(HC) Doe v. Becerra

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: March 3, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-00647
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JOHN DOE, No. 2:25-cv-00647-DJC-DMC 12 Petitioner, 13 v. ORDER GRANTING PRELIMINARY 14 INJUNCTION MOISES BECERRA, et al., 15 Respondents. 16 17 18 Petitioner John Doe is presently in the custody of United States Immigration 19 and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). Removal proceedings have been pending against 20 Petitioner since he first entered the United States on July 26, 2019. Following a 21 determination that Petitioner possessed a credible fear of persecution or torture, an 22 Immigration Judge found that Petitioner did not pose a danger to the community and 23 was not a flight risk, and released Petitioner on bond pending full adjudication of his 24 asylum application. Until recently, Petitioner had remained out of custody on bond for 25 over five years, working as a truck driver and actively participating in his community. 26 However, on January 28, 2025, Petitioner was taken into custody during a standard 27 check-in at the Sacramento ICE office. No neutral decisionmaker has determined that 28 Petitioner is now dangerous or poses a risk of flight, and the Government has taken 1 the position that no such hearing is required. As of the date of this Order, Petitioner 2 remains in the custody of ICE. 3 Petitioner has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Pet. (ECF No. 1)) 4 seeking his release and a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Mot. (ECF No. 2)) 5 that is presently before the Court.1 For the reasons stated below, the Court grants 6 Petitioner’s Motion and orders that within seven days of this order, Petitioner be 7 granted a hearing before an Immigration Judge where the Government bears the 8 burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner poses a danger to 9 the community or a risk of flight. 10 I. Background 11 Petitioner entered the United States on July 26, 2019, after fleeing his home 12 country. (Pet. ¶¶ 24, 35; Opp’n (ECF No. 8) at 2.) At that time, Petitioner was 13 detained. (Id.) Petitioner applied for asylum based on the belief that he was in 14 danger should he return to his country of origin. (Pet. ¶ 35; Opp’n at 2.) In October 15 2019, an Immigration Judge determined that Petitioner had a credible fear of 16 persecution or torture, thereby permitting Petitioner to seek asylum. (Pet. ¶ 35; Opp’n 17 at 2.) Petitioner was subsequently released from custody on bond on November 8, 18 2019, after an Immigration Judge found that Petitioner did not present a danger to 19 the community or risk of flight. (Pet. ¶ 37; Opp’n at 2.) Petitioner remained out of ICE 20 custody for over five years until January 28, 2025, when ICE rearrested Petitioner. 21 (Pet. ¶ 4; Opp’n at 3.) In the intervening five years between his release and rearrest, 22 Petitioner has allegedly been gainfully employed as a truck driver. (Pet. ¶ 83.) He has 23 also been an active member of his religious and political community within the United 24 States. (Id.; Mot. at 28.) Petitioner states that he is “a recognized leader in the Sikh 25 community in California, where he is doing meaningful work and living a constructive 26 life.” (Mot. at 28.)

27 1 As Petitioner is currently housed at the Golden State Annex located in the Eastern District of California, 28 this Court has jurisdiction and venue is proper. See Doe v. Garland, 109 F.4th 1188, 1191–92 (2024). 1 At the time of this Order, over a month after he was originally detained, 2 Petitioner remains in the custody of ICE. In that time, he has not received a hearing 3 before an Immigration Judge to determine whether he now presents a danger to the 4 community or a risk of flight. 5 II. Legal Standard 6 The standards for issuing a temporary restraining order and a preliminary 7 injunction are “substantially similar.” See Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Bush & 8 Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). To obtain preliminary injunctive relief, 9 Plaintiff must show (1) likelihood of success on the merits; (2) likelihood of irreparable 10 harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in his 11 favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. 12 Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).2 13 III. Discussion 14 A. Request for Mandatory Injunction 15 As an initial matter, Respondents contend that Petitioner’s Motion is 16 inappropriate as it seeks to alter the status quo. Injunctions take two forms: 17 mandatory and prohibitive. Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 18 571 F.3d 873, 878–79 (9th Cir. 2009). Prohibitive injunctions are the more common 19 form of preliminary injunction and grant relief that prohibits a party from taking certain 20 actions and “preserves the status quo” of the case. Id. at 878. A mandatory injunction 21 instead “goes well beyond simply maintaining the status quo . . . .” Id. at 879. 22 “Mandatory injunctions are not granted unless extreme or very serious damage will 23 result and are not issued in doubtful cases or where the injury complained of is 24 25

