United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
No. 24-1951
KATHLEEN F. HEBERT; TREVOR PARKER HEBERT; ZACHARY R. HEBERT,
Plaintiffs, Appellees,
v.
KARISSA DONAHUE, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Tiffany Donahue-Hebert, deceased,
Defendant, Appellant,
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE CO.; U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT,
Defendants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. M. Page Kelley, U.S. Magistrate Judge]
Before
Gelpí, Thompson, and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.
Donald J. Correa, with whom Quinn, Correa & Gaynor, P.C., was on brief, for appellant.
Kristopher Aleksov for appellees. February 5, 2026 GELPÍ, Circuit Judge. This case arises from a dispute
over the proceeds of the federal life insurance policy of Gary
Hebert ("Mr. Hebert"). Mr. Hebert was a United States Postal
Service ("USPS") employee insured pursuant to the Federal
Employees' Group Life Insurance Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8701 et seq.
("FEGLIA"). Shortly before his death from esophageal cancer,
Mr. Hebert executed a designation of beneficiary form ("the form"
or "the designation form"). He named Plaintiff-Appellees -- his
ex-wife Kathleen Hebert ("Ms. Hebert") and his sons Trevor and
Zachary Hebert (collectively with Ms. Hebert, "the Heberts") -- as
his beneficiaries. But he failed to fully complete the form,
leading to this litigation.
Under FEGLIA, if Mr. Hebert properly executed the
designation form, then his designation governs the distribution of
his life insurance benefits. If not, then the proceeds of his
life insurance go to the estate of his widow, Tiffany
Donahue-Hebert ("Mrs. Donahue-Hebert"). The district court held
that the form met all of the statutory requirements, and that there
was no evidence Mr. Hebert lacked mental capacity when he executed
the form. Defendant-Appellant Karissa Donahue ("Ms. Donahue"),
who is the daughter and personal representative for the estate of
Mrs. Donahue-Hebert, now appeals from the district court's entry
- 3 - of judgment for the Heberts.1 Because we see no error below, we
affirm.
I.
A. Factual Background
The following facts are not in dispute. Gary and
Kathleen Hebert married in 1991. Over the course of their
marriage, they had two sons together, Trevor and Zachary Hebert.
Mr. Hebert and Ms. Hebert divorced in 2015, and the next year,
Mr. Hebert remarried to Mrs. Donahue-Hebert. In 2016, Mr. Hebert
was also diagnosed with Stage IV esophageal cancer. Due to his
illness, Mr. Hebert was in and out of the hospital for treatment
in 2016 and early 2017. Mrs. Donahue-Hebert was also hospitalized
with a serious medical condition during this time. As such, in
early 2017, Mr. Hebert was staying with Mrs. Donahue-Hebert's
sister and other daughter.2 During the month of January, they
drove him to the hospital because they believed Mr. Hebert was
"experiencing confusion." The hospital discharged Mr. Hebert the
same day and Kevin Levesque, Mr. Hebert's friend since childhood,
picked him up. Levesque drove Mr. Hebert to Ms. Hebert's house,
1 The parties consented to proceed before the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636. 2 For ease of reference, Mrs. Donahue-Hebert's sister and other daughter will hereinafter be referred to by their relationship with Ms. Donahue -- in other words, as Ms. Donahue's sister and aunt.
- 4 - where he stayed with her and their sons for the remainder of his
life.
Prior to his death, Mr. Hebert worked for USPS and
enrolled in a Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance ("FEGLI")
policy. On January 26, 2017, while staying with Ms. Hebert and
their sons, Mr. Hebert prepared and signed a designation form for
his FEGLI policy. He named Ms. Hebert and his sons as the
beneficiaries and signed in the presence of two witnesses:
Levesque, and Lorraine Sawyer, a USPS employee and colleague.
Levesque and Sawyer both signed on the witness signature lines and
provided their addresses.
When Mr. Hebert prepared the designation form, he did
not fully complete Section C, "Statement of Insured or Assignee."
