Henderson v. Golden Corral Systems, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMay 3, 2019
Docket7:19-cv-02878
StatusUnknown

This text of Henderson v. Golden Corral Systems, Inc. (Henderson v. Golden Corral Systems, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Henderson v. Golden Corral Systems, Inc., (S.D.N.Y. 2019).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK SHERRANCE HENDERSON, Plaintiff, 19-CV-2878 (CM) -against- ORDERTO AMEND GOLDEN CORRAL SYSTEMS, INC., et al., Defendants. COLLEEN McMAHON, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, appearing pro se, brings this action arising out of her role as a franchisee of a Golden Corral restaurant in Poughkeepsie, New York.By order dated April 12, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is,in forma pauperis.For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.SeeFed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro sepleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). The Court’s “special solicitude,” Ruotolo v. I.R.S., 28 F.3d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1994) (per curiam), has its limits, however, because pro sepleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8 requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. A complaint states a claim for relief if the claim is plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To review a complaint for plausibility, the Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the pleader’s favor.Id. But the Court need not accept “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially legal conclusions. Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). As set forth in Iqbal: [T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully- harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement. Id. (internal citations, quotation marks, and alteration omitted).After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible –not merely possible –that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND This action arises out of a franchisee agreement Plaintiff entered into with Golden Corral Inc. (GC) to manage a GC restaurant in Poughkeepsie, New York. Plaintiff submits a complaint captioned for New York Supreme Court, Dutchess County,and alleges that Defendants discriminated against her because she is African Americanand a woman,violating New York State laws. She also alleges that Defendants violated the civil provision of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Plaintiff is a resident of New Jersey and Georgia. (Compl. at 34.) She names as defendants GC, a North Carolina corporation; TD Bank, headquartered in New Jersey; Lance Trenary, GC CEO and North Carolina resident; Niral Patel, a New York resident; and two John Doe defendants, both of whom reside in eitherNew York, Georgia, North Carolina, or Canada. The following facts are taken from the 239-page complaint: In 2013, Plaintiff signed a

franchise agreement to run a GC restaurant in Poughkeepsie, New York. In 2014, Sam Starling, GC Vice President of Franchisee Finance, “instructed/told/ordered Plaintiff to use TD Bank . . . for ‘ONLY’ a Small Business Administration [SBA]. . . loan because Plaintiff had ‘good credit,’ in excess of 2 million (2,000,000) dollars in cash and no mortgage on her 1.7 million dollarhome in . . . Georgia.” (Compl. at 4.) On an unspecified date, “Plaintiff was led by her attorney, Donnie Solon, to sign a bogus and baseless leasing agreement with Afran Realty owned by Anthony Segreti.” (Id. at 6.) From May 2016 until September 2017, Plaintiff oversaw the construction of the GC restaurant,during which time TD Bank failed to make timely payments to the construction

companies, including to National Consulting and Development, Inc. (NCD). Also during this time, “TD Bank loan had not been finalized/completed and totally fulfilled by TD Bank.” (Id.at 7.) As a result, the actions of TD [Bank] of not paying on a[n] SBA loan that Plaintiff was already funded, increased disdain among NCD, subcontractors, and Poughkeepsie Town board community members. (Id.) Although construction was still ongoing, the restaurant opened in January 2017, and closed sometime in November 2018. From thetime that Plaintiff entered into the agreement with GC, until the closing of the restaurant, she requested help with training. To the extent she received assistance from GC, she ended up spendingmoney that “caused a financial hardship on” her and her restaurant. (Id.at 9.) GC also undermined her authority and sent Plaintiff representatives who essentially acted as spies for GC. (Id.at 10.) GC eventually terminated the franchisee license agreement. Plaintiff seeks $350,000,000 in money damages. On June 22, 2018, TD Bank removed from New York Supreme Court, Dutchess County,

an action brought by NCD against TD Bank, Plaintiff, and Cornucopia Queen, Inc., Plaintiff’s company. NCD alleged “that it entered into a contract with Cornucopia to construct a Golden Corral restaurant at an agreed price of $3,140,072.68.” Nat. Consulting & Develop., Inc. v. Cornucopia Queen, Inc., No. 18-CV-5699 (KMK) (S.D.N.Y.). NCD has moved for a default judgment against Cornucopia Queen. Id.(ECF Nos. 17, 18.) According to the docket sheet, Plaintiff also has not appeared in that action. On August 20, 2018, Plaintiff filed a complaint against her former attorney in the Eastern District of New York, and on September 14, 2018, that court transferred the action here. Henderson v. Sanders, No. 18-CV-8473 (LTS) (BCM) (S.D.N.Y.). Plaintiff alleged in that action

that Eric Sanders of The Sanders Firm, P.C., a New York law firm, committed legal malpractice by failing to prepare and file Plaintiff’s lawsuit against GC. She claims the basis for jurisdiction in that action is the diversity of citizenship statute, 28 U.S.C. §

Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Dipilato v. 7-Eleven, Inc.
662 F. Supp. 2d 333 (S.D. New York, 2009)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Attis v. Solow Realty Development Co.
522 F. Supp. 2d 623 (S.D. New York, 2007)

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Henderson v. Golden Corral Systems, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/henderson-v-golden-corral-systems-inc-nysd-2019.