Heidelberg Materials NE v. Blue Rock Construction

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: April 14, 2025
• Docket: 875 EDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-A25020-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

HEIDELBERG MATERIALS : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF NORTHEAST, LLC F/K/A HANSON : PENNSYLVANIA AGGREGATES PENNSYLVANIA, LLC : : : v. : : : BLUE ROCK CONSTRUCTION, INC. : No. 875 EDA 2024 : Appellant :

Appeal from the Order Entered February 19, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County Civil Division at No(s): C-48-CV-2021-09261

BEFORE: OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED APRIL 14, 2025

Appellant, Blue Rock Construction, Inc. appeals the February 19, 2024

order entered in the Northampton County Court of Common Pleas, granting

summary judgment to Appellee, Heidelberg Materials Northeast, LLC, f/k/a

Hanson Aggregates Pennsylvania, LLC, in this case brought under the

Mechanics’ Lien Law of 1963.1 After careful consideration, we affirm.

The relevant factual and procedural history is as follows. Centerpoint

Willowbrook, LLC (“Owner”) engaged Appellant as the general contractor for

a construction project on Owner’s real property (the “Project”). Appellant then

contracted with Dobrinski Brothers, Inc., which, in turn, subcontracted with

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1 49 P.S. §§ 1101-1902. J-A25020-24

Appellee for labor and materials related to the construction of parking lots and

entrance ways on the Project.

On December 8, 2021, Appellee filed a mechanics’ lien claim against

Owner’s property to secure payment of $395,829.89 owed for materials and

labor provided by Appellee on the Project. Relevantly, Appellee averred that

it last furnished labor and materials for the Project on July 8, 2021, which

would render the lien claim timely under the Mechanics’ Lien Law. 2

In January 2022, Appellant and Appellee filed a Joint Stipulation to

permit Appellant to intervene and to discharge the lien claim against Owner’s

property. Importantly, Appellant waived its defenses in the following

stipulation:

[Appellant] stipulates that the amount of the liens accurately represent work performed or materials furnished by [Appellee], the mechanics[’] lien is valid, and [sic] waives any defenses.

Joint Stipulation, 1/18/22, at ¶ 8. On January 18, 2022, the court adopted

the stipulation. On March 23, 2022, Appellee filed a complaint to enforce the

mechanics’ lien.

On June 15, 2022, new counsel for Appellant served on Appellee

requests for admission seeking to determine whether the lien claim was

untimely. Specifically, Appellant contended that the July 8, 2021 invoice relied

upon by Appellee to establish the timeliness of the lien did not involve

Appellee’s work on the Project but was merely an accounting adjustment. ____________________________________________

2See 49 P.S. § 1502(a)(1) (requiring the filing of a lien claim within six months after completion of work).

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Appellee responded by invoking the Joint Stipulation in which Appellant agreed

that the lien was valid and waived any defenses. Appellant then filed a Motion

to Determine the Sufficiency of Plaintiff’s Answers to Requests for Admissions.

On September 19, 2022, with its discovery motion pending, Appellant

answered Appellee’s complaint and asserted affirmative defenses as new

matter. Appellee filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer to

the new matter based again on the Joint Stipulation.

On October 17, 2022, the court partially granted Appellant’s Motion to

Determine the Sufficiency of [Appellee’s] Answers to Requests for Admission

but subsequently granted reconsideration. On June 5, 2023, the trial court

denied the previously granted portions of Appellant’s discovery motion and

sustained Appellee’s preliminary objections, dismissing with prejudice

Appellant’s affirmative defenses. In support of both holdings, the court relied

on Appellant’s waiver of defenses in the Joint Stipulation, which it recognized

was “the law of the case.” Order, 6/5/23, at 5 n.5.

On July 21, 2023, Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment, which

the court granted on February 19, 2024.3 Relying on the June 5, 2023 order

finding that Appellant waived its defenses, the court opined that permitting

Appellant’s challenges would “undermine the parties’ Joint Stipulation, which

would also undermine the very agreement that permitted [Appellant’s]

3 President Judge Craig A. Dally issued the October 2022 and the June 2023

orders, while Judge Jennifer T. Sletvold issued the February 2024 order granting summary judgment.

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intervention in the first instance.” Order, 2/19/24, at 6 (unpaginated). The

court also rejected Appellant’s argument that its issues implicated non-

waivable subject matter jurisdiction.

On March 15, 2024, Appellant filed a notice of appeal, and the trial court

and Appellant subsequently complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:

1. A trial court abuses its discretion when it exercises judgment that is manifestly unreasonable. The court denied [Appellant] the opportunity to take discovery relevant to the validity of the Joint Stipulation, the timeliness of a mechanics’ lien claim, and the subject matter jurisdiction of the court. Did the court abuse its discretion in so doing?

2. It is a violation of a party’s right to procedural due process for a court not to afford a party with a full opportunity to present evidence. The court denied [Appellant] any opportunity to challenge i) the validity of [Appellee’s] mechanics’ lien claim and of an agreement in which [Appellant] purported to waive all defenses thereto; and ii) the subject matter jurisdiction of the court. Did the court violate [Appellant’s] procedural due process rights?

