OPINION
By the Court,
Mowbray, J.:
Appellant-plaintiff Frank Hassett has appealed from two orders of the district court dismissing his complaint for damages that he had filed against respondents-defendants Dr. James Greear and St. Mary’s Hospital, both of Reno. The orders of dismissal were granted under the provisions of NRCP 41(e), which reads, in part:
“(e) Want of Prosecution. The court may in its discretion dismiss any action for want of prosecution on motion of the defendant and after due notice to the plaintiff, whenever plaintiff has failed for two years after action is filed to bring such action to trial. . ..”
We affirm the orders of the district court dismissing the complaint against both respondents-defendants.
1. The Facts.
On March 3, 1965, Dr. James Greear removed a cataract from Frank Hassett’s right eye. The operation was performed at St. Mary’s Hospital in Reno. Hassett, after the operation and while recuperating in the Hospital, scratched his eye while attempting to relieve the itching resulting from the operation. [902]*902Two years later, on March 2, 1967, which was 1 day before the statute of limitations would have barred this action, Hassett filed in the district court a two-count complaint seeking damages from the respondents-defendants for their alleged negligence in caring for Hassett, which he claimed caused him to suffer loss of sight in his right eye. No attempt was made to effect service on Doctor Greear. Two years later, on March 4, 1969, Doctor Greear, without yet having been served with process, moved to dismiss the complaint for want of prosecution under the 2-year discretionary provision of NRCP 41(e). The motion was granted, and the complaint against Doctor Greear was dismissed on July 22, 1969. Thereafter, in October 1969 (2Vi years after the complaint had been filed), the Hospital was served with a copy of the complaint and summons. The Hospital then filed a 41(e) motion to dismiss, as Doctor Greear had done, and the district judge entered an order on December 8, 1969, dismissing the complaint against the Hospital.
2. The Discretion of the District Judge.
Our role on this appeal is clear and well defined. We are simply to determine whether the district judge abused his discretion in granting the two 41(e) dismissal motions. This court, in Harris v. Harris, 65 Nev. 342, 350, 196 P.2d 402, 406 (1948), has laid down the standard that must govern our ruling in this appeal:
“. . . Unless it is made to appear that there has been a gross abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in dismissing an action for lack of prosecution its decision will not be disturbed on appeal. Raine v. Ennor, ... 39 Nev. 365, 374, 158 P. 133; Inderbitzen v. Lane Hospital, ... 17 Cal.App.2d 103, 61 P.2d 514, 516; Cohn v. Rosenberg, 62 Cal.App.2d 140, 144 P.2d 399, 401; Allyne v. Murasky, . . . 200 Cal. 661, 254 P. 564, 566; Brown v. Haymore, ... 43 Ariz. 466, 32 P.2d 1027, 1028; Hicks v. Bekins Moving & Storage Co., . . . 9 Cir., 115 F.2d 406, 409; Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. City of Pittsburgh, 335 Pa. 449, 6 A.2d 907, 911; Bancroft’s Code Practice and Remedies, vol. 1, page 758, sec. 506, note 10; and 10-year supplement, vol. 2, pages 1581, 1582, note 12.” See also Volpert v. Papagna, 85 Nev. 437, 456 P.2d 848 (1969), wherein this court last year, in a unanimous opinion, approved the Harris standard.
We have reviewed the record in this case, and it does support the rulings of the district judge. There was no abuse of discretion in granting the orders of dismissal. Indeed, a recent decision of our sister state, California, has held, under facts similar to the instant case, that the court’s refusal to dismiss [903]*903constituted an abuse of discretion. In Paul W. Speer, Inc. v. Superior Court, 77 Cal.Rptr. 152 (Cal.App. 1969, hearing denied, Cal. 1969), the appellate court issued a peremptory writ of mandate to the judge who had denied the motion to dismiss for want of prosecution under the 2-year discretionary rule and said, 77 Cal.Rptr. at 155:
“. . . In Black Bros. Co. v. Superior Court, supra [71 Cal.Rptr. 344 (1968)], the facts were very similar to the instant case. The complaint was filed on January 22, 1965, and service was not made on the defendant until January 9, 1968. That court decided that the trial court ‘. . . abused its discretion in denying motion of defendant to dismiss.’ In Anderson v. Nawa, 25 Cal.App. 151, 154, 143 P. 555, 556 [1914], the court held that: ‘. . . the unexplained and inexcusable failure to serve the summons within two years and ten months . . . prima facie constituted good and sufficient grounds of dismissal.’ (See also Sprajc v. Scandinavian Airlines System, Inc., supra [50 Cal.Rptr. 181 (1966)], affirming a dismissal under section 583 where the complaint was filed on July 24, 1961, and service was not made on the defendant until August 13, 1963.[)]
“On the record before us we find there is an absence of any showing constituting good cause. Since the plaintiff in this case has not met his burden of showing ‘excusable delay,’ the trial court had a duty to dismiss the action upon the motion of petitioner. The failure to do so was an abuse of discretion.
