1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 JOHN DOE, No. 2:25-cv-00647-DJC-DMC 12 Petitioner, 13 v. ORDER
14 MOISES BECERRA, et al.,
15 Respondents. 16 17 Petitioner John Doe is an asylum seeker presently in the custody of United 18 States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). Petitioner had been out on 19 bond for over five years before he was taken into custody on January 28, 2025. This 20 Court previously found that Petitioner was entitled to a bond hearing before an 21 Immigration Judge to determine whether his detention was warranted and ordered 22 that Respondents provide such a hearing on or before March 10, 2025, or release 23 Petitioner from their custody. (Order (ECF No. 19).) Petitioner has now filed a Motion 24 to Enforce Preliminary Injunction Order in which he argues that while Respondents 25 provided Petitioner with a bond hearing on March 10, 2025, Respondents failed to 26 comply with the Court’s Order as the hearing did not comport with the requirements 27 of due process. (Mot. (ECF No. 23).) 28 //// 1 For the reasons stated below, the Court denies Petitioner’s Motion. 2 Respondents’ Motions to Strike and Dismiss, raised in their Opposition, are also 3 denied as non-compliant with the Local Rules. 5 The Court previously summarized the events that preceded the Court’s prior 6 Order. (See Order at 2–3.) Since the issuance of the Court’s Order, Petitioner was 7 brought before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) for a bond hearing on March 10, 2025. 8 (Mot. at 2; Opp’n (ECF No. 31) at 2.) At that hearing, the IJ found that the Government 9 had met its burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner 10 presented a danger to the community and a risk of flight. (Mot at 2; Opp’n at 3; see 11 ECF No. 31-1 at 12:19–13:2.) The IJ issued an oral ruling to that effect and entered a 12 brief order denying Petitioner’s request for release on bond. (Mot. at 2.) On April 3, 13 2024, Petitioner filed both an appeal of the IJ’s decision before the Board of 14 Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) and the Motion presently before this Court. (Mot at 9; 15 Opp’n at 3.) Subsequently, on April 8, 2025, the IJ issued a long form “Bond 16 Memorandum” which described, in detail, the legal and factual basis for the IJ’s 17 decision. (See Bond Mem. (ECF No. 31-1 at 30–38).) 18 The parties have fully briefed Petitioner’s Motion (see Mot.; Opp’n; Reply (ECF 19 No. 33)) and the Court heard argument from the parties on April 22, 2025, at which 20 time the Court ordered additional, optional briefing from the parties. (ECF No. 38.) 21 Both parties filed additional briefing on Monday, April 28, 2025, at which time 22 Petitioner’s Motion was submitted. (ECF Nos. 39, 40.) Within their Opposition, 23 Respondents also moved to strike “unlawfully named officials” in the Petition as well as 24 to dismiss the Petition outright. (See Opp’n at 1 n.1, 8–9.) 26 I. Petitioner’s Motion to Enforce Order 27 Petitioner argues that his March 10, 2025, bond hearing did not satisfy the 28 requirements of due process as the Government failed to establish by clear and 1 convincing evidence that Petitioner posed a danger to the community or risk of flight 2 and because the IJ’s various evidentiary decisions violated Petitioner’s due process 3 rights. Petitioner argues that Respondents thus violated this Court’s Order as the 4 bond hearing that Petitioner received did not comport with due process. 5 This Court has clear authority to ensure that the Government acts in accordance 6 with its orders granting relief in habeas actions. See Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 7 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he district court ha[s] authority to review compliance 8 with its earlier order conditionally granting habeas relief.”). As such, the Court first 9 considers whether Respondents complied with the Court’s Order. At the conclusion 10 of the Court’s prior Order, the Court ordered the following:
11 The Court finds that Petitioner is entitled to a hearing before an Immigration Judge to determine whether his 12 detention is warranted. At this hearing, the Government 13 shall bear the burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a danger to the 14 community or a risk of flight. Respondents are ordered to provide Petitioner with such a hearing on or before March 15 10, 2025, if no hearing occurs by this time, Petitioner shall 16 be released from Respondents’ custody. 17 (Order at 14–15.) Stated succinctly, the Court ordered that by March 10, 2025, 18 Respondents provide Petitioner with a hearing before an IJ where the Government 19 had the burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner 20 posed a danger to the community or a risk of flight. This is precisely the relief 21 requested by Petitioner in his Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. (ECF No. 2.) 