Hassan v. Wingfield

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: January 9, 2026
• Docket: 24-6785
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 9 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

STEVEN HADLEY HASSAN, No. 24-6785 D.C. No. Petitioner - Appellant, 4:23-cv-00510-JCH v. MEMORANDUM* B. WINGFIELD, acting Warden for FCI- Marianna,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona John Charles Hinderaker, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted January 7, 2026** Phoenix, Arizona

Before: RAWLINSON, M. SMITH, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.

Steven Hadley Hassan (Hassan) appeals the district court’s order denying his

petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We review the denial of the habeas petition

and underlying questions of law de novo. See Gonzalez v. Herrera, 151 F.4th

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

1 24-6785 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 2025). We affirm.

1. The First Step Act (FSA) offers various incentives to encourage inmates’

participation in recidivism reduction programs, including phone and visitation

privileges, transfer to institutions closer to the inmate’s release residence, increased

commissary spending limits and product offerings, and time credits. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3632(d). However, prisoners convicted of several offense categories are

ineligible from earning time credits. Id. § 3632(d)(4)(A), (D). Included within the

offenses that are ineligible for time credits are Hassan’s convictions under 18

U.S.C. § 2251, relating to the sexual exploitation of children. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3632(d)(4)(D)(xxxix). Hassan argues that this ineligibility violates his equal

protection rights, and heightened scrutiny should apply because the distinction is

driven by animus towards sex offenders.

Rational basis review applies to Hassan’s equal protection claim because he

is not a member of a suspect class. See Raidoo v. Moylan, 75 F.4th 1115, 1125

(9th Cir. 2023); see also United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1030 (9th Cir.

2001) (“Sex offenders are not a suspect class. . . .”). Under rational basis review,

legislation will be upheld “if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally

related to a legitimate state interest.” City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living

Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (citations omitted). In addition, “the state actor has

no obligation to produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a classification;

2 24-6785 rather, the burden is on the one attacking the arrangement to negative every

conceivable basis which might support it.” Curtis v. Inslee, 154 F.4th 678, 694

(9th Cir. 2025) (citation and alterations omitted).

Hassan has not met this burden. The FSA time credit exclusions are

rationally related to ensuring that those who commit the most serious offenses

serve their complete sentences. See United States v. Sharma, 119 F.4th 1141, 1144

(9th Cir. 2024) (“Distinctions can have a rational basis even when based on

rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data. . . .”) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). Congress could rationally determine that

convictions relating to the sexual exploitation of children are among the most

serious offenses based on the significant potential penalties. See Blanton v. City of

N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541-42 (1989).

To mount a successful equal protection challenge, Hassan must establish that

a “motivating factor” for the FSA was a “discriminatory purpose” directed toward

sex offenders. See United States v. Carrillo-Lopez, 68 F.4th 1133, 1139 (9th Cir.

2023). Hassan cites law review articles that discuss general animus toward sex

offenders in the criminal justice system, resulting in what the authors of those

articles believe to be excessive punishment for those crimes. However, Hassan did

not present sufficient evidence that lawmakers were motivated by animus toward

sex offenders when they passed the FSA time credit exclusions to overcome the

3 24-6785 “presumption of legislative good faith.” Abbott v. Perez, 585 U.S. 579, 605

(2018).

2. The time credit exclusions do not violate Hassan’s due process rights

because he has no liberty interest in earning the credits. See Johnson v. Ryan, 55

F.4th 1167, 1179 (9th Cir. 2022) (noting that the first step in a due process claim is

to “determine whether the inmate was deprived of a constitutionally

protected liberty or property interest”). Although “there is no constitutional or

inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the

expiration of a valid sentence,” a statute may create a liberty interest, “but only to

the extent that . . . law creates that interest.” Haggard v. Curry, 631 F.3d 931, 935

(9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam), as amended (citations and alteration omitted). And

the FSA explicitly excludes prisoners convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2251 from

earning time credits. See 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(D)(xxxix). Therefore, the statute

did not create a liberty interest in time credits for Hassan. See Haggard, 631 F.3d

at 935.

3. The FSA’s time credit exclusions do not constitute ex post facto

punishment. The Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits the government “from

retroactively changing the definition of a crime to make formerly innocent

behavior illegal or increasing the punishment for criminal acts.” McGill v. Shinn,

16 F.4th 666, 700-01 (9th Cir. 2021) (citations omitted); see also U.S. Const. art. 1,

4 24-6785 § 9, cl. 3. Hassan’s sentence remains the same as it was before the FSA was

enacted. Because the FSA does not alter the definition of criminal punishment or

lengthen Hassan’s sentence, it is not an unconstitutional ex post facto law. See

Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 441 (1997).

AFFIRMED.

5 24-6785