Heath v. Gallaway

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJune 10, 2024
Docket1:23-cv-10886
StatusUnknown

This text of Heath v. Gallaway (Heath v. Gallaway) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Heath v. Gallaway, (S.D.N.Y. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK JOHN JUNIOR HEATH, Plaintiff, -against- 23-CV-10886 (LTS) T. ERIC GALLOWAY, THE LANSING ORDER OF DISMISSAL GROUP, THE LANTERN ORGANIZATION, WITH LEAVE TO AMEND SCHAEFFER SERVICES, AND GALVAN FOUNDATION Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff brings this action pro se. By order dated December 22, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). For the reasons set forth in this order, the Court dismisses the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but grants Plaintiff 30 days’ leave to amend his complaint. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when it lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and to interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits—to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. Rule 8 requires a complaint to

include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009). In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Id. at 678. But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well- pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff John Junior Heath, who resides in the Bronx, New York, brings this complaint against “Timothy, Eric Galloway,” “the Lansing group,” “the lantern organization,” “Schaeffer services,” “Galvan Foundation,” “Eric Galloway,” and “T Eric Galloway.”1 See ECF No. 1 at 1,

5–6. Plaintiff alleges that, from May 2013 through February 2014, Defendant Galloway sexually harassed and assaulted him on numerous occasions. The conduct allegedly began after Defendant hired Plaintiff to perform clerical work. Plaintiff states that he endured numerous unwanted sexual advances in the workplace; Defendant sent text messages soliciting explicit pictures, attempted to forcibly kiss Plaintiff in an elevator and in a stairwell, and tried to remove

1 All of Plaintiff’s allegations pertain to Defendant Galloway. It is unclear to the Court how the other defendants are purportedly involved in the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff’s pants after calling him to a meeting in his office. Plaintiff states that in each of these incidents, he “fought [Defendant] off.” Id. at 5. Plaintiff was eventually terminated from his employment with Defendant. After being denied unemployment benefits, Plaintiff contacted Defendant for assistance. Id. at 6. The two met for dinner, and afterward, Defendant asked

Plaintiff to return to his home in Manhattan. There, Defendant insisted that Plaintiff drink a glass of wine, despite his initial refusal. Plaintiff then recalls waking up on the floor with his pants pulled down. He felt pain and noticed evidence of anal penetration. As he gathered his things to leave, Defendant allegedly ushered Plaintiff into the elevator, handed him two hundred dollars, and said he would resolve the unemployment benefits issue. Plaintiff then left the premises. Id. DISCUSSION A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction The limited subject matter jurisdiction of federal district courts is set forth generally in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Under these statutes, federal jurisdiction is available only when a

“federal question” is presented or when plaintiff and defendant are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000. “‘[I]t is common ground that in our federal system of limited jurisdiction any party or the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings, may raise the question of whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction.’” United Food & Com. Workers Union, Loc. 919, AFL-CIO v. CenterMark Prop. Meriden Square, Inc., 30 F.3d 298, 301 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Manway Constr. Co., Inc. v. Hous. Auth. of the City of Hartford, 711 F.2d 501, 503 (2d Cir. 1983)); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”); Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999) (“[S]ubject-matter delineations must be policed by the courts on their own initiative . . . .”). 1. Federal Question Jurisdiction To invoke federal question jurisdiction, a plaintiff’s claim must arise “under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. A case arises under federal law if the complaint “establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal

law.” Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Kain, 485 F.3d 730, 734-35 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Empire Healthchoice Assur., Inc. v.

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Heath v. Gallaway, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/heath-v-gallaway-nysd-2024.