22 In their Notice of Motion, Petitioner stated the claim for relief as follows: “Petitioner 23 hereby moves this Court for an order enjoining Defendants . . . to release Petitioner- 24 Plaintiff John Doe (Mr. Doe) until he is afforded a hearing, as required by the Due 25 Process clause of the Fifth Amendment, to determine whether circumstances have 26 materially changed such that Petitioner’s re-incarceration would be justified because 27 there is clear and convincing evidence establishing that he is a danger to the 28 community or a flight risk.” (Id. at i.) In resolving that Motion, the Court had no 1 occasion to determine the precise scope of the hearing that would be required to 2 conform with due process, other than to note the standard of clear and convincing 3 evidence. 4 Reviewing the record before the Court, Respondents complied with the Court’s 5 Order. Petitioner received a bond hearing within the time prescribed by the Court in 6 which the IJ identified the appropriate standard and burden of proof that applied and 7 rendered a determination as to Petitioner’s danger to the community and risk of flight. 8 The IJ later issued a memorandum again identifying the correct standard and burden 9 and described, in detail, the basis for the IJ’s decision. The hearing afforded 10 Petitioner thus satisfies the Court’s prior Order. 11 Petitioner’s Motion challenges the adequacy of the bond hearing on the basis 12 that the Government did not meet its burden and the IJ had committed errors during 13 the hearing that violated due process, such as not permitting Petitioner and his 14 experts to testify. (See Mot.) The arguments raised in Petitioner’s Motion extend well 15 beyond the scope of the original Habeas Petition and this Court’s Order. It is far from 16 apparent that the hearing violated Petitioner’s due process rights. Many of the cases 17 Petitioner cites to support his claims that his due process rights were violated come 18 from different hearings, such as during Removal proceedings, where the balancing of 19 due process factors may be different. (See e.g., Reply at 6, 9.) At oral argument, 20 Petitioner’s Counsel himself noted the dearth of cases discussing what due process is 21 required at the bond stage. As such, it is unclear that the alleged due process failures 22 Petitioner alleged were in fact violations of due process. 23 Petitioner may ultimately be correct that the bond hearing he was afforded did 24 not comport with due process. However, the Court’s review here concerns whether 25 the Government complied with the Court’s Order and provided Petitioner with a bond 26 hearing. As Petitioner was provided with a bond hearing where the IJ stated and 27 seemed to apply the appropriate burden of proof and standard, the Government 28 complied with the Order. While a proceeding could fall so far below what comports 1 with due process as to not constitute a “hearing” under the Court’s Order, that did not 2 happen here.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 JOHN DOE, No. 2:25-cv-00647-DJC-DMC 12 Petitioner, 13 v. ORDER
14 MOISES BECERRA, et al.,
15 Respondents. 16 17 Petitioner John Doe is an asylum seeker presently in the custody of United 18 States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). Petitioner had been out on 19 bond for over five years before he was taken into custody on January 28, 2025. This 20 Court previously found that Petitioner was entitled to a bond hearing before an 21 Immigration Judge to determine whether his detention was warranted and ordered 22 that Respondents provide such a hearing on or before March 10, 2025, or release 23 Petitioner from their custody. (Order (ECF No. 19).) Petitioner has now filed a Motion 24 to Enforce Preliminary Injunction Order in which he argues that while Respondents 25 provided Petitioner with a bond hearing on March 10, 2025, Respondents failed to 26 comply with the Court’s Order as the hearing did not comport with the requirements 27 of due process. (Mot. (ECF No. 23).) 28 //// 1 For the reasons stated below, the Court denies Petitioner’s Motion. 2 Respondents’ Motions to Strike and Dismiss, raised in their Opposition, are also 3 denied as non-compliant with the Local Rules. 5 The Court previously summarized the events that preceded the Court’s prior 6 Order. (See Order at 2–3.) Since the issuance of the Court’s Order, Petitioner was 7 brought before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) for a bond hearing on March 10, 2025. 8 (Mot. at 2; Opp’n (ECF No. 31) at 2.) At that hearing, the IJ found that the Government 9 had met its burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner 10 presented a danger to the community and a risk of flight. (Mot at 2; Opp’n at 3; see 11 ECF No. 31-1 at 12:19–13:2.) The IJ issued an oral ruling to that effect and entered a 12 brief order denying Petitioner’s request for release on bond. (Mot. at 2.) On April 3, 13 2024, Petitioner filed both an appeal of the IJ’s decision before the Board of 14 Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) and the Motion presently before this Court. (Mot at 9; 15 Opp’n at 3.) Subsequently, on April 8, 2025, the IJ issued a long form “Bond 16 Memorandum” which described, in detail, the legal and factual basis for the IJ’s 17 decision. (See Bond Mem. (ECF No. 31-1 at 30–38).) 