each party.

Opinion

As stated above, both parties have appealed this case even though it is apparent that each was successful as to part of the relief sought. The plaintiffs have twenty-eight points of error, and defendant has what he has designated as ten counterpoints and one cross-point.

Plaintiffs’ first points of error are that the trial court erred in rendering judgment for defendant for a balance of the contract note because defendant had assigned the note to the bank and had not redeemed it. It is also argued that plaintiffs were the owners and holders of the note by assignment from the bank.

This court finds nothing to indicate the trial court was rendering judgment upon the note but, on the contrary, was rendering judgment upon the contract itself. Defendant had agreed to build the house for which plaintiffs agreed to pay $48,200. The jury found it would take $7,783 to complete the house, leaving the balance due on the contract. The note in question was merely evidence of the amount due under the contract so that, together with the lien, interim financing could be obtained.

Defendant’s cross-action was on the contract to recover the balance due, and it was not error for the trial court to render judgment on such contract. Kleiner v. Eubank, 358 S.W.2d 902 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1962, writ ref’d n.r.e); Sullivan v. Dubis, 271 S.W.2d 316 (Tex.Civ.App.—Galveston 1954, writ ref’d n.r.e); Hahl v. Deutsch, 42 Tex.Civ.App. 1, 94 S.W. 443 (Houston 1906, no writ); 13 Tex.Jur.2d 552, Contracts § 303 (1960); 17A C.J.S. Contracts §§ 511, 828, et seq. (1963).

Plaintiffs’ next point of error, in effect, is that there was no evidence to support the jury finding of $7,783 as to the reasonable cost of completion because defendant had judicially admitted the cost to be $8,033. It is noted that this is a difference of exactly $250.

This case has been extremely hard fought, as evidenced by the five volumes of statement of facts. Involved in the argument about this point of error is the question as to whether $250.22 for fluorescent fixtures and electric chimes are extras or to be included in the $500 allowed for electric fixtures.

It is contended by plaintiffs that in view of deposition testimony, a request for admission directed to defendant should be deemed admitted under Tex.R.Civ.P. 169. [711]*711The deposition referred to is not a part of the record before this court.

Plaintiffs in their pleading claimed the reasonable cost of completion to be $15,-500. They offered in evidence the fact that they paid $14,373.82 to Floyd Cooper to complete the house. The amount found by the jury is the one contended for by defendant. The trial court did not deem the request to be admitted and that action is not made a point of error before this court. There is evidence to support the jury finding, and the point is overruled.

Plaintiffs’ next point of error is that the trial court erred in not allowing them to recover the $3,000 in damages which the jury found because defendant did not complete the contract on time.

As shown above as Finding 4, the jury first found that defendant’s failure to complete the improvements directly resulted from acts or omissions on the part of defendant and/or his employees and/or subcontractors. Also, as shown above as Finding 6, the jury found defendant’s failure to complete the improvements directly resulted from extra work and materials requested by plaintiffs, and they unduly and unreasonably interfered with defendant during the course of construction. The jury findings that the failure to complete the improvements directly resulted from the acts or omissions of both the defendant and plaintiffs could not serve as a basis for plaintiffs to recover damages. The point is overruled.

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Related

Malone v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.
611 S.W.2d 855 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1980)
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Manning
608 S.W.2d 270 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1980)
Herron v. Lackey
556 S.W.2d 246 (Texas Supreme Court, 1977)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
554 S.W.2d 708, 1977 Tex. App. LEXIS 3510, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/herron-v-lackey-texapp-1977.