3. Any issue going to the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial [court] cannot be waived by the parties by agreement or stipulation. In granting [Appellee’s] motion for summary judgment, the court found that [Appellant] did not have the ability to challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of the court because [Appellant] waived all defenses to the underlying mechanics’ lien claim. Did the court err in finding that [Appellant] could not challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of the court?

4. A mechanics’ lien claim is fatally and incurably defective if it is untimely filed. There is a genuine issue of material fact concerning when [Appellee] last furnished labor or materials and, thus, whether its Lien Claim was void ab initio and unenforceable. Did the court err in granting [Appellee’s] motion for summary judgment under these circumstances?

Appellant’s Br. at 5.

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This case involves a mechanics’ lien claim, which is a statutory remedy,

unknown at common law, that permits a contractor or subcontractor to obtain

a priority lien on property for labor and materials that the claimant invested

in that property. See Terra Firma Builders, LLC v. King, 249 A.3d 976,

983 (Pa. 2021); see also El-Gharbaoui v. Ajayi, 260 A.3d 944, 961 (Pa.

Super. 2021). As mechanics’ liens are “extraordinary remedies[,]” “a

contractor seeking the benefit of the lien must judiciously adhere to the

requirements of the Mechanics’ Lien Law in order to secure a valid and

enforceable lien.” Terra Firma Builders, LLC, 249 A.3d at 983 (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted).

Appellant’s first two issues challenge the portion of the June 5, 2023

order denying Appellant’s discovery request. Appellate courts generally

review a trial court’s discovery rulings for an abuse of discretion. See McNeil

v. Jordan, 894 A.2d 1260, 1268 (Pa. 2006). “Abuse of discretion occurs if

the trial court renders a judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary

or capricious; that fails to apply the law; or that is motivated by partiality,

prejudice, bias or ill-will.” Carlino E. Brandywine, L.P. v. Brandywine Vill.

Assocs., 260 A.3d 179, 196 (Pa. Super. 2021).

Generally, a “party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not

privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending

action[.]” Pa.R.Civ.P. No. 4003.1(a). “Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any

tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the

evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.”

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Pa.R.E. 401. Pa.R.Civ.P. 4014 permits a party to “serve upon any other party

a written request for the admission . . . of the truth of any matters within the

scope” of, inter alia, Pa.R.Civ.P. 4003.1.

As noted, the parties’ Joint Stipulation is central to the issues in this

case. It is well-established that parties may “resolve questions of fact or limit

the issues” by stipulation. Osial v. Cook, 803 A.2d 209, 216 (Pa. Super.

2002) (citation omitted). “[C]oncessions made in stipulations are judicial

admissions" that a party may not later contradict in the proceeding. Tyler v.

King, 496 A.2d 16, 21 (Pa. Super. 1985). “The courts employ a contracts-

law analysis to interpret stipulations, so that the intent of the parties is

controlling.” Tindall v. Friedman, 970 A.2d 1159, 1165 (Pa. Super. 2009)

(citation omitted).

***

Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in denying its motion seeking

discovery relating to the timeliness of the lien claim. Appellant’s Br. at 21-26.

Appellant maintains that the requested evidence related to the following three

claims that it “either did not or could not waive” in the Joint Stipulation: (1)

that the “Joint Stipulation itself was invalid under the mutual mistake or

unilateral mistake doctrines;” (2) that “the trial court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction[;]” and (3) that the lien claim “was incurably defective and void

ab initio.” Appellant’s Br. at 23. We address each claim in turn.

First, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by

denying discovery to determine whether “one or both parties were mistaken”

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as to when Appellee filed the lien claim and, thus, whether the claim was

timely. Appellant’s Br. at 24; Appellant’s Reply Br. at 1-4.

We find that Appellant waived this claim by failing to cite relevant

authority. Appellant provides authority supporting the general principle that

a party “can seek to set aside [an] agreement on the grounds of mistake.”

Appellant’s Br. at 24. The caselaw Appellant cites, however, involves mistakes

that the party established “by clear, precise[,] and convincing evidence[.]”

Mellish v. Hurlock Neck Duck Club, Inc., 886 A.2d 1151, 1159 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2005). Appellant fails to provide authority permitting discovery to

search for a potential “mistake” which would contradict the party’s prior

binding stipulation. We reiterate that the “failure to develop an argument with

citation to, and analysis of, relevant authority waives that issue on review.”

In re Estate of Schumacher, 133 A.3d 45, 51 (Pa. Super. 2016); Pa.R.A.P.

2119.

Second, Appellant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in

denying discovery to determine the timeliness of the lien claim, which it claims

is a non-waivable defense implicating the trial court’s subject matter

jurisdiction. Appellant’s Br. at 24-26; Reply Br. at 5-13. Appellant does not

dispute that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over Mechanics’ Lien

Law claims generally. Instead, Appellant argues that the trial court did not

have jurisdiction over this lien claim if it was “initiated beyond statutorily

prescribed deadlines[.]” Appellant’s Br. at 25.

