Haussermann v. Commissioner

23 B.T.A. 378, 1931 BTA LEXIS 1880
CourtUnited States Board of Tax Appeals
DecidedMay 25, 1931
DocketDocket Nos. 23101, 40307.
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 23 B.T.A. 378 (Haussermann v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Board of Tax Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Haussermann v. Commissioner, 23 B.T.A. 378, 1931 BTA LEXIS 1880 (bta 1931).

Opinion

[384]*384OPINION.

MoeRis:

The issues numbered one and two, hereinbefore stated, place in controversy the interpretation of subdivisions one and three of section 262 of the Revenue Acts of 1921, 1924 and 1926, the language of which section in said acts is the same, except that the word “ That,” inscribed at the beginning of subdivision (a) of the 1921 Act, was deleted in the later acts.

We have found as a fact that more than 80 per centum of the petitioner’s income for the years 1920 to 1925, both inclusive, was derived from sources within a possession of the United States, a fact which the respondent has not contested but, in fact, admits. The respondent contends that subdivisions (1) and (3) of section 262 should be read together, that is, in the conjunctive form, and that the petitioner must show, not only that 80 per centum of his income was derived from the Philippines, but also that 50 per centum or more thereof “ was derived from the active conduct of a trade or business within a possession of the United States either on his own account or as an employee or agent of another.”

The petitioner contends, on the other hand, that said subdivisions (1) and (3) should be read separately, that is, in the disjunctive form, or, as he expresses it, in the “ alternative,” and that he is required to establish only one of the two propositions therein con[385]*385tained in order to invoke and enjoy the benefits of section 262, notwithstanding, as he contends, he has complied with the requirements of both subdivisions.

Section 262 of the Revenue Act of 1921 reads as follows:

Sec. 262. (a) That in the case of citizens of the United States or domestic corporations, satisfying the following conditions, gross income means only gross income from sources within the United States—
(1) If 80 per centum or more of the gross income of such citizen or domestic corporation, (computed without the benefit of this section) for the three-year period immediately preceding the close of the taxable year (or for s'Mch part of such period immediately preceding the close of such taxable year as may be applicable) was derived from sources within a possession of the United States; and ■ .
(2) If, in the case of such corporation, 60 per centum or more of its gross income (computed without the benefit of this section) for such period or such part thereof was derived from the active conduct of a trade or business within a possession of the United States; or
(3) If, in the case of such citizen, 50 per centum or more of his gross income (computed without the benefit of this section) for such period or such part thereof was derived from the active conduct of a trade or business within a possession of the United States either on his own account or as an employee or agent of another.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision (a) there shall be included in gross income all amounts received by such citizens or corporations within the United States, whether derived from sources within or without the United States. • ’ •
(e) As used in this section the term “ possession o-f the United States'” does not include the Virgin Islands of the United States.

Since the controversy really resolves itself into a question of the statutory interpretation of the section aforesaid, a historical review of the prevailing evils sought to be remedied by the enactment thereof and its legislative history may prove helpful. In thus approaching the matter we do so mindfully of the varying weight given by the courts to the different phases of legislative history in construing Federal statutes,” (Southern California Loan Association, 4 B. T. A. 223), but, as we said in that case, “it seems to be well settled that while such legislative history can not be used to add to or take from the body of the statute, it may help in interpreting its meaning.” See also Burkhart Manufacturing Co., 9 B. T. A. 1228.

Commenting upon the question of statutory interpretation the Supreme Court of the United States, in American Net Twine Co. v. Worthington, 141 U. S. 468, said:

While the statements made and the opinions advanced by the promoters of the act in the legislative body are inadmissible as bearing upon its construction, yet reference to the proceedings of such body may properly be made to inform the court of the exigencies ‘of the fishing interests and the reasons for fixing the duty at this amount. Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U. S. 453, 459; Blake v. National Banks, 23 Wall. 307, 317; The Collector v. Richards, 23 Wall. 246, 258; Gilmer [386]*386v. Stone, 120 U. S. 586, 590; United States v. Union Pacific Railroad, 91 U. S. 72, 79.

As the petitioner contends, the manner in which citizens of the United States, resident of the Philippine Islands, were taxed under the earlier revenue acts was a matter of great concern. Widespread agitation sprang up from all quarters for some form of relief in order that citizens of the United States residing in the Philippine Islands might be treated as favorably as other residents of the Islands, and so that they might not be hampered in their competition with citizens of other countries, resident of the Philippines, by excessive taxation. In pursuance of such agitation the Philippine legislature adopted Concurrent Resolution numbered (13) on February 9, 1920 (Phil. Pub. Laws, vol. 15, p. 284), reading as follows:

Be it resolved by the Senate, the House of Representatives of the Philippines concurring, That the Resident Commissioners be, and they hereby are, instructed to ask Congress for the amendment of the United States Internal Revenue Act of nineteen hundred and nineteen, in the sense that American citizens who are bona fide residents of the Philippine Islands shall not be subject to any income tax greater than that required of other residents of said islands.

The House bill, proposed as the 1921 Act, containing provision for the taxation of a “ foreign trader ” or a “ foreign trade corporation,” provided that in the case of such “ foreign trader ” or “ foreign trade corporation ” gross income for the purpose of income tax meant only gross income from sources within the United States. The terms “ foreign trader ” and “ foreign trade corporation ” were defined to mean:

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Haussermann v. Commissioner
23 B.T.A. 378 (Board of Tax Appeals, 1931)

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Bluebook (online)
23 B.T.A. 378, 1931 BTA LEXIS 1880, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/haussermann-v-commissioner-bta-1931.