Haug v. Norick's

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: October 16, 2025
• Docket: 24CA2146
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24CA2146 Haug v Norick’s 10-16-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA2146 Pueblo County District Court No. 23CV30406 Honorable Michelle Chostner, Judge

Josephine Haug,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Norick’s Auto Service, Inc., a Colorado corporation, and Dennis W. Norick,

Defendants-Appellees.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VI Opinion by JUDGE WELLING Gomez and Sullivan, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 16, 2025

Mullans, Piersel & Reed, P.C., Shannon Reed, Pueblo, Colorado, for Plaintiff- Appellant

White and Steele, PC, E. Catlynne Shadakofsky, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees ¶1 Plaintiff, Josephine Haug, brought an action against

defendants, Norick’s Auto Service, Inc. (NAS), and Dennis W. Norick

(collectively, defendants), under the Colorado Premises Liability Act

(PLA), section 13-21-115, C.R.S. 2025. Haug appeals the district

court’s determination that she was a trespasser rather than an

invitee under the PLA, see section 13-21-115(7), and the court’s

decision granting summary judgment in favor of defendants. We

affirm.

I. Background

A. Haug’s Accident

¶2 In August 2021, Haug took her car to NAS for service. The

real property where NAS is located is owned by Norick. Haug had

taken her car to NAS to be serviced in the past, and, according to

Haug, she had never entered the building when having her car

serviced by NAS; instead, she typically picked up her car from the

NAS parking lot after hours. When picking up her car after hours

in previous dealings, Haug would have an NAS employee lock her

keys in the car, and she would access her serviced car with a spare

set of keys.

1 ¶3 As with her previous dealings with NAS, Haug didn’t enter the

building when taking her car for service in August 2021. Instead,

she pulled her car up to the NAS building and dropped her car and

keys off. After NAS finished servicing Haug’s car, Norick called

Haug to inform her that her car was ready to be picked up and

Haug paid for the service over the phone via credit card. Haug told

Norick that she might not be able to pick up her car before NAS’s

closing time of 5:30 p.m. Norick and Haug agreed that Norick

would leave Haug’s car outside with her keys locked inside for her

to pick up using her spare key.

¶4 According to Haug’s deposition testimony, she knew that NAS

closed at 5:30 p.m. and that she didn’t arrive at NAS to pick up her

car until “[s]hortly after 5:30.” When she arrived, her car was

parked outside the NAS building by a door with the number “418”

above it. Haug used a key to get inside her car, but upon getting in

she noticed that there wasn’t an invoice inside the car. Haug

“wanted to see [her] invoice” and thought someone was still in the

NAS building because “there was a pickup truck parked right in

front of [a closed] bay door” and it was “only a couple of minutes

after 5:30 [p.m].” Haug didn’t try to call NAS about the invoice, nor

2 did she try to knock on the door. Instead, when Haug found the

door below the “418” number unlocked, she entered the NAS

building. According to Haug, there was no writing or signage on the

door. Upon entering the building, Haug didn’t see a counter, desk,

computer, or cash register. Haug stood by the door for

approximately one minute, and after “realiz[ing] that nobody was

going to respond to [her],” “hollered for help.” Haug saw that to the

right of the door she had entered “and right inside of the bay door,

there was an opening, and it was lit,” which, to Haug, “indicated

that . . . somebody must be over there.” As Haug walked toward the

opening, she “had to negotiate other vehicles” because there were

cars tightly packed inside. While walking, Haug fell into a pit and

suffered serious injuries.

B. Procedural History

¶5 Haug filed suit against NAS and Norick for negligence and

premises liability under the PLA. Regarding her premises liability

claim, Haug alleged that she was an invitee at the time she entered

the NAS building. In their answer to the complaint, defendants

asserted as an affirmative defense that Haug was a trespasser

under the PLA when she fell.

3 ¶6 Defendants later moved for a determination of law that Haug

was a trespasser under the PLA at the time of her fall. In her

response, Haug requested that the district court rule that she was a

business invitee at the time of her injury. Defendants appended a

portion of Haug’s deposition transcript and some photos of the NAS

building to their motion. Haug appended her entire deposition

transcript to her response. Neither party requested an evidentiary

hearing.