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We reject Appellant’s claim as it relies on inapplicable precedent.

Appellant invokes the established principle that appellate courts do not have

jurisdiction to hear the merits of an untimely-filed appeal. See Day v. Civil

Service Commission of Borough of Carlisle, 931 A.2d 646, 651 (Pa.

2007)); see also Smithson v. Columbia Gas of PA/NiSource, 264 A.3d

755, 759 (Pa. Super. 2021). The instant case, however, pertains to an

allegedly untimely mechanics’ lien claim, not an untimely appeal. Appellant

fails to recognize the distinction between the statutorily-proscribed jurisdiction

of appellate courts and the broad original jurisdiction of Pennsylvania’s courts

of common pleas. See In re Admin. Ord. No. 1-MD-2003, 936 A.2d 1, 6

(Pa. 2007) (observing that “the courts of common pleas are granted unlimited

original jurisdiction in all actions and proceedings not exclusively vested

elsewhere” (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted)). As Appellant

fails to set forth an issue implicating the court’s subject matter jurisdiction,

we agree with the trial court that Appellant waived any related defenses by

agreeing to the Joint Stipulation.

Third, Appellant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in

denying discovery regarding the timeliness of the lien claim. Appellant’s Br.

at 25. It argues that an “an untimely-filed lien claim is [] fatally defective[,]”

such that it is “void ab initio and cannot be enforced, regardless of any

agreement between the parties.” Id. In support, Appellant relies upon Terra

Firma Builders, supra. Id.; Reply Br. at 14-17.

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As with the prior claims, Appellant’s authority is inapt. The Supreme

Court in Terra Firma Builders held that failure to perfect a lien in

conformance with the service requirements of Section 1502(a)(2) of the

Mechanics’ Lien Law resulted in an incurable defect. Terra Firma Builders,

249 A.3d at 984. The Court additionally concluded that the property owners’

failure to raise the defect earlier did not result in waiver. Id. at 985. In so

doing, the Court emphasized that the Mechanics’ Lien Law expressly provides

that the failure to comply with the provision’s service requirements “shall be

sufficient ground for striking off the claim.” Id. at 983-84 (quoting 49 P.S.

§ 1502(a)(2)). Appellant, however, invokes Section 1502(a)(1), which

requires a claimant to file a lien claim “within six (6) months after the

completion of his work[;]” importantly, subsection (a)(1) does not provide for

“striking off the claim” as in subsection (a)(2). 49 P.S. § 1502(a)(1). We

conclude that Appellant failed to provide authority for its claim that a party

cannot waive via stipulation a defense related to the timeliness of the lien

claim.

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion

in denying Appellant’s discovery motion based upon its waiver of defenses in

the Joint Stipulation.

In its next issue, Appellant invokes the federal and state constitutional

rights to due process. Appellant’s Br. at 26-28; Reply Br. at 4-5. Appellant

asserts that “due process requires that [Appellant] be afforded the opportunity

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to test the validity of the Joint Stipulation in the litigation below.” Appellant’s

Br. at 27-28. Beyond general citations to the right to procedural due process,

Appellant fails to provide relevant authority supporting its claim that the right

to due process equates to a right to challenge its own stipulation. Thus,

Appellant waived this issue.

Appellant’s final two issues challenge the trial court’s grant of summary

judgment to Appellee. “[S]ummary judgment is appropriate only in those

cases where the record clearly demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Summers v. Certainteed Corp., 997 A.2d 1152, 1159 (Pa. 2010)

(citation omitted). Appellate courts review a trial court’s grant of summary

judgment for “error of law or an abuse of discretion.” Id. (citation omitted).

The trial court’s determination of “whether there are no genuine issues as to

any material fact presents a question of law, and therefore, on that question

our standard of review is de novo” and our scope of review is plenary. Id.

(citation omitted). In evaluating summary judgment motions, courts “must

take all facts of record and reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most

favorable to the non-moving party.” Id.

In challenging the grant of summary judgment, Appellant reiterates its

claim that an untimely lien claim implicates the trial court’s subject matter

jurisdiction, a defense which it claims it could not waive via a stipulation.

Appellant’s Br. at 29. For the reasons set forth above, we reject Appellant’s

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argument that the untimeliness of a lien claim could negate the trial court’s

subject matter jurisdiction over a Mechanics’ Lien Law claim.

In its final issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in granting

summary judgment because “a genuine issue of material fact [existed]

pertaining to the timeliness of [Appellee’s] Lien Claim and, thus, its validity

and enforceability.” Appellant’s Br. at 33; Reply Br. at 14-17. We agree with

the trial court’s conclusion that Appellant in the Joint Stipulation “intentionally

waived any defenses it may have to the underlying mechanics’ lien,” which

would include challenges to the timeliness of the lien. Order, 6/5/23, at 5. In

the absence of a preserved defense, the trial court did not err in granting

summary judgment.

After consideration of Appellant’s issues, we affirm the court’s order

denying discovery and granting summary judgment to Appellee.

Order affirmed.

Judge Olson and Judge Sullivan concur in result.

Date: 4/14/2025

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