Sean Banks II v. Aaa Insurance Company

CourtMichigan Court of Appeals
DecidedSeptember 15, 2016
Docket327386
StatusUnpublished

This text of Sean Banks II v. Aaa Insurance Company (Sean Banks II v. Aaa Insurance Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sean Banks II v. Aaa Insurance Company, (Mich. Ct. App. 2016).

Opinion

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

SEAN BANKS II, by next friend, SHARON UNPUBLISHED CLARK, September 15, 2016

Plaintiff,

and

SPECIAL TREE REHABILITATION SERVICES and VHS OF MICHIGAN, d/b/a DETROIT MEDICAL CENTER,

Intervening Plaintiffs,

v No. 327386 Wayne Circuit Court AAA INSURANCE COMPANY, LC No. 14-005762-NF

Defendant-Appellee,

CITIZENS INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA,

Defendant-Appellant,

GREAT AMERICAN ASSURANCE COMPANY/GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK, GREAT AMERICAN SECURITY INSURANCE COMPANY, and GREAT AMERICAN SPIRIT INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendants.

Before: CAVANAGH, P.J., and SAAD and FORT HOOD, JJ.

-1- PER CURIAM.

In this priority dispute regarding the payment of first-party no-fault insurance benefits, defendant Citizens Insurance Company of America (Citizens) appeals as of right an order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant AAA Insurance Company (AAA). We affirm.

The facts related to the underlying motor vehicle accident are essentially undisputed. At approximately 10:30 p.m. on June 13, 2013, Sharon Clark returned to her Detroit home from a trip to the grocery store with friends. She was a passenger in a 2003 Honda Civic operated by Darcia Davis. After Davis parallel parked curbside on eastbound Kercheval Avenue, Sharon’s 15-year-old son, Sean Banks II, came off the porch and greeted his mother and her friends. He then went to the opened trunk of the Honda Civic to help unload groceries from the vehicle. First, however, Sean rummaged through the grocery bags looking for a certain food item. As Sean leaned into the trunk, he was struck by a GMC Envoy turning left onto eastbound Kercheval from southbound Van Dyke. Essentially, the driver of the GMC Envoy, Christopher Laster, turned too wide and rear-ended the Honda Civic.1 Sean sustained serious injuries as a consequence of the impact. At the time of the accident, the Honda Civic was insured under a no- fault policy issued by AAA. Laster’s vehicle was uninsured.

In September 2013, Sharon applied for personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits from AAA on Sean’s behalf. Initially, AAA voluntarily paid the PIP benefits, but later concluded that Sean was ineligible for benefits and, therefore, future payments were denied. Apparently because no other insurance coverage was readily identifiable, benefits were sought through the Michigan Assigned Claims Plan, which led to Citizens’ appointment as the servicing insurer. Subsequently, a complaint was filed on Sean’s behalf that sought to resolve which insurance carrier was first in priority for the payment of no-fault benefits to Sean. Several insurance companies were named as defendants, including Citizens and AAA.2

Citizens filed a motion for summary disposition, arguing that the AAA-insured Honda Civic was involved in the accident because Sean was in the process of unloading a parked vehicle when he was injured. Therefore, Citizens argued, AAA was a higher priority insurer than Citizens, an assignee of the Michigan Assigned Claims Plan. AAA opposed the motion, arguing that the parked Honda Civic was not “involved in the accident” within the meaning of the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq.; therefore, it had no obligation to pay PIP benefits. AAA requested that the court render judgment in its favor under MCR 2.116(I)(2). The trial court

1 Based on the testimony of two neighbors, Katrice Kinkle and Stefanie Kinkle, there is some suggestion that Sean was unloading groceries from the rear passenger door at the time of the impact. However, when presented with conflicting testimony, Katrice readily admitted that Sean could have moved to the back of the Honda Civic. In any event, this factual discrepancy is irrelevant to the issues presented in this appeal. 2 Two health care providers, VHS of Michigan, d/b/a Detroit Medical Center, and Special Tree Rehabilitation Services were later granted leave to intervene as plaintiffs.

