OPINION
COHEN, Justice.
Appellants are prison inmates who sued appellees, prison employees, the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ), and the Texas Department of Criminal Justice— Institutional Division (TDCJ-ID), alleging that the prison is too noisy. The trial judge granted summary judgment. We affirm.
In 1992, appellants sued, alleging appellees negligently failed to enforce the prison’s low-volume radio regulation. The suit was dismissed as frivolous, pursuant to Tex.Civ. PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. § 13.001 (Vernon Supp.1996), and they appealed. A panel of this Court held that prisoners do not have a constitutionally-protected right to a noise-free environment, but observed that appellants did not allege constitutional violations. Hector v. Thaler, 862 S.W.2d 176, 178 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ) (hereafter called Hector I). The panel quoted the low-volume radio rule and set forth appellants’ allegations that:
(1) inmates regularly violate the rule; (2) appellees have a duty to enforce the rule; (3) appellees do not enforce the rale; (4) appellees admit a noise problem exists; (5) appellees told appellants to help the building major enforce its own rules; and (6) [97]*97appellants have physical and mental damages from appellees’ acts or omissions.
Id. The panel reversed and remanded, holding, “Appellants asserted claims that have arguable bases in law or in fact; thus, the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the claims as frivolous.” Id. at 179. This is a further appeal of the same suit that was ruled on in Hector I.
In points of error one and two, appellants contend the trial judge erred by granting summary judgment.
In their fifth amended original petition, appellants assert five causes of action: (1) guards yell too loudly, too often, too late, and they loudly slam doors unnecessarily; (2) inmates play their radios too loudly; (3) ap-pellees play televisions too loudly; (4) the above claims show gross negligence, give appellants headaches, make them nervous, keep them awake, and make them depressed; and (5) appellees fail to enforce rules requiring inmates to wear headphones. Appellants contend the prison failed to make, enforce, or follow rules against noise. The judge granted summary judgment without stating any grounds. Thus, we will affirm if any of appellees’ theories were meritorious. See Rogers v. Ricane Enter. Inc., 772 S.W.2d 76, 79 (Tex.1989).1
In Johnson v. Kinney, 893 S.W.2d 271 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ), Johnson sued the TDC because it failed to enforce its rules to keep his fellow inmates from talking too loud and playing their televisions too loudly. A panel of this Court (Justices Hedges, Cohen, and Wilson) that included none of the panel members in Hector I (Justices Duggan, Dunn, and An-dell) held that such a claim had no arguable basis in law and therefore affirmed a judgment dismissing the suit as frivolous. The Johnson court wrote:
We conclude that appellant’s claim has no arguable basis in law. He complains that TDCJ officials had an obligation to enforce the regulations in the Inmate Orientation Manual and that he has standing to complain of their negligence when they fail to do so. We do not believe that state law recognizes a right to damages for prison officials’ negligent or even gross negligent failure to enforce rules applicable to the inmates.
Id. at 272-73. This holding conflicts with the holding in Hector I. We disagree with Hector I’s apparent holding that a cause of action exists for failure to enforce the prison’s noise rules. However, this case is distinguishable from Hector I.
First, Hector I merely held that this case was not patently frivolous. It did not hold that a summary judgment could not be granted after further development, as occurred here. This is true even if the reason for the summary judgment is, as we hold, that there is no state law cause of action for the negligent failure to make or enforce internal prison rules against excessive noise.
Second, Hector I sought to distinguish Johnson v. Lynaugh, 800 S.W.2d 936 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied), by pointing out that Johnson alleged a federal constitutional violation, whereas Hector I alleged a violation of TDC noise rules. We find this distinction unpersuasive. The Johnson plaintiffs complained of the same low-volume rule that appellants complain of here. Id. at 938-39. They claimed that TDC violated the federal constitution by failing to enforce its own low-volume rule. On this contention, they lost twice in the 14th Court of Appeals. Id. at 939; Johnson v. Ozim, 804 S.W.2d 179 (Tex.App.-Houston [98]*98[14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied). The Texas Supreme Court twice denied review. Thus, this claim has been held frivolous at least three times, twice by the 14th Court of Appeals and by this Court in Johnson v. Kinney. We hold that a claim for failure to make or enforce prison noise rules is no more meritorious under state law than under federal constitutional law.
Prisoners do not have the same rights as others, and courts are ill-suited to micromanage the state prison. Johnson v. Ozim, 804 S.W.2d at 181; Johnson v. Lynaugh, 800 S.W.2d at 938-39. In Ozim, the court held that excessive noise does not rise to the level of a health threat. 804 S.W.2d at 181. We hold that, under the facts of this case,2 it does not rise to the level of a judicially cognizable health threat. Despite the huge volume of litigation over prison conditions in this state and nation over the last 20 years, much of which has been won by inmates, appellants cite no authority to the contrary.
