F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 8 2001 TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
JAMES HELLUMS,
Petitioner-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, Nos. 00-2100 and 00-2109 v. (District of New Mexico) (D.C. No. CIV-96-63-MV) JOE WILLIAMS, Warden,
Respondent-Appellant and Cross-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, HOLLOWAY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
I. INTRODUCTION
Petitioner James Hellums was convicted by a jury on eight counts of
criminal sexual penetration of a minor in the first degree (CSP) and two counts of
criminal sexual contact of a minor (CSC). See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-9-11(A), (C);
§ 30-9-13(A). On habeas review, the federal district court granted relief on the
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. CSP convictions, concluding the admission of expert testimony which vouched
for the victim’s credibility violated Hellums’ constitutional right to due process.
The district court denied relief on the CSC convictions. Respondent filed an
appeal from the grant of habeas on the CSP convictions; Hellums filed a cross-
appeal from the denial of habeas on the CSC convictions. Exercising jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 28 U.S.C. § 2253, this court affirms the district
court.
II. BACKGROUND
Hellums was charged by the state of New Mexico with sexually abusing his
adopted daughter in a ten-count indictment. The indictment arose from
allegations brought to the attention of the victim’s grandmother after a family
gathering in November 1989 in which the victim informed her grandmother that
her father had sexually touched her. Hellums ultimately was indicted on eight
counts of CSP, including one count of fellatio, one count of digital penetration of
the victim’s vagina, and one count of digital penetration of the victim’s anus for
the time period in which the Hellums family lived in an apartment. See N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 30-9-11(A), (C). In addition, he was indicted on one count of each
of these acts for the time period in which the family lived in a house. 1 The final
The location of the sexual abuse is relevant to the testimony of the victim 1
who described the time frame for the abuse in terms of where the family was living at the time. The indictment charges Hellums with committing the specified
-2- two CSP counts charged Hellums with engaging in vaginal intercourse and anal
intercourse with the victim during the time period spanning the family’s
occupation of the apartment and the house. Hellums also was charged with two
counts of CSC. See id. § 30-9-13(A).
After a jury trial, Hellums was convicted on all ten counts of the
indictment. The trial court sentenced Hellums to consecutive terms of eighteen
years for each of the CSP convictions and three years for each of the CSC
convictions, for a total of 150 years of which ninety years were suspended.
Hellums’ convictions were affirmed on direct appeal and his petition for post-
conviction relief was denied in state court proceedings. Hellums’ habeas petition
in federal district court, however, was granted with respect to the CSP convictions
based on the erroneous admission of expert testimony which vouched for the
victim’s credibility. The district court denied Hellums’ petition with respect to
the CSC convictions.
Respondent appeals the district court’s grant of habeas relief on the CSP
convictions, claiming the admission of the expert’s erroneous testimony was
harmless. Hellums appeals the district court’s denial of habeas relief on the CSC
acts between October 25, 1985 and November 30, 1986 and again during the period of time from December 1, 1986 to November 22, 1989. The first set of dates corresponds with the time in which the family was living in an apartment; the second set of dates corresponds with the time in which the family was living in a house.
-3- convictions, alleging (1) his right to a fair trial was violated by the introduction of
expert testimony that vouched for the victim’s credibility; (2) his right to a fair
trial was violated by the admission of sexually-oriented physical evidence and
testimony; (3) his right to due process was violated because the evidence
presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction; (4) he received
ineffective assistance of counsel during the state court proceedings; and (5) his
right to a definite deadline for retrial was violated.
III. DISCUSSION
In reviewing the grant or denial of a petitioner’s habeas corpus petition,
this court accepts the district court’s factual findings unless they are clearly
erroneous and reviews its legal conclusions de novo. See Richmond v. Embry,
122 F.3d 866, 870 (10th Cir. 1997); Hill v. Reynolds, 942 F.2d 1494, 1495 (10th
Cir. 1991). The scope of this court’s review is limited to reviewing a petition only
for a violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. See
Romano v. Gibson, 239 F.3d 1156, 1166 (10th Cir. 2001); Jackson v. Shanks, 143
F.3d 1313, 1317 (10th Cir. 1998). A federal court may grant habeas corpus relief
due to state evidentiary errors only if the error was “so grossly prejudicial that it
fatally infected the trial and denied the fundamental fairness that is the essence of
due process.” See Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d 1508, 1522 (10th Cir. 1997).