26 2 Alternatively, courts within the Ninth Circuit may consider a request for a temporary restraining order using a “sliding scale” test in which “a stronger showing of one element may offset a weaker showing of 27 another.” All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). Given that Petitioner’s request is arguably for a mandatory injunction (see infra III.A), and is thus subject to a higher 28 standard, the Court declines to use this alternate framework here. 1 capable of compensation in damages.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks 2 omitted). 3 The Court is not fully convinced that the relief it grants here is a mandatory 4 injunction. The “status quo ante litem” does not mean that the status quo is any 5 situation that precedes a lawsuit. Instead, “[t]he status quo is the last uncontested 6 status which preceded the pending controversy.” Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd. v. Avis, 7 Inc., 316 F.2d 804, 809 (9th Cir. 1963) (quoting Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Free 8 Sewing Mach. Co., 256 F.2d 806, 808 (7 Cir. 1958)). Petitioner had remained out of 9 custody for over five years until his bond was suddenly revoked. It is questionable 10 whether that status quo is properly considered to be detention when the Government 11 suddenly took an allegedly unconstitutional action in rearresting Petitioner without a 12 hearing. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has expressed some uncertainty about whether a 13 preliminary injunction in similar circumstances would constitute a mandatory 14 injunction. Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 998–99 (9th Cir. 2017). However, as 15 the Ninth Circuit did there, the Court here ultimately has no need to reach that issue. 16 Instead, the Court assumes without deciding that the injunctive relief requested does 17 constitute a mandatory injunction. 18 While mandatory injunctions are subject to a higher standard, that standard is 19 met here. An alleged violation of Petitioner’s due process rights and his continued 20 unlawful detention in violation of those rights constitutes extreme or very serious 21 damage that will result in the absence of an injunction. Id. at 999. Additionally, as 22 discussed in the following section, the result does not appear to be doubtful either; 23 due process clearly requires that Petitioner be given a hearing before his bond is 24 revoked. Id. This is also not an injury capable of monetary compensation. 25 Accordingly, injunctive relief is appropriate even under the higher standard for 26 mandatory injunctions. Moreover, while it may typically be inappropriate to grant 27 relief via preliminary injunction that constitutes most or all of the final relief sought, 28 1 there is no mechanism to “temporarily” halt the deprivation of Petitioner’s due process 2 rights while the parties litigate the full merits of Petitioner’s habeas petition. 3 The Court will also convert Petitioner’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order 4 into one for preliminary injunction. Respondents had notice, opportunity to respond, 5 and the ability to be heard. There is no benefit in additional briefing and the standard 6 is the same. As such, given the nature of the relief granted by this Order and so as to 7 appropriately permit Respondents the ability to appeal should they choose to do so, 8 the Court converts this to a Motion for Preliminary Injunction. See Bennett v. 9 Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 804 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Ordinarily, temporary restraining 10 orders, in contrast to preliminary injunctions, are not appealable . . . .”). 11 B. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 12 The first Winter factor, the likelihood of success on the merits, “is a threshold 13 inquiry and is the most important factor in any motion for preliminary injunction.” 14 Baird v. Bonta, 81 F.4th 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2023) (cleaned up). This is especially true 15 where, as here, the moving party alleges a constitutional violation and injury. Id. 16 Petitioner has established a likelihood of success on the merits based on the violation 17 of his due process rights. 18 The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause prohibits government deprivation of 19 an individual’s life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Hernandez, 872 20 F.3d at 990. While noncitizens located outside the country are not granted the full 21 protections of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause applies to all “persons” within 22 the borders of the United States, regardless of immigration status. Zadvydas v. Davis, 23 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (“[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all “persons” within the 24 United States, including noncitizens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, 25 temporary, or permanent.”). These due process rights extend to immigration 26 proceedings, including final deportation orders. Id. at 693–94; see Demore v. Kim, 27 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (Recognizing that Fifth Amendment due process protections 28 1 extend to deportation proceedings but noting that “detention during deportation 2 proceedings [is] a constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation process.”). 