The dissenting opinion cites decisions by federal trial and intermediate appellate courts granting relief to prisoners. In one, prison officials took specific action against the plaintiff. Castor v. Mitchell, 355 F.Supp. 123 (W.D.N.C.1973) (interrupting his sleep every 30 minutes while in solitary confinement). In another, noise was allegedly created to harass all inmates. Lewis v. Lane, 816 F.2d 1165 (7th Cir.1987). Those facts differ from these. The noise here is not specifically directed against appellants; in fact, their complaint alleges that much of it comes from other prisoners’ radios and from television provided for the benefit of all inmates. In Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215 (5th Cir.1983), the inmates claimed they were forced to work seven days a week, which appellants have not alleged. In Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F.Supp. 594, 627-28 (S.D.N.Y.1974), the court granted injunctive relief for excessive noise in a suit by unconvicted pretrial detainees, alleging federal constitutional violations, under 42 U.S.C.1983. Id. at 597.
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OPINION
COHEN, Justice.
Appellants are prison inmates who sued appellees, prison employees, the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ), and the Texas Department of Criminal Justice— Institutional Division (TDCJ-ID), alleging that the prison is too noisy. The trial judge granted summary judgment. We affirm.
In 1992, appellants sued, alleging appellees negligently failed to enforce the prison’s low-volume radio regulation. The suit was dismissed as frivolous, pursuant to Tex.Civ. PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. § 13.001 (Vernon Supp.1996), and they appealed. A panel of this Court held that prisoners do not have a constitutionally-protected right to a noise-free environment, but observed that appellants did not allege constitutional violations. Hector v. Thaler, 862 S.W.2d 176, 178 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ) (hereafter called Hector I). The panel quoted the low-volume radio rule and set forth appellants’ allegations that:
(1) inmates regularly violate the rule; (2) appellees have a duty to enforce the rule; (3) appellees do not enforce the rale; (4) appellees admit a noise problem exists; (5) appellees told appellants to help the building major enforce its own rules; and (6) [97]*97appellants have physical and mental damages from appellees’ acts or omissions.
Id. The panel reversed and remanded, holding, “Appellants asserted claims that have arguable bases in law or in fact; thus, the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the claims as frivolous.” Id. at 179. This is a further appeal of the same suit that was ruled on in Hector I.
In points of error one and two, appellants contend the trial judge erred by granting summary judgment.
In their fifth amended original petition, appellants assert five causes of action: (1) guards yell too loudly, too often, too late, and they loudly slam doors unnecessarily; (2) inmates play their radios too loudly; (3) ap-pellees play televisions too loudly; (4) the above claims show gross negligence, give appellants headaches, make them nervous, keep them awake, and make them depressed; and (5) appellees fail to enforce rules requiring inmates to wear headphones. Appellants contend the prison failed to make, enforce, or follow rules against noise. The judge granted summary judgment without stating any grounds. Thus, we will affirm if any of appellees’ theories were meritorious. See Rogers v. Ricane Enter. Inc., 772 S.W.2d 76, 79 (Tex.1989).1
In Johnson v. Kinney, 893 S.W.2d 271 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ), Johnson sued the TDC because it failed to enforce its rules to keep his fellow inmates from talking too loud and playing their televisions too loudly. A panel of this Court (Justices Hedges, Cohen, and Wilson) that included none of the panel members in Hector I (Justices Duggan, Dunn, and An-dell) held that such a claim had no arguable basis in law and therefore affirmed a judgment dismissing the suit as frivolous. The Johnson court wrote:
We conclude that appellant’s claim has no arguable basis in law. He complains that TDCJ officials had an obligation to enforce the regulations in the Inmate Orientation Manual and that he has standing to complain of their negligence when they fail to do so. We do not believe that state law recognizes a right to damages for prison officials’ negligent or even gross negligent failure to enforce rules applicable to the inmates.
Id. at 272-73. This holding conflicts with the holding in Hector I. We disagree with Hector I’s apparent holding that a cause of action exists for failure to enforce the prison’s noise rules. However, this case is distinguishable from Hector I.
First, Hector I merely held that this case was not patently frivolous. It did not hold that a summary judgment could not be granted after further development, as occurred here. This is true even if the reason for the summary judgment is, as we hold, that there is no state law cause of action for the negligent failure to make or enforce internal prison rules against excessive noise.
Second, Hector I sought to distinguish Johnson v. Lynaugh, 800 S.W.2d 936 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied), by pointing out that Johnson alleged a federal constitutional violation, whereas Hector I alleged a violation of TDC noise rules. We find this distinction unpersuasive. The Johnson plaintiffs complained of the same low-volume rule that appellants complain of here. Id. at 938-39. They claimed that TDC violated the federal constitution by failing to enforce its own low-volume rule. On this contention, they lost twice in the 14th Court of Appeals. Id. at 939; Johnson v. Ozim, 804 S.W.2d 179 (Tex.App.-Houston [98]*98[14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied). The Texas Supreme Court twice denied review. Thus, this claim has been held frivolous at least three times, twice by the 14th Court of Appeals and by this Court in Johnson v. Kinney. We hold that a claim for failure to make or enforce prison noise rules is no more meritorious under state law than under federal constitutional law.
