Hatadis v. Achieva Credit Union

159 So. 3d 256, 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 2961, 2015 WL 894319
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedMarch 4, 2015
DocketNo. 2D13-5349
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 159 So. 3d 256 (Hatadis v. Achieva Credit Union) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hatadis v. Achieva Credit Union, 159 So. 3d 256, 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 2961, 2015 WL 894319 (Fla. Ct. App. 2015).

Opinion

KHOUZAM, Judge.

Steven and Esperanza Hatadis appeal the final summary judgment of foreclosure entered in favor of Achieva Credit Union, arguing that the trial court erred in finding that the Hatadises waived their right to a notice of default and thirty-day opportunity to cure when they entered into a forbearance agreement. Because we conclude that the Hatadises did not waive these rights, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

In December 2006, the Hatadises took out a mortgage with Achieva. Paragraph twenty-two of the mortgage provided that prior to acceleration, Achieva was required to give the Hatadises notice of the default and thirty days to cure it.1 A little over [258]*258two years after they began making payments on the mortgage, the Hatadises entered into a forbearance agreement with Achieva providing for interest-only payments for a six-month period (from June 1, 2009, to November 30, 2009).2 Paragraph six of the forbearance agreement stated that the “[borrowers acknowledge that no further notice of default is necessary and any additional notice of default of this agreement is hereby waived.” The Hatad-ises successfully made the six reduced payments under this agreement and resumed making regular payments. But less than two years later, in October 2011, they received a letter from Achieva stating that they were in default, that their loan had been accelerated, and that the default must be cured immediately.3

[259]*259Achieva filed a foreclosure complaint against the Hatadises in December 2011. The Hatadises argued as an affirmative defense and later in their motions for summary judgment that Achieva had failed to comply with the specific requirements of paragraph twenty-two of the mortgage. Specifically, the Hatadises pointed out that paragraph twenty-two required Achieva to give them thirty days to cure the default before acceleration but that instead the October 2011 letter stated the loan had already been accelerated and the default needed to be cured immediately. The court denied Mr. Hatadis’s motion for summary judgment, determining that “paragraph 6 of the Forbearance Agreement signed by [Mr. Hatadis] waived the necessity for [Achieva] to comply with paragraph 22 of the mortgage concerning the default and acceleration notice.” Ultimately, the court granted summary judgment in Achieva’s favor, and the Hatadises filed this appeal challenging the circuit court’s determination that they waived their right to notice under paragraph twenty-two of the mortgage when they signed paragraph six of the forbearance agreement.

“When interpreting a contract, the court must first examine the plain language of the contract for evidence of the parties’ intent.” Murley v. Wiedamann, 25 So.3d 27, 29 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). The goal in construing the contract language is to reach a reasonable interpretation of the entire agreement in order to accomplish its stated purpose and meaning. Id. “[W]here one interpretation of a contract would be absurd and another would be consistent with reason and probability, the contract should be interpreted in the rational manner.” BED Twenty-One Mgmt. Co. v. Delsordo, 127 So.3d 527, 530 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012).

Here, it is clear that the forbearance agreement, when examined in its entirety, was not intended to waive the Ha-tadises’ right to notice outside of the six-month period from June 1, 2009, to November 30, 2009. The agreement first states that the Hatadises requested interest-only payments for this six-month period and that Achieva was willing to give them this reduction in payments. In paragraph two, the agreement clarifies that the “parties agree that a forbearance period from June 1, 2009 [through] November 30, 2009 is appropriate.” Paragraph three sets the exact amount that the Hatadises were to pay “[d]uring the period of forbearance,” and paragraph four states that the Hatadises would resume their regular monthly payments “[u]pon expiration of this forbearance, on December 1, 2009.”

Considering these preceding paragraphs, it becomes clear that the waiver of notice found in paragraph six was only intended to apply during the six-month forbearance period. Indeed, the language of paragraph six at issue reflects just that: “Borrowers acknowledge that no further notice of default is necessary and any additional notice of default of this agreement is hereby waived.” (Emphasis added.) Paragraph six also states that “[a]ll other terms and conditions of the original Note and Mortgage remain in full force and effect other than the change in terms of [260]*260payment during the forbearance period as provided in this agreement.” Taken together, the two sentences in paragraph six indicate that once the forbearance agreement expired on December 1, 2009, Achieva was again required to provide notice of default under paragraph twenty-two of the mortgage. Moreover, the record shows that in response to the Hatadises’ request for admissions, Achieva admitted that the October 2011 letter was intended as notice pursuant to paragraph twenty-two of the mortgage. This admission belies Achieva’s position that no notice was necessary.

In sum, we conclude that the waiver of notice found in paragraph six of the forbearance agreement only applied during the six-month period of that agreement and no longer applied once it had been completed. To hold otherwise would allow the waiver found in the six-month forbearance agreement to apply for the remainder of the thirty-year mortgage; such an interpretation would be unreasonable. And though the trial court did not reach the question of whether Achieva’s October 2011 letter complied with paragraph twenty-two of the mortgage, we note that the Hatadises’ argument on this issue may have merit and should be addressed on remand. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

WALLACE and SLEET, JJ., Concur.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
159 So. 3d 256, 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 2961, 2015 WL 894319, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hatadis-v-achieva-credit-union-fladistctapp-2015.