Herrick v. Grindr, LLC

306 F. Supp. 3d 579
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Illinois
DecidedJanuary 25, 2018
Docket17–CV–932 (VEC)
StatusPublished
Cited by21 cases

This text of 306 F. Supp. 3d 579 (Herrick v. Grindr, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Herrick v. Grindr, LLC, 306 F. Supp. 3d 579 (S.D. Ill. 2018).

Opinion

VALERIE CAPRONI, United States District Judge *584Grindr, LLC ("Grindr") is a web-based dating application ("app") for gay and bi-sexual men. Plaintiff Matthew Herrick ("Herrick") is a former Grindr user and the victim of a campaign of malicious catfishing:1 since October 2016, Herrick's former boyfriend has used Grindr to impersonate Herrick by posting fake profiles to Grindr, which describe Herrick as being interested in fetishistic sex, bondage, role playing, and rape fantasies and which encourage potential suitors to go to Herrick's home or workplace for sex. Allegedly hundreds of interested Grindr users have responded to the false profiles and many of them have physically sought out Herrick. This lawsuit is, however, against Grindr, not Herrick's former boyfriend. Herrick alleges 14 causes of action, the gist of which is that Grindr is a defectively designed and manufactured product because it lacks built-in safety features; that Grindr misled Herrick into believing it could interdict impersonating profiles or other unpermitted content; and that Grindr has wrongfully refused to search for and remove the impersonating profiles. Grindr and its two corporate parents, KL Grindr Holdings, Inc. ("KL Grindr") and Grindr Holding Company ("Grindr Holding" and together with Grindr and KL Grindr, the "Defendants"), have moved to dismiss on the grounds that Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (the "CDA"), 47 U.S.C. § 230, immunizes Grindr from liability for content created by other users. The Court agrees. The CDA bars Herrick's products liability claims and his claims that Grindr must do more to remove impersonating profiles. Each of these claims depends on holding Grindr responsible for the content created by one of its users. Herrick's misrepresentation-related claims fail on their merits because Herrick has not alleged a misleading or false statement by Grindr or that Grindr's alleged misstatements are the cause of his injury.

BACKGROUND

Herrick joined Grindr in approximately May 2011. Am. Compl. (Dkt. 34) ¶ 46. Grindr works by matching users based on their interests and location. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 22-24, 31. In order to set up a Grindr profile, a user must enter his email address, accept Grindr's terms of service, and create a profile, including a "display name, profile photo, and 'about me' section." Am. Compl. ¶ 32. Users can customize their profile by selecting from a list of drop-down menus, including, inter alia , their age, height, weight, body type, and preferred sexual position. Am. Compl. ¶ 32.

The app's user-interface presents each user with a scroll of thumbnails of compatible profiles. Am. Compl. ¶ 31. Matches are generated by Grindr's algorithmic sorting and filtering software and are based on sexual preferences-as captured by the user's profile-and location. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 31, 53. Grindr accesses a user's location by accessing the latitude and longitude of his mobile device. Am. Compl. ¶ 24. Once two users match, the app allows them to send direct messages. Am. Compl. ¶ 31. Users can also generate and share a map of their location, based on the geolocational data collected by the app. Am. Compl. ¶ 24.

Herrick "matched" with his former boyfriend in June 2015 and deactivated his Grindr account after the relationship became *585exclusive in November 2015. Am. Compl. ¶ 48. At some unspecified time, the two parted ways, apparently on bad terms. Beginning in October 2016, Herrick's former boyfriend began impersonating Herrick on Grindr. Am. Compl. ¶ 49. The impersonating profiles suggest that Herrick is interested in "serious kink and many fantasy scenes," hardcore and unprotected group sex, and "hosting"-that is looking for partners to meet him at his location. Am. Compl. ¶ 50. Herrick alleges that "approximately 1100" users responded to the impersonating profiles from October 2016 through the end of March 2017. Am. Compl. ¶ 49; see also Am. Compl. ¶¶ 54-62 (describing interactions with numerous men responding to the impersonating profiles at Herrick's home and work). Grindr's direct messaging feature was used to facilitate the scheme. Users were transmitted maps of Herrick's location, Am. Compl. ¶ 52, and some of the men were told to expect that Herrick would resist their approach, which they were told was part of a rape-fantasy or role play, Am. Compl. ¶ 62. Herrick also alleges that Grindr's geolocation functionality directed some of these users to his home and work (even though the app is no longer installed on his phone).2 Am. Compl. ¶ 52. Herrick and others have reported the impersonating accounts to Grindr approximately 100 times, but Grindr has not responded, other than to send an automated, form response. Am. Compl. ¶ 71.

The Amended Complaint alleges that the design of the Grindr app has enabled this campaign of harassment. More specifically, Herrick alleges that Grindr does not incorporate certain safety features that could prevent impersonating profiles.3 Herrick alleges that Grindr does not use "proven and common image recognition or duplicate-detection software," which could be used to search for profiles using Herrick's picture. Am. Compl. ¶ 79; see also Am. Compl. ¶ 84 (Grindr does not use "PhotoDNA technology" to identify unauthorized photographs). Grindr does not run keyword searches on direct messages sent through the app. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 80, 83. Grindr does not have the ability to search for IP addresses, MAC addresses, and ICC numbers or block the use of spoofing, proxies, and virtual private networks (VPNs), all of which might prevent new impersonating accounts. Am. Compl. ¶ 82. And Grindr could use a technique called "geofencing" to determine when an impersonating account is associated either with Herrick's address or the address of his former boyfriend. Am. Compl. ¶ 85.4

According to Herrick, Grindr is on notice of the potential for the app to be misused and nonetheless failed to warn users (including Herrick) of this risk: "Grindr neither warned users of this location exposure vulnerability, nor that Grindr could be used to direct scores of *586potentially dangerous individuals to their workplace and home." Am. Compl. ¶ 38. Herrick alleges, instead, that Grindr's advertising and terms of service led him to believe that Grindr had effective controls in place to prevent harassment. "At all relevant times, Grindr represented to users in its advertising and community values page that it protects users from 'behaviors that endanger them.' " Am. Compl. ¶ 40; see also Am. Compl. ¶ 41 (Grindr's website states that "[i]n order for everyone to have the best time possible, we have a system of digital and human screening tools to protect our users from actions and behaviors that endanger them and go against what we're about.").

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Bluebook (online)
306 F. Supp. 3d 579, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/herrick-v-grindr-llc-ilsd-2018.