Prisoners do not have the same rights as others, and courts are ill-suited to micromanage the state prison. Johnson v. Ozim, 804 S.W.2d at 181; Johnson v. Lynaugh, 800 S.W.2d at 938-39. In Ozim, the court held that excessive noise does not rise to the level of a health threat. 804 S.W.2d at 181. We hold that, under the facts of this case,2 it does not rise to the level of a judicially cognizable health threat. Despite the huge volume of litigation over prison conditions in this state and nation over the last 20 years, much of which has been won by inmates, appellants cite no authority to the contrary.
The dissenting opinion cites decisions by federal trial and intermediate appellate courts granting relief to prisoners. In one, prison officials took specific action against the plaintiff. Castor v. Mitchell, 355 F.Supp. 123 (W.D.N.C.1973) (interrupting his sleep every 30 minutes while in solitary confinement). In another, noise was allegedly created to harass all inmates. Lewis v. Lane, 816 F.2d 1165 (7th Cir.1987). Those facts differ from these. The noise here is not specifically directed against appellants; in fact, their complaint alleges that much of it comes from other prisoners’ radios and from television provided for the benefit of all inmates. In Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215 (5th Cir.1983), the inmates claimed they were forced to work seven days a week, which appellants have not alleged. In Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F.Supp. 594, 627-28 (S.D.N.Y.1974), the court granted injunctive relief for excessive noise in a suit by unconvicted pretrial detainees, alleging federal constitutional violations, under 42 U.S.C.1983. Id. at 597. Appellants are not pretrial detainees; they are convicted felons. More important, this Court has already held in an earlier appeal of this very case that, “We agree that appellants do not have a constitutionally protected right to a noise-free environment.” Hector I, 862 S.W.2d at 178 (Duggan, Dunn, and Andell, Justices); accord Johnson v. Lynaugh, 800 S.W.2d at 938 (freedom from excessive television noise is not a right secured by the United States Constitution). Thus, we do not consider these authorities to be controlling. Nor are we persuaded by the fact that “in other contexts,” as the dissenting opinion states, suits for excessive noise have been allowed. Prison is a different context than any of them. See footnote 2, supra. Prisoners do not have the same rights as people “in other contexts.”
Points of error one and two are overruled.
In their third point of error, appellants assert the judge who heard their recusal motion erred by denying it and also by refusing to allow them to call as a witness the judge they sought to recuse.
Recusal Motion
Appellants moved to recuse the trial judge, Judge McAdams, alleging (1) his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, (2) he had a personal bias or prejudice against them, specifically, and against prisoners generally, (3) he had an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding, and (4) he ignores procedural rules. Judge McAdams refused to recuse himself, and Judge Black held a hearing on the recusal motion.
Appellants were the sole witnesses. Hector testified that Judge McAdams always rules against prisoners, often without adequate time for them to respond, and other prisoners also believe inmate litigation is treated unfairly in Walker County.
Hinkle testified that before he was incarcerated, acquaintances from Huntsville laughed about inmate litigation because they knew TDCJ controlled Walker County and that the inmates could never win. Hinkle [99]*99testified that someone in every family in Walker County is connected to the TDCJ. Hinkle also testified that a prison employee told him it was impossible for inmate litigants to win because a judge would not rule against his neighbors. Moreover, Hinkle testified that other employees and prisoners have told him inmate litigation in Walker County is a losing proposition. Finally, Hin-kle testified that in the present case, Judge McAdams always rules for the officials and TDCJ without permitting appellants to respond, thus demonstrating his bias against prisoners.
Johnson testified that in a previous lawsuit in which he was a party and Judge McAdams was the trial judge, he encountered repeated difficulties having the defendants served. When the defendants were served and did not answer, Judge McAdams refused to grant a default judgment and also refused to rule on several discovery motions. Prison employees have told Johnson he cannot win in Walker County courts. Finally, Johnson testified that Judge McAdams routinely grants motions without allowing appellants to respond.
Judge Black was free to not believe this testimony. Thus, there was no abuse of discretion. Tex.R.Civ.P. 18a(f).
Trial Judge as Witness
Judge Black refused appellants’ request to have Judge McAdams testify at the recusal hearing. This was not error because the record does not show that Judge Mc-Adams was either subpoenaed or present.
We overrule appellants’ third point of error.
In their fourth point of error, appellants assert the trial judge erred by failing to grant their motion for a free transcript and a free statement of facts. Both documents have been filed in this court. Therefore, appellants have not been harmed.
Appellants timely filed declarations of indi-gency, which were not contested. Thus, they were entitled to a free transcript and statement of facts. Tex.R.App.P. 13(k), 40(a)(3)(E), and 53(j)(l). The cost bill says nothing about the statement of facts. It lists a $684 charge for the transcript, but in place of a receipt, the District Clerk has written, “No fees collected — State inmates — Filed Pauper’s Oath.” The court reporter’s certificate from the hearing of June 5, 1995 states, “I have charged plaintiffs the sum of $124 for preparing said statement of facts.” We agree with appellants that no such charge was authorized and none should be collected. If it has been paid, appellants should seek relief in the trial court.
Point of error four is overruled.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
O’CONNOR, J., dissenting.