-2- agreed with AAA that the Honda Civic was not involved in the accident for purposes of the no- fault act, and thus was not liable for the payment of PIP benefits. Accordingly, the court denied Citizens’ motion for summary disposition and granted summary disposition in favor of AAA pursuant to MCR 2.116(I)(2). In light of this ruling, the court also denied as moot Citizens’ motion for leave to file a cross-claim against AAA.

On appeal, Citizens argues that the parked Honda Civic was “involved in the accident” for purposes of the no-fault act because Sean was in physical contact with property being unloaded from the trunk of the vehicle—groceries—when he was struck by a car and injured. We disagree.

This Court reviews a decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). When considering a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), a reviewing court must consider any affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, or other evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Id. at 120, citing MCR 2.116(G)(5). “Summary disposition is properly granted if the proffered evidence fails to establish a genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Klein v HP Pelzer Auto Sys, Inc, 306 Mich App 67, 75; 854 NW2d 521 (2014). Summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(I)(2) is properly granted if it is clear that “the opposing party, rather than the moving party, is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Rataj v Romulus, 306 Mich App 735, 747; 858 NW2d 116 (2014) (citation omitted). Further, appellate courts review de novo questions of statutory interpretation. Jesperson v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 499 Mich 29, 34; 878 NW2d 799 (2016).

Pursuant to MCL 500.3105(1), “an insurer is liable to pay benefits for accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle.” None of the parties dispute Sean’s entitlement to first-party no-fault benefits under the parameters set forth in MCL 500.3105(1). Instead, the issue in this case concerns which defendant insurer is responsible for the payment of those benefits. MCL 500.3115 governs the order of priority because Sean had no auto insurance of his own, there is none in the household where he resides, and he was not an occupant of any vehicle. Under that statute, a person injured while not an occupant of a motor vehicle would first claim PIP benefits from the insurers of owners or operators of the vehicles “involved in the accident.” MCL 500.3115(1). If no insurance is applicable or available under this priority scheme, then benefits would be paid by the assigned claims insurer under MCL 500.3172(1), i.e., Citizens in this case. The vehicle obviously involved in the accident, the GMC Envoy operated by Laster, was uninsured. Consequently, it is necessary to determine whether the AAA-insured Honda Civic was “involved in the accident.” MCL 500.3115(1). This inquiry is further complicated because the Honda Civic was a parked vehicle.

In general, parked vehicles are not considered to be involved in an accident unless certain circumstances are present. MCL 500.3106(1) sets forth the exceptions to the no-fault act’s parked vehicle exclusion. That is, “MCL 500.3106(1) expressly delineates when ‘accidental bodily injury aris[es] out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle’ if the vehicle is parked.” Frazier v Allstate Ins Co, 490 Mich 381, 384; 808 NW2d 450 (2011). Pursuant to § 3106, accidental bodily injury does not arise out of the

-3- ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of a parked vehicle unless any of the following occurred:

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Related

Frazier v. Allstate Insurance Company
808 N.W.2d 450 (Michigan Supreme Court, 2011)
Heard v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
324 N.W.2d 1 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1982)
Maiden v. Rozwood
597 N.W.2d 817 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1999)
Arnold v. Auto-Owners Insurance
269 N.W.2d 311 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 1978)
Adanalic v. Harco National Insurance Company
870 N.W.2d 731 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2015)
Jesperson v. Auto Club Insurance Association
878 N.W.2d 799 (Michigan Supreme Court, 2016)
Boylan v. Fifty Eight Ltd. Liability Co.
808 N.W.2d 277 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2010)
Klein v. HP Pelzer Automotive Systems, Inc.
854 N.W.2d 521 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2014)
Rataj v. City of Romulus
858 N.W.2d 116 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2014)

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Sean Banks II v. Aaa Insurance Company, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sean-banks-ii-v-aaa-insurance-company-michctapp-2016.