(HC) Rodriguez v. Fisher

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: August 21, 2024
• Docket: 3:21-cv-01395
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 PEDRO RODRIGUEZ, Case No.: 21-CV-1395 JLS (AHG)

12 Petitioner, ORDER (1) DENYING MOTION 13 v. FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT AND (2) DENYING CERTIFICATE 14 OF APPEALABILITY 15 KATHLEEN ALLISON, Secretary, (ECF No. 68) 16 Respondent. 17

18 Presently before the Court is Petitioner Pedro Rodriguez’s Motion for Relief From 19 Judgment (“Mot.,” ECF No. 68) brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 20 Procedure 60(b)(6). Having carefully considered Petitioner’s arguments and the law, the 21 Court DENIES the Motion for lack of jurisdiction and DENIES a certificate of 22 appealability. 23 BACKGROUND 24 The Court incorporates by reference its October 7, 2022 Order (the “Order,” ECF 25 No. 55) and recounts only those details relevant to the instant Motion. 26 In San Diego Superior Court case number SCN340334, Petitioner was convicted for, 27 among other things, falsely obtaining unemployment benefits in violation of California 28 Unemployment Insurance Code § 2101(a). Order at 1; ECF No. 36-17 at 6, 9. This charge 1 was based on false statements Petitioner made in his benefits application. Petitioner 2 reported needing benefits due to “lack of work” when, in reality, he was incarcerated—and 3 thus ineligible for benefits—pursuant to an earlier conviction for unlawful sexual 4 misconduct with a minor (in Case No. SCN333477). See id. at 4 n.1, 5–6. 5 Seeking to challenge the unemployment benefits conviction (Case No. SCN340334), 6 Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Pet.,” ECF No. 1) pursuant to 7 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on August 3, 2021. The Petition contained nine grounds for relief, 8 including one based on a theory of false evidence and actual innocence. See id. at 20, 9 23–34. Regarding said claim, Petitioner argued: (1) the prosecutor in his sexual 10 misconduct case (Case No. SCN333477) had introduced false evidence, so (2) he was 11 “unlawfully detained” when he applied for unemployment benefits, meaning (3) he was 12 “actually innocent” of the unemployment benefits charge in Case No. SCN340334. See id. 13 On October 7, 2022, the Court denied the Petition, dismissed this action with 14 prejudice, and denied a certificate of appealability. See generally Order. The Court 15 concluded six of the Petition’s nine claims—but not Petitioner’s false-evidence-and-actual- 16 innocence argument—were procedurally defaulted. Id. at 13–14. Nevertheless, the Court 17 proceeded to explain why each of the Petition’s grounds failed on their merits. See id. 18 at 13–31. As to evidence/innocence claim, the Court concluded Petitioner had failed to 19 establish (1) that the prosecution introduced false evidence in the sexual misconduct case 20 (Case No. SCN333477); and (2) that he was actually innocent of the employment benefit 21 fraud charges in Case No. SCN340334. Id. at 15–16. 22 On October 20, 2022, Petitioner filed a motion seeking to alter or amend the 23 judgment in this case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). See ECF No. 57 24 (“Rule 59(e) Mot.”). On November 15, the Court denied the Rule 59(e) Motion on the 25 grounds that Plaintiff had failed to raise any arguments relevant to such a motion. 26 Specifically, the Court explained that Petitioner had not presented newly discovered 27 evidence relevant to the Petition, claimed the Court committed clear error in its prior Order, 28 nor pointed to any intervening change in controlling law. See ECF No. 64 at 3. 1 On October 21, 2022—before the Court had ruled on his Rule 59(e) Motion— 2 Petitioner appealed the Court’s denial of the Petition. See ECF No. 58. On 3 October 25, 2023, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioner a certificate of 4 appealability because he “ha[d] not shown that ‘jurists of reason would find it debatable 5 whether the [P]etition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that 6 jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its 7 procedural ruling.” See ECF No. 65 at 1 (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 8 (2000)). On December 1 of the same year, the Ninth Circuit denied Petitioners subsequent 9 motion for reconsideration and held that “[n]o further filings w[ould] be entertained in this 10 closed case.” ECF No. 66 at 1. 11 The instant Motion followed on March 26, 2024. 12 DISCUSSION 13 Presently, Petitioner seeks relief from judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 14 Procedure 60(b)(6). Under that Rule, a “court may relieve a party or its legal representative 15 from a final judgment, order or proceeding” for “any other reason that justifies relief.” 16 Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). So far as the Court can tell, Petitioner argues (1) that the Court 17 erred in its prior Order by “assuming” Case No. SCN340334 (the unemployment benefits 18 case) and Case No. SCN333477 (the unlawful sexual conduct case) were “the same,” see 19 Mot. at 2–3;1 (2) that he is actually innocent of the benefits fraud charge because the “claim 20 against . . . Petitioner was not ripe until two years after [his] conviction,” id. at 1; and 21 (3) that the Motion should not be construed as a successive habeas petition because (a) he 22 alleges actual innocence and (b) he is challenging the integrity of the instant proceedings, 23 see id. at 2–3. The Court will start with Petitioner’s second-or-successive argument and 24 work backwards from there. 25 / / / 26 27 28 1 Pin citations to the Motion refer to the blue CM/ECF page numbers stamped electronically across the 1 I. Successive Habeas Petitions 2 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) puts certain 3 limitations on successive habeas petitions. “First, any claim that has already been 4 adjudicated in a previous petition must be dismissed.” Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 5 530–31 (2005) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1)). Meanwhile, 6 “[a] claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was not presented in a prior 7 application shall be dismissed unless” it “relies on a new rule of 8 constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable” or on 9 newly discovered facts that show a high probability of actual 10 innocence.