3 Petitioner is a noncitizen who has been present inside the United States for over 4 five years. As a person inside the United States, Petitioner is entitled to the 5 protections of the Due Process Clause. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693. The Court 6 must first consider whether Petitioner has a liberty interest in light of Petitioner’s prior 7 release on bond and the command of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) that noncitizens 8 petitioning for asylum are subject to mandatory detention. If Petitioner possesses a 9 cognizable liberty interest, the Court must evaluate what procedure is due under the 10 framework provided by Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 11 1. Liberty Interest 12 Petitioner concedes that under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) of the Immigration 13 and Naturalization Act (“INA”), he is subject to mandatory detention pending a 14 determination of his asylum claim. Respondents appear to assert that in light of this 15 mandatory detention, Petitioner has no right to release and that his continued 16 detention is thus permissible. 17 To begin, the Court notes that the Ninth Circuit has raised significant questions 18 about the constitutionality of section 1225(b). In Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 19 (2018), the Supreme Court held that the canon of constitutional avoidance had been 20 misapplied to read a right to periodic bond hearings into several sections of INA, 21 including section 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). The Court did not reach the issue of the 22 constitutionality of those sections of the INA and remanded to the Ninth Circuit to 23 consider that issue. Id. at 312. On remand, the Ninth Circuit further remanded to the 24 trial court but, in doing so, indicated it had serious ongoing concerns about the 25 constitutionality of these provisions: 26 We have grave doubts that any statute that allows for arbitrary prolonged detention without any process is 27 constitutional or that those who founded our democracy 28 precisely to protect against the government’s arbitrary 1 deprivation of liberty would have thought so. Arbitrary civil detention is not a feature of our American government. 2 Liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial 3 is the carefully limited exception. 4 Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252, 256–57 (9th Cir. 2018). 5 The District Court for the Western District of Washington has directly 6 considered the constitutionality of section 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) on several occasions in the 7 Padilla case and, in doing so, repeatedly expressed serious doubts about the 8 constitutionality of that section.3 Most recently, Judge Pechman determined that 9 asylum seekers have a right to bond hearings, concluding that “Due Process protects 10 against immigration decisions detention that is not reasonably related to the 11 legitimate purpose of effectuating removal or protecting against danger and flight 12 risk.” ICE v. Padilla, 704 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2023) (citing Zadvydas, 13 533 U.S. at 690–94). In concluding that noncitizens who had expressed a credible fear 14 were eligible for bond notwithstanding section 1225(b), the district court 15 distinguished Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), in which the Supreme Court 16 rejected a due process challenge to mandatory detention of noncitizens who had 17 committed certain crimes, including aggravated felonies. Judge Pechman concluded 18 that, compared to the class of noncitizens at issue in Demore for which “the 19 voluminous Congressional record . . . justified denying bail given the substantial rate 20 at which such individuals either reoffended or absconded,” there were “no similar 21 public safety concerns or flight risk that might apply to those, like Plaintiffs, with bona 22 fide asylum claims and who desire to remain in the United States.” Padilla, 704 F. 23 Supp. 3d at 1173 (citing Demore, 538 U.S. at 518–20). The district court also relied on 24 25 3 In 2019, the court issued a modified preliminary injunction concluding that asylum seekers were constitutionally entitled to a bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker. Padilla v. ICE, 387 F. Supp. 26 3d 1219, 1232 (W.D. Wash. 2019), aff’d, 953 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2020). The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the decision, and remanded the matter to the Ninth Circuit for further consideration 27 in light of Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020). ICE v. Padilla, 141 S.Ct. 1041 (2021). 28 1 information before it that the length of detention for asylum seekers was much longer 2 than that at issue in Demore. Padilla, 704 F. Supp. 3d at 1173. More directly, Judge 3 Pechman also found that asylum seekers had adequately alleged a due process claim 4 given that they had a liberty interest in freedom from confinement and there were not 5 adequate procedures in place to test the legitimate need for continued detention. Id. 6 at 1174. 