¶7 After reviewing the parties’ briefing and appended documents,

the district court entered a written order. The court agreed with

defendants and determined that Haug was an invitee “for the

purpose of picking up her vehicle after hours from the [NAS]

parking lot” but “was a trespasser once she entered the [NAS] shop

at door number 418 after hours.” In reaching this conclusion, the

court determined the following:

• The NAS building where Haug was injured “was not part

of the land which she was permitted to enter after hours,

and [Haug] sustained her injury within a part of the land

she was not permitted to enter.”

4 • “[Haug] and [Norick] expressly discussed the procedure

[Haug] would use to pick up her vehicle if she arrived

after 5:30 [p.m.]” and “[t]hat procedure was for [Haug] to

pick up her vehicle from the parking lot and use her own

spare keys to enter the vehicle.”

• There was no express or implied consent for Haug to

enter the NAS building after 5:30 p.m.

• “[T]here was no custom, usage, or conduct of [Haug]

entering the [NAS] building after hours. Instead, the

custom was that [Haug] would pay for the repair in

advance and pick up her vehicle from the parking lot

using her spare set of keys.”

• There was no evidence from which implied consent could

be inferred and “consent [couldn’t] be inferred by the

back door being unlocked, given the facts and

circumstances of [the] case.”

• Haug “exceeded the scope of permission to enter the

parking lot area when she entered the [NAS] building

after hours. The purpose of the after-hours visit was to

5 pick[ ]up the car from the parking lot, not to obtain a

payment receipt.”

• “[Haug] knew the nature of the activities occurring inside

the repair shop, being car repairs, and that the area she

entered was used by [d]efendant[s] to work on the cars.”

¶8 The district court concluded that the determination of Haug’s

status as a trespasser at the time of her injury was dispositive of

her PLA claim and entered summary judgment on that claim in

favor of defendants. The court also entered summary judgment in

favor of defendants on Haug’s negligence claim because the

“common law negligence claim is abrogated by the PLA and fails as

a matter of law.”1

II. Analysis

¶9 On appeal, Haug contends that the district court erred by

(1) determining that she was a trespasser rather than an invitee at

the time of her injury and (2) granting summary judgment in favor

of defendants on her PLA claim. We address and reject both

contentions.

1 Haug doesn’t challenge this determination regarding the

negligence claim, so we won’t address it or disturb it.

6 A. The Premises Liability Act

¶ 10 We first address Haug’s contention that the district court erred

when it determined that she was a trespasser under the PLA at the

time of her injury. We aren’t persuaded that the district court

erred.

1. Legal Principles and Standard of Review

¶ 11 The PLA “preempts prior common law theories of liability, and

[is] the sole codification of landowner duties in tort.” Warembourg v.

Excel Elec., Inc., 2020 COA 103, ¶ 36 (quoting Vigil v. Franklin, 103

P.3d 322, 328 (Colo. 2004)). Under the PLA, a landowner’s liability

to a person injured on their land is based on the entrant’s status as

an invitee, licensee, or trespasser. See Lucero v. Ulvestad, 2015

COA 98, ¶ 11; § 13-21-115(3), (4). The PLA “outlines the respective

duties that a landowner owes to trespassers, invitees, and licensees

and provides that a breach of those duties may result in liability for

damages caused.” Warembourg, ¶ 38 (quoting Lombard v. Colo.

Outdoor Educ. Ctr., Inc., 187 P.3d 565, 574 (Colo. 2008)). Under the

PLA, “invitee,” “licensee,” and “trespasser” are defined as follows:

(a) “Invitee” means a person who enters or remains on the land of another to transact business in which the parties are mutually

7 interested or who enters or remains on such land in response to the landowner’s express or implied representation that the public is requested, expected, or intended to enter or remain.

....

(c) “Licensee” means a person who enters or remains on the land of another for the licensee’s own convenience or to advance the licensee’s own interests, pursuant to the landowner’s permission or consent. “Licensee” includes a social guest.

(d) “Trespasser” means a person who enters or remains on the land of another without the landowner’s consent.

§ 13-21-115(7)(a), (c)-(d).

¶ 12 The district court determines “whether a plaintiff was an

invitee, licensee, or trespasser at the time of injury.” Legro v.

Robinson, 2015 COA 183, ¶ 15. Typically, we review this

determination as a mixed question of law and fact, reviewing a

court’s findings of fact for clear error but reviewing the court’s

application of the facts to the governing legal standards de novo.

