Henderson v. SNL Distribution Services, Inc.

89 So. 3d 417, 2012 WL 1232164, 2012 La. App. LEXIS 512
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedApril 11, 2012
DocketNo. 2011-CA-1638
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 89 So. 3d 417 (Henderson v. SNL Distribution Services, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Henderson v. SNL Distribution Services, Inc., 89 So. 3d 417, 2012 WL 1232164, 2012 La. App. LEXIS 512 (La. Ct. App. 2012).

Opinion

JOY COSSICH LOBRANO, Judge.

| plaintiff, Jerome Henderson, appeals a judgment of the Office of Workers’ Compensation (“OWC”), maintaining an exception of prescription in favor of defendant, SNL Distribution Services/SNL Trucking (“SNL Distribution/Trucking”), his former employer. For the following reasons, we affirm.

On January 13, 2009, Mr. Henderson filed a disputed claim for compensation with the OWC, naming his employer as “SNL, Inc.” He alleged that on March 3, 2003, while in the course and scope of his employment driving an eighteen-wheeler truck from New Orleans, Louisiana, to Mobile, Alabama, the police stopped him and accused him of smoking marijuana and falsifying a driving log. Mr. Henderson further alleged that he was terminated as a result of the charges and suffered severe emotional distress due to the incident. Attached to the OWC claim form is a copy of a petition for damages Mr. Henderson had filed in the Orleans Parish Civil District Court on March 17, 20041, that named [419]*419“SNL, Inc.” as his employer and alleged the incident occurred on March 17, 2003.

|2In response to Mr. Henderson’s claim, SNL, Inc. filed an answer with the OWC, alleging that it never employed Mr. Henderson, owned any vehicles, and was incorporated for the sole purpose of building a house.

On April 20, 2009, Mr. Henderson filed both a first amended disputed claim for compensation, naming “SNL Distribution Services Corporation” as his employer, and a motion to dismiss SNL, Inc. from the claim. The OWC judge granted the motion, dismissing SNL, Inc. from the claim on May 1, 2009. Thereafter, on February 2, 2011, Mr. Henderson filed a second amended disputed claim for compensation, naming SNL Distribution/Trucking as his employer.

In response, SNL Distribution/Trucking filed a peremptory exception of prescription. Following a hearing, the OWC judge sustained the exception and dismissed Mr. Henderson’s claim. Mr. Henderson appealed.

“In reviewing a peremptory exception of prescription, the standard of review requires an appellate court to determine whether the trial court’s finding of fact was manifestly erroneous.” Taranto v. Louisiana Citizens Property Ins. Corp., 10-0105, p. 5 (La.3/15/11), 62 So.3d 721, 726 (citation omitted). Generally, the burden of proof on the prescription issue lies with the party asserting it. Id. However, if the claim is prescribed on its face, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to negate the presumption by establishing a suspension or interruption. Id.

The prescriptive periods governing workers’ compensation claims are set forth in La. R.S. 23:1209(A).2 Pursuant to the statute, claims for disability benefits Rare barred unless filed (1) within one year from the date of the accident; (2) one or three years from the date of the last payment of compensation benefits, depending on the type of benefits paid; and (3) one year from the time the injury develops if not immediately manifest, but, in any event, no more than two years after the accident. See Muhammad v. New Orleans Police Department, 02-0306, p. 5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/26/02), 822 So.2d 183, 186 (citation omitted).

“[T]he jurisprudence has liberally construed the time limits for institution of a claim for benefits.” Scott v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 03-0104, p. 6 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/2/03), 851 So.2d 1210, 1213-14 (citations omitted). Prescription statutes, including La. R.S. 23:1209(A), are construed in favor [420]*420of maintaining rather than barring actions. See, e.g., Taylor v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 579 So.2d 443, 446 (La.1991).

Mr. Henderson argues the OWC judge erred in sustaining the exception of prescription where the allegations in his second amended claim for compensation relate back to the filing of his petition for damages in Civil District Court. In support of his argument, he cites La. C.C.P. art. 1153 and Miller v. New Orleans Home & Rehabilitation Center, 449 So.2d 133 (La.App. 4th Cir.1984).

La.C.C.P. art. 1153 provides:

When the action or defense asserted in the amended petition or answer arises out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of filing the original pleading.

|4In Miller, supra, the plaintiff was injured on December 11, 1981, while riding in an elevator at the New Orleans Home & Rehabilitation Center (“Center”). Plaintiff filed a petition for damages on February 8, 1982, naming the Center, the State of Louisiana, and the City of New Orleans as defendants. On February 28, 1983, plaintiff filed a supplemental and amended petition to assert a claim for workmen’s compensation benefits against her employer, the Center. The Center filed an exception of prescription. The trial court sustained the exception, dismissing the supplemental and amended petition. Id., 449 So.2d at 134. This Court, relying upon La. C.C.P. art. 1153, reversed, stating:

We hold that the factual allegations contained in the plaintiffs original tort petition were sufficient to interrupt the prescriptive period for bringing a workmen’s compensation claim arising out of the same accident. Because the defendants received notice of the necessary factual allegations in the original petition, Code of Civil Procedure Article 1153 allows the amended petition to relate back to the date of the filing of the original petition.

Miller, 449 So.2d at 135-136.

In this case, Mr. Henderson named SNL, Inc. as a defendant in the action filed in Civil District Court and in the original workers’ compensation claim. However, SNL, Inc. was never Mr. Henderson’s employer and, therefore, not the proper party defendant in the action filed in Civil District Court. Furthermore, the record contains no proof that Mr. Henderson’s employer, SNL Distribution/Trucking, ever received notice of the action filed in Civil District Court. Mr. Henderson’s reliance upon the Miller case is misplaced.

Mr. Henderson named SNL Distribution/Trucking as a new defendant in his second amended disputed claim for compensation. In Ray v. Alexandria Mall, 434 So.2d 1083 (La.1983), the Louisiana Supreme Court discussed whether a 1 ^subsequent pleading would relate back to the original pleading when the subsequent pleading adds or changes a defendant. Specifically, the Court stated:

We establish the following criteria for determining whether art. 1153 allows an amendment which changes the identity of the party or parties sued to relate back to the date of filing of the original petition:
(1) The amended claim must arise out of the same transaction or occurrence set forth in the original pleading;
(2) The purported substitute defendant must have received notice of the institution of the action such that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits;
(3) The purported substitute defendant must know or should have known that but for a mistake concerning the identity [421]*421of the proper party defendant, the action would have been brought against him;

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89 So. 3d 417, 2012 WL 1232164, 2012 La. App. LEXIS 512, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/henderson-v-snl-distribution-services-inc-lactapp-2012.