That section includes spaces for the preparer's name and address,
and checkboxes to indicate whether the preparer is the insured or
an assignee. It also directs the preparer to "Please check all
three: I have not assigned the Insurance. Two people who witnessed
my signature signed below. I did not name either witness as a
beneficiary." Mr. Hebert left the space for his name and address
blank, and he did not mark any of the checkboxes. But he signed
and dated the form where indicated.
Ms. Hebert sent the designation form to the Human
Resources Shared Service Center ("HRSSC") at USPS via overnight
mail. Per a letter dated January 31, 2017, HRSSC "received the
- 5 - enclosed Designation of Beneficiary Standard Form(s) (SF): SF
2823, Designation of Beneficiary Federal Employees' Group Life
Insurance Program." But the form was "returned unprocessed"
because "Section C information [was] omitted on the [designation
form]." The letter directed Mr. Hebert to complete the missing
information. On February 14, 2017, Mr. Hebert asked Ms. Hebert to
complete Section C. He did not fill out a new form, so his
signature remained from January 26. Mr. Hebert died the next day,
February 15, and Ms. Hebert faxed the form back to HRSSC on
February 16. HRSSC rejected the form a second time because it was
received after Mr. Hebert's death.
Thus, at the time of Mr. Hebert's death, HRSSC did not
have a designation form for his life insurance. Under FEGLIA,
when the insured does not designate a beneficiary, the benefits
are distributed according to an order of precedence. 5 U.S.C.
§ 8705(a). In this case, Mrs. Donahue-Hebert was the statutory
beneficiary if Mr. Hebert did not properly designate another
beneficiary. Mrs. Donahue-Hebert passed away in 2020, while this
litigation was pending. Her daughter, Ms. Donahue, now proceeds
in her stead.
- 6 - B. Procedural Background3
In July 2018, the Heberts brought a lawsuit against
Mrs. Donahue-Hebert, the Office of Personnel Management ("OPM"),
and the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company.4 The Heberts sought
a declaration that the designation form submitted in January 2017,
which HRSSC returned as unprocessed, was valid.5 In October 2019,
the district court converted the suit into an interpleader
proceeding.
On May 10, 2022, the district court entered a memorandum
and procedural order. Among other things, the May 2022 memorandum
concluded: "Although the employee did not completely fill out every
aspect of the beneficiary form, he executed all aspects required
under [FEGLIA]." Hebert v. OPM, Civil Action No. 18-11483-DPW,
2022 WL 22895040, at *1 (D. Mass. May 10, 2022). But the district
court also offered the parties "a last opportunity to develop the
record further" before entry of final judgment. Id.
During subsequent briefing, Ms. Donahue raised two new
issues for the district court to consider: whether Mr. Hebert's
3This case's procedural history dates back seven and a half years. We recite it here only as necessary to provide context for this appeal. 4Metropolitan issued the life insurance policy and OPM administered it. They are not parties to this appeal. 5And, therefore, that they are Mr. Hebert's life insurance beneficiaries.
- 7 - signature was authentic, and whether he had the mental capacity to
designate beneficiaries on January 26, 2017. In January 2024, the
court held an evidentiary hearing to hear testimony on these two
issues. Numerous witnesses testified and were cross-examined,
including Ms. Donahue, Ms. Donahue's sister and aunt, Ms. Hebert,
Levesque, and Sawyer.
After the evidentiary hearing, Ms. Donahue subpoenaed
Mr. Hebert's medical providers, who "took quite a while" to respond
to her. The providers refused to release Mr. Hebert's records
absent authorization by the patient, his next of kin, or his
personal representative, or absent a court order. Upon request,
Ms. Hebert refused to authorize the records' release.
On March 22, 2024, Ms. Donahue filed a document titled
"Defendant Status Report and Response to Briefing Schedule" and,
after a line break, "Defendant Request for Discovery." She
requested "a court order to obtain any and all relevant medical
records for Gary Hebert including, but not limited to, any hospital
and hospice care for one year prior to Gary Hebert's death o[n]
February 15, 2017." She also "propose[d] that the court allow
[ninety] days to complete discovery."