Because Hellums filed his habeas corpus petition before the effective date of the
-4- Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), pre-AEDPA
standards apply to the case. See Moore v. Gibson, 195 F.3d 1152, 1160-61 (10th
Cir. 1999). 2
A. Expert Testimony
At Hellums’ trial, the state elicited testimony from several witnesses who
examined the victim after the alleged sexual abuse came to light. Two of the
witnesses were Julia Barker, a child and family counselor, and Dr. Robert
Zussman, a clinical psychologist. In seeking habeas relief below, Hellums alleged
both of these expert witnesses impermissibly vouched for the victim’s credibility
by indicating that they believed her allegations. Hellums claimed the vouching
invaded the jury’s province to determine the victim’s credibility in violation of
his right to due process.
2 Because this appeal was filed after the effective date of the AEDPA, Hellums was required to obtain a certificate of appealability (COA). See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 481-82 (2000) (holding the post-AEDPA version of 28 U.S.C. § 2253 controls petitioner’s right to appeal denial of habeas relief when appeal is filed after effective date of AEDPA). Respondent claims the district court issued a COA only on the issue of the expert witness testimony relating to the victim’s credibility. Hellums, on the other hand, argues the district court issued a blanket COA to its order denying relief on the other issues Hellums raised in his habeas petition. Cf. LaFevers v. Gibson, 182 F.3d 705, 710-11 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting that blanket COAs are improper but that once COA is granted, even if erroneously, this court must review the merits). Regardless of whether the district court granted a blanket COA, this court concludes Hellums made a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right” which leads this court to grant a COA as to the issues Hellums raises on appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
-5- Adopting the magistrate’s report and recommendation (R & R), the district
court agreed with Hellums with respect to Barker’s testimony. The district court
granted habeas relief on the CSP convictions but denied such relief as to the CSC
convictions. Hellums objected to the magistrate’s R & R with respect to the CSC
convictions. Respondent filed an untimely objection to the R & R with respect to
the CSP convictions. On appeal, Hellums claims he was denied a fair trial and
requests this court to reverse the district court’s denial of habeas relief on his
CSC convictions. Respondent seeks a reversal of the grant of habeas relief on
Hellums’ CSP convictions.
New Mexico’s evidentiary rule on admissible expert testimony corresponds
with the federal rule. Both rules allow experts to testify if their testimony will
assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or determining a fact in issue.
See N.M.R. Ann. 11-702; Fed. R. Evid. 702. In abuse cases, experts may testify
that an alleged victim suffers from symptoms consistent with sexual abuse. See
United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251, 1264 (10th Cir. 1999); State v. Alberico,
861 P.2d 192, 210 (N.M. 1993). Experts, however, may not comment on the
alleged victim’s credibility. See United States v. Whitted, 11 F.3d 782, 785-86,
787 (8th Cir. 1993); Alberico, 861 P.2d at 210-11. Such comments exceed the
scope of the expert’s specialized knowledge and merely inform the jury that it
should reach a particular conclusion rather than allowing the jury to decide the
-6- ultimate issue of sexual abuse. See United States v. Shay, 57 F.3d 126, 131 (1st
Cir. 1995). Expert testimony, based on the statements of an alleged victim, that
sexual abuse in fact occurred is inadmissible. See Charley, 189 F.3d at 1267;
State v. Lucero, 863 P.2d 1071, 1075 (N.M. 1993); Alberico, 861 P.2d at 211.
Statements that assume the fact of abuse are also inadmissible. See Charley, 189
F.3d at 1270.
During her testimony at trial, Barker consistently made statements in which
she assumed the truth of the victim’s allegations or affirmatively indicated that
the abuse had occurred based on the victim’s statements to her. For example,
Barker testified that it was clear to her that the victim “has her own memory of
incidents of fellatio.” Even Respondent concedes that Barker’s testimony
constituted impermissible vouching.
