Hernandez v. Cabrales

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: April 2, 2024
• Docket: 3:23-cv-01759
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MARIA HERNANDEZ, Case No.: 23-CV-1759 TWR (KSC)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART 13 v. AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 14 OFFICER JOSEPH CABRALES, DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S 15 Defendant. COMPLAINT, AND (2) REMINDING PARTIES OF 16 THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER 17 FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11 AND 18 U.S.C. 18 § 1621(2) 19 (ECF No. 7) 20

21 Presently before the Court are Defendant Officer Joseph Cabrales’s Motion to 22 Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (“Mot.,” ECF No. 7) and Plaintiff Maria Hernandez’s 23 Response (“Opp’n,” ECF No. 10). Defendant elected not to file a reply. (See generally 24 Docket.) The Court vacated the hearing and took the Motion under submission on the 25 papers pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). (See ECF No. 12.) Having carefully 26 considered Plaintiff’s Complaint (“Compl.,” ECF No. 1), the Parties’ arguments, and the 27 relevant law, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendant’s 28 Motion, as follows. 1 BACKGROUND 2 At approximately 1:15 p.m. on November 3, 2022,2 the brakes on Plaintiff’s recently 3 purchased used car failed, causing her to “slightly scrape another vehicle that was close by 4 it on Iris Ave. of the city of San Ysidro, County of San Diego.” (See Compl. at 4.) 5 Defendant arrived on the scene approximately 15 minutes later at 1:30 p.m., and asked 6 Plaintiff whether she had consumed any alcoholic beverages or other medication or 7 substances that may have impeded her ability to operate her vehicle. (See id.) Plaintiff 8 responded that she had not and explained that her brakes had malfunctioned. (See id. at 9 4–5.) 10 Nonetheless, Defendant—acting “very disrespectful[ly]” and “hyper abusive 11 physically and psychologically”—ordered Plaintiff to exit her vehicle and perform field 12 sobriety tests. (See id. at 5.) Plaintiff passed the tests, but Defendant insulted her and 13 “forcefully grab[bed] her by her right arm and . . . push[ed] her to the police vehicle and 14 . . . press[ed] his big body to her small 4-foot 9-inch frame[,] obstructing her airways for a 15 considerable amount of time.” (See id.) Not only was this witnessed by several bystanders, 16 but Plaintiff’s “two young children were also watching and crying and yelling to Officer 17 Cabrales to please cease this physical and psychological abuse to their mother.” (See id.) 18 Defendant handcuffed Plaintiff and ignored her repeated pleas to loosen them. (See 19 id. at 5–6.) Defendant then took her to the police station, where he “push[ed] her in[to] the 20

21 22 1 Defendant’s Motion introduces a number of facts not contained in Plaintiff’s Complaint based on Defendant’s body-worn camera footage that cannot properly be judicially noticed or incorporated by 23 referenced. (See ECF No. 7-1 (“Mem.”) at 2–4.) But as Defendant himself recognizes, (see id. at 4), at this stage in the proceedings, the Court “must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint, as 24 well as any reasonable inferences to be drawn from them,” and construe Plaintiff’s Complaint “in the light 25 most favorable to the plaintiff.” See Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, the Court limits the Background to the facts as alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint. 26 2 Although Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that the underlying events occurred on November 3, 2023, 27 the Court assumes that the events in question necessarily occurred on November 3, 2022, given that Plaintiff’s Complaint was filed on September 25, 2023. (See generally ECF No. 1; see also Mem. at 2 28 1 chair” and had a nurse draw her blood, (see id. at 6), which ultimately tested negative. (See 2 id. at 8.) Finally, Defendant “unlawfully confiscated [her] drivers license.” (See id. at 6.) 3 The following day, Plaintiff’s hands were “bruised purple and black and so swollen.” 4 (See id. at 5–6.) Her hands and arms were “so bruised blue and black that she could barely 5 stand up let alone . . . walk.” (See id. at 6.) Plaintiff’s “middle and upper back were also 6 severely bruised” during the encounter. (See id.) As a result of “mental and psychological 7 traumas,” (see id.), Plaintiff “has fallen into a grave depressive and heavily anxious state.” 8 (See id. at 7.) She also has been unable to work following the confiscation of her driver’s 9 license, causing her and her daughter “to pass days and nights without many of the basic 10 meals that human beings require in order to have proper nourishment.” (See id.) 11 Plaintiff, proceeding without counsel, initiated this action on September 25, 2023, 12 alleging under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that Defendant had violated her “Constitutional [r]ights[] 13 to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures (4th [A]mendment), . . . to be free from 14 cruel and unusual punishment (8th [A]mendment)[,] and . . . of due process under law (14th 15 [A]mendment).” (See Compl. at 4; see also id. at 8.) She seeks compensatory damages in 16 the amount of $593,000; punitive damages in the amount of $800,546; Defendant’s 17 resignation; and a public acknowledgment and apology from the San Diego Police 18 Department. (See id. at 2.) 19 Defendant filed the instant Motion on December 26, 2023. (See generally ECF No. 20 7.) At Plaintiff’s request, (see Opp’n at 2), the Court vacated the hearing on Defendant’s 21 Motion and took the matter under submission on the papers. (See ECF No. 12.) 