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5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 9 AT SEATTLE 10 11 HASSAN AMHIRRA, CASE NO. 2:25-cv-01376-TL 12 Petitioner, ORDER ON WRIT OF HABEAS 13 v. CORPUS 14 WARDEN, Northwest Detention Center, et al. 15 Respondents. 16
17 This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Hassan Amhirra’s Petition for Writ of 18 Habeas Corpus (Dkt. No. 1), Petitioner’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. No. 14), and 19 the Interested Non-Party United States’ Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 16). Having reviewed the 20 petition and motions, the subsequent briefing, and the relevant record, the Court GRANTS 21 Petitioner’s petition, DENIES AS MOOT Petitioner’s motion, and DENIES the United States’ motion. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 This case is one of two that Petitioner has filed regarding his detention and removal. The 24 instant case, No. C25-1376 (“Warden”), seeks habeas relief and challenges Petitioner’s ongoing 1 detention. The other case, Amhirra v. Fitting, No. C25-5800 (“Fitting”), is a civil action that 2 challenges the Government’s ongoing efforts to prosecute removal proceedings against Petitioner 3 without providing Petitioner with a competent interpreter, in violation of Petitioner’s due-process 4 rights. See generally Complaint, Amhirra v. Fitting, No. C25-5800 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 8, 2025),
5 Dkt. No. 1. 6 Petitioner Hassan Amhirra is a native and citizen of Morocco. Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 1. Petitioner 7 “has limited or no proficiency in languages commonly used by DHS [Department of Homeland 8 Security] (such as English, French, or Arabic).” Id. ¶ 47. Petitioner’s “primary language is 9 Tamazight (an Amazigh/Berber language).”1 Id. Petitioner avers that “[h]e fled his home country 10 due to fear of persecution and arrived in the United States in 2024 seeking protection.” Id. ¶ 47. 11 Upon entering United States territory, U.S. authorities apprehended Petitioner. Id. Petitioner is 12 presently located at the Northwest ICE Processing Center (“NWIPC”) in Tacoma, Washington, 13 where he has been detained since September 15, 2024. Id. Respondent is captioned as “Warden, 14 Northwest Detention Center.” Dkt. No. 1 at 1. The United States, which has participated in this
15 case as an interested non-party, advises that “The Northwest ICE [Immigration and Customs 16 Enforcement] Processing Centers’ [sic] Facility Administrator is employed by a private 17 contractor, the Geo Group. Undersigned counsel does not represent the Respondent. The Petition 18 does not name a federal entity.” Dkt. No. 16 at 1 n.1.2 19
20 1 Tamazight includes 15 different dialects which, the Parties have demonstrated, are not mutually comprehensible. See Dkt. No. 25 ¶ 2. 21 2 Although the U.S. Attorney’s Office states that it does not represent the NWIPC warden, and the warden has not appeared or otherwise participated in this case, the Court finds that it is still appropriate to proceed and adjudicate 22 the merits of the petition here, because: (1) the purpose of naming the custodian in a habeas petition is to effectuate injunctive relief where appropriate, see Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435 (2004) (the custodian has “the power 23 to produce the body of [the petitioner] before the court or judge,” such that “he may be liberated if no sufficient reason is shown to the contrary” (citation modified)); and (2) the federal government often represents the warden’s interests, as it does in this case, see Doe v. Garland, 109 F.4th 1188, 1196 (9th Cir. 2024) (“Even in cases where 24 1 When Petitioner arrived in the United States, he “expressed a fear of return to Morocco.” 2 Id. ¶ 49. He was subsequently “placed in the custody of DHS/ICE pending removal 3 proceedings.” Id. ¶ 50. Initially, Petitioner’s removal proceedings were expedited, and Petitioner 4 was scheduled for a credible-fear interview as part of the asylum-screening process. Id. ¶ 51. The
5 credible-fear interview never occurred, however, because DHS could not obtain a Tamazight- 6 speaking interpreter. Id. ¶ 52. Due to DHS’s inability to retain a competent interpreter, 7 Petitioner’s removal process has been “brought . . . to a standstill.” Id. ¶ 54. 8 On December 13, 2024, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) convened a master calendar hearing 9 in Petitioner’s case. Id. ¶ 60. No interpreter was present, and the IJ issued an order that 10 terminated the removal proceedings. Id. ¶ 62. After the termination of removal proceedings, 11 Petitioner remained detained at NWIPC. Id. ¶¶ 75, 77. In July 2025, after approximately ten 12 months of detention, Petitioner requested a bond hearing. Id. ¶ 83. On July 16, 2025, an IJ denied 13 the request, ruling that she lacked jurisdiction to consider bond because Petitioner was not in 14 active removal hearings. Id. ¶¶ 86–87.