On March 25, the court entered an electronic order
granting an additional sixty days to complete discovery. The new
discovery deadline was May 24, 2024. Although Ms. Donahue
understood this electronic order to be a denial of her request for
- 8 - a court order, she did not follow up at the time, and the parties
filed cross-motions for summary judgment in June 2024.
On July 12, 2024, Ms. Donahue filed an "Emergency
Motion" to, in relevant part, obtain the medical records. The
motion summarized her efforts to obtain the records and blamed
Ms. Hebert for being "noncooperative." Ms. Donahue claimed that
because Ms. Hebert did not authorize release of the records, she
needed a court order to obtain them, and that without the records,
she could not prepare a "proper" response to the Heberts' summary
judgment motion. Finally, Ms. Donahue requested "a reasonable
extension of time" -- until the medical records could be
"obtained" -- to respond to the Heberts' motion for summary
judgment.
The court denied the request for an order, reasoning
that it was essentially a motion to reopen and extend the time for
discovery. In doing so, the court pointed to Ms. Donahue's delay,
her failure to "identif[y] what records she requires or describe[]
'any relevant leads' these new records might generate," and the
fact that she never "moved to compel the production of these
records or properly sought the court's assistance to obtain them."6
6 The parties dispute whether Ms. Donahue unreasonably delayed in her efforts to obtain Mr. Hebert's medical records. The Heberts argue that Ms. Donahue knew as early as November 2019 that she would need the records. But Ms. Donahue contends she was not on notice until the hearing in January 2024. As discussed in Section II.A. below, ultimately this dispute does not impact our decision.
- 9 - On September 16, 2024, the court denied Ms. Donahue's
motion for summary judgment, and granted summary judgment for the
Heberts. The opinion did not reconsider whether the designation
form Mr. Hebert signed in January 2017 was valid. Instead, the
court adopted the May 2022 memorandum's conclusion that Mr. Hebert
"made a valid designation of his beneficiaries under [FEGLIA]."
Hebert v. OPM, Civil Action No. 18-11483-MPK, 2024 WL 4892666, at
*4 (D. Mass. Sep. 16, 2024) (citation modified). The court further
concluded that Ms. Donahue had not shown that Mr. Hebert lacked
the mental capacity to designate a beneficiary: "There is simply
no evidence before this court which shows that [Mr. Hebert] lacked
the capacity to contract on the date he signed the [designation
form], and the testimony taken in this case indicates otherwise."7
Id. at *7. This appeal followed.
II.
Ms. Donahue presents three claims of error on appeal.
First, she argues that the district court abused its discretion
when it denied her motion for a court order to produce Mr. Hebert's
7 As to the testimony, the court noted that Levesque and Sawyer both "gave 'very clear' testimony that [Mr. Hebert] appeared mentally competent and able to fully understand the significance of his actions when they witnessed him sign the [form]." Id. at *7. Ms. Hebert similarly testified that she "had no concerns" about his mental capacity. Id. Ms. Donahue, her sister, and her aunt testified to the contrary, but their last encounters with Mr. Hebert were anywhere from four days to a week and a half before he signed the designation form. Id.
- 10 - medical records. Second, she contends that the district court
erred when it determined that Mr. Hebert's designation form was
valid. And third, she asserts in the alternative that Mr. Hebert
lacked the mental capacity to execute a valid designation form
when he named the Heberts as his beneficiaries. We address each
claim seriatim.
A. Requests for Additional Discovery
We begin with Ms. Donahue's challenge of the district
court's decision to deny her discovery requests for Mr. Hebert's
medical records. She argues that the records "were essential to
determine [Mr. Hebert's] mental capacity to designate a
beneficiary." She further argues that she did not cause the delay
and instead attributes it to Ms. Hebert and the district court.