Zussman, on the other hand, generally followed the rule which allows an
expert to testify that an alleged victim suffers from symptoms consistent with
sexual abuse. He testified that the victim’s “behavior and her psychological test
results were consistent with what both the research and [his] clinical experience
indicates is commonly found in child sexual abuse.” On cross-examination,
however, one of Zussman’s lengthy responses to a question posed by Hellums’
counsel clearly went beyond both the scope of admissible testimony and the
questioning by counsel. In addressing whether he thought some of the victim’s
-7- behavioral problems stemmed from her dysfunctional family, Zussman indicated
that the victim’s behavior was typical of sexual abuse victims but may have
resulted from dysfunctional family dynamics as well. This statement was
permissible testimony under the state evidentiary rules. See Alberico, 861 P.2d at
210 (permitting expert testimony that an alleged victim suffers from symptoms
consistent with sexual abuse). After having answered the question posed by
counsel, however, Zussman continued to testify that he found no reason to
question the victim’s allegations of sexual abuse. In this part of Zussman’s
testimony, he plainly invaded the jury’s province to determine whether the victim
was credible. Zussman’s statements informed the jury that it should reach a
particular conclusion rather than allowing it to draw inferences from his
testimony on the ultimate issue of sexual abuse.
The erroneous admission of Barker’s and Zussman’s testimony provides a
foundation for habeas relief only if this court determines that it was prejudicial
under the harmless-error analysis. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-
38 (1993). The proper inquiry does not focus on whether, without the
inadmissible testimony, there was sufficient evidence to convict Hellums on the
CSC and CSP charges. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946).
Rather, this court must determine whether, in light of the entire record, Barker’s
or Zussman’s testimony so influenced the jury that it had a substantial and
-8- injurious effect in determining the jury’s verdict. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638;
Tuttle v. Utah, 57 F.3d 879, 884 (10th Cir. 1995); Brewer v. Reynolds, 51 F.3d
1519, 1529 (10th Cir. 1995).
1. CSC Convictions
To convict Hellums on the CSC counts, the jury was compelled to find
Hellums unlawfully and intentionally touched or applied force to the intimate
parts of the victim. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-9-13. Unlawful touching occurs
when the touching is done to arouse or gratify sexual desire or to otherwise
intrude upon the bodily integrity of a minor. See State v. Osborne, 808 P.2d 624,
631 (N.M. 1991).
Hellums’ admissions with respect to the CSC counts were devastating to his
defense and overwhelmingly compelling even in light of the impermissible
vouching. Prior to his arrest, Hellums spoke with Detective Babcock about the
allegations of sexual abuse. The conversation was taped and played for the jury
during the state’s presentation of evidence at trial. During the interview, Hellums
admitted to touching his daughter’s “sex parts” three-and-a-half years prior to
their conversation. 3 Hellums asserted, “I did probably fondle her and caress her a
couple times.” He defined fondling and caressing as touching her “sexual
3 The time specified in the indictment during which the CSC was alleged to have occurred corresponds with the period of time described by Hellums.
-9- organs.” Babcock questioned Hellums about the details of the fondling, asking
whether his finger ever penetrated the victim. Hellums replied, “No, because I
knew it would hurt her if I did, and I had no intention of hurting her.” Babcock
further asked whether Hellums touched her over or under her clothing. Hellums
responded, “Mostly over clothing. I think one time I run [sic] my finger over her
skin, touched her [labia].” Detective Babcock asked Hellums whether it was
pleasurable to touch the victim, to which he replied, “After I did it and thought
about it, not really.” Babcock asked if it was pleasurable at the time, and Hellums
responded, “I guess I thought so.”
Hellums further hurt his credibility by changing his testimony at trial from
the statements he made during the taped conversation with Babcock. At trial,
Hellums admitted that he accidentally touched his daughter but indicated that he
had no intent to become sexually aroused by doing so. On cross-examination, the
state read the portion of the taped conversation to Hellums in which he admitted
to being aroused at the time he touched his daughter. When questioned by the
prosecution about whether the statement was true, Hellums responded, “Yes, sir,
if that’s what’s written down there, then I would say it probably is. Has to be.”