11 Jones v. Ryan, 733 F.3d 825, 834 (9th Cir. 2013) (alteration in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. 12 § 2244(b)(2)(A)–(B)). Before a district court can accept a “successive petition” that raises 13 a new claim, however, “the court of appeals must determine” said claim “is sufficient to 14 meet § 2244(b)(2)’s new-rule or actual-innocence provisions.” Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 530 15 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)). 16 In the habeas context, courts must consider whether a Rule 60(b) motion should be 17 treated as a successive petition. See Mitchell v. United States, 958 F.3d 775, 784 (9th Cir. 18 2020); see also Jones, 733 F.3d at 834 (“Because of the difficulty of meeting this standard, 19 habeas corpus petitioners at times have characterized their second or successive habeas 20 corpus petitions as Rule 60(b) motions.”). A Rule 60(b) motion “is in substance a 21 successive habeas petition” if it advances a “claim,” meaning it contains an “asserted 22 federal basis for relief from a state court’s judgment of conviction.” Mitchell, 958 F.3d 23 at 784 (quoting Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 530–31). So, for example, a motion raises a “claim” 24 if it “seeks to add a new ground for relief,” Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532; “attacks the federal 25 court’s previous resolution of a claim on the merits,” id. (emphasis omitted); or tries to 26 “present ‘newly discovered evidence’ in support of a claim previously denied,” id. at 531 27 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2)). But a Rule 60(b) motion 28 that “attacks . . . some defect in the integrity of the federal habeas proceedings” does not 1 assert a “claim” for purposes of this analysis. Id. at 532. 2 Here, the Court must treat the Motion as a successive habeas petition. Though 3 Petitioner characterizes his challenge as targeting “the integrity” of these proceedings, his 4 arguments reveal otherwise. Petitioner claims the Court incorrectly treated SCN340334 5 and SCN333477 as a single case. See Mot. at 2. Even if true (which is doubtful),2 this 6 argument attacks the “[C]ourt’s previous resolution of a claim on the merits.”3 Gonzalez, 7 545 U.S. at 532. Petitioner also purports to present new evidence to support his claim that 8 he is innocent of unemployment benefits fraud. See Mot. at 1, 5–7. Petitioner, however, 9 made this actual innocence argument in his Petition. See Order at 14–16. And he cannot 10 bring new evidence to bolster “a claim previously denied”—even if his underlying factual 11 theory has changed—without contending with AEDPA’s limitations.4 12 Consequently, the Court DENIES the Motion for lack of jurisdiction. District courts 13 “must deny a second or successive motion unless the court of appeals first certifies that the 14 motion relies on a new rule of constitutional law that is retroactively applicable or presents 15 new evidence.” Mitchell, 958 F.3d at 784;5 see also Rishor v. Ferguson, 822 F.3d 482, 490 16 (9th Cir. 2016) (“A petitioner’s failure to seek such authorization from the appropriate 17 18 2 After a thorough review of its prior Order, the Court found no instances in which it considered SCN340334 and SCN333477 as constituting a single case. Nor does Petitioner’s Motion identify any 19 such instances. 20 3 To the extent Petitioner attempts to argue the alleged case mix-up impacted this action procedurally, his 21 point would be moot because the Court addressed the merits of each of the Petition’s claims despite finding several had been procedurally defaulted. See Order at 13–31. 22 4 The Gonzalez Court explained that, even if “a new factual predicate” could be used “to escape 23 § 2244(b)(1)’s prohibition of claims” already presented, the requirements of § 2244(b)(2)(B) (“facts 24 showing a high probability of actual innocence”) and § 2244(b)(3) (precertification by the court of appeals) would still apply. 545 U.S. at 530–32. 25 5 Mitchell addressed AEDPA’s limitations on second or successive petitions brought under 26 28 U.S.C. § 2255, not § 2254. 958 F.3d at 784. However, the Ninth Circuit cited Burton v. Stewart on this point, where the Supreme Court explained that § 2254 is subject to a functionally identical 27 requirement. See 549 U.S. 147, 152–53 (2007) (explaining in a § 2254 case that, “before filing the 28 application in the district court, a prisoner ‘shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order 1 appellate court before filing a second or successive habeas petition acts as a jurisdictional 2 bar.”). “Actual innocence” is not some magical phrase that vaporizes this rule. See 3 Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 530; 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3). And here, the Court sees no indication 4 that Petitioner has acquired the necessary certification from the Ninth Circuit. 