Haviland v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.

736 F. Supp. 507, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5424, 1990 WL 63160
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMay 8, 1990
Docket89 CIV. 8463 (LBS)
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 736 F. Supp. 507 (Haviland v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Haviland v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 736 F. Supp. 507, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5424, 1990 WL 63160 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).

Opinion

OPINION

SAND, District Judge.

Plaintiff Leo Haviland brings suit against his former employer Goldman, Sachs & Co. (“Goldman”) and its affiliate J. Aron & Co. (“Aron”) alleging injury caused by a pattern of racketeering activity that included mail fraud, wire fraud and attempted extortion. The defendants now seek an order pursuant to section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3, staying these judicial proceedings pending the completion of arbitration. We grant the motion to stay the claims asserted against defendant Goldman and deny the motion to stay the claims asserted against defendant Aron.

BACKGROUND

Leo Haviland joined Goldman in 1979 and worked as a vice president in Goldman’s Energy Futures and Options Group during the relevant time period and until his termination in February 1989. Haviland earned commissions for Goldman by trading energy futures and options on energy futures on behalf of large refining and marketing firms, energy producers, and oil trading companies. These trades were executed predominantly on the International Petroleum Exchange in London; none of these *508 trades were executed on the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”).

Haviland’s claims involve the alleged conflicting interests of Goldman’s Energy Futures and Options Group and defendant Aron, a partnership consisting of all Goldman partners. In 1984, Aron began trading as a principal in the energy futures, options, forwards and physical delivery markets. Haviland alleges that the confidential information he acquired from his clients about their future trading plans was tremendously valuable to Aron. For example, if Aron knew that one of Haviland’s clients intended to purchase a substantial amount of oil, Aron could attempt to enter the market in advance of Haviland’s client and profit from that information.

Haviland asserts that from April, 1984 to Spring, 1987, Goldman made explicit, but false, promises that it would erect a “Chinese Wall” so that Aron would not obtain any confidential customer information from Haviland’s group. Then, from July, 1987 to January, 1989, both Goldman and Aron allegedly attempted to extort Haviland into divulging confidential client information to Aron. Haviland claims that he was denied appropriate salary increases and eventually summarily dismissed because he refused to divulge the requested information. In his complaint, Haviland asserts claims against both Goldman and Aron for violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), (d), and common law fraud.

The parties do not dispute that in September 1981, Haviland executed a Form U-4, captioned “Uniform Application for Securities Industry Registration” (“U-4”). Paragraph 5 on page 4 of the U-4 states:

I agree to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy that may arise between me and my firm, or a customer, or any other person, that is required to be arbitrated under the rules, constitutions, or by-laws of the organizations with which I register, as indicated in Question 8.

Affidavit of Robert J. Katz, Exhibit A. In response to Question 8, Haviland applied for registration with the NYSE, the American Stock Exchange and the National Association of Securities Dealers.

The parties also do not dispute that Haviland is a registered representative of the NYSE, that defendant Goldman is a member organization of the NYSE and that defendant Aron is not a member. Different NYSE rules apply to controversies involving member organizations of the NYSE and to controversies involving non-members. NYSE Arbitration Rule 347, which might apply to Haviland’s claims against Goldman, states:

Any controversy between a registered representative and any member or member organization arising out of the employment or termination of employment of such registered representative by and with such member or member organization shall be settled by arbitration, at the insistence of any such party, in accordance with the arbitration procedure prescribed elsewhere in these rules.

2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) ¶ 2347 (Sept. 1988) (emphasis added). NYSE Rule 600(a), which might apply to Haviland’s claims against Aron, states:

Any dispute, claim or controversy between a customer or non-member and a member, allied member, member organization and/or associated person arising in connection with the business of such member, allied member, member organization and/or associated person in connection with his activities as an associated person shall be arbitrated under the Constitution and Rules of the [NYSE] as provided by any duly executed and enforceable written agreement or upon the demand of the customer or non-member.

2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 112600 (May 1988) (emphasis added). Haviland is clearly an associated person within the meaning of Rule 600(a). See Fleck v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 891 F.2d 1047, 1054 (2d Cir. 1989) (citing the definition in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(18), 78c(a)(21) (1982) (including an employee of a member in the definition of a person associated with a member).

*509 Haviland argues that although he was a registered representative with the NYSE, he never acted in that capacity and never executed any trades on the NYSE. Haviland claims that he could have performed his job and traded on various commodities exchanges even if he had not registered with the NYSE and even if Goldman were not a NYSE member organization. See Affidavit of Leo Haviland. The defendants respond that even if registration were not required by the NYSE, Goldman required as a policy matter that all employees in Haviland’s position complete such registration. See Reply Affidavit of David B. Ford. Haviland retorts that Goldman did not enforce that policy, noting that other members of his group were not so registered.

For the purposes of this motion, we need not resolve the parties’ dispute over the bona fide nature of Goldman’s policy requiring registration with the NYSE. Haviland does not claim that his decision to execute the U-4 was involuntary, 1 and the parties do not dispute that Haviland could have performed exactly the same job without executing that written agreement. The issue before this Court is whether Haviland’s claims against Goldman and Aron fall within the scope of the written arbitration rules of the NYSE.

DISCUSSION

By signing the U-4 application, Haviland voluntarily agreed to comply with the rules of the NYSE. Arbitration agreements are contractual obligations which are governed by general principles of contract interpretation.

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Bluebook (online)
736 F. Supp. 507, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5424, 1990 WL 63160, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/haviland-v-goldman-sachs-co-nysd-1990.