Heard v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance

324 N.W.2d 1, 414 Mich. 139
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedSeptember 13, 1982
Docket64040, (Calendar No. 3)
StatusPublished
Cited by55 cases

This text of 324 N.W.2d 1 (Heard v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Heard v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance, 324 N.W.2d 1, 414 Mich. 139 (Mich. 1982).

Opinions

Levin, J.

(for reversal). William H. Heard seeks to recover no-fault automobile liability insurance benefits for injuries suffered when he was struck by an automobile while he was pumping gasoline, at a self-service station, into a vehicle owned by him. Heard was pinned between his vehicle and the vehicle which struck him.

Heard, who had not purchased no-fault insurance for his vehicle, brought this action to recover no-fault benefits from State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, the insurer of the vehicle which struck him.

The circuit court granted State Farm summary judgment, dismissing Heard’s complaint on the ground that the no-fault act provides that a person is not entitled to no-fault personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits if he is the owner of an uninsured "motor vehicle involved in the accident” (§ 3113 of the no-fault act).1 The Court of Appeals affirmed._

[144]*144We reverse and remand for trial because we are of the opinion that a parked vehicle is not "involved in the accident” unless one of the exceptions to the parked vehicle provision (§ 3106)2 is applicable. Those exceptions spell out when a parked vehicle is deemed to be in use as a motor vehicle; "[e]ach exception pertains to injuries related to the character of a parked vehicle as a [145]*145motor vehicle — characteristics which make it unlike other stationary roadside objects that can be involved in vehicle accidents”. Miller v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 411 Mich 633, 640; 309 NW2d 544 (1981). (Emphasis supplied.)

At the time of the accident, Heard’s vehicle was not in use as a motor vehicle; rather, it was like "other stationary roadside objects that can be involved in vehicle accidents”. Heard was entitled to PIP benefits from State Farm. § 3115(l)(a).3

I

The disqualification of an uninsured owner from entitlement to no-fault benefits is not absolute. While the no-fault act does indeed provide that the owner of an uninsured "motor vehicle involved in the accident” is not entitled to recover PIP benefits, the converse is equally true: the owner of an uninsured vehicle is entitled to recover PIP benefits if his uninsured motor vehicle is not "involved in the accident”. An owner is entitled to PIP benefits, although he has not insured his vehicle, if he suffers injury in a motor vehicle accident while he is a pedestrian, a bicyclist, a motorcyclist, or a passenger in another vehicle.

Since the penalty for failing to purchase no-fault insurance is limited to disqualification for benefits when the uninsured vehicle is involved in the accident, it begs the question to argue that Heard [146]*146is "seeking to take advantage”4 of those who have, contributed to the system. Because Heard’s uninsured vehicle was not involved in the accident and he was a pedestrian and not a motorist or occupant of a motor vehicle (or, if one prefers, he was more like a pedestrian than a motorist or occupant), he is as much entitled — under the terms and policies of the no-fault act — to recover from the insurer of the vehicle that struck him as is a pedestrian or motorcyclist who does not own an automobile (or a pedestrian or motorcyclist who does own an automobile but who, like Heard, has not purchased no-fault insurance) and who also has not contributed "to the fund from which benefits are to be paid”.5

II

The dissenting opinion states:

"To determine whether a vehicle is involved in an accident, it is necessary to decide the required causal relationship between the injury and the uninsured vehicle. We hold that when one is maintaining his vehicle at the time of an accident, as by pumping gasoline, and is pinned between his car and another car as a result of the accident, there is a sufficient causal connection between his injury and his automobile to constitute involvement. The mere fact that plaintiff’s automobile was stationary does not mean that the vehicle was not involved. Physically, even if a motor vehicle hits a tree or pole, those things are 'involved’ in the accident. If those things had not been at the scene, there might not have been any accident at all, and certainly any accident that did occur would be of a different nature without them. Therefore, plaintiff’s automobile was involved in the accident, and thus, as [147]*147an uninsured motorist, plaintiff is precluded from recovering no-fault benefits.”

The liability of a no-fault insurer does not depend on there being a "causal relationship” between the accident or injury and a vehicle. While there is often a causal relationship between the insured vehicle and the accident, a no-fault insurer may be responsible although the insured vehicle is not a cause of the accident. For example, the no-fault insurer of an insured person is subject to liability if the insured person or certain members of his household suffer injury while pedestrians or occupants of other vehicles.6

Just as the absence of causal relationship or of its corollary, fault, does not necessarily relieve the no-fault insurer of liability, so too the presence of a "causal relationship” does not resolve the question whether a particular vehicle is "involved” for the purposes of the act. Whether a vehicle is "involved” cannot be determined by abstract reasoning or resort to dictionary definitions. It depends on the meaning derived from the purpose and structure of the no-fault act.

While there will generally (perhaps always) be some causal relationship between the loss incurred and a "vehicle involved in the accident”, it does not follow that whenever there is any causal relationship the vehicle is "involved”. "But for” causal analysis would "involve” a vehicle which drops off a member of a car pool who, after he reaches the curb, is struck crossing a street; a vehicle which runs out of gas where a person who was an occupant is struck walking along the highway to a service station; and a vehicle left in a parking lot where a person who was an occupant is struck [148]*148crossing the street. "But for” analysis could even involve a disabled automobile left at home occasioning the use of other transportation setting in motion a chain of events which lead to accidental injury of the owner of the disabled vehicle, members of his family and other persons.

"But for” analysis can, indeed, be limited by interposing a requirement of physical proximity. Because Heard was pinned between his vehicle and the offending vehicle, his vehicle is involved; or because he, rather than a service station attendant, was pumping the gasoline, his vehicle is involved. Heard had, he testified on deposition, been leaning against his vehicle, and State Farm argues that for that reason also his vehicle is involved.

We are persuaded, however, on examination of the no-fault act as a whole, that disqualification for benefits and the distribution of losses between insurance carriers (which depends in some circumstances on the meaning given the term "vehicle involved in the accident”, see part III) were not meant to depend on such adventitious circumstances.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
324 N.W.2d 1, 414 Mich. 139, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/heard-v-state-farm-mutual-automobile-insurance-mich-1982.