22 ANALYSIS 23 Through the instant Motion, Defendant attacks Plaintiff’s Complaint on several 24 grounds, (see generally Mot.; Mem.), which the Court addresses in turn. 25 I. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a) 26 As an initial matter, Defendant contends that Plaintiff fails to comply with Rule 11(a) 27 because pages four through seven of her Complaint are unsigned. (See Mem. at 4.) 28 Plaintiff’s Complaint consists of three pieces: (1) a verified complaint on pages 1 through 1 3, (2) an unsigned factual statement on pages 4 through 7, and (3) a declaration signed 2 under penalty of perjury on pages 8 through 9. (See generally ECF No. 1.) In light of the 3 signatures on pages 3 and 9 of Plaintiff’s Complaint and Defendant’s failure to identify 4 any authorities that Plaintiff’s separate factual statement requires a separate signature, (see 5 generally Mem. at 4), the Court DENIES Defendant’s request for dismissal under Rule 6 11(a). 7 II. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 8 A. Legal Standard 9 “A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to 10 state a claim upon which relief can be granted ‘tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.’” 11 Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1241–42 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Navarro 12 v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001)). “A district court’s dismissal for failure to 13 state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is proper if there is a ‘lack of 14 a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal 15 theory.’” Id. at 1242 (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th 16 Cir. 1988)). 17 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 18 accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 19 677–78 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the 20 plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 21 the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 22 “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere 23 possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the 24 pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 679 (second alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. 25 Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). 26 “If a complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim, leave to amend should be 27 granted ‘unless the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the 28 challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.’” DeSoto v. Yellow Freight 1 Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well 2 Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986)). “A district court does not err in 3 denying leave to amend where the amendment would be futile.” Id. (citing Reddy v. Litton 4 Indus., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 921 (1991)). 5 B. Discussion 6 “Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, privileges, 7 or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” McDonald v. 8 Cnty. of Sonoma, 506 F. Supp. 3d 969, 978 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (internal quotation marks 9 omitted) (quoting Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. 10 § 1983)). “Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a 11 method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Id. (citing Graham v. Connor, 12 490 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989)). “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two 13 essential elements: (1) that a person violated a right secured by the Constitution or laws of 14 the United States and (2) that said person acted under the color of state law when they 15 committed the alleged violation.” Id. (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); 16 Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987)). 17 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated her “Constitutional Rights[] to be free from 18 unreasonable searches and seizures (4th amendment), right to be free from cruel and 19 unusual punishment (8th amendment) and . . . her right of due process under law (14th 20 amendment).” (See Compl. at 4.) Defendant seeks dismissal of each of these causes of 21 action. (See Mem. at 5–8.) 22 1. Fourth Amendment 23 Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims under the Fourth Amendment to the 24 extent they are predicated on unlawful detention and arrest without probable cause, (see 25 Mem. at 5–6), and excessive force. (See id. at 6.) 26 a. Unreasonable Seizure 27 “[A] warrantless arrest by a law officer is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment 28 where there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been or is being committed.” 1 McDonald, 506 F. Supp. 3d at 979 (alteration in original) (quoting Devenpeck v. Alford, 2 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004)). “It is well established that an arrest without probable cause 3 violates the Fourth Amendment and gives rise to a claim for damages under § 1983.” Id. 4 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rosenbaum v. Washoe Cnty., 663 F.3d 1071, 5 1076 (9th Cir. 2011)). “Whether probable cause exists depends upon the reasonable 6 conclusion to be drawn from the facts known to the arresting officer at the time of the 7 arrest.” Id. (quoting Rosenbaum, 663 F.3d at 1076). “An officer who observes criminal 8 conduct may arrest the offender without a warrant, even if the pertinent offense carries only 9 a minor penalty.” Id. (quoting Tatum v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 10 1094 (2006)). 11 Plaintiff alleges that she was arrested without probable cause. (See Compl at 5.) 