Heinz v. Bowles

149 F.2d 277
CourtEmergency Court of Appeals
DecidedMarch 29, 1945
Docket102, 103
StatusPublished
Cited by20 cases

This text of 149 F.2d 277 (Heinz v. Bowles) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Emergency Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Heinz v. Bowles, 149 F.2d 277 (eca 1945).

Opinion

149 F.2d 277 (1945)

HEINZ et al.
v.
BOWLES, Price Administrator.[*] E. KAHN'S SONS CO.
v.
SAME.

Nos. 102, 103.

United States Emergency Court of Appeals.

Heard September 21, 1944.
Decided March 29, 1945.
Complainants Petition for Rehearing Denied May 1, 1945.

*278 Wilbur LaRoe, Jr., of Washington, D. C. (Frederick E. Brown and Arthur L. Winn, Jr., both of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for complainants.

Jacob D. Hyman, Chief, Court Review Price Branch, of Washington, D. C. (Richard H. Field, Gen. Counsel, Nathaniel L. Nathanson, Associate Gen. Counsel, Carl H. Fulda, and John J. Downey, Jr., Attys., all of the Office of Price Administration, all of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for respondent.

Before MARIS, Chief Judge, and MAGRUDER and LAWS, Judges.

Heard at Washington September 21, 1944.

MAGRUDER, Judge.

Edward Heinz et al., co-partners doing business as Heinz's Riverside Abattoir, The Koblenzer Company, Reynolds Packing Company, Ben H. Rosenthal & Company, Inc., T. L. Lay Packing Company, and E. Kahn's Sons Company, at various dates between March 25, 1943, and April 10, 1943, filed with the Price Administrator their separate protests against Revised Maximum Price Regulation No. 169 — Beef and Veal Carcasses and Wholesale Cuts, issued December 10, 1942, 7 F.R. 10381. The Administrator consolidated these protests with several similar protests of other parties, and after extended proceedings issued an order on October 27, 1943, denying the consolidated protests except to the extent that relief was forthcoming under the subsidy program and cattle stabilization plan instituted pursuant to the Directive of the Office of Economic Stabilization issued October 26, 1943, 8 F.R. 14641.

On November 26, 1943, the first five complainants named above filed their joint complaint in this court (No. 102), and on the same day E. Kahn's Sons Company filed its separate complaint (No. 103). By orders entered January 17, 1944, we granted applications by the complainants in the two cases for leave to introduce additional evidence, such evidence to be presented to the Price Administrator together with such other evidence as the Administrator might deem it proper to receive. The Administrator *279 on February 21, 1944, reopened the protest proceedings for the reception of additional evidence. On April 24, 1944, the Administrator issued an order denying the protests upon reconsideration.

By order dated April 27, 1944, we granted respondent's motion to consolidate Nos. 102 and 103 for hearing and disposition. Subsequently, pursuant to leave granted, respondent and complainants presented directly to the court certain additional evidence.

Of the five joint complainants in No. 102, Reynolds, Rosenthal, and Lay are medium sized or small meat packers, with some degree of integration in their operations, the details of which do not appear in the record. The other two, Heinz and Koblenzer, are non-processing slaughterers; that is, they are engaged in the slaughter of cattle and the sale of beef and veal carcasses and in the preparation and sale of wholesale cuts of beef and veal, but they do no substantial processing of beef carcasses or other materials derived from the slaughter of cattle. Kahn, the complainant in No. 103, states that it is "engaged in the Meat Packing business, and slaughters Cattle, Calves, Sheep, Lambs and Hogs; from these it produces Dressed Beef, Pork, Veal and Lamb, also the curing of all Pork products, such as Ham, Bacon, Picnics, Butts, Tongues and Pig Feet; and manufacturing Sausage, Lard, Tallow, Dried Blood, Fertilizer, Tankage, Grease, Casings, Live Stock Feed and Poultry Feed, as well as many other articles produced or manufactured by the Meat Packing Industry; is also engaged in curing and preparing hides, ready for the tanner, and lamb and pelt skins, ready for the wool pullers, and the dressing of poultry."

Complainants have attacked the regulation on the ground that, in the absence of ceilings on live cattle prices, they have advanced to a point that, under the established maximum prices for carcass beef and wholesale cuts, complainants and the industry generally are compelled to produce these commodities at a loss. To prove such losses, they have utilized the cut-out test method of accounting which for many years has been in vogue in the meat packing industry.

In our opinion in Armour & Company v. Bowles, 148 F.2d 529, we have described the organization of the industry, the cost accounting method in question, the history of price control of beef products under the Emergency Price Control Act, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix § 901 et seq., and the subsidy program and cattle stabilization plan contained in the Directive of October 26, 1943, above mentioned. These matters will not be set forth again in the present opinion.

On the main point, the two consolidated cases now before us are governed by our decision in the Armour case. In that case we upheld the Administrator's contention that the cut-out test method of cost accounting is not an acceptable criterion for determining whether RMPR 169 establishes generally fair and equitable maximum prices. Since the over-all industry earnings under price control are well above their normal peacetime level, we held, applying the pricing standards approved by us in Gillespie-Rogers-Pyatt Co., Inc. v. Bowles, Em.App.1944, 144 F.2d 361, that the maximum prices in RMPR No. 169 must be deemed generally fair and equitable if they afford a sufficient margin to enable the industry generally to earn in its cattle operations as an entirety enough to cover its "out-of-pocket" costs in respect thereto. While insisting that the only relevant figures were its "losses" on carcass beef computed by the cut-out test method, Armour did submit in evidence its figures allocating and crediting to the beef division its equitable share of all profits made by the various processing departments out of by-products of cattle slaughter. These figures, for a large and representative packer, showed that its cattle operations as a whole, under price control, have not only returned the "out-of-pocket" costs, but also made a substantial contribution to the general overhead expense. The present complainants have not undertaken to make a similar allocation, asserting that it would be difficult, if not impossible, for them to do so. As the record stands, they have failed to sustain the burden of proving their case under the Gillespie formula as applied by us in the Armour case.

In the cases at bar, the Administrator maintained, as he did in the Armour case, that in the years before price control, the industry as a whole showed "losses" on the sales of carcass beef, using the cutout test method of accounting. He again put in evidence a graph with supporting data showing the relationship between the market prices of good and choice steers *280 and their reflected cut-out value since 1937 at the Chicago market; the conclusion to be drawn from this evidence is that, for most of that period, the market prices of the steer did in fact exceed the reflected cut-out value. Armour did not seek to controvert the existence of this historic "loss" on carcass beef; indeed, Armour's own figures on the cut-out test method (which are also included in the records of the present consolidated cases) seem to bear out the Administrator's statistics for the industry generally.

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Bluebook (online)
149 F.2d 277, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/heinz-v-bowles-eca-1945.