Whether we construe Ms. Donahue's requests as motions to
extend the discovery deadline, as the district court did, or as
motions to compel discovery, we review the district court's
decision for abuse of discretion. Rivera-Almodóvar v. Instituto
Socioeconómico Comunitario, Inc., 730 F.3d 23, 26 (1st Cir. 2013)
("[A]ppellate review of a district court's case management orders,
such as a scheduling order, is solely for abuse of discretion.");
Bonner v. Triple-S Mgmt. Corp., 68 F.4th 677, 684 (1st Cir. 2023)
("We review the court's denial of the motion to compel for abuse
of its considerable discretion." (citation modified)). Review for
abuse of discretion "is not appellant-friendly, and we will
- 11 - intervene . . . only upon a clear showing of manifest injustice,
that is, where the lower court's discovery order was plainly wrong
and resulted in substantial prejudice to the aggrieved party."
Triple-S Mgmt. Corp., 68 F.4th at 684 (citation modified). A
district court enjoys "broad discretion in ruling on pre-trial
management matters." Id. (citation modified).
Ms. Donahue's first request for a court order, filed in
March 2024, was appended to a "Status Report and Response to
Briefing Schedule" as a "Request for Discovery." In a single
sentence, she asked for "a court order to obtain any and all
relevant medical records for Gary Hebert including, but not limited
to, any hospital or hospice care for one year prior to Gary
Hebert's death o[n] February 15, 2017." Thus, her request lacked
any detail, such as the doctors or medical facilities that had
those records, what subpoenas needed enforcement, or whether
notice had been given to the doctors or facilities, as required by
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(d)(2)(B)(i).
Given these facts, we conclude that Ms. Donahue did not
file a proper motion for the court to act on. Cf. Gray v. Evercore
Restructuring L.L.C., 544 F.3d 320, 327 (1st Cir. 2008) ("[I]n its
omnibus opposition . . . [plaintiff] stated 'in the event that the
Court finds that the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim,
Plaintiff requests leave to replead.' This statement does not
constitute a motion to amend a complaint."). And absent a motion
- 12 - for court order, it was within the district court's discretion to
deny Ms. Donahue's request implicitly by not addressing it. Cf.
Fire & Police Pension Ass'n of Colo. v. Abiomed, Inc., 778 F.3d
228, 247 (1st Cir. 2015) (noting the plaintiffs did not make a
"proper request" to amend their complaint, "only a mention in a
footnote," and so it was "within the court's discretion to deny
leave to amend implicitly by not addressing the request" (citation
modified)).
We turn to Ms. Donahue's "Emergency Motion" filed in
July 2024. She again requested, among other things, a court order
to produce all of Mr. Hebert's medical records from the year
preceding his death. As the district court noted, "[w]hile not
styled as a motion to extend the discovery deadlines in this case,
Donahue's Emergency Motion seeks to do just that."
"A schedule may be modified only for good cause and with
the judge's consent." Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). Additionally,
"[w]hen an act may or must be done within a specified time, the
court may, for good cause, extend the time: . . . on motion made
after the time has expired if the party failed to act because of
excusable neglect." Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B). Thus, for the
district court to grant Ms. Donahue's July 2024 discovery motion,
she needed to show both "good cause" and "excusable neglect."
Good cause "emphasizes the diligence of the party
seeking" the extension. O'Connell v. Hyatt Hotels of P.R., 357
- 13 - F.3d 152, 155 (1st Cir. 2004). And the excusable neglect standard
"is at bottom an equitable one, taking account of all relevant
circumstances surrounding the party's omission." Pioneer Inv.
Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395
(1993). The relevant circumstances include "the danger of
prejudice to the [opposing party], the length of the delay and its
potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay,
including whether it was within the reasonable control of the
movant, and whether the movant acted in good faith." Id.; see
also Tubens v. Doe, 976 F.3d 101, 105-06 (1st Cir. 2020)
(discussing application of the Pioneer factors under Rule 6(b)).