12 Although Defendant introduces evidence to the contrary, (see Mem. at 11–12 (“Ex. A”)), 13 Plaintiff alleges that she informed Defendant that she was not under the influence of drugs 14 or alcohol and that she passed the field sobriety tests Defendant administered. (See Compl. 15 at 4–5.) Nonetheless, Defendant handcuffed and arrested Plaintiff and transported her to 16 the police station for a blood test, (see id. at 5–6), which also “tested negative.” (See id. at 17 8.) Defendant contends that “Plaintiff does admit that she was involved in a traffic accident 18 at the time of her arrest, which justifies Defendant’s detention of Plaintiff,” (see Mem. at 19 6 (citing Compl. at 4)), but cites no authority to support probable cause to arrest Plaintiff 20 and subject her to a blood test under the circumstances as alleged by Plaintiff. (See 21 generally id. at 5–6.) The Court therefore DENIES Defendant’s Motion to dismiss 22 Plaintiff’s cause of action for unlawful detention in violation of her Fourth Amendment 23 rights under Section 1983. 24 b. Excessive Force 25 “[A] constitutional complaint of excessive force arises under the Fourth Amendment 26 and constitutes a claim concerning the overall reasonableness of a seizure.” McDonald, 27 506 F. Supp. 3d at 980 (alteration in original) (quoting Velazquez v. City of Long Beach, 28 793 F.3d 1010, 1025 (9th Cir. 2015)). “[T]here are no per se rules in the Fourth 1 Amendment excessive force context; rather, courts must still slosh [their] way through the 2 factbound morass of reasonableness.” Id. (alterations in original and internal quotation 3 marks omitted) (quoting Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 441 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) 4 (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007))). “To assess the ‘reasonableness’ of a 5 law enforcement officer’s conduct, courts first consider the ‘nature and quality of the 6 alleged intrusion,’ then turn to the governmental interests at stake: ‘(1) how severe the 7 crime at issue is, (2) whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the 8 officers or others, and (3) whether the suspect was actively resisting arrest or attempting to 9 evade arrest by flight.’” Id. at 980–81 (quoting Mattos, 661 F.3d at 441). 10 Defendant contends that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for excessive force under the 11 Fourth Amendment because her allegations are “conclusory” and she “does not recite the 12 elements of the cause of action.”3 (See Mem. at 6–7.) But “[a] plaintiff need not plead 13 facts specifically addressed to each element of its legal theories,” Nichols v. Smart 14 Document Sols. LLC, No. SACV080569DOCPJWX, 2008 WL 11339982, at *2 (C.D. Cal. 15 July 7, 2008) (citing Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516, 518 (7th Cir. 1998)), and, far from 16 being conclusory, Plaintiff alleges Defendant “forcefully grab[bed] her,” “obstruct[ed] her 17 airways,” and handcuffed her so tightly that “her hands were bruised purple and black and 18 so swollen by the next day.” (See Compl. at 5–6.) She further alleges that “her middle and 19 upper back were also severely bruised” and that “she could barely stand up let alone . . . 20 able to walk.” (See id. at 6.) Weighing this force against the severity of the crime at issue 21 as alleged by Plaintiff (a minor traffic accident, (see id. at 4)), and the apparent lack of 22 threat posed by a seemingly compliant subject, the Court concludes that Plaintiff plausibly 23 alleges that the force used was unreasonable. See, e.g., McDonald, 506 F. Supp. 3d at 981 24 25 3 Defendant also argues that Plaintiff’s allegations of excessive force are “only made in the portion 26 of Plaintiff’s original complaint that is not signed and appears not to have been written by Plaintiff.” (See Mem. at 6.) Defendant offers no factual support for his speculation that somebody else authored pages 27 four through seven of Plaintiff’s Complaint, (see generally id.), and, for the reasons discussed above, see supra Section I, the Court does not find persuasive Defendant’s argument that the allegations on those 28 1 (denying motion to dismiss excessive force claim where plaintiff alleged he was compliant 2 but officer slammed him against pavement during arrest for public intoxication). The Court 3 therefore DENIES Defendant’s Motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim for 4 excessive force. 5 2. Eighth Amendment 6 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s actions violated her constitutional right to be free 7 from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. (See Compl. at 4.) 8 Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim must be dismissed because 9 “[t]he Eighth Amendment’s bar to cruel and unusual punishment applies only to defendants 10 that have been convicted of a crime.” (See Mem. at 7 (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 11 651, 663–64 (1977)).) Defendant is correct—because Plaintiff does not allege that she was 12 convicted of a crime, she has not stated a claim under the Eighth Amendment. The Court 13 therefore GRANTS Defendant’s Motion and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s cause of action for 14 violation of her Eighth Amendment rights. Because the Court cannot yet conclude that 15 Plaintiff cannot allege further facts consistent with the Complaint that she was convicted 16 of a crime, the dismissal of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim is WITHOUT 17 PREJUDICE. 