Hellums contradicted himself again at trial when he described the
circumstances surrounding the incidents of the touching for which he could
remember the details. When talking to Babcock, Hellums initially indicated that
-10- he put his hand between the victim’s legs when he was tickling her, and later in
the interview he indicated that he put his hand between her legs when she went
over to give him a hug while he was watching television. At trial, however,
Hellums testified that he had put his hand between his daughter’s legs only to
warm her legs after she had been outside in the cold.
In the context of Hellums’ admissions and credibility problems, this court
concludes that the inadmissible expert testimony was harmless. Regardless of
how Barker and Zussman may have bolstered the victim’s credibility, Hellums
devastated his own defense. Given his admissions and inconsistent statements,
the vouching testimony was not prejudicial to Hellums on the CSC charges.
2. CSP Convictions
On appeal, Respondent claims the district court erred in granting Hellums
habeas relief on the CSP convictions because Barker’s testimony constituted
harmless error. Respondent, however, failed to file a timely objection to the
magistrate’s R & R. When a party fails to timely object to a magistrate’s R & R,
this court applies a firm waiver rule which bars appellate review. See Vega v.
Suthers, 195 F.3d 573, 579 (10th Cir. 1999). The waiver rule does not apply,
however, if the interests of justice demand otherwise. See Theede v. United
States Dep’t of Labor, 172 F.3d 1262, 1268 (10th Cir. 1999). This court has
under certain circumstances reviewed the merits of a claim, as one factor among
-11- many, in deciding whether to apply the “interests of justice” exception to the
waiver rule. See Key Energy Res. Inc. v. Merrill (In re Key Energy Res. Inc.),
230 F.3d 1197, 1200 (10th Cir. 2000); Vega, 195 F.3d at 580 n.7; Theede, 172
F.3d at 1268.
Assuming, without deciding, that such an analysis is appropriate in the
context of this case, this court concludes that there is little merit to Respondent’s
claim that Barker’s testimony constitutes harmless error with respect to the CSP
convictions. Unlike Hellums’ compelling admissions in support of the CSC
convictions, Hellums made no such admissions in support of the CSP convictions.
Neither during the taped conversation with Detective Babcock nor at trial did
Hellums admit to penetrating the victim. Given the absence of any admissions in
the context of the impermissible vouching, this court’s decision to apply the firm
waiver rule is consistent with the “interests of justice.” The district court’s grant
of habeas on the CSP convictions is therefore affirmed.
B. Hellums’ Remaining Claims
1. Sexually-Oriented Evidence and Testimony
Hellums also claims he was denied a fair trial as to the CSC convictions
because of the admission at trial of sexually-oriented physical evidence and
testimony. Specifically, Hellums asserts the trial court impermissibly admitted
(1) pornographic photographs and sexually-oriented books seized during the
-12- search of his house; (2) testimony by Detective Babcock that he found
pornographic magazines and videos, a vibrator, and anal lube in Hellums’ house;
and (3) testimony by the victim’s grandmother that Hellums had rubbed against
her chest in a sexual manner. Hellums argues that at the very least the cumulative
effect of the inadmissible evidence deprived him of a fundamentally fair trial.
Although this court closely examined the record with respect to Hellums’ claims,
we need not spend much time discussing them. Even assuming admission of the
pornographic photographs, sexually-oriented books, and testimony was improper,
the error—cumulative or not—was harmless in light of the devastating nature of
Hellums’ admissions.
2. Sufficiency of the Evidence Claims
Hellums claims the government presented insufficient evidence at trial to
support the eight counts of CSP and two counts of CSC on which he was
convicted. The district court rejected his arguments below. This court reviews
the district court’s determinations de novo. See Maes v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 979,
988 (10th Cir. 1995). In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, this court
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and
determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of each crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Romano, 239 F.3d at
-13- 1164. This court, however, neither weighs the evidence nor considers witness
credibility. See Wingfield v. Massie, 122 F.3d 1329, 1332 (10th Cir. 1997).