18 The parties have fully briefed Petitioner’s Motion (see Mot.; Opp’n; Reply (ECF 19 No. 33)) and the Court heard argument from the parties on April 22, 2025, at which 20 time the Court ordered additional, optional briefing from the parties. (ECF No. 38.) 21 Both parties filed additional briefing on Monday, April 28, 2025, at which time 22 Petitioner’s Motion was submitted. (ECF Nos. 39, 40.) Within their Opposition, 23 Respondents also moved to strike “unlawfully named officials” in the Petition as well as 24 to dismiss the Petition outright. (See Opp’n at 1 n.1, 8–9.) 26 I. Petitioner’s Motion to Enforce Order 27 Petitioner argues that his March 10, 2025, bond hearing did not satisfy the 28 requirements of due process as the Government failed to establish by clear and 1 convincing evidence that Petitioner posed a danger to the community or risk of flight 2 and because the IJ’s various evidentiary decisions violated Petitioner’s due process 3 rights. Petitioner argues that Respondents thus violated this Court’s Order as the 4 bond hearing that Petitioner received did not comport with due process. 5 This Court has clear authority to ensure that the Government acts in accordance 6 with its orders granting relief in habeas actions. See Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 7 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he district court ha[s] authority to review compliance 8 with its earlier order conditionally granting habeas relief.”). As such, the Court first 9 considers whether Respondents complied with the Court’s Order. At the conclusion 10 of the Court’s prior Order, the Court ordered the following:
11 The Court finds that Petitioner is entitled to a hearing before an Immigration Judge to determine whether his 12 detention is warranted. At this hearing, the Government 13 shall bear the burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a danger to the 14 community or a risk of flight. Respondents are ordered to provide Petitioner with such a hearing on or before March 15 10, 2025, if no hearing occurs by this time, Petitioner shall 16 be released from Respondents’ custody. 17 (Order at 14–15.) Stated succinctly, the Court ordered that by March 10, 2025, 18 Respondents provide Petitioner with a hearing before an IJ where the Government 19 had the burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner 20 posed a danger to the community or a risk of flight. This is precisely the relief 21 requested by Petitioner in his Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. (ECF No. 2.) 22 In their Notice of Motion, Petitioner stated the claim for relief as follows: “Petitioner 23 hereby moves this Court for an order enjoining Defendants . . . to release Petitioner- 24 Plaintiff John Doe (Mr. Doe) until he is afforded a hearing, as required by the Due 25 Process clause of the Fifth Amendment, to determine whether circumstances have 26 materially changed such that Petitioner’s re-incarceration would be justified because 27 there is clear and convincing evidence establishing that he is a danger to the 28 community or a flight risk.” (Id. at i.) In resolving that Motion, the Court had no 1 occasion to determine the precise scope of the hearing that would be required to 2 conform with due process, other than to note the standard of clear and convincing 3 evidence. 4 Reviewing the record before the Court, Respondents complied with the Court’s 5 Order. Petitioner received a bond hearing within the time prescribed by the Court in 6 which the IJ identified the appropriate standard and burden of proof that applied and 7 rendered a determination as to Petitioner’s danger to the community and risk of flight. 8 The IJ later issued a memorandum again identifying the correct standard and burden 9 and described, in detail, the basis for the IJ’s decision. The hearing afforded 10 Petitioner thus satisfies the Court’s prior Order. 11 Petitioner’s Motion challenges the adequacy of the bond hearing on the basis 12 that the Government did not meet its burden and the IJ had committed errors during 13 the hearing that violated due process, such as not permitting Petitioner and his 14 experts to testify. (See Mot.) The arguments raised in Petitioner’s Motion extend well 15 beyond the scope of the original Habeas Petition and this Court’s Order. It is far from 16 apparent that the hearing violated Petitioner’s due process rights. Many of the cases 17 Petitioner cites to support his claims that his due process rights were violated come 18 from different hearings, such as during Removal proceedings, where the balancing of 19 due process factors may be different. (See e.g., Reply at 6, 9.) At oral argument, 20 Petitioner’s Counsel himself noted the dearth of cases discussing what due process is 21 required at the bond stage. As such, it is unclear that the alleged due process failures 22 Petitioner alleged were in fact violations of due process. 23 Petitioner may ultimately be correct that the bond hearing he was afforded did 24 not comport with due process. However, the Court’s review here concerns whether 25 the Government complied with the Court’s Order and provided Petitioner with a bond 26 hearing. As Petitioner was provided with a bond hearing where the IJ stated and 27 seemed to apply the appropriate burden of proof and standard, the Government 28 complied with the Order. While a proceeding could fall so far below what comports 1 with due process as to not constitute a “hearing” under the Court’s Order, that did not 2 happen here. As such, Petitioner’s Motion to Enforce Preliminary Injunction — brought 3 on the basis that the bond hearing provided did not comply with the Court’s Order — 4 must be denied. 