7 Many of the due process issues underlying the district court’s decision in Padilla 8 apply with even greater force to Petitioner. Whatever concerns for public safety or 9 flight risk that might exist for a class of individuals seeking asylum who have been 10 determined to have a credible fear, that risk is reduced further in the specific case of 11 Petitioner. Significantly, an Immigration Judge has already determined that Petitioner 12 is not a danger to the community or likely to flee. That determination has largely 13 borne out: while Petitioner was arrested for violating California Vehicle Code section 14 10851(a) for taking a Semi Trailer without the consent of his employer, those charges 15 were dismissed after Petitioner successfully completed a diversion program, and 16 Petitioner has consistently made his scheduled status conferences with the 17 Immigration Judge with only one exception where he was hospitalized at the time of 18 the hearing. Additionally, Petitioner was also the subject of an INTERPOL “Red 19 Notice” received by ICE in 2023 but many sources, including Congress, have noted 20 serious reliability issues with Red Notices. See 22 U.S.C. § 263b(a) (“It is the sense of 21 Congress that some INTERPOL member countries have repeatedly misused 22 INTERPOL's databases and processes, including Notice and Diffusion mechanisms, to 23 conduct activities of an overtly political or other unlawful character and in violation of 24 international human rights standards, including by making requests to harass or 25 persecute political opponents, human rights defenders, or journalists.”). While the 26 government must be provided an opportunity to show that Petitioner is a danger to 27 the community or likely to flee, the record here demonstrates that the concerns of 28 1 Congress in enacting section 1125(b) do not justify Petitioner’s indefinite detention in 2 his particular case without appropriate procedures to protect his liberty interest. 3 Moreover, the actions of the Government in allowing Petitioner to remain in the 4 community for over five years strengthen Petitioner’s liberty interest. Governmental 5 actions may create a liberty interest entitled to the protections of the Due Process 6 Clause. See Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 371 (1987). The Supreme Court has 7 repeatedly recognized that individuals who have been released from custody, even 8 where such release is conditional, have a liberty interest in their continued liberty. See 9 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (finding a parolee had an interest in his 10 continued liberty); Young v. Harper, 520 U.S. 143, 150 (1997) (applying Morrissey to 11 pre-parole); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (finding probationers have 12 a liberty interest). Petitioner, having been released at a bond hearing over five years 13 ago, has a similar liberty interest. See Jorge M.F. v. Wilkinson, No. 21-cv-01434-JST, 14 2021 WL 783561, at *3 (N.D. Cal. March 1, 2021) (holding that a Mexican citizen with 15 pending removal proceedings who had been released on bond had “a substantial 16 private interest in remaining on bond.” (internal citation and quotation removed)); see 17 also Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 18 Accordingly, Petitioner has established a strong likelihood of success in 19 showing that he has an interest in his continued liberty and that mandatory detention 20 under section 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) would violate his due process rights unless he is 21 afforded adequate process. 22 2. Procedural Due Process 23 To determine what process is due, the Court considers three factors: (1) “the 24 private interest that will be affected by the official action[,]” (2) “the risk of an 25 erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the 26 probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards[,]” and (3) 27 “the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 28 administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would 1 entail.” Mathews 424 U.S. at 335. Applying the three factors as described in Mathews 2 v. Eldridge, the Court concludes a hearing before an Immigration Judge is required to 3 continue to detain Petitioner. 4 It cannot be gainsaid that Petitioner has a substantial private interest in 5 maintaining his out-of-custody status. Freedom from imprisonment is at the core of 6 the Due Process Clause. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. Petitioner has remained out of 7 custody on bond for over five years. During that time, he appears to have been 8 gainfully employed as a truck driver and been an active member of his community. 9 (Pet. ¶¶ 82–83.) The lengthy duration of his conditional release as well as the 10 meaningful connections Petitioner seems to have made with his community during 11 that time create a powerful interest for Petitioner in his continued liberty. 