Because this court affirmed the district court’s grant of habeas relief on the
CSP convictions, we need not examine Hellums’ sufficiency claim with respect to
these convictions except to analyze the Double Jeopardy implications. To
determine whether Double Jeopardy bars retrial on the CSP counts, this court
must examine all of the evidence from trial, including erroneously admitted
evidence. See Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 34 (1988) (holding when “the
evidence offered by the State and admitted by the trial court—whether
erroneously or not—would have been sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict, the
Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude retrial”); see also United States v.
Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1465 (10th Cir. 1996). Double Jeopardy would preclude
retrial of Hellums on the CSP charges if this court were to determine that there
was insufficient evidence to convict him even with the inadmissible evidence
detailed above. See Lockhart, 488 U.S. at 40.
At trial, the state amassed a significant amount of testimony against
Hellums. The victim testified by videotaped deposition that Hellums made her
“suck on his private part” more than once while they were living in the apartment
and the house. She testified that one time ejaculate came out of Hellums penis
and went into her mouth. The victim also testified that Hellums put his penis
-14- inside of “[her] back private and [her] front private.” She indicated that this
happened more than once.
Detective Babcock testified that the victim indicated to him that Hellums
stuck “his private in [her] private.” Specifically, she told the detective that her
dad stuck his penis in her anus on numerous occasions. The state also relied on
Dr. Carol Geil who testified that the victim told her during a medical evaluation
that Hellums “always does the ‘F’ word with me,” “he sticks his finger up my
private,” and “makes me suck his private.” Dr. Geil further testified that her
medical examination findings were “consistent with the history that [the victim]
gave” even though they were “nonspecific in terms of the other overall findings.”
She indicated that there was “increased vascularity of [the victim’s] hymenal
area” that could have been caused by “rubbing or traumatic injury to the area.”
Dr. Geil indicated that there was more rounding in the victim’s hymeneal area
than she normally sees, which was consistent with non-accidental trauma.
Another doctor called by the state, Dr. Kathleen Christopherson, testified that the
victim told her that Hellums had “stuck his finger in her private” many times.
Hellums’ wife, Mary, testified that her daughter had told her about the
alleged sexual abuse a few years prior to the criminal charges being filed against
Hellums. Specifically, the victim told Mary that she had engaged in fellatio with
-15- her father. Mary further testified that Hellums admitted to putting his penis in
their daughter’s vaginal area.
Even though some of their testimony was improperly admitted at trial, the
testimony of Barker and Zussman also supports the CSP convictions. Barker
testified that the victim indicated that Hellums had put his penis in her mouth.
Barker further testified that the victim’s emotional functioning and coping were
consistent with children who have experienced extensive abuse over time from a
young age. Zussman testified that the conclusion he reached based on his
evaluation of the victim was that her behavior and psychological test results were
consistent with other sexually-abused children.
Hellums claims the inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony regarding the
allegations suggest that no reasonable juror could find her credible or convict him
on the specified charges. It is true that the young girl had difficulty specifying
the actual dates of the sexual abuse and her age at the time of the abuse. She was
definitive, however, in her statements about the particular locations in which the
abuse occurred, specifying that the abuse began while her family was living in the
apartment and continued after they moved to the house. The charges in the
indictment corresponded to these two time periods. Simply because an eight year
old child defines a period of time based on her residence in a specific location
rather than by the specific dates does not make her “wholly incredible” as
-16- Hellums suggests. Although Hellums denied his daughter’s allegations at trial,
the jury was entitled to credit her testimony over Hellums’ conflicting testimony.
See United States v. Valadez-Gallegos, 162 F.3d 1256, 1262 (10th Cir. 1998).
An examination of the evidence presented at trial compels this court to
conclude that there was sufficient evidence to convict Hellums on the CSP counts.
Because there was no failure to produce sufficient evidence at trial on the CSP
charges, Double Jeopardy does not bar the state from retrying Hellums.