5 Petitioner heavily cites two Northern District of California cases, Ramos v. 6 Sessions, 293 F. Supp. 3d 1021 (N.D. Cal. 2018) and Sales v. Johnson, No.16-cv- 7 01745-EDL, 2017 WL 6855827 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2017), to support his contention 8 that it would be appropriate for the Court to grant the relief requested in his Motion. 9 In both cases, the district court granted motions to enforce the court’s prior order. 10 However, these cases present substantially different factual scenarios that render them 11 unhelpful and inapplicable here. 12 In Ramos, the petitioner first sought habeas review and a temporary restraining 13 order after the petitioner received a bond hearing before an IJ. Ramos, 293 F. Supp. 14 3d at 1024. The petitioner argued that the hearing he had been provided violated 15 due process because “[the IJ] failed to hold the government to its burden to show by 16 clear and convincing evidence that [the petitioner was a flight risk or a danger to 17 society.” Id. The court granted in part the habeas petition on this basis and ordered 18 that the Government release the petitioner or provide them with a new bond hearing 19 that complied with due process. Id.; see Ramos v. Sessions, No. 18-cv-00413-JST, 20 2018 WL 905922, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2018) (ordering that the Government was 21 enjoined from detaining the petitioner “unless they hold a bond hearing which 22 comports with due process, where the Government shows by clear and convincing 23 evidence that she is a flight risk or danger to the community”). After a second bond 24 hearing was conducted, the petitioner returned to the district court and argued that 25 the second hearing was still not compliant with due process and thus violated the 26 court’s order. The court ultimately agreed and found that the IJ had committed clear 27 error in finding that the Government had met its burden. Ramos, 293 F. Supp. 3d at 28 1037–38. 1 Ramos presents a notably different scenario to the present action. The 2 petitioner in Ramos had already received a bond hearing before seeking habeas 3 review and the central question presented in the habeas petition and motion for 4 temporary restraining order was whether that hearing satisfied due process. Ramos, 5 2018 WL 905922, at *2. The original order issued by the court in Ramos considered, 6 in detail, the adequacy of the first bond hearing including the evidence presented and 7 the stated bases for the IJ’s decision. Id. at *4–5. The court found it did not and 8 ordered a second hearing that complied with due process. Id. at *6. Thus, the 9 question of whether the substance of the second hearing complied with due process 10 was effectively the same question as whether that hearing complied with the court’s 11 order. 12 Like Ramos, Sales v. Sessions also concerns a case where the petitioner had 13 already been afforded a bond hearing but had challenged the adequacy of that bond 14 hearing. When the IJ conducted a new hearing after the district court had found the 15 prior hearing to be deficient, the IJ found that they lacked jurisdiction to release the 16 petitioner and denied release. Sales, 2017 WL 6855827, at *1–2. Just as in Ramos, 17 the district court in Sales ultimately issued an order to enforce its original order, 18 finding that the failure to provide a bond hearing violated the court’s order. Id. at *5– 19 7. However, also as with Ramos, this is not informative for the present case. 20 Unlike Ramos and Sales, the Petitioner in this case sought habeas review 21 because his due process rights were allegedly violated when the Government failed 22 to provide Petitioner with any bond hearing before he was taken into custody. The 23 Court agreed and ordered that Petitioner be provided with a bond hearing before an 24 IJ and simply stated the appropriate evidentiary burden. Thus, this Court’s initial 25 order had nothing to do with the content or adequacy of a bond hearing. 26 This case is thus akin to Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2011). 27 While there are some differences between this case and Leonardo, the core facts are 28 extremely similar. In Leonardo, the district court ordered a bond hearing based on 1 prolonged detention. Id. at 1159. After that hearing was held, the petitioner returned 2 to the district court seeking to contest the adequacy of the hearing under due 3 process. Id. The district court determined that the respondents had complied with its 4 order by providing a bond hearing before an IJ and did not address new arguments 5 that were raised in the petitioner’s subsequent motion. Id. The Ninth Circuit affirmed 6 that decision stating “[t]he district court was under no obligation to address 7 Leonardo's new arguments under the ambit of ensuring compliance with the earlier 8 order.” Id. at 1161. 