12 The risk of erroneous deprivation is also considerable in this case. Petitioner 13 was previously released on bond after it was determined he was not a danger to the 14 community or a flight risk. While Respondents argue that there has been a change in 15 circumstances, many if not all of these changes seem to substantially predate 16 Petitioner’s present detention and may have been known by ICE and the Immigration 17 Court for some time. (See Opp’n at 2–3; see also Mot. at 7.) The Immigration Court 18 may ultimately determine that Petitioner now presents a danger to the community or 19 risk of flight, and the Court expressly makes no finding as to whether or not detention 20 is warranted under that standard and expresses no opinion on that issue. However, 21 given that Petitioner was previously found to not be a danger or risk of flight and the 22 unresolved questions about the timing and reliability of the new information, the risk 23 of erroneous deprivation remains high. Moreover, the value in granting Petitioner 24 procedural safeguard is readily apparent. At a hearing, a neutral decisionmaker can 25 consider all of the facts and evidence before him to determine whether Petitioner in 26 fact presents a risk of flight or dangerousness. The reliability and significance of the 27 alleged changes in circumstance that Respondents identify can be weighed and 28 Petitioner’s liberty interests can be protected. 1 The final Mathews factor is simple as the Government’s interest in placing 2 Petitioner in detention without a hearing is low. Ortega, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 970; see 3 Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 994. The effort and cost required to provide Petitioner with 4 procedural safeguards is minimal and indeed was previously provided in his case. 5 Such safeguards were also provided to many others under the formerly applicable 6 decision of In re X-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 731 (B.I.A. 2005). Any additional burden does 7 not outweigh Petitioner’s substantial liberty interests and the risk of erroneous 8 deprivation. 9 * * * * 10 Having found Petitioner has a liberty interest and determined, via the Mathews 11 factors, that due process requires Petitioner receive a hearing to determine whether 12 detention is warranted, the Court finds that Petitioner has established a likelihood of 13 success on the merits.4 14 C. Irreparable Harm 15 Petitioner will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary injunctive 16 relief. “It is well established that the deprivation of constitutional rights 17 ‘unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 18 1002 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). Despite 19 Petitioner previously remaining out of custody for many years prior to his rearrest, he 20 is now in ICE custody and has not been afforded the opportunity to be heard by a 21 neutral decisionmaker on whether detention is warranted. Absent such review, it 22 appears that Petitioner will indefinitely remain in custody until final adjudication is

23 4 At oral argument, Respondents placed emphasis on the argument found in the Opposition that 24 Petitioner should be required to seek a bond hearing before seeking relief from this Court. Parties were permitted to file supplemental authority on this issue. Having considered the Parties’ argument 25 and authority the Court is not persuaded by Respondents’ argument. All parties have agreed that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) applies mandatory detention to Petitioner. Forcing Petitioner to first seek 26 bond review when it is clear this request will be denied based on the Attorney General’s decision in Matter of M-S- does not serve any purpose besides keeping Petitioner in custody for a longer period 27 without due process. See Hernandez, 872 F.3d 988 (describing situations where prudential exhaustion may be required before a habeas petition may be filed). As the Government concedes (ECF No. 15), 28 any exhaustion requirement is prudential in nature, and the Court declines to impose one in this case. 1 reached on his asylum application. This violation of Petitioner’s due process rights is 2 sufficient to satisfy the irreparable harm requirement. 3 D. Balance of the Equities and Public Interest 4 The final two Winter factors merge when the government is the nonmoving 5 party. Baird, 81 F.4th at 1040. Public interest concerns are always implicated as “it is 6 always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party's constitutional rights.” 7 Melendres, 695 F.3d at 1002 (internal quotations and citations omitted). “The 8 government also cannot reasonably assert that it is harmed in any legally cognizable 9 sense by being enjoined from constitutional violations.” Baird, 81 F.4th at 1042 10 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Given that this Court has found that 11 Petitioner has a strong likelihood of success on the merits based on his constitutional 12 claims and the Government’s inability to assert any harm, the balance of equities and 13 public interest weighs in Petitioner’s favor. 14 IV. Procedural Issues 15 A. Proper Respondent 16 Where an individual brings a “core” habeas petition challenging present 17 physical confinement, the immediate custodian rule states that the proper respondent 18 is the immediate custodian. Doe, 109 F.4th at 1197. This rule applies to immigrant 19 detainees who must also name their immediate custodian. Id. Here, Petitioner’s 20 immediate custodian is the Facility Administrator of the Golden State Annex, see id., 21 who has been properly named in this action. Should Respondents seek to dismiss the 22 remainder of the Respondents from this action, they should do so pursuant to a 23 properly noticed motion. 24 B. Request to Seal and Proceed under Pseudonym 25 The Court grants Petitioner’s request to proceed under a pseudonym and seal 26 all documents containing his name. “The normal presumption in litigation is that 27 parties must use their real names.” Doe v. Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi 28 Bishop Est., 596 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a) (“[t]he 1 title of the complaint must name all the parties”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a)(1) (“An action 2 must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.”). However, it is common 3 for courts to permit parties to proceed under a pseudonym where there is a threat that 4 an individual will suffer retaliation from third parties. See Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced 5 Textile, 214 F.3d 1058, 1067 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[T]his court and others have concealed 6 parties' identities in order to protect them from retaliation by third parties and also to 7 protect nonparties from reprisals.”). Petitioner has presented evidence of both the 8 severity of the threatened harm and the reasonableness of his fears. Given Petitioner 9 is still at risk of removal should his asylum application be denied, he is also acutely 10 vulnerable to retaliation. There is no prejudice to Respondents here — Petitioner’s 11 identity is fully known to the Court and Respondents — and the public interest in 12 knowing Petitioner’s identity is minimal and outweighed by Petitioner’s need for 13 anonymity. The public’s interest is not best served by knowing Petitioner’s identity. 14 Accordingly, Petitioner’s request to proceed under a pseudonym is granted and all 15 documents containing Petitioner’s name shall be sealed. See id. at 1068–69 (stating 16 the standard for permitting a party to proceed under pseudonym to shield them from 17 retaliation). The Court grants Petitioner’s request to seal documents containing 18 Petitioner’s name on this same basis. 19 Additionally, any information related to Petitioner’s asylum application shall be 20 filed under seal due to its potential to identify Petitioner and the sensitive nature of the 21 allegations. While there is a strong presumption in favor of access to public records, 22 for the same reasons stated above, Petitioner has articulated compelling reasons that 23 outweigh the general history of access and the public policies favoring disclosure. 24 Kamakana v. City & County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178–79 (9th Cir. 2006). All 25 past filings containing such information shall be sealed and all future filings containing 26 27 28 1 such information shall be filed using the process described in the Court’s standing 2 order.5 3 C. Referral of this Matter to a Magistrate Judge 4 In their Opposition, Respondents suggest that Petitioner seeks to “by-pass the 5 Magistrate Judge deliberative process of routine processing of similar matters” and in 6 concluding their Opposition state that “this district court properly must order the 7 matter calendared before a Magistrate Judge for further proceedings on the 8 underlying petition.” While habeas matters in this district are generally referred to a 9 Magistrate Judge, see Local Rule 302(c)(17), the decision of whether to refer a matter 10 or withdraw the reference is expressly at the discretion of the District Judge assigned 11 to the action. See Local Rule 302(d) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of this 12 Rule, a Judge may retain any matter otherwise routinely referred to a Magistrate 13 Judge.”). Moreover, while not memorialized in the Local Rules, it has been the 14 practice in this District that when a party seeks a temporary restraining order at the 15 opening of a case, that motion and related matters are handled by the assigned 16 District Judge. This is because the objection period necessitated by the issuance of 17 findings and recommendations would substantially hinder a party’s ability to obtain a 18 temporary restraining order where, as here, preliminary injunctive relief is warranted. 19 Petitioner’s Motion is properly before this Court. 20 V. Conclusion 21 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion 22 for Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 2) is converted to a Motion for Preliminary 23 Injunction and GRANTED. The Court finds that Petitioner is entitled to a hearing 24 before an Immigration Judge to determine whether his detention is warranted. At this 25

26 5 The Court notes that in opposing this request, Respondents erroneously stated that this matter is under seal pursuant to Local Rule 141. This is incorrect. This matter is not under seal and Local Rule 27 141 does not provide for automatic sealing of immigration actions. As noted by Petitioner, access to civil immigration cases such as this one is restricted, but documents are still viewable by the public via 28 public terminals. 1 | hearing, the Government shall bear the burden of establishing, by clear and 2 | convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a danger to the community or a risk of 3 | flight. Respondents are ordered to provide Petitioner with such a hearing on or 4 | before March 10, 2025, if no hearing occurs by this time, Petitioner shall be released 5 | from Respondents’ custody. 6 j IT IS SO ORDERED. | Dated: _March 3, 2025 “Daal A Hon. Daniel alabretta ? UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

4K