“Let the peremptory writ of mandate issue as prayed.”
The purpose of the 2-year discretionary power of dismissal is to compel reasonable diligence in the prosecution of an action after it has been commenced, so that the parties against whom it is brought will have an opportunity to properly present any defense that may be available at the time of the commencement of the action. It is the duty of the plaintiff to act, and to act with reasonable diligence, and a defendant need make no move until the law requires him to do so in response to the movements of the plaintiff at the various stages of the litigation.
It is the general policy, as declared by the courts, that where a plaintiff exercises reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his action, the action shall be tried on the merits. This policy is counterbalanced, however, by the policy that, when a plaintiff fails to exercise reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his action, it may be dismissed by the district judge. When the [904]*904defendant has made a prima facie showing of unreasonable delay in serving the summons and complaint, it is the plaintiff’s duty to show circumstances excusing his tardiness.
Hassett chose not to testify at either hearing on the 41 (e) motions to dismiss. He submitted an affidavit that in essence charged four attorneys of the Washoe County Bar with whom he had discussed his case at one time or another with negligence in not prosecuting it.1
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OPINION
By the Court,
Mowbray, J.:
Appellant-plaintiff Frank Hassett has appealed from two orders of the district court dismissing his complaint for damages that he had filed against respondents-defendants Dr. James Greear and St. Mary’s Hospital, both of Reno. The orders of dismissal were granted under the provisions of NRCP 41(e), which reads, in part:
“(e) Want of Prosecution. The court may in its discretion dismiss any action for want of prosecution on motion of the defendant and after due notice to the plaintiff, whenever plaintiff has failed for two years after action is filed to bring such action to trial. . ..”
We affirm the orders of the district court dismissing the complaint against both respondents-defendants.
1. The Facts.
On March 3, 1965, Dr. James Greear removed a cataract from Frank Hassett’s right eye. The operation was performed at St. Mary’s Hospital in Reno. Hassett, after the operation and while recuperating in the Hospital, scratched his eye while attempting to relieve the itching resulting from the operation. [902]*902Two years later, on March 2, 1967, which was 1 day before the statute of limitations would have barred this action, Hassett filed in the district court a two-count complaint seeking damages from the respondents-defendants for their alleged negligence in caring for Hassett, which he claimed caused him to suffer loss of sight in his right eye. No attempt was made to effect service on Doctor Greear. Two years later, on March 4, 1969, Doctor Greear, without yet having been served with process, moved to dismiss the complaint for want of prosecution under the 2-year discretionary provision of NRCP 41(e). The motion was granted, and the complaint against Doctor Greear was dismissed on July 22, 1969. Thereafter, in October 1969 (2Vi years after the complaint had been filed), the Hospital was served with a copy of the complaint and summons. The Hospital then filed a 41(e) motion to dismiss, as Doctor Greear had done, and the district judge entered an order on December 8, 1969, dismissing the complaint against the Hospital.
2. The Discretion of the District Judge.
Our role on this appeal is clear and well defined. We are simply to determine whether the district judge abused his discretion in granting the two 41(e) dismissal motions. This court, in Harris v. Harris, 65 Nev. 342, 350, 196 P.2d 402, 406 (1948), has laid down the standard that must govern our ruling in this appeal:
“. . . Unless it is made to appear that there has been a gross abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in dismissing an action for lack of prosecution its decision will not be disturbed on appeal. Raine v. Ennor, ... 39 Nev. 365, 374, 158 P. 133; Inderbitzen v. Lane Hospital, ... 17 Cal.App.2d 103, 61 P.2d 514, 516; Cohn v. Rosenberg, 62 Cal.App.2d 140, 144 P.2d 399, 401; Allyne v. Murasky, . . . 200 Cal. 661, 254 P. 564, 566; Brown v. Haymore, ... 43 Ariz. 466, 32 P.2d 1027, 1028; Hicks v. Bekins Moving & Storage Co., . . . 9 Cir., 115 F.2d 406, 409; Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. City of Pittsburgh, 335 Pa. 449, 6 A.2d 907, 911; Bancroft’s Code Practice and Remedies, vol. 1, page 758, sec. 506, note 10; and 10-year supplement, vol. 2, pages 1581, 1582, note 12.” See also Volpert v. Papagna, 85 Nev. 437, 456 P.2d 848 (1969), wherein this court last year, in a unanimous opinion, approved the Harris standard.