"While each potential factor should be weighed . . . the most
important is the reason for the particular oversight." Tubens,
976 F.3d at 105 (citation modified).
This case does not present a close question. As a
starting point, we are skeptical of Ms. Donahue's contention that
it was not clear she would need the medical records until the
evidentiary hearing. She was the party who challenged Mr. Hebert's
competence, and she did so before the evidentiary hearing. But
even if we accept that contention, Ms. Donahue has not explained
why, after the court extended the discovery deadline in March 2024,
she did not then file a motion for a court order promptly. While
Ms. Donahue took the court's electronic order extending the
deadline as a denial of the discovery request, it is evident that
- 14 - she knew or should have known that she needed to file a motion,
given that she filed one in July 2024. There is no other apparent
reason on the record for her failure to file a motion before the
end of discovery.
Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that
Ms. Donahue had good cause or showed excusable neglect. It is
axiomatic that "district courts are endowed with sweeping
case-management authority," including "the power to set
deadlines . . . [and] to insist upon compliance with those
deadlines." Rivera-Aponte v. Gomez Bus Line, Inc., 62 F.4th 1, 6
(1st Cir. 2023) (citation modified). And as we have previously
observed, "litigants cannot be permitted to treat a scheduling
order as a frivolous piece of paper idly entered, which can be
cavalierly disregarded without peril." O'Connell, 357 F.3d at 155
(citation modified). When Ms. Donahue finally moved for a court
order to access Mr. Hebert's medical records six years into
litigation, the extended discovery period had already closed, and
the parties had filed cross-motions for summary judgment. We
discern no abuse.
B. Motion for Summary Judgment
Ms. Donahue challenges the district court's decision
denying her motion for summary judgment (and granting the Heberts'
motion) on two fronts. First, she asserts that both beneficiary
designation forms were invalid. Second, she argues in the
- 15 - alternative that Mr. Hebert was not mentally competent when he
executed the first form, and that his competence was a material
fact in dispute.
We "review a district court's grant or denial of summary
judgment de novo, examining the record in the light most favorable
to the nonmovant and drawing all reasonable inferences in that
party's favor." Dusel v. Factory Mut. Ins., 52 F.4th 495, 502-03
(1st Cir. 2022). A court must grant summary judgment if "there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
"Facts are material if they 'might affect the outcome of the suit
under the governing law.'" Dusel, 52 F.4th at 503 (quoting
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). As
such, "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between
the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion
for summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48.
1. The Designation Forms
Ms. Donahue argues that the district court erred when it
determined that the beneficiary form Mr. Hebert executed in
January 2017 was valid. She belabors the importance of the omitted
information, and points to the fact that HRSSC rejected the first
form. She further asserts that the second, completed form was
also invalid because HRSSC received it after Mr. Hebert's death.
- 16 - The Heberts counter that the district court reached the right
conclusion in its "well-reasoned" memorandum, and we agree.
Congress enacted FEGLIA, 5 U.S.C. § 8701 et seq., to
"provide low-cost group life insurance to Federal employees."
Hillman v. Maretta, 569 U.S. 483, 486 (2013) (quoting H.R. Rep.
No. 83-2579, at 1 (1954)). With respect to the designation of a
beneficiary, FEGLIA states:
Except as provided in subsection (e), the amount of group life insurance . . . in force on an employee at the date of his death shall be paid, on the establishment of a valid claim, to the person or persons surviving at the date of his death, in the following order of precedence:
First, to the beneficiary or beneficiaries designated by the employee in a signed and witnessed writing received before death in the employing office . . . . For this purpose, a designation, change, or cancellation of beneficiary in a will or other document not so executed and filed has no force or effect.
Second, if there is no designated beneficiary, to the widow or widower of the employee.
5 U.S.C. § 8705(a).
Ms. Donahue correctly notes that FEGLIA is "strictly
construed." Hightower v. Kirksey, 157 F.3d 528, 531 (7th Cir.