18 3. Fourteenth Amendment 19 Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated her right to due process under the 20 law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. (See Compl. at 4.) Defendant, assuming 21 that this claim also relates to Plaintiff’s allegations of excessive force, argues that it is 22 “subsumed under her Fourth Amendment claims” and therefore must be dismissed. (See 23 Mem. at 8.) Construing Plaintiff’s Complaint in her favor, however, the Court reads 24 Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim as relating to Defendant’s alleged confiscation of 25 her driver’s license. See, e.g., Burkhart v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 124 Cal. App. 3d 99, 26 107 (1981) (“[T]he [United States Supreme Court] has held that the Due Process Clause of 27 the Fourteenth Amendment applies to a state’s suspension or revocation of a driver’s 28 license.”). 1 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant confiscated her driver’s license on the grounds that 2 she “refused [a] chemical test,” despite the fact that she was subjected to a blood test and 3 tested negative for any substances. (See Compl. at 7–8.) Plaintiff therefore appears to 4 allege that her license was revoked in contravention of California’s statutory scheme. See 5 Cal. Vehicle Code §§ 13100–13559. Given Defendant’s failure to address these 6 allegations, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion to the extent it seeks dismissal of 7 Plaintiff’s cause of action for violation of her due process rights under the Fourteenth 8 Amendment. 9 III. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) 10 Alternatively, Defendant requests that the Court order Plaintiff to file a more definite 11 statement under Rule 12(e), (see Mem. at 8), pursuant to which “[a] party may move for a 12 more definite statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which 13 is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.” In light of 14 Defendant’s filing of the instant Motion, the Court necessarily denies Defendant’s 15 alternative request under Rule 12(e). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e) (“The motion must be made 16 before filing a responsive pleading.” (emphasis added)); see also Hubbs v. Cnty. of San 17 Bernardino, 538 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1262 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (denying Rule 12(e) motion 18 because Rule 12(b)(6) motion “amply demonstrate[s] that [defendants] do understand the 19 issues presented by the First Amended Complaint” (alterations in original) (quoting 20 Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922 F. Supp. 1450, 1462 (C.D. Cal. 1996), abrogated in part on 21 other grounds by Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 975–76 (9th Cir. 22 2010))). 23 ADMONITION 24 Although lawsuits are often based on disputed facts, the Court notes that many of 25 the facts alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint—which the Court must accept as true at the 26 pleading stage—appear to be contradicted by evidence Defendant claims is in his 27 possession, including his body-worn camera footage and sworn Affidavit in Support of 28 Blood Draw Search Warrant. (Compare Compl., with Mem. at 2–4 & Ex. A.) Because 1 Plaintiff is unrepresented, the Court takes this opportunity to remind the Parties of their 2 obligations of candor to the Court and the gravity of signing legal filings. 3 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, “[b]y presenting to the court a pleading, 4 written motion, or other paper . . . an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the 5 best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, . . . the factual contentions have 6 evidentiary support.” Fed R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3). Failure to comply with Rule 11(b) may 7 result in the imposition of sanctions, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c), “includ[ing] nonmonetary 8 directives; an order to pay a penalty into court; or, if imposed on motion and warranted for 9 effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of part or all of the 10 reasonable attorney’s fees and other expenses directly resulting from the violation.” See 11 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4). Further, the decision to submit a filing under penalty of perjury 12 should not be taken lightly, as the filing of a false affidavit may expose the affiant to 13 criminal liability. See 18 U.S.C. § 1621(2) (“Whoever . . . in any declaration, certificate, 14 verification, or statement under penalty of perjury as permitted under section 1746 of title 15 28, United States Code, willfully subscribes as true any material matter which he does not 16 believe to be true[,] is guilty of perjury and shall, except as otherwise expressly provided 17 by law, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”). 18 CONCLUSION 19 In light of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART 20 Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 7). Specifically, the Court 21 GRANTS Defendant’s Motion and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s 22 cause of action for violation of her right against cruel and unusual punishment under the 23 Eighth Amendment. Defendant’s Motion is otherwise DENIED. Because dismissal of 24 Plaintiff’s cause of action under the Eighth Amendment is without prejudice, Plaintiff 25 SHALL FILE on or before April 30, 2024, either a notice that she is proceeding on her 26 surviving Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment causes of action or an amended complaint 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 ||remedying the deficiencies identified in this Order. Defendant SHALL RESPOND to 2 || Plaintiff’s operative complaint on or before May 17, 2024. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 || Dated: April 2, 2024 [5 14 bre 6 Honorable Todd W. Robinson United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28