Henry v. Komarovsky

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: January 16, 2026
• Docket: 24-3014
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 16 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DAVID G. HENRY, No. 24-3014 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 3:22-cv-05523-TMC v. MEMORANDUM* RON KOMAROVSKY, Police Officer; BRYNN CELLAN, Police Officer; CITY OF TACOMA,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Tiffany M. Cartwright, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted January 16, 2026**

Before: PAEZ, BENNETT, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.

David Henry appeals from the district court’s entry of summary judgment in

his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional violations arising from his 2021

arrest. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, see Lowry

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). v. City of San Diego, 858 F.3d 1248, 1254 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc), and we affirm.

1. On January 6, 2021, David Henry caused a traffic collision at an

intersection in Tacoma, Washington. Tacoma Police Officers Ron Komarovsky and

Brynn Cellan responded to the scene. Many of the relevant events are captured on

Officer Komarovsky’s body-worn camera. Witnesses told the officers that they saw

Henry run a red light and collide with another vehicle, which was passing through a

green light on the intersecting road.

When Officer Komarovsky questioned Henry, Henry provided inconsistent

answers about where he was coming from and his cannabis use. When Officer

Komarovsky asked Henry about his cannabis use, Henry removed an unopened

cartridge of THC fluid from his pocket. Henry struggled to keep his balance on field

sobriety tests, but a preliminary breath test showed his blood alcohol content was

0.00. Officer Komarovsky then told Henry he was under arrest for driving under the

influence, placed him in handcuffs, read him his Miranda rights, and escorted him

to the patrol car.

Officer Komarovsky applied for, and a Pierce County Superior Court judge

authorized, a search warrant to draw a blood sample. Officer Komarovsky drove

Henry to a hospital for the blood test, and then to Pierce County Jail. Henry stayed

at the jail overnight and appeared in Tacoma Municipal Court the next day, January

7. The court found probable cause for the driving under the influence charge. But

2 24-3014 the blood test results showed insufficient levels to report active THC in Henry’s

blood, so the charge against Henry was dismissed with prejudice on December 17,

2021.

2. Henry sued Officer Komarovsky, Officer Cellan, and the City of

Tacoma under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged an illegal search and seizure, false

arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and excessive force. The district

court entered summary judgment for the defendants, and Henry now appeals.

3. The district court properly granted summary judgment on the illegal

search and seizure claims. After hearing from witnesses that Henry caused the

collision by driving through a red light and hitting a car that had the right of way,

Officer Komarovsky had, at the very least, reasonable suspicion that justified his

stopping and questioning Henry. See United States v. Valdes-Vega, 738 F.3d 1074,

1078 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (“Officers . . . may conduct ‘brief investigatory stops’

without violating the Fourth Amendment ‘if the officer’s action is supported by

reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity may be afoot.’” (quoting

United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002))); id. (“The reasonable-suspicion

standard is not a particularly high threshold to reach.”). And a Pierce County

Superior Court judge found that probable cause supported the search warrant to draw

a blood sample.

Henry contends that Officer Komarovsky obtained this search warrant only

3 24-3014 by omitting material information—that the cartridge of THC fluid he possessed was

unopened and that one witness incorrectly stated that Henry went around another car

to run the red light. But for a claim of judicial deception to survive summary

judgment, Henry must show that the officers “deliberately or recklessly made false

statements or omissions that were material to the finding of probable cause.” Ewing

v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting KRL v. Moore, 384

F.3d 1105, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004)). Materiality requires a showing that the judge

“would not have issued the warrant with false information redacted, or omitted

information restored.” Lombardi v. City of El Cajon, 117 F.3d 1117, 1126 (9th Cir.

1997).

The facts that Henry points to are not material. Even if the warrant application

were supplemented with the omitted information, Officer Komarovsky still had, and

would have provided to the judicial officer, the following information when he

sought the search warrant: (1) witness testimony that Henry caused a collision by

driving through a red light; (2) Henry’s inconsistent answers to questions about his

cannabis use; (3) Henry’s poor performance on field sobriety tests; (4) a preliminary

breath test result showing Henry’s blood alcohol content was 0.00; and (5) an

unopened cartridge of THC fluid found in Henry’s pocket. These facts established

probable cause to obtain a blood sample via a search warrant, so Henry has failed to

demonstrate a constitutional violation occurred in obtaining his blood sample. See

4 24-3014 Bravo v. City of Santa Maria, 665 F.3d 1076, 1084 (9th Cir. 2011) (“If probable

cause remains after amendment [of the warrant application], then no constitutional

error has occurred.”).