15 On July 22, 2025, Petitioner filed the instant petition. Dkt. No. 1. That same day, 16 Petitioner filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and preliminary injunction, 17 seeking Petitioner’s immediate release from ICE custody and an injunction against Petitioner’s 18 continued unlawful detention. Dkt. No. 2. In the alternative, Petitioner’s motion asked the Court 19 to order Respondent to provide Petitioner with an expedited bond hearing. Id. at 5. On July 23, 20 2025, the Court denied Petitioner’s motion. Dkt. No. 9. In denying the motion, however, the 21 Court “advise[d] Petitioner that he may still seek a preliminary injunction that allows for full 22
23 private contract wardens are named as respondents, the government can and has stepped in to defend its interest in keeping petitioners detained.”). 24 1 briefing or, if appropriate, pursue alternative paths for relief.” Id. at 7. Petitioner did just that, and 2 two parallel tracks of motion practice emerged: a habeas track and an injunctive-relief track. 3 On the habeas track, on August 27, 2025, the United States, participating in this case as 4 an interested non-party (see Dkt. No. 16 at 1 n.1), filed a return/motion to dismiss the habeas
5 petition. Dkt. No. 16. Petitioner did not file a traverse, and on November 10, 2025, the Parties 6 submitted a joint status report in Fitting that advised the Court “the Habeas Petition [in Warden] 7 is fully briefed and ripe for decision.” Joint Status Report at 1, Fitting (Nov. 10, 2025), Dkt. 8 No. 20 at 1. 9 On the injunctive-relief track, on August 20, 2025, Petitioner filed a motion for 10 preliminary injunction. Dkt. No. 14. The motion is substantially similar to the motion for a TRO 11 and seeks the same relief. Compare Dkt. No. 14, with Dkt. No. 2; compare Dkt. No. 14-4 12 (proposed order), with Dkt. No. 2-1 (proposed order). On September 10, 2025, the United States 13 filed an opposition to Petitioner’s motion. Dkt. No. 22. On September 17, 2025, Petitioner filed 14 his reply brief. Dkt. No. 30.
15 As this case has proceeded, the Government has made multiple unsuccessful attempts to 16 obtain an interpreter and initiate removal proceedings for Petitioner. On or about July 17, 2025, 17 the Government initiated a new removal case against Petitioner. Complaint ¶ 37, Fitting (Sept. 8, 18 2025), Dkt. No. 1. 19 On July 31, 2025, the Government attempted to hold a master calendar hearing for 20 Petitioner. Id. ¶ 45. No interpreter was present, and the IJ “was unable to communicate with 21 [Petitioner] to either explain the proceedings, take pleadings, or conduct any substantive 22 business.” Id. ¶¶ 46–47. The IJ continued the hearing. Id. ¶ 48. 23 On August 18, 2025, “the exact same scenario played out . . . .” Id. ¶ 51.
