LEAHY, District Judge.
The manifold and confusing aspects of this case, the variety of alternative prayers for relief, have made it difficult, at times, for the court to keep the real issue in focus. With diversity and amount in controversy present, I base jurisdiction on Perrine v. Pennroad Corporation, 19 Del.Ch. 368, 168 A. 196; Bouree et al. v. Trust Francais, 14 Del.Ch. 332, 127 A. 56; and Jellenik v. Huron Copper Min. Co., 177 U.S. 1, 20 S.Ct. 559, 44 L.Ed. 647, because the res is here. We must approach the issue and determine the rights of all parties as of March 16, 1942.
The basic question then to which Shearn’s motion for summary judgment is directed is whether the Voting Trust Agreement, which by its terms is irrevocable, may be terminated by the March 16, 1942 notice of the sole depositing shareholder, without the consent of the trustee and, as of the date of the notice, without the consent of the lending banks, such consent being by the provisions of the agreement necessary concomitants to effect such termination.
Plaintiff meets this challenging question by saying, (1) the orginal trust agreement gave the banks no interest in the subject matter of the trust and no rights thereunder; (2) defendant Shearn, as voting trustee, cannot put forward a defense of non-consent by the banks, even though the specific provisions of the agreement require as a condition precedent to termination such consent, because he is not in privity with such banks; and (3) as the banks took no affirmative action after the receipt of the March 16, 1942, notice, defendant Shearn cannot plead the rights such banks may have had under the original agreement.
I. By its plain terms, the Hearst agreement is to continue until June 26, 1947, unless sooner terminated with consent of (1) the trustee, (2) a majority in interest of voting trust certificate holders, and if at any time there be outstanding bank loans made upon the faith of the existence of the agreement, (3) the consent of the lending banks. These are obviously lawful provisions which the signatories had the right to embody in the agreement.
The Restatement
has attempted to envisage the situation here, i.e., where persons make
loans on the basis of a voting trust agreement, the agreement cannot be terminated by the settlor without their consent, especially where the instrument of deposit contemplates such affirmative consent. In utilizing the corporate instrumentality of the voting trust, modern business has convinced courts that this divorcement of ownership from control is not without practical necessity,
especially where — as here, to be particular — the purpose of such voting trust is “to obtain and insure continuity of control for a definite and substantial period of years and thereby, among other things, to facilitate a financial and corporate reorganization of the Company [American] and for its subsidiaries.”
The various banks who lent money to the Hearst Companies in an amount in excess of $2,000,000 on the faith of the Voting Trust Agreement appear to be a legal deterrent to Hearst’s supposed right to bring about the termination of such agreement in defiance of the explicit provisions of the trust which, clearly, provides the settlor has not reserved to himself the unconditional right to terminate. We are not concerned with the postulates of “beneficiary” and “interested person” as those terms are known in testamentary and inter vivos personal trusts.
Such persons ordinarily have either a vested or contingent property “interest”, a value which, for most purposes, the law is in a position to evaluate in the hard terms of dollars and cents. But, as the law develops, it is bound to take within its aura of protection certain rights which in daily life cannot be sold over the counter. Thus, when an attempt is made to form a legalistic concept of the various “interests”, or who are “beneficiaries” of the corporate device known as the statutory voting trust, courts enter the country of the nuance, not the land of the absolutes. So, here, when Hearst supplicates a financial institution to advance his companies substantial sums on the say that he has committed himself to a definite line of action, via a voting trust, which will remain static during the life of the loan, such legal relation of the owner with respect to his own property should not be changed without the consent of the lender for the latter’s rights are something in the nature of —if not a legal — at least an equitable interest which courts are bound to protect. It matters little whether the lending banks could have maintained an action to enforce the voting trust agreement. The question is whether a court should ignore a written contract, regard it as meaningless, and aid a party to violate its express provisions.
The banks are within their rights in treating the March 16, 1942, notice of termination as a nullity. While they may have had the legal right to call their loans or sue for damages — if such they sustained as a result of the attempted revocation— they likewise had the protection of the specific provisos of the agreement insuring them that the Voting Trust Agreement would not be revoked unless they consented.