Henry also presses that Officer Komarovsky only began investigating him

because of racial profiling. But “[s]ubjective intentions play no role” in the Fourth

Amendment analysis. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). And to

the extent that Henry intended to raise an equal protection claim for selective

enforcement of the law, he has failed to come forward with evidence establishing

that the officers’ conduct had both a discriminatory purpose and a discriminatory

effect. See Rosenbaum v. City & County of San Francisco, 484 F.3d 1142, 1152–53

(9th Cir. 2007).

4. The district court properly granted summary judgment on Henry’s false

arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution claims. “To prevail on his

§ 1983 claim for false arrest and imprisonment, [Henry] would have to demonstrate

that there was no probable cause to arrest him.” Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park,

159 F.3d 374, 380 (9th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). So too with his malicious

prosecution claim. See Lassiter v. City of Bremerton, 556 F.3d 1049, 1054–55 (9th

Cir. 2009) (“[P]robable cause is an absolute defense to malicious prosecution.”). But

the undisputed evidence shows that Officer Komarovsky had probable cause to

arrest Henry for driving under the influence of cannabis in violation of Washington

5 24-3014 law. See United States v. Hamilton, 131 F.4th 1087, 1094 (9th Cir. 2025) (“Probable

cause justifying a warrantless arrest exists where, ‘under the totality of the facts and

circumstances known to the arresting officer, a prudent person would have

concluded that there was a fair probability that the suspect had committed a crime.’”

(quoting United States v. Struckman, 603 F.3d 731, 739 (9th Cir. 2010))); Wash.

Rev. Code § 46.61.502; see also id. § 10.31.100(3)(d), (16)(a). The existence of

probable cause thus bars these claims.

5. The district court properly granted summary judgment on Henry’s

excessive force claims. Henry asserts that the police officers used excessive force

in violation of the Fourth Amendment when (1) Officer Komarovsky placed the

handcuffs too tightly and shook Henry by the handcuffs; (2) both officers pushed

Henry against the patrol vehicle; and (3) Officer Komarovsky threatened to kill

Henry. We analyze Fourth Amendment excessive force claims under the “objective

reasonableness” standard. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989).

First, an excessive force claim based on handcuffing can survive summary

judgment when the plaintiff presents medical evidence to support their claim or

contends the officer ignored complaints that their handcuffs were too tight. See, e.g.,

Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 645 (9th Cir. 1989); Wall v. County of Orange, 364

F.3d 1107, 1109–10, 1112 (9th Cir. 2004); Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1434,

1436 (9th Cir. 1993); LaLonde v. County of Riverside, 204 F.3d 947, 952, 960 (9th

6 24-3014 Cir. 2000). By contrast, a plaintiff’s mere allegations that handcuffs caused him

injury, unsupported by medical records or other evidence, are insufficient to

establish that the amount of force used was objectively unreasonable. See Arpin v.

Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 922 (9th Cir. 2001). Henry has

not presented medical or other evidence of the purported tight handcuffing and

shaking, and he has not alleged that he suffered any physical injury from the

handcuffs nor that he told the officers he was in pain. Because the evidence is

insufficient to allow a factfinder to conclude that the amount of force used was

unreasonable, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on the

claims that Officer Komarovsky used excessive force in tightening or shaking

Henry’s handcuffs.

Second, the video evidence confirms that there is no genuine dispute of

material fact over whether officers used excessive force by pushing Henry against

the patrol car. The body-worn camera video never shows either officer violently

shoving Henry against the vehicle or otherwise using more than minimal force to

secure him. The officers are thus entitled to summary judgment on this claim. See

Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (“When opposing parties tell two different

stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable

jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes

of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”); Lowry, 858 F.3d at 1256 (“Because

7 24-3014 there are no genuine issues of material fact and ‘the relevant set of facts’ has been

determined, the reasonableness of the use of force is ‘a pure question of law.’”

(quoting Scott, 550 U.S. at 381 n.8)).

Third, Henry claims that Officer Komarovsky used excessive force by

threatening to kill Henry when he said he would “get a bunch of cops here and it

[would] become[] a whole lot worse” if Henry did not put on his shoes. Placed in

the context of the parties’ entire interaction, which is captured on video, see Scott,

550 U.S. at 380–81, this comment cannot reasonably be interpreted as a threat to kill

Henry. And Henry has not pointed to any precedent that this type of statement,

standing alone, can constitute excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

As a result, Henry has failed to demonstrate that Officer Komarovsky’s comment

amounted to a constitutional violation.

6. Because Henry cannot prove that he suffered a constitutional injury, his

claims against the City of Tacoma fail. See Fairley v. Luman, 281 F.3d 913, 917

(9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam).

7. On appeal, Henry urges that his due process rights were also violated

because the district court’s handling of the summary judgment proceedings reflected

judicial bias. We reject Henry’s contentions of judicial bias as unsupported by the

record. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (“[J]udicial rulings

8 24-3014 alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.”).

AFFIRMED.

9 24-3014