1998); see also Bonner v. Metro. Life Ins., 621 F.3d 530, 533 (6th
Cir. 2010) ("Congress created 'an inflexible rule that the
beneficiary designated in accordance with the statute would
- 17 - receive the policy proceeds, regardless of other documents or the
equities in a particular case.'" (quoting O'Neal v. Gonzalez, 839
F.2d 1437, 1440 (11th Cir. 1988))). Thus, according to
Ms. Donahue, since HRSSC returned Mr. Hebert's designation form
unprocessed, the form did not comply with § 8705.8 Ms. Donahue,
however, "seem[s] to be conflating a construction of the statute
itself with a construction of the standardized beneficiary
designation form." Bonner, 621 F.3d at 535 (discussing how "[a]
strict or literalist construction of the beneficiary designation
form would, perhaps, lead to requiring a signature in the
designated box marked 'Signature of Insured.'").
Courts considering the validity of designation forms
under FEGLIA have uniformly looked to the statutory requirements
of "a signed and witnessed writing." 5 U.S.C. § 8705(a). When
designation forms are (1) signed and (2) witnessed, courts find
the forms to be valid, regardless of other irregularities. See
Terry v. LaGrois, 354 F.3d 527, 528-29 (6th Cir. 2004) (affirming
validity of a signed and witnessed designation form though the
insured signed "with only her first name, failed to date the form,
and neglected to check a box acknowledging that she had signed in
She also argues that the designation form did not comply 8
with the pertinent regulatory provision, 5 C.F.R. § 870.802. We address this argument as necessary throughout this section.
- 18 - the presence of the two witnesses");9 Bonner, 621 F.3d at 537
(affirming validity of a signed and witnessed designation form
that listed the employee's fiancée as his wife and the date as
"March," and left numerous checkboxes blank). Conversely, when
designation forms lack a signature and/or witnesses, courts hold
that those forms are not valid. See, e.g., Hightower, 157 F.3d at
529 (affirming district court ruling that unsigned designation
form was not valid); Thomas v. Metro. Life Ins., 111 F.3d 963 (D.C.
Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision) (per curiam) (same); Ward
v. Stratton, 988 F.2d 65, 67 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that an
unwitnessed letter "was ineffective to change the beneficiary
designation" in the insured's FEGLI policy).10
9 Ms. Donahue argues that Terry is "actually in support of" her case, in part because the designation form's "deficiencies were distinguishable." The differences between the Terry designation form and Mr. Hebert's designation form are neither here nor there. The relevant question is whether the forms were signed and witnessed, as required by § 8705. Both were. She also notes that the decedent's employer in Terry acknowledged receipt of the designation form, despite its deficiencies. To the extent she is arguing that HRSSC's rejection of Mr. Hebert's designation form invalidated it, we address this argument below. 10 Again, Ms. Donahue argues that Ward provides support for her position: "[I]n Ward, the OPM rejected the form because [it] was incomplete." Not only is this argument factually inaccurate -- the writing in Ward was a letter, not a standard form -- it misses the point again. The letter in Ward was "incomplete" because it was not witnessed.
- 19 - A case from the Sixth Circuit illustrates this point
clearly. In Bonner v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 621 F.3d
530 (6th Cir. 2010), the insured filled out two beneficiary
designation forms. The first form listed his fiancée as his wife,
left numerous checkboxes blank, and listed the date as just
"March." Bonner, 621 F.3d at 531, 537. After the insured married
a different woman, he filled out a second form which named his
wife as his beneficiary. Id. But he did not sign the second form.
Id. The Sixth Circuit held that the policy was payable to the
former fiancée named in the first form, which was signed and
witnessed, because the second form was not signed. Id. at 537.
As the court noted, although the first form "contain[ed]
irregularities," they did not "affect a statutory requirement."
Id.11
Ms. Donahue also points to regulatory language to argue
that a designation form must be complete to be valid. Under the
Code of Federal Regulations, "[a] designation of beneficiary must
be in writing, signed by the insured individual, and witnessed and
signed by [two] people. The completed designation of beneficiary
form may be submitted to the appropriate office via appropriate
As with Terry and Ward, Ms. Donahue maintains that Bonner 11
supports her position. In her view, "Bonner makes clear that when a standard form is used . . . the required information is indicated thereon, and therefore, is required to be fully completed." It is unclear from where she derives this conclusion, but suffice to say, we disagree with her assessment of Bonner.