24 1 On September 2, 2025, the Government tried again. Id. ¶ 56. Again, there was no 2 interpreter. Id. ¶ 57. 3 In the present case, Petitioner filed a second status report providing that on September 12, 4 2025, the Government attempted a master calendar hearing and, this time, “attempted to proceed
5 with a Tamazight interpreter.” Dkt. No. 25 (Petitioner’s Second Status Report) ¶ 1–2. The 6 interpreter and Petitioner “ha[d] difficulty understanding each other’s dialects” because “there 7 are 15 different Tamazight dialects,” Id. ¶ 2. As a result, the matter was again continued. Id. ¶ 3. 8 On October 28, 2025, the Government convened another hearing. See Dkt. No. 42 9 (United States’ Status Report) at 1. “While the interpreter could understand Petitioner’s dialect, 10 Petitioner could not understand the interpreter’s dialect.” Id. The IJ reset the hearing to 11 November 26, 2025, so that an appropriate interpreter could be provided. Id. 12 On November 26, 2025, the Government held another hearing, but the problem persisted: 13 “While the interpreter could understand Petitioner, Petitioner could not understand the 14 interpreter.” Dkt. No. 46 (United States’ Status Report) at 1. The United States advised the Court
15 that, after this unsuccessful hearing, the IJ “reset the hearing to be held within the next two 16 weeks.” Id. at 2. The United States asserted that “[i]f an appropriate interpreter cannot be 17 located, the immigration judge stated that he will terminate the case without prejudice.” Id. 18 On December 15, 2025, the Government held another hearing. See Dkt. No. 51 (United 19 States’ Status Report) at 1. No competent interpreter was present. Id. This hearing was not before 20 the same IJ as the prior hearing. See Dkt. No. 52-2 (audio recording). Instead of terminating the 21 case, however, the IJ re-set the hearing to January 29, 2025, “so that an appropriate interpreter 22 could be provided.” Dkt. No. 51 at 1. In re-setting the case, the IJ opined that the immigration 23 court “may have” a suitable interpreter at the next hearing—“hopefully, after making every
24 effort.” Dkt. No. 52-1. 1 On December 19, 2025, Petitioner filed a status report, noting that “[a]fter the 10th 2 hearing to locate a qualified interpreter, the Petitioner’s removal proceedings were rescheduled 3 once again to locate a qualified interpreter.” Dkt. No. 54 at 2. Petitioner avers that, through 4 counsel, he has advised the immigration court “of the exact interpretation services required,” but
5 that that court has “demonstrate[d] a clear lack of diligence in securing a qualified interpreter.” 6 Id. Indeed, Petitioner asserts that at his November 26, 2025, hearing, the immigration court 7 provided Petitioner with the same interpreter it had provided at a prior hearing, despite that 8 interpreter’s previously demonstrated unsuitability. See id. Petitioner asserts, “At no point has 9 there been any indication that the [immigration court] either understands the Petitioner’s 10 language needs, is effectively attempting to secure [an interpreter,] or is even capable of securing 11 an appropriate interpreter.” Id. at 4. Petitioner requested the prompt adjudication of his petition 12 for writ of habeas corpus. See id. 13 II. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK AND CASELAW OVERVIEW 14 Petitioner is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). Dkt. No. 16 at 5. Noncitizens are
15 considered “applicants for admission” to the United States when they have not been admitted or 16 arrive in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). “Applicants for admission fall into one of two 17 categories, those covered by § 1225(b)(1) and those covered by § 1225(b)(2).” See Jennings v. 18 Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018). Section 1225(b)(1) applies to noncitizens who are 19 “initially determined to be inadmissible due to fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of valid 20 documentation.” Id. (citing § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)). The Jennings Court found that 21 Section 1225(b)(2) is broader and “serves as the catchall provision that applies to all applicants 22 for admission not covered by § 1225(b)(1).” Id. 23 Typically, noncitizens who fall under Section 1225(b)(1) are “subject to an expedited
24 removal process that does not include a hearing before an [immigration judge] or review of the 1 removal order,” but when a noncitizen indicates an intention to apply for asylum, or fear of 2 prosecution, they must be referred for an interview with an asylum officer. Banda v. McAleenan, 3 385 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1111–12 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (quoting 8 U.S.C. §1225(b)(1)(A)(ii); 8 4 C.F.R. § 208.30(d)). If, after the interview with an asylum officer, the officer determines