We have reviewed the record in this case, and it does support the rulings of the district judge. There was no abuse of discretion in granting the orders of dismissal. Indeed, a recent decision of our sister state, California, has held, under facts similar to the instant case, that the court’s refusal to dismiss [903]*903constituted an abuse of discretion. In Paul W. Speer, Inc. v. Superior Court, 77 Cal.Rptr. 152 (Cal.App. 1969, hearing denied, Cal. 1969), the appellate court issued a peremptory writ of mandate to the judge who had denied the motion to dismiss for want of prosecution under the 2-year discretionary rule and said, 77 Cal.Rptr. at 155:
“. . . In Black Bros. Co. v. Superior Court, supra [71 Cal.Rptr. 344 (1968)], the facts were very similar to the instant case. The complaint was filed on January 22, 1965, and service was not made on the defendant until January 9, 1968. That court decided that the trial court ‘. . . abused its discretion in denying motion of defendant to dismiss.’ In Anderson v. Nawa, 25 Cal.App. 151, 154, 143 P. 555, 556 [1914], the court held that: ‘. . . the unexplained and inexcusable failure to serve the summons within two years and ten months . . . prima facie constituted good and sufficient grounds of dismissal.’ (See also Sprajc v. Scandinavian Airlines System, Inc., supra [50 Cal.Rptr. 181 (1966)], affirming a dismissal under section 583 where the complaint was filed on July 24, 1961, and service was not made on the defendant until August 13, 1963.[)]
“On the record before us we find there is an absence of any showing constituting good cause. Since the plaintiff in this case has not met his burden of showing ‘excusable delay,’ the trial court had a duty to dismiss the action upon the motion of petitioner. The failure to do so was an abuse of discretion.
“Let the peremptory writ of mandate issue as prayed.”
The purpose of the 2-year discretionary power of dismissal is to compel reasonable diligence in the prosecution of an action after it has been commenced, so that the parties against whom it is brought will have an opportunity to properly present any defense that may be available at the time of the commencement of the action. It is the duty of the plaintiff to act, and to act with reasonable diligence, and a defendant need make no move until the law requires him to do so in response to the movements of the plaintiff at the various stages of the litigation.
It is the general policy, as declared by the courts, that where a plaintiff exercises reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his action, the action shall be tried on the merits. This policy is counterbalanced, however, by the policy that, when a plaintiff fails to exercise reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his action, it may be dismissed by the district judge. When the [904]*904defendant has made a prima facie showing of unreasonable delay in serving the summons and complaint, it is the plaintiff’s duty to show circumstances excusing his tardiness.
Hassett chose not to testify at either hearing on the 41 (e) motions to dismiss. He submitted an affidavit that in essence charged four attorneys of the Washoe County Bar with whom he had discussed his case at one time or another with negligence in not prosecuting it.1 It is upon this naked assertion that the dissenting opinion blames members of the bar for failure to proceed diligently and would therefore reverse the orders of the district court granting the 41(e) motions to dismiss. We disagree with the reasoning of the dissenters. We must presume from the record that no one involved with Hassett’s case believed it had merit. On March 2, 1967, one day before the statute of limitations would have run, it was given a case number by court order, under the practice in Washoe County. Next, a “complaint-letter” was sent, on September 6, 1967, to the Joint Screening Panel of the Washoe County Medical Society and the Washoe County Bar Association, charging Doctor Greear with professional negligence. A hearing was held by that board on December 12, 1967, and the board concluded that there was no possible basis for the negligence charge. It was at that hearing that Doctor Greear learned that a complaint in district court had been filed against him. He asked at that time, through his counsel, and several times thereafter that he be served. He never was served, and so, 4 years after the act of negligence allegedly occurred, and 2 years after the complaint had been filed against him, Doctor Greear filed his 41(e) motion to dismiss for want of prosecution.
Under the state of this record, it was within the permissible limits of the court’s discretion to dismiss the action. Every man is entitled to his day in court, but a law suit is not a unilateral affair. The rights of all parties to the litigation are involved. One who is charged with a complaint and against whom substantial damages are sought is entitled to a determination of those issues within a reasonable time. That is the purpose of 41(e). Likewise, it is categorically unfair and unrealistic to brand members of the bar as “recalcitrant” in this case on the naked charge that they failed to prosecute Hassett’s case and that this resulted in Hassett’s prejudice. To do so would mean that any attorney who reviews a case and fails to prosecute it is ipso facto guilty of malpractice. The inference apparent in this case is that not one but several members of the bar [905]*905concluded, after reviewing the matter, that the complaint was without merit.2
Applying the standard this court announced in Harris, supra, and approved in Volpert, supra, we conclude that the district judge did not abuse his discretion in granting the 41(e) motions for dismissal. We therefore affirm the orders dismissing the complaint against the respondents.
Collins, C. J., and Thompson, J., concur.