- 20 - methods approved by the employing office." 5 C.F.R. § 870.802(b)
(emphasis added). If we read this language as Ms. Donahue invites
us to, it would invalidate designations that would otherwise be
valid under FEGLIA. We decline her invitation.
"Determining a regulation's meaning requires application
of the same principles that imbue exercises in statutory
construction." Jette v. United of Omaha Life Ins., 18 F.4th 18,
26 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting Morales v. Sociedad Española de Auxilio
Mutuo & Beneficencia, 524 F.3d 54, 57 (1st Cir. 2008)). We
"start[] with the plain language of the regulation," id., and we
keep in mind "a fundamental canon of [regulatory] construction:
that the words of a [regulation] must be read in their context and
with a view to their place in the overall [regulatory] scheme,"
United States v. Miller, 604 U.S. 518, 533 (2025) (citation
modified). Applying these principles to § 870.802(b), we read
"completed designation of beneficiary form" as referring to the
prior sentence, which simply reiterates the statutory
requirements. In other words, a designation form is "completed"
pursuant to § 870.802(b) when it is in writing, signed, and
witnessed by two people.
Thus, under 5 U.S.C. § 8705 and 5 C.F.R. § 870.802,
Mr. Hebert was not required to provide the omitted information in
Section C "as a condition of making a valid designation." Terry,
354 F.3d at 532. Put another way, although the omitted information
- 21 - might have made it more convenient for HRSSC to process
Mr. Hebert's designation form, none of the blanks and unchecked
boxes "affect[ed] a statutory requirement. The [designation form]
was 'signed' and in a 'witnessed writing.' It is therefore
effective." Bonner, 621 F.3d at 537 (citation omitted) (quoting
5 U.S.C. § 8705).
Nevertheless, Ms. Donahue still has one more argument to
discharge. She asserts that Mr. Hebert's designation form "was
not properly submitted," and so was "unprocessed" and rejected by
HRSSC. She points to regulatory language that designation forms
"may be submitted to the appropriate office via appropriate methods
approved by the employing office," and that designations not "filed
as required by this section ha[ve] no legal effect with respect to
benefits." 5 C.F.R. § 870.802(b)-(c). She also points to an
affidavit submitted by a HRSSC supervisor, which explains that
HRSSC verifies, among other things, that designation forms are
complete. According to the affidavit, "[r]ecords show that HRSSC
received an invalid [designation form] on 1/27/17. HRSSC
determined the form was invalid because Section C was not complete.
HRSSC records do not contain a valid designation of beneficiary
form for life insurance . . . prior to Mr. Hebert's date of
death."
As before, we look to FEGLIA for guidance. The statute
provides that a designation must be "received before death in the
- 22 - employing office," and it is silent as to any further requirements
after a form is received. 5 U.S.C. § 8705(a) (emphasis added).
We note, however, that the Fifth Circuit recently concluded that
if a form is "received," then "[w]hat happens after the form is
received and out of the [insured's] control 'cannot vitiate the
validly expressed intent of the insured.'" Metro. Life Ins. v.
Vasquez, No. 24-11024, 2025 WL 2795055, at *3 (5th Cir. Oct. 1,
2025) (per curiam) (quoting Coomer v. United States, 471 F.2d 1,
5 (5th Cir. 1973)). Though the Fifth Circuit was referring to a
form that was lost by the employer's Human Resources office, its
holding is nonetheless instructive.
In this case, it is undisputed that Mr. Hebert submitted
his form to "the appropriate office via appropriate methods
approved by the employing office" -- specifically, HRSSC and
overnight mail. 5 C.F.R. § 870.802(b). It is further undisputed
that HRSSC "received" Mr. Hebert's designation form, as
acknowledged in its letter dated January 31, 2017. That HRSSC
returned the form as unprocessed has no import under § 8705.