5 noncitizen’s fear is credible, the noncitizen “shall be detained for further consideration of the 6 application for asylum.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii); Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1112. In sum, 7 both §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) mandate detention of noncitizens for the entirety of the applicable 8 proceedings. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 302. 9 While the detention of noncitizens may be mandated under Section 1225(b), both the 10 Supreme Court as well as the Ninth Circuit have “grappled . . . with whether the various 11 immigration detention statutes may authorize indefinite or prolonged detention of detainees and, 12 if so, may do so without providing a bond hearing.” Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1067 13 (9th Cir. 2015)3, rev’d sub nom. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018) (citation modified). 14 The Supreme Court in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), held that the Immigration
15 Nationality Act (“INA”) does not authorize “indefinite, perhaps permanent, detention,” id. at 16 699, of noncitizens subject to final orders of removal under Section 1231(a)(6), instead 17 construing the statute to contain an “implicit ‘reasonable time’ limitation,” id. at 682. “[F]or the 18 sake of uniform administration in the federal courts,” the Supreme Court recognized six months 19 as that time limitation. Id. at 701. It further found that if a statute were to permit indefinite 20 detention of a noncitizen, that would “raise a serious constitutional problem.” Id. at 690. 21 “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical 22
23 3 This case stems from a class action, in which numerous issues within the claims brought by the petitioners were appealed to the Ninth Circuit. For clarity purposes, the Court will cite these cases throughout the order using a full 24 citation, except when using “id.” to refer to an immediately preceding citation. 1 restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process] Clause 2 protects.” Id. 3 Two years later, in Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), the Supreme Court considered a 4 due process challenge to Section 1226(c), which mandates detention during removal proceedings
5 for noncitizens convicted of certain crimes. In holding that the Government could 6 constitutionally detain deportable noncitizens during the limited period necessary for their 7 removal proceedings, the Supreme Court stressed the “brief” nature of mandatory detention 8 under that section which, in the vast majority of cases, was less than about five months. Id. at 9 518–21, 526, 529–30. Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion that provided the fifth vote to 10 create the majority, reasoned that a noncitizen could be entitled to “an individualized 11 determination as to his risk of flight and dangerousness if the continued detention became 12 unreasonable or unjustified” under the Due Process Clause. Id. at 532 (Kennedy, J., concurring) 13 (citation omitted). 14 Post Zadvydas and Demore, the Ninth Circuit held that the detention under § 1226(c) of a
15 lawfully admitted resident noncitizen subject to removal for over 32 months was 16 “constitutionally doubtful.” Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241, 1242 (9th Cir. 2005). In 2013, the 17 Ninth Circuit concluded that “[b]ecause Demore’s holding hinged on the brevity of mandatory 18 detention . . . ‘prolonged detention of aliens is permissible only where the Attorney General finds 19 such detention individually necessary by providing the alien with an adequate opportunity to 20 contest the necessity of his detention.’” Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 21 2013). Therefore, “under § 1226(a)’s discretionary detention regime, a bond hearing is required 22 before the government may detain an alien for a ‘prolonged’ period.” Id. 23 In 2018 in Jennings, the Supreme Court held that Section 1225(b) of the INA—under
24 which Petitioner is detained—“unambiguously authorizes detention pending resolution of 1 removal proceedings and does not plausibly suggest a 6-month limitation or periodic bond 2 hearings.” Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1115 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (citing Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297, 3 303). While Jennings declined to address whether the Constitution places limits on prolonged 4 detention under the INA, 583 U.S. at 312, the Ninth Circuit post-Jennings expressed “grave