Id. But “where the controlling facts are not in dispute, we review de

novo a district court’s determination of a party’s status under the

PLA.” Willis v. Twin Shores Master Owner Ass’n, 2025 COA 37, ¶ 8.

8 2. Haug’s Status

¶ 13 The district court determined that Haug was an invitee “for the

purpose of picking up her vehicle after hours from [NAS].”

Defendants don’t appear to contest this determination and concede

that “Haug was an invitee when she was in the parking lot.”

Instead, the primary dispute is whether Haug’s status changed once

she entered the NAS building. The court determined that it did.

¶ 14 In analyzing whether this determination was correct, we first

address the circumstances under which a person may be

considered an invitee. We then address when a person may be

considered a trespasser. (Because neither party contends that

Haug was a licensee at the time of her injury, we don’t address this

issue.)

a. Invitee

¶ 15 The PLA provides two means by which a person entering land

may be an invitee. See 13-21-115(7)(a). First, an entrant may be

an invitee if the entrant “enters or remains on the land of another to

transact business in which the parties are mutually interested.” Id.

Second, an entrant may be an invitee if the entrant “enters or

remains on [the land of another] in response to the landowner’s

9 express or implied representation that the public is requested,

expected, or intended to enter or remain.” Id. The undisputed facts

support the district court conclusion that Haug wasn’t an invitee

under either prong at the time of her injury.

i. Transacting Business

¶ 16 We first address whether Haug was an invitee because of her

business relationship with defendants.

¶ 17 The parties don’t disput that Haug engaged in a business

transaction with NAS. Haug took her car to NAS for service, NAS

completed the service, and Haug paid NAS for the completed

service. Given these facts, the district court correctly determined

that Haug was an invitee when picking up her vehicle. But an

entrant’s “status may change if he or she exceeds the scope of the

landowner’s invitation to access the property.” Warembourg, ¶ 40;

see also Chapman v. Willey, 134 P.3d 568, 569 (Colo. App. 2006)

(“Although permitted to visit the motel for certain purposes, [the]

plaintiff became a trespasser when he returned to the motel for the

purpose of fighting.”).

¶ 18 In this case, the scope of defendants’ invitation to Haug was

confined to the NAS parking lot. Indeed, the record establishes that

10 Haug informed Norick that she might arrive after hours and,

therefore, agreed to a plan that would allow her to retrieve her car

from the NAS parking lot without entering the NAS building. There

is no indication that defendants gave Haug permission to enter the

NAS building Instead, Haug had agreed to pick up her car from the

parking lot rather than inside the NAS building, knew that NAS

closed at 5:30 p.m., and had never entered the NAS building when

having her car serviced there in the past. This supports the district

court’s conclusion that “[t]he building was not part of the land

which [Haug] was permitted to enter after hours” and, thus,

supports the district court’s determination that Haug’s status

changed from invitee to trespasser once she entered the NAS

building.

ii. Express or Implied Representation

¶ 19 Next, we address whether Haug was an invitee because of an

express or implied representation by defendants.

¶ 20 Although Haug exceeded the scope of her permission to enter

the NAS premises when she entered the NAS building, Haug could

have remained an invitee if defendants expressly or impliedly

represented that “the public [was] requested, expected, or intended

11 to enter” the NAS building. § 13-21-115(7)(a) (emphasis added).

Haug suggests that she was permitted to enter the NAS building

and was an invitee because business “closing times are typically

subject to flexibility” and a “[c]losed business would be expected to

be locked.” Haug also notes that whether there were signs

informing the public that the door she entered was “restricted” and

for “employees only” remains disputed and was never resolved by

the district court. But even construing this disputed fact in Haug’s

favor (i.e., assuming that such signage wasn’t present on the date of

her injury), the facts of this case don’t support the conclusion that

Haug was an invitee through an express or implied representation

at the time she entered the NAS building.

¶ 21 To begin, there are no facts to support the conclusion that

defendants expressly represented that the public could enter. But

whether there was an implied representation is more difficult to

ascertain.