I reject plaintiff’s arguments that Shearn has no right to urge the position of the various lending banks. Even though the banks are not formal parties to this proceeding, they have the right to assume that their rights will be recognized as, in this proceeding, the court is sitting as a court of equity, with the duty of ascertaining every fact, and then applying the correct rule in an effort to do justice to all parties who may in any way be affected by its decree. Plaintiff sought out this court and now seeks its aid in striking down an agreement of legal solemnity. This is the traditional case where the Chancellor cautiously examines each bit of evidence in order to see that rights of others, regardless of their presence, are not jeopardized. Plaintiff’s fire directed at Shearn’s right to sustain the trust is mis-directed. Equity imposes on a trustee the duty of defending the integrity of his trust, if he has reasonable grounds
to believe that the attack is without justification. Perrine v. Pennroad Corp., 19 Del.Ch. 368, 168 A. 196; 3 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, § 561.
H. M. Byllesby & Co. v. Doriot, Del. Ch., 12 A.2d 603, is not opposed to this view. In that case, Byllesby & Co., a holding company under the definition of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C.A. § 79 et seq., owned 75% of the common stock of Standard Power & Light Corporation, thus insuring director control over a spreading public utility system. In an effort to by-pass the federal statute, Byllesby entered into a voting trust agreement under the Delaware law. The agreement had a life of ten years, but contained no proviso for earlier termination or revocation. Non-depositing stockholders were not to be let in without Byllesby’s consent. The Securities and Exchange Commission refused to recognize the agreement in its considerations of what Standard was required to do to comply with the statute.
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LEAHY, District Judge.
The manifold and confusing aspects of this case, the variety of alternative prayers for relief, have made it difficult, at times, for the court to keep the real issue in focus. With diversity and amount in controversy present, I base jurisdiction on Perrine v. Pennroad Corporation, 19 Del.Ch. 368, 168 A. 196; Bouree et al. v. Trust Francais, 14 Del.Ch. 332, 127 A. 56; and Jellenik v. Huron Copper Min. Co., 177 U.S. 1, 20 S.Ct. 559, 44 L.Ed. 647, because the res is here. We must approach the issue and determine the rights of all parties as of March 16, 1942.
The basic question then to which Shearn’s motion for summary judgment is directed is whether the Voting Trust Agreement, which by its terms is irrevocable, may be terminated by the March 16, 1942 notice of the sole depositing shareholder, without the consent of the trustee and, as of the date of the notice, without the consent of the lending banks, such consent being by the provisions of the agreement necessary concomitants to effect such termination.
Plaintiff meets this challenging question by saying, (1) the orginal trust agreement gave the banks no interest in the subject matter of the trust and no rights thereunder; (2) defendant Shearn, as voting trustee, cannot put forward a defense of non-consent by the banks, even though the specific provisions of the agreement require as a condition precedent to termination such consent, because he is not in privity with such banks; and (3) as the banks took no affirmative action after the receipt of the March 16, 1942, notice, defendant Shearn cannot plead the rights such banks may have had under the original agreement.
I. By its plain terms, the Hearst agreement is to continue until June 26, 1947, unless sooner terminated with consent of (1) the trustee, (2) a majority in interest of voting trust certificate holders, and if at any time there be outstanding bank loans made upon the faith of the existence of the agreement, (3) the consent of the lending banks. These are obviously lawful provisions which the signatories had the right to embody in the agreement.
The Restatement
has attempted to envisage the situation here, i.e., where persons make
loans on the basis of a voting trust agreement, the agreement cannot be terminated by the settlor without their consent, especially where the instrument of deposit contemplates such affirmative consent. In utilizing the corporate instrumentality of the voting trust, modern business has convinced courts that this divorcement of ownership from control is not without practical necessity,
especially where — as here, to be particular — the purpose of such voting trust is “to obtain and insure continuity of control for a definite and substantial period of years and thereby, among other things, to facilitate a financial and corporate reorganization of the Company [American] and for its subsidiaries.”
