Heffran v. Department of Corrections

878 A.2d 985, 2005 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 391
CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedJuly 15, 2005
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 878 A.2d 985 (Heffran v. Department of Corrections) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Heffran v. Department of Corrections, 878 A.2d 985, 2005 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 391 (Pa. Ct. App. 2005).

Opinion

OPINION BY

Judge LEAVITT.

Christopher Heffran (Petitioner) petitions for review of an adjudication of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) denying his request for documents that was made pursuant to the statute commonly known as the Right-to-Know Law. 1 DOC held that the documents Petitioner requested, which were incident reports and disbursement sheets for chemicals used in the facility, were not public records required to be made available under the Right-to-Know Law.

Petitioner is incarcerated at SCI-Gra-terford. On May 5, 2004, Petitioner requested, in writing, that SCI-Graterford’s public information officer produce ten documents relating to the use of chemicals in the prison’s shops and their impact on inmates exposed to them. 2 When DOC did *988 not respond, on May 29, 2004, Petitioner filed “exceptions” with Jeffrey Beard, Secretary of Corrections, stating the reasons why the requested documents were public records that had to be made available under the Right-to-Know Law. DOC received this letter on June 7, 2004, treated it as an initial request and forwarded it to DOC’s Right-to-Know Officer. 3 On June 22, 2004, the officer notified Petitioner that she needed additional time to review his request.

On July 27, 2004, the Right-to-Know Officer responded to each of Petitioners’ requests. She granted some requests and denied others. 4 The request for DOC’s order to its Safety Officer to inspect the prison’s shoe shop was denied as non-existent. The other documents were denied because either they were not public records or, alternatively, they were public records that did not have to be disclosed under the safety and security exception. Petitioner filed exceptions, and on September 1, 2004, DOC affirmed the decision of the Right-to-Know Officer. Petitioner then sought this Court’s review.

On appeal, 5 Petitioner challenges DOC’s refusal with respect to three of his requested documents, 6 which are:

(1) A copy of the incident report written by John Mellinger, Foreman C.I. Shoe Shop, detailing inmate Chris Heffran Becoming Ill & votiming (sic) from the chemicals he works with. This incident report was written April 24th, 2004, at approximately 2:00 PM.
(4) The Requested copies of weekly and monthy (sic) disbursement sheets of the chemicals used in the C.I. shoe shop rubber mill.
(6) Added from last request: A copy of the incident report detailing John Mel-linger escorting inmate Jose Hernandez to dispensary because of his asthma attack. Incident date April 30th, 2004.

S.R.R. 5b-7b. Petitioner raises three issues with respect to DOC’s denial of these items. First, he contends that DOC erred in holding the incident reports not be public records because they are “decisions” that fix the rights of inmates. Second, he contends that DOC erred in holding the chemical disbursement sheets not to be public records because they relate to the *989 fiscal governance of DOC. Third, he contends that DOC’s finding that disclosure of the chemical disbursement sheets posed a threat to security is not supported by substantial evidence.

The Right-to-Know Law provides generally that “a public record shall be accessible for inspection and duplication by a requester in accordance with this act.” Section 2(a) of the Right-to-Know Law, 65 P.S. § 66.2(a). “Public records” fall into two categories: (1) an account, voucher or contract dealing with the receipt or disbursement of funds by an agency, or (2) a minute, order or decision by an agency fixing personal or property rights. Section 1 of the Right-to-Know Law, 66 P.S. § 66.1. The first category relates to the fiscal aspects of agency governance, and it includes accounts, vouchers or contracts dealing with receipts of and disbursements by an agency. Sapp Roofing Co., Inc. v. Sheet Metal Workers’ International Association, Local Union No. 12, 552 Pa. 105, 109, 713 A.2d 627, 629 (1998). The second relates to agency decisions that fix the rights and duties of some person or persons. North Hills News Record v. Town of McCandless, 555 Pa. 51, 55, 722 A.2d 1037, 1039 (1999). Both categories reach a range of records beyond those that on their face identify themselves to be accounts, vouchers or contracts, or minutes, orders or decisions. Nevertheless, in order to be a public record, a document in this range must have a close connection to those specified in Section 1 of the Right-to-Know Law. LaValle v. Office of General Counsel of the Commonwealth, 564 Pa. 482, 493, 769 A.2d 449, 456 (2001).

With these principles in mind, we consider, first, Petitioners contention that the prisons incident reports are public records. He argues that the incident reports formed the basis for DOC’s decision to provide inmates medical treatment, thereby fixing their rights. Stated otherwise, Petitioner asserts that the incident reports fall into the “decision” category of public records.

In support, Petitioner directs our attention to Tapco, Inc. v. Township of Neville, 695 A.2d 460 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997), in which this Court held that police incident reports were public records within the meaning of the Right-to-Know Law. In Tapco, we observed that prior precedent 7 had established that police incident reports are “police blotters,” which are defined as public records under the Criminal History Records Information Act. 8 We then reasoned that the more general Right-to-Know Law necessarily extended to all documents specifically defined as public records in other statutes. Because police incident reports, or police blotters, were defined as public records under the specific Criminal History Records Information Act, a fortiori, they were public records under the Righfr-to-Know Law. Tapco, Inc., 695 A.2d at 464.

Petitioner’s reliance on Tapco, Inc. is misplaced. Unlike a police blotter, a correction facility incident report is not defined by another statute as a public record. Accordingly, the determination as to whether the prison incident reports fall into the “decision” category of public records is governed solely by the Right-to-Know Law. A “decision” is a document (1) that was generated by an agency, (2) that *990

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Bowling v. Office of Open Records
75 A.3d 453 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 2013)
LeGRANDE v. Department of Corrections
920 A.2d 943 (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 2007)
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885 A.2d 621 (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 2005)

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Bluebook (online)
878 A.2d 985, 2005 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 391, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/heffran-v-department-of-corrections-pacommwct-2005.