With respect to the CSC counts, this court must determine whether
Hellums’ sufficiency claim requires this court to grant habeas relief. The
evidentiary sufficiency inquiry requires this court to examine whether there was
sufficient evidence to support the convictions without the inadmissible evidence.
See United States v. Tome, 61 F.3d 1446, 1455 (10th Cir. 1995) (contrasting the
analyses for the harmless-error inquiry, in which the analysis includes an
examination of the erroneously admitted evidence in light of the entire record,
and the evidentiary sufficiency inquiry, in which the inadmissible evidence is
omitted from the analysis altogether and only the properly admitted evidence is
examined).
The victim testified that Hellums touched her “private parts” during the
time they lived in the apartment and the house. She further testified that Hellums
put his penis on the outside of “[her] back private and [her] front private.” Mary
-17- testified that Hellums admitted to her that he had touched their daughter and he
apologized to Mary for doing so. Dr. Geil testified that Mary indicated that her
daughter had told her a couple years before about Hellums “touching her in her
private parts.” Dr. Geil indicated that Mary told her that Hellums admitted to
touching their daughter and claimed to want help to stop touching her. A social
worker corroborated Dr. Geil’s testimony regarding Mary’s statements about
Hellums’ admission. Most devastating to Hellums, however, was his own
admission that he had fondled his daughter. Even setting aside the improperly
admitted evidence from trial, the admissible evidence overwhelmingly supports
the jury’s decision to convict Hellums on the CSC charges.
3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim
Hellums claims he was deprived of his right to effective assistance of
counsel in the state court proceedings. He asserts that his counsel failed to object
to the admission of the vouching testimony and failed to investigate evidence that
the photographs of a young girl performing fellatio on an adult male, which were
admitted at trial, were taken on film that was no longer manufactured at the time
the alleged sexual abuse occurred with his daughter. Because Hellums has
already obtained habeas relief on the CSP convictions, this court analyzes his
ineffective assistance claim only to determine whether habeas relief should be
-18- granted on the CSC convictions. This court reviews Hellums’ claim de novo. See
Houchin v. Zavaras, 107 F.3d 1465, 1469 (10th Cir. 1997).
To prevail on his claim, Hellums must demonstrate that (1) counsel’s
performance was objectively deficient, and (2) counsel’s deficiency prejudiced
the defense such that, but for counsel’s errors, there is a reasonable probability
that the outcome of the trial would have been different. See Gonzales v. McKune,
247 F.3d 1066, 1072 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668 (1984)). Hellums claims his counsel not only prejudicially failed to object to
the expert testimony at trial but that he further exacerbated its prejudicial impact
on cross-examination by eliciting more vouching testimony. Hellums also asserts
the photographs of what the state claimed to be the victim performing fellatio on
Hellums constituted the most prejudicial physical evidence admitted by the state
at trial because the photographs directly supported the offense for which he was
charged. This court concluded above, however, that admission of the vouching
testimony and the pornographic photographs was harmless error with respect to
the CSC convictions in light of the devastating nature of Hellums’ admissions.
Thus, even assuming counsel’s performance was rendered deficient by his failure
to object to the vouching testimony and failure to investigate the production date
of the film used for the pornographic photographs, Hellums cannot establish that
-19- he was prejudiced by the deficiency. Without counsel’s errors, it is highly
unlikely that the trial outcome would have been different.
4. Timing of Retrial
In his brief-in-chief, Hellums maintains the district court erred by giving
discretion to the state trial court to determine the date by which he must be
retried. Hellums asserts that is it the responsibility of the federal habeas court to
set a definite deadline for retrial. In his reply brief, however, Hellums indicates
that in ruling on Respondent’s motion to stay the grant of habeas on the CSP
convictions, the district court “orally ordered that the state retry Mr. Hellums
within five months of when the court’s granting of habeas relief becomes final on
appeal.” Because Hellums has already obtained the relief he requested, this issue
is moot.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, this court AFFIRMS the district court.
Entered for the Court
Michael R. Murphy Circuit Judge
-20-