The various banks who lent money to the Hearst Companies in an amount in excess of $2,000,000 on the faith of the Voting Trust Agreement appear to be a legal deterrent to Hearst’s supposed right to bring about the termination of such agreement in defiance of the explicit provisions of the trust which, clearly, provides the settlor has not reserved to himself the unconditional right to terminate. We are not concerned with the postulates of “beneficiary” and “interested person” as those terms are known in testamentary and inter vivos personal trusts.
Such persons ordinarily have either a vested or contingent property “interest”, a value which, for most purposes, the law is in a position to evaluate in the hard terms of dollars and cents. But, as the law develops, it is bound to take within its aura of protection certain rights which in daily life cannot be sold over the counter. Thus, when an attempt is made to form a legalistic concept of the various “interests”, or who are “beneficiaries” of the corporate device known as the statutory voting trust, courts enter the country of the nuance, not the land of the absolutes. So, here, when Hearst supplicates a financial institution to advance his companies substantial sums on the say that he has committed himself to a definite line of action, via a voting trust, which will remain static during the life of the loan, such legal relation of the owner with respect to his own property should not be changed without the consent of the lender for the latter’s rights are something in the nature of —if not a legal — at least an equitable interest which courts are bound to protect. It matters little whether the lending banks could have maintained an action to enforce the voting trust agreement. The question is whether a court should ignore a written contract, regard it as meaningless, and aid a party to violate its express provisions.
The banks are within their rights in treating the March 16, 1942, notice of termination as a nullity. While they may have had the legal right to call their loans or sue for damages — if such they sustained as a result of the attempted revocation— they likewise had the protection of the specific provisos of the agreement insuring them that the Voting Trust Agreement would not be revoked unless they consented.
I reject plaintiff’s arguments that Shearn has no right to urge the position of the various lending banks. Even though the banks are not formal parties to this proceeding, they have the right to assume that their rights will be recognized as, in this proceeding, the court is sitting as a court of equity, with the duty of ascertaining every fact, and then applying the correct rule in an effort to do justice to all parties who may in any way be affected by its decree. Plaintiff sought out this court and now seeks its aid in striking down an agreement of legal solemnity. This is the traditional case where the Chancellor cautiously examines each bit of evidence in order to see that rights of others, regardless of their presence, are not jeopardized. Plaintiff’s fire directed at Shearn’s right to sustain the trust is mis-directed. Equity imposes on a trustee the duty of defending the integrity of his trust, if he has reasonable grounds
to believe that the attack is without justification. Perrine v. Pennroad Corp., 19 Del.Ch. 368, 168 A. 196; 3 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, § 561.
H. M. Byllesby & Co. v. Doriot, Del. Ch., 12 A.2d 603, is not opposed to this view. In that case, Byllesby & Co., a holding company under the definition of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C.A. § 79 et seq., owned 75% of the common stock of Standard Power & Light Corporation, thus insuring director control over a spreading public utility system. In an effort to by-pass the federal statute, Byllesby entered into a voting trust agreement under the Delaware law. The agreement had a life of ten years, but contained no proviso for earlier termination or revocation. Non-depositing stockholders were not to be let in without Byllesby’s consent. The Securities and Exchange Commission refused to recognize the agreement in its considerations of what Standard was required to do to comply with the statute. Byllesby then requested the Trustees to join with it in revoking the voting trust agreement. The trustees refused. Chancellor Pearson properly held that, under the facts before him, the settlor had the right to terminate the trust. The case can be distinguished from the problems presented in the instant case on many fronts. In the first place, it was recognized that, where the settlor gives a third person an interest in the agreement, it cannot be terminated without such third party’s consent; here, the lending banks had, as of March 16, 1942, an interest in the deposited shares through their power to insist on the continuance of the exercise of the voting rights by the trustee. Secondly, the Byllesby agreement having failed to receive the administrative imprimatur of the Securities and Exchange Commission, its fundamental purpose had failed; whereas here, at least as long as the lending banks were in the picture, there was an existing necessity to divorce Hearst from control of the corporate enterprise. Thirdly, the Byllesby agreement was silent on irrevocability. However, it did contain a provision that “The Depositing Stockholders hereby severally agree irrevocably to assign, transfer and deliver to the trustees shares of stock, etc.” This was a promise which Byllesby made to itself, while in Hearst it was expressly provided that the agreement would be irrevocable as the “Trustee” was “willing to undertake the trusts * * * only upon the condition that said trusts be irrevocable.” Moreover, the Byllesby agreement had no conditions requiring the consent of its trustee or a third party to termination.