FEGLIA requires that the designation form be "received" before the
insured's death. 5 U.S.C. § 8705(a). Here, it was. And, as
discussed above, Mr. Hebert's designation form was signed and
witnessed. Therefore, it was valid.12 And because we conclude
12 We note that Ms. Donahue has two additional arguments. First, she argues that holding as we do "sets a dangerous
- 23 - that the designation form Mr. Hebert executed in January 2017 was
valid, we need not reach Ms. Donahue's arguments regarding the
validity of the resubmitted form.
2. Mr. Hebert's Mental Capacity
We turn now to the third issue raised by Ms. Donahue on
appeal: whether Mr. Hebert had the mental capacity to designate
beneficiaries on January 26, 2017, which she argues "is material
to the case." In support thereof, Ms. Donahue points to dueling
witness testimony regarding Mr. Hebert's mental state. She also
speculates about why Mr. Hebert would make the
Heberts -- particularly, his ex-wife -- his beneficiaries, instead
of Mrs. Donahue-Hebert.
For purposes of this case, we assume that "a designation
of beneficiary can be set aside upon a finding that the insured
was not mentally competent . . . at the time the document was
executed." Metro. Life Ins. v. Bradway, No. 10 Civ. 0254(JCF),
2011 WL 723579, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2011); see also Metro.
precedent" and requires us "to speculate regarding a decedent's intent." Second, she "asserts that the integrity and determination of the HRSSC ought to be supported by this Court because the determination affects public policy." We treat these arguments as waived: "[I]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived." United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990). Finally, we do not address Ms. Donahue's remaining case citations to non-binding district court decisions from outside of our Circuit. See Johnson v. Metro. Life Ins., 732 F. Supp. 3d 829 (N.D. Ill. 2024); Graber v. Metro. Life Ins., 855 F. Supp. 2d 673 (N.D. Ohio 2012).
- 24 - Life Ins. v. Beard, Civil Action No. 16-11782-PBS, 2019 WL 480513,
at *4 (D. Mass. Feb. 7, 2019) (noting an insurance beneficiary has
"defenses recognized under federal law"). We further assume, as
asserted by Ms. Donahue, that Massachusetts law applies. See
Beard, 2019 WL 480513, at *5 (applying state law to a FEGLIA
capacity challenge in the absence of federal common law).
Under Massachusetts law:
Contractual incapacity exists where a party is either "incapable of understanding and deciding upon the terms of the contract," or where, "by reason of mental illness or defect, the person is unable to act in a reasonable manner in relation to the transaction and the other party has reason to know of his condition."
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Flanders-Borden, 11
F.4th 12, 22 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting Sparrow v. Demonico, 960
N.E.2d 296, 301, 302 (Mass. 2012)) (citation modified). Medical
evidence is required to show contractual incapacity, and the
relevant "inquiry . . . focuses on a party's understanding or
conduct only at the time of the disputed transaction." Id.
(quoting Sparrow, 960 N.E.2d at 303). Finally, the "burden is on
the party seeking to void the contract to establish that the person
was incapacitated at the time of the transaction." Id. at 23
(quoting Sparrow, 960 N.E.2d at 301).
Our decision regarding Ms. Donahue's discovery requests,
supra Section II.A., determines the outcome here. Ms. Donahue had
- 25 - the burden of showing that Mr. Hebert was mentally incapacitated
on January 26, 2017, when he executed the designation form leaving
his life insurance benefits to the Heberts. She failed to present
any medical evidence regarding his capacity, or lack thereof, on
that date (or any date). Because medical evidence is required to
show incapacity, she did not carry her burden of proof under either
Massachusetts law or the federal summary judgment standard. See
Dusel, 52 F.4th at 503 ("The nonmoving party . . . must, with
respect to each issue on which it would bear the burden of proof
at trial, demonstrate that a trier of fact could reasonably resolve
that issue in its favor." (citation modified)). Therefore, like
the district court, we conclude that Ms. Donahue failed to
demonstrate Mr. Hebert lacked the capacity to designate
beneficiaries on January 26, 2017.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment for
the Heberts.
- 26 -