Armour & Co. v. Bowles

148 F.2d 529
Emergency Court of Appeals·Decided March 29, 1945·No. 101·Published·Cited by 24 cases

Opinion

148 F.2d 529 (1945)

ARMOUR & CO.
v.
BOWLES, Price Administrator.

No. 101.

United States Emergency Court of Appeals.

Heard October 4, 1944.
Decided March 29, 1945.
Writ of Certiorari Denied June 4, 1945.

*530 Donald R. Richberg, of Chicago, Ill. (George E. Leonard, Jr., of Chicago, Ill., on the brief), for complainant.

Jacob D. Hyman, Chief Court Review Price Branch, of Washington, D. C. (Richard H. Field, Gen. Counsel, Nathaniel L. Nathanson, Associate Gen. Counsel, and Carl H. Fulda, all of Washington, D. C., and Charles Rotstein, Atty. of New York City, on the brief), for respondent.

Before MARIS, Chief Judge, and MAGRUDER and LAWS, Judges.

Heard at Chicago October 4, 1944.

Writ of Certiorari Denied June 4, 1945. See 65 S.Ct. 1411.

MAGRUDER, Judge.

This case had its origin in a protest filed by Armour and Company on February 8, 1943, setting forth various objections to Revised Maximum Price Regulation No. 169 — Beef and Veal Carcasses and Wholesale Cuts (7 F.R. 10381). It was alleged that the maximum prices established by the regulation did not provide a generally fair and equitable margin of profit and required protestant to sell such carcasses and cuts at a loss. In substantiation of this allegation, the protest was accompanied by numerous exhibits showing Armour's costs at Chicago of various grades of beef carcasses for the weeks ending May 9, 1942, December 12, 1942, and January 23, 1943, computed by the so-called cut-out test method, which will be described and discussed subsequently in this opinion.

On March 12, 1943, the Administrator issued an order providing protestant an opportunity to present further evidence relating to cattle slaughtered in recent years, volume in pounds and dollars of each class of dressed meat sold, realization from sales of carcass beef, and a current profit and loss statement. Additional evidence in response to this order was filed by Armour on May 10, 1943. Upon the representation that certain items requested would require an inordinate labor to compile, the Administrator on July 3, 1943, modified said order of March 12, 1943, by striking out certain items and substituting others on which information was requested. On August 19, 1943, Armour filed the additional evidence requested.

On August 24, 1943, the Administrator ordered Armour's protest to be consolidated with pending protests of a number of other meat packers, incorporated into the record certain exhibits of statistical data, and afforded protestants fifteen days within which to file rebuttal evidence.

All of the protests in the consolidated proceeding were denied by order issued October 27, 1943, except in so far as relief had been granted pursuant to the Directive of the Office of Economic Stabilization, issued October 26, 1943, relating to livestock slaughter subsidy payments. 8 F.R. 14641. Accompanying the order was an elaborate opinion by the Administrator, and an appendix relating to the profits of the industry. In view of the new facts introduced by the subsidy Directive of October 26, 1943, protestants were given thirty days within which to request a reconsideration of their protests, "upon a showing that the relief being granted pursuant to said Directive is insufficient to achieve the objectives indicated in the accompanying opinion."

Armour filed a complaint in this court on November 26, 1943. On January 10, 1944, we granted an application by complainant for leave to introduce additional evidence, and ordered the same to be presented to the Administrator, together with such other evidence as the Administrator might deem it proper to receive. Subsequently, the Administrator reopened the protest proceedings and received additional evidence. On June 21, 1944, the Administrator issued an order, with opinion, denying Armour's protest upon reconsideration. An amended complaint was filed by Armour. At the hearing before us, both complainant and respondent were permitted to introduce certain additional evidence directly to the court.

The meat industry ranks well up with the automobile and steel industries in annual value of its product. Over fifty per cent of the beef processed and sold annually in the United States is accounted for by four very large corporations, Swift, Wilson, Cudahy, and Armour, the present complainant. The "big four" have introduced to the fullest extent mass production methods in slaughtering and processing. The processing of numerous by-products has become an important part of their activities. By weight, the ordinary beef cattle is less than two thirds fresh meat carcass. The remainder is manufactured, often with the addition of parts of sheep and hogs, into many different products such as *531 sausages, pharmaceuticals, tallow, oils, etc. With the development of a mass distribution system for the efficient handling of their products, it has become the practice of the larger packers to distribute their overhead by handling also such items as eggs, poultry, cheese and butter. In addition to the "big four", the industry contains a larger number of medium size packers and processors who vary considerably in the degree to which they process the raw by-products of their beef slaughtering operations, but who nevertheless have this characteristic feature of the industry as a whole. In numbers, by far the largest group in the industry are small non-processing slaughterers, who account for about fifteen per cent of the beef processed and sold annually in the United States.

The meat packers and slaughterers obtain their cattle from the livestock markets and other sources all over the United States. Important livestock marketing areas include Chicago, Kansas City, Omaha, and St. Louis. Of these, the most important is the Chicago livestock market. While only fourteen per cent of the cattle marketed is sold in Chicago, this market tends to influence in some degree the prices for cattle throughout the country, and it seems that Chicago sells a higher proportion of the top grades of cattle than appears from the volume of sales.

In undertaking to regulate prices in the meat industry, the Administrator has come up against one of his thorniest administrative problems. The effect of the regulation can only be gauged in the light of an understanding of the economics of a vast and intricate industry. The record is laden with complicated statistical data from which the parties seek to draw conflicting inferences. Our task of judicial review is one of peculiar difficulty. Able briefs and oral arguments have been submitted by counsel for the complainant and for the Administrator — and this, in one sense, paradoxically enough, has made the case harder for us to decide.

The Administrator originally placed the meat packing industry under price control by means of the General Maximum Price Regulation, which fixed the maximum prices on the basis of the prices prevailing in March, 1942. For various reasons this general freeze method was found by the Administrator to be unsatisfactory as applied to the particular industry. Therefore, on June 19, 1942, he issued a regulation especially applicable to the meat industry, Maximum Price Regulation No. 169, which, while making provisions for the special characteristics of the industry, continued to use the March, 1942, prices as a base (7 F.R 4653). Finally, on December 10, 1942, the Administrator issued Revised Maximum Price Regulation No. 169, the regulation whose validity is now at issue in the present case. Its major feature was the establishment of dollars-and-cents ceiling prices on the wholesale level for all fresh beef and veal commodities.

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