Alderman v. Alderman, 178 S.C. 9, 181 S.E. 897, 105 A.L.R. 102, has been offered by Shearn as coming as close as any case which has been found to be determinative of the instant case. There, four out of six stockholders deposited their shares with the other two as trustees to vote the stock of the four, to collect and pay any declared dividends. Later the trustees made written acknowledgement of the receipt of the shares and undertook to carry out the terms of what was obviously a voting trust. Then the depositing stockholders sought to have the agreement declared void. The court refused such relief on the theory that there was no suggestion in the agreement that it could be revoked at the whim of the settlors. The court indulged in the presumption that the voting trustees would not have accepted the trust if the grantors could revoke at any time. I am not completely satisfied that this case is controlling authority under the peculiar circumstances in the case at bar.
But, for present purposes, I reject the proposition urged by plaintiff’s counsel that if Hearst terminated, the lending banks were relegated to calling their loans or suing him for damages. The inclusion of such rights in the original agreement were simply additional remedies.
At the same time, I am unable to understand plaintiff’s argument that his Voting Trust Agreement is not an agreement at all for the reason that he calls it a conveyance. Most formal inter vivos trusts do take the form of a conveyance, while those testamentary in nature are embodied in a will. And a trust can even utilize a more simple form, viz., the settlor can stand seized to uses as a trustee himself — he agrees with no jural person and nothing leaves him by way of a conveyance. Such formalities are not without historical interest to the legal student. But the present-day conception is — at least, I think it should be — that a voting trust under Sec. 18 of the General Corporation Law of Delaware as it is sui generis may
also be a valid and enforceable contract.
Voting Trust Agreements have been used for nearly the last forty years. They are an established technique in our current business world, sanctified not only by Sec. 18 of the General Corporation Law ■of Delaware, but recognized by the statutes of almost every other state which deals in corporations. If the terms of such agreements can be wiped out by revocable action on the part of stock depositors when they have written into the agreement overtones of irrevocability, it is difficult to see how we can consider certain a contractual arrangement which the profession has been lead to believe is not subject to the incidence of change even through the instrumentality of the courts.
I conclude the March 16, 1942, notice was not sufficient to revoke the June 26, 1937, trust.
II. There still exists the charge that the trustee should be removed for cause. The proposed amendment seeks to elaborate these charges. The amendment as to such detail will be allowed. Defendant Shearn, therefore, has no further need for a bill of particulars on this score. He shall, of course, as is his right, be permitted to answer these alleged charges.
The proposed supplements to the complaint allege acts which have occurred after the filing of the original complaint. This Circuit, fortified by Rule 15 (d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, has indicated an increasing latitude in the matter of supplemental pleadings. Bessemer Inv. Co. v. City of Chester, 3 Cir., 113 F.2d 571.
The supplemental matters, as one can read from the preceding statements of fact, are concerned with payment of the bank loans which were made in reliance on the original Voting Trust Agreement. The supplements are allowed. If defendant Shearn, under Rule 42 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, suggests that I try the separate issue as to whether the agreement may be terminated without his consent alone, as voting trustee, then the parties may request the clerk for a date for hearing such issue.
In the interim, Shearn’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that the March 16, 1942, notice was ineffective either to revoke the June 26, 1937, Voting Trust Agreement or to depose him as trustee thereunder is granted.