¶ 22 We agree with Haug that posted business hours alone don’t

necessarily support the conclusion that a person who enters the

premises outside of those hours is a trespasser. We also agree that

defendants’ failure to lock the door lends support to the conclusion

12 that defendants impliedly represented that the public was expected

or intended to enter the NAS building. Cf. Grizzell v. Hartman

Enters., Inc., 68 P.3d 551, 553 (Colo. App. 2003) (“It is undisputed

that the shop was not open for business, and the premises were

locked to prevent entry by the general public.”). But the particular

facts of this case establish, and the district court correctly

concluded, that there wasn’t an implied representation that the

public or Haug individually could enter the building at the door

beneath the “418” numbering.

¶ 23 In its order on the determination of law, the district court

found that the following facts weren’t disputed:

• The door Haug entered was a “back door.”

• When Haug entered, “no one was there to greet her, there

were no cash registers, no computer or desk, and [Haug]

did not see any person, whether a customer or

employee.”

• Haug called out and no one answered.

• Haug did not hear anyone working on cars.

• Haug had to “walk[] around stored cars.”

13 ¶ 24 The record supports the district court’s determination that

these facts aren’t disputed. And these facts establish that

defendants didn’t impliedly represent a request, expectation, or

intent that the public enter the NAS building through the door

Haug used. We are further convinced that there was no

representation to Haug specifically that she could enter the building

because she knew that NAS was closed when she did so.

¶ 25 Because the undisputed facts support the legal conclusion

that Haug wasn’t an invitee at the time of her injury, the district

court didn’t err in making this determination.

b. Trespasser

¶ 26 The district court concluded that at the time of her injury,

Haug was a trespasser. Again, the PLA defines a trespasser as “a

person who enters or remains on the land of another without the

landowner’s consent.” § 13-21-115(7)(d). The district court

determined, and the record supports, that it was “undisputed that

there was no express consent for [Haug] to enter the [NAS] shop.”

Indeed, Haug’s own statements support this: Haug said that she

and Norick agreed that she would pick up her car in the parking lot.

14 There was no evidence presented that Norick told Haug she could

enter the NAS building.

¶ 27 But consent also includes implied consent and “a landowner

may consent to entry, absent express words, by his or her course of

conduct.” Corder v. Folds, 2012 COA 174, ¶¶ 17, 19. The district

court determined, however, that implied consent couldn’t be

inferred because (1) the “custom” between Haug and defendants

was that Haug “would pay for the repair in advance and pick up her

vehicle from the parking lot using her spare set of keys”; (2) Haug

did in fact pay for the repair in advance on the date of her injury

and “was able to accomplish the agreed upon entry to pick up her

vehicle without entering the building”; and (3) “consent cannot be

inferred by the back door being unlocked, given the facts and

circumstances of th[e] case.”

¶ 28 The record supports these determinations. Haug said that she

had done business with NAS before and that NAS employees had

always left her car outside the building with her keys locked inside.

This testimony demonstrates a course of conduct between Haug

and NAS. Haug also said that on the day of her injury, in line with

the established course of conduct, NAS employees locked her keys

15 inside of her car in the parking lot and that she was able to access

her car with her spare keys. Haug further testified that she had

never been inside the NAS building before and that she had entered

through the door that she did because it was the door nearest her

car (not because she thought it to be the main business entrance).

That Haug knew NAS was closed also supports a determination that

she didn’t have consent to enter the building.

¶ 29 Because Haug didn’t have consent to enter the building and

the record supports the court’s determination that Haug wasn’t an

invitee, the district court didn’t err when it determined that she

became a trespasser once inside the NAS building.

B. Summary Judgment

¶ 30 Finally, we address whether the district court properly

disposed of Haug’s PLA claim on summary judgment. Because the

district court correctly determined that Haug was a trespasser, the

court didn’t err in granting summary judgment.

¶ 31 “Summary judgment is appropriate only if the pleadings,

affidavits, depositions, or admissions establish that there is no

genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled

16 to judgment as a matter of law.” Corder, ¶ 5. We review a district

court’s order granting summary judgment de novo. Id.

¶ 32 If the court determined an entrant was a trespasser, the

entrant “may only recover damages willfully or deliberately caused

by the landowner.” § 13-21-115(4)(a). Because Haug was a

trespasser and doesn’t contend that defendants willfully or

deliberately caused her damages, the district court didn’t err by

granting summary judgment in favor of defendants on Haug’s PLA

claim.

III. Disposition

¶ 33 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE GOMEZ and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.