9 Just as in Leonardo, Petitioner’s Motion to Enforce thus seeks different relief 10 well beyond what was briefed and ordered previously. Petitioner may challenge the 11 adequacy under due process of the hearing and whether the IJ’s finding that the 12 Government had met its burden was in error. However, such a challenge is not 13 properly brought as a motion to enforce the Court’s prior Order. Subsequent 14 challenges to the sufficiency of the IJ’s determination constitute a new and separate 15 basis for relief which must be brought in a habeas proceeding after Petitioner has 16 exhausted his administrative remedies. 17 Moreover, binding Ninth Circuit precedent imposes a prudential exhaustion 18 requirement where a petitioner contests the adequacy of a bond hearing after a 19 district court orders such a hearing. Leonardo, 646 F.3d at 1160; see Diaz Reyes v. 20 Mayorkis, 854 Fed. App’x 190, 191 (9th Cir. 2021). Petitioner must first exhaust his 21 administrative remedies by seeking review of the IJ’s decision before the BIA. Id. 22 Courts can waive the prudential exhaustion requirement if “administrative remedies 23 are inadequate or not efficacious, pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile 24 gesture, irreparable injury will result, or the administrative proceedings would be 25 void.” Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal citations and 26 quotation marks omitted). The Court notes that in its prior Order, the Court waived 27 the prudential exhaustion requirement as it found that exhaustion would be futile 28 given the Government’s position that Petitioner was subject to mandatory detention. 1 (Order at 11 n.4.) Thus, an appeal to the BIA was futile at that time as an appeal could 2 not result in Petitioner receiving a bond hearing. (Id.) However, Petitioner has not 3 made a showing that any of the exceptions to the exhaustion requirement apply at this 4 stage of the proceedings. 5 While Petitioner points to the fact that his habeas petition challenges his initial 6 arrest, which the IJ does not have jurisdiction to consider, (Pet’r’s Suppl. Br. (ECF No. 7 39) at 2), that fact is immaterial at this stage of the proceedings where the Government 8 has now provided Petitioner with a hearing. Rather, the BIA is well-equipped to 9 consider the challenges to the IJ’s decision, and application of the exhaustion 10 requirement is appropriate. See, e.g., Aden v. Nielsen, No. C18-1441RSL, 2019 WL 11 5802013, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 7, 2019) (“Mr. Aden asserts that by relying too 12 heavily on his criminal history in determining whether Mr. Aden is a danger to society, 13 the IJ did not hold the government to the clear and convincing evidence standard, in 14 violation of his constitutional due process rights. . . . But the BIA is capable of re- 15 assessing the evidence and determining whether the government has carried its 16 burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Aden is a current 17 danger and must be detained.”); see also Morgan v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 1084, 1090 n. 18 2 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The exception to the rule that constitutional claims need not be 19 exhausted before the agency are claims of denial of procedural due process by the IJ, 20 which must be raised before the BIA because the agency does have the power to 21 adjudicate procedural due process claims.”). 22 For these reasons, Petitioner’s Motion to Enforce Preliminary Injunction Order 23 must be denied. 24 II. Respondents’ Motions 25 Within a footnote in their Opposition, Respondents request that the Court strike 26 certain Respondents from the Petition. (See Opp’n at 1 n.1, 8–9.) Respondents 27 previously sought to dismiss certain Respondents via the same method: a footnote in 28 an opposition. In its prior Order, the Court directed Respondents that any such 1 | request needed to be made via a noticed motion. (Order at 12.) Respondents have 2 || again failed to properly notice this motion. Respondents Motion to Dismiss, raised 3 | within their Opposition to Petitioner's Motion and not properly noticed on the Court's 4 || calendar, is also not proper.' Both motions are denied without prejudice as non- 5 || compliant with the Local Rules. See E.D. Cal. L.R. 230. 7 For the reasons stated above, IT |S HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion 8 || to Enforce Preliminary Injunction Order (ECF No. 23) is DENIED. Respondents’ 9 || Motions to Dismiss and Strike (ECF No. 31) are also DENIED as non-compliant with the 10 | Local Rules. 11 12 IT 1S SO ORDERED. 13 | Dated: _April 29, 2025 “Daniel CoD tto— Hon. Daniel □□ |. Cod 14 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 15 16 17 18 | DJct -doe25ev00647 enforce 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 | ‘The Court notes that while the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and subsequent Motion to Enforce the Preliminary Injunction Order were properly before this Court, under Local Rule 302(c)(17), 28 | this matter is generally referred to the assigned Magistrate Judge.