5 II. Rule 60(b)(6) 6 Even if the instant Motion could be brought under Rule 60(b)(6), it would still fail. 7 Rule 60(b)(6) is “used sparingly as an equitable remedy to prevent manifest injustice.” 8 Latshaw v. Trainer Wortham & Co., 452 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting United 9 States v. Washington, 394 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir.2005)). A movant seeking relief 10 pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) “must demonstrate ‘extraordinary circumstances which 11 prevented or rendered him unable to prosecute [his case].’” Lal v. California, 12 610 F.3d 518, 524 (9th Cir. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Cmty. Dental Servs. v. 13 Tani, 282 F.3d 1164, 1168 (9th Cir. 2002)). Per the Supreme Court, “[s]uch 14 circumstances . . . rarely occur in the habeas context.” Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 535. 15 Petitioner has not satisfied Rule 60(b)(6)’s extraordinary circumstances requirement. 16 Petitioner’s vague argument regarding the Court’s treatment of SCN340334 and 17 SCN333477 is unconvincing. And in any event, “error by the Court is not” generally “an 18 extraordinary circumstance under Rule 60(b)(6), because it does not prevent a litigant 19 ‘from taking timely action to prevent or correct’ the district court’s judgment.”6 Couture 20 v. Berkebile, No. CV 15-80-M-DLC-JCL, 2017 WL 4767787, at *2 (D. Mont. 21 Sept. 19, 2017) (quoting Greenawalt v. Stewart, 105 F. 3d 1268, 1273 (9th Cir. 1997)), 22 report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 4767671 (D. Mont. Oct. 20, 2017). 23 Petitioner’s innocence claim fairs no better. Petitioner points to a California superior 24 court order entering judgment against him and for the State of California to recover for 25 26 6 A court’s legal error can provide grounds for relief from final judgment under Rule 60(b)(1). Kemp v. United States, 596 U.S. 528, 533–34 (2022). But Rule 60(b)(1) motions “must be made . . . no more than 27 a year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). 28 And here, Petitioner’s Motion was filed on March 26, 2024—nearly eighteen months after the Court 1 “[b]enefit overpayment.” Mot. at 6–7. The order is dated April 25, 2019, and it lists an 2 “Overpayment Establishment Date” of April 21, 2017. See id. Petitioner seems to argue 3 that because these dates fall after his benefits-fraud conviction, he was innocent of said 4 crime when he was charged. See generally Mot. But he does not explain why records from 5 a civil action bear on the facts of his criminal case. Plus, the dates listed on the document 6 strongly indicate Petitioner could have introduced this “evidence” in his original Petition, 7 which he filed in 2021. See Hamilton v. Newland, 374 F.3d 822, 825 (9th Cir. 2004) 8 (affirming denial of Rule 60(b) motion where petitioner “attempt[ed] to have the district 9 court consider evidence that . . . was available when he filed his federal habeas petition,” 10 as “[t]here was no change of circumstances between the time when [he] filed his habeas 11 petition and the time when he filed his 60(b) motion”). 12 In short, Petitioner could not succeed under Rule 60(b)(6) even if the Court had 13 jurisdiction to address the merits of his Motion. 14 CONCLUSION 15 In light of the above, the Court DENIES the Motion (ECF No. 68) for lack of 16 jurisdiction without prejudice to Petitioner filing a second or successive petition if he 17 obtains permission from the Ninth Circuit. The Court also DENIES a certificate of 18 appealability with respect to the denial of the Motion; reasonable jurists would not debate 19 (1) whether the Court lacks jurisdiction over the Motion nor (2) whether the Motion stated 20 a valid claim of a denial of a constitutional right. See United States v. Winkles, 21 795 F.3d 1134, 1143 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Godfrey v. Salmonson, No. CV 20- 22 122-M-DWM, 2020 WL 4896675, at *1 (D. Mont. Aug. 20, 2020) (denying certificate of 23 appealability regarding denial of a Rule 60 motion—that was treated as a second or 24 successive § 2254 petition—“because there is no doubt this Court lacks jurisdiction and 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 || there is no basis to encourage further proceedings at this time” (citing Miller-El v. Cockrell, 2 ||537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003))). 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 ||Dated: August 21, 2024 jae L. Lo memeaite- 5 on. Janis L. Sammartino ‘ United States District Judge

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