5 doubts that any statute that allows for arbitrary prolonged detention without any process is 6 constitutional or that those who founded our democracy precisely to protect against the 7 government’s arbitrary deprivation of liberty would have thought so.” Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 8 F.3d 252, 256 (9th Cir. 2018). 9 III. LEGAL STANDARD 10 Neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit has settled on a test for assessing the 11 constitutionality of prolonged mandatory detention. See Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1106. 12 However, “‘[n]early all district courts that have considered the issue agree that prolonged 13 mandatory detention pending removal proceedings, without a bond hearing, will—at some 14 point—violate the right to due process.’” Maliwat v. Scott, No. C25-788, 2025 WL 2256711, at
15 *3 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 7, 2025) (quoting Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1116); see also Rogers v. 16 Ripa, No. C21-24433, 2022 WL 708493, at *4–5 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2022), report and 17 recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 574389 (Feb. 25, 2022); Romero Romero v. Wolf, No. C20- 18 8031, 2021 WL 254435, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2021); Leke v. Hott, 521 F. Supp. 3d 597, 604– 19 05 (E.D. Va. 2021); Martinez v. Clark, No. C18-1669, 2019 WL 5968089, at *6 (W.D. Wash. 20 May 23, 2019); Thompson v. Horton, No. C19-120, 2019 WL 4793170, at *5 n.7 (N.D. Ala. 21 Aug. 26, 2019). 22 In assessing the constitutionality of prolonged mandatory detention, the court in Banda 23 declined to apply the test in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976), because the test
24 does “not resolve the more fundamental issue of whether any procedure—such as a bond 1 hearing—must be provided.” Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1106–07. Rather, the Court in Banda 2 conducted a case-specific analysis considering the following factors: 3 (1) the total length of detention to date; (2) the likely duration of future detention; (3) the conditions of detention; (4) delays in the 4 removal proceedings caused by the detainee; (5) delays in the removal proceedings caused by the government; and (6) the 5 likelihood that the removal proceedings will result in a final order of removal.” 6 7 Id. at 1117 (quoting Jamal A. v. Whitaker, 358 F. Supp. 3d 853, 858–59 (D. Minn. 2019)). 8 Courts in this district have now adopted the “Banda test” to assess when detention violates due 9 process. See, e.g., Maliwat, 2025 WL 2256711, at *3–4; Report and Recommendation, Belqasim 10 v. Hermosillo, No. C25-1282, (W.D. Wash. Oct. 28, 2025), Dkt. No. 17, report and 11 recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 3170929 (Nov. 13, 2025); Hong v. Mayorkas, No. C20- 12 01784, 2022 WL 1078627, at *4–5 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 11, 2022). The Respondents acknowledge 13 that courts in this District analyze this issue using the Banda multi-factor test, and the Court will 14 likewise apply the Banda test in determining if Respondents have met their burden of proving 15 that Petitioner’s continued detention without a bond hearing is justified. 16 IV. DISCUSSION 17 A. The Banda Factors 18 1. Total Length of Detention 19 “[T]he most important factor” under the Banda test is the length of detention. Banda, 385 20 F. Supp. 3d at 1118. The “context” of a petitioner’s circumstances is crucial to keep in mind, 21 particularly that “[t]he detention that is being examined here is the detention of a human being 22 who has never been found to pose a danger to the community or to be likely to flee if released.” 23 Jamal A., 358 F. Supp. 3d at 859. “The longer mandatory detention continues . . . the harder it is 24 1 to justify.” Murillo-Chavez v. Garland, No. C22-303, 2022 WL 16555994, at *5 (W.D. Wash. 2 Aug. 30, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 16553176 (Oct. 31, 2022). 3 As of the date of this Order, Petitioner has been detained for approximately 15 months. 4 See Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 47. Courts in this district have found that similar detention lengths weigh in
5 favor of granting a bond hearing. See, e.g., Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1118–19 (finding that 6 petitioner’s length of detention “strongly favors” a bond hearing because “Petitioner has been in 7 detention for approximately 17 months, which is a very long time.”); Toktosunov v. Wamsley, 8 No. C25-1724, 2025 WL 3492858, at *4 (finding petitioner’s 16-month detention favored 9 granting a bond hearing); Cardozo v. Bostock, No. C25-871, 2025 WL 2592275, at *1 (W.D. 10 Wash. Sept. 8, 2025) (12 to 13 months)); Maliwat, 2025 WL 2256711, at *2 (“nearly” 12 11 months); Rahman v. Garland, No. C24-2132, 2025 WL 1920341, at *3 (W.D. Wash. June 26, 12 2025), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Anisur R. v. Garland, 2025 WL 1919252 13 (July 11, 2025) (“almost” 12 months); Ashemuke v. ICE Field Off. Dir., No. C23-1592, 2024 WL 14 1683797, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 29, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL
15 1676681 (Apr. 18, 2024) (11 months). 16 Therefore, the Court finds that the first Banda factor weighs in favor of granting a bond 17 hearing. 18 2. Likely Duration of Future Detention 19 The second Banda factor is the likely duration of future detention. Banda, 385 F. Supp. 20 3d at 1118. The United States asserts that this factor “cannot be assessed at this time.” Dkt. 21 No. 16 at 7. The United States advised in August 2025 that “[t]he immigration court is working 22 to obtain an appropriate interpreter to move forward with his removal proceedings.” Id. 23 If anything, this factor weighs slightly in favor of granting a bond hearing. In Maliwat,
24 the court found the third Banda factor neutral after “declin[ing] to speculate as to the likely 1 duration of future detention.” Maliwat, 2025 WL 2256711, at *5. The court noted that “[w]here 2 proceedings are in much earlier stages”—i.e., pre-appeal—“courts have found the factor 3 neutral.” Id. (collecting cases). Here, under ordinary circumstances, the Court would tend to find 4 the factor neutral, too, “[g]iven that [Petitioner’s] case is still before the IJ, and no appeal has
5 been filed.” Id. But the Government’s serial failures to obtain an interpreter, combined with: 6 (1) its repeated representations that it will do so; and (2) the immigration court’s unexplained 7 about-face regarding its intent to terminate Petitioner’s case, render these circumstances 8 decidedly extraordinary. The Court is unimpressed with the IJ’s assurance that, “hopefully, after 9 making every effort,” the immigration court will be able to provide an interpreter—in six weeks’ 10 time. The IJ’s language amounts to a wing and a prayer and, what is more, it is unclear why this 11 next pause must last through the end of January 2026. The seemingly arbitrary durations of the 12 immigration court’s continuances and re-sets, see supra Section I, do not demonstrate that 13 court’s appreciation that what is at issue here is “the detention of a human being who has never 14 been found to pose a danger to the community or to be likely to flee if released.” Jamal A., 358
15 F. Supp. 3d at 859. Put another way, the record tends to indicate that the immigration court is 16 content to play it fast and loose with Petitioner’s right to due process and to proceed in an ad hoc 17 manner for as long as it takes to remove Petitioner. The Court cannot abide such a scenario. 18 Therefore, the Court finds that the second Banda factor weighs in favor of granting a 19 bond hearing. 20 3. The Conditions of Detention 21 The third Banda factor is the conditions of detention. Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1118. 22 The United States asserts only that Petitioner “is detained at the NWIPC.” Dkt. No. 16 at 7. For 23 his part, Petitioner characterizes his detention as “prison-like.” Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 109. “Courts in this
24 1 District have . . . found that, at this facility, under circumstances similar to that of Petitioner, this 2 factor favors granting a bond hearing.” Toktosunov, 2025 WL 3492858, at *5 (collecting cases). 3 Given the United States’ failure to rebut Petitioner’s comparison of the NWIPC to prison, 4 the Court finds that the third Banda factor weighs in favor of granting a bond hearing.
5 4. Delays in Removal Proceedings Caused by Petitioner 6 The fourth Banda factor considers delays in the removal proceedings caused by the 7 petitioner. Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1118. The United States concedes that “[t]here are no 8 indicia at this time that [Petitioner] has caused delay in his removal proceedings.” Dkt. No. 22 at 9 4. 10 Therefore, the Court finds that the fourth Banda factor weighs in favor of granting a bond 11 hearing. 12 5. Delays in Removal Proceedings Caused by Respondent 13 The fifth Banda factor considers delays in the removal proceedings caused by 14 Respondent. Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1118. The United States urges the Court not to find “that
15 the Government’s efforts to obtain the appropriate interpreter for [Petitioner] are averse to the 16 Government for this factor.” Dkt. No. 22 at 5. But in the original examination of the fifth Banda 17 factor, the Banda court itself attributed “essentially all the delay” in that case to “the lack of an 18 appropriate interpreter or DHS’s request for a continuance.” Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1120 19 (emphasis added). In Banda, DHS sought to avoid responsibility for the delay by “plac[ing] the 20 blame for the difficulties securing an interpreter on the Executive Office for Immigration 21 Review, which is the agency responsible for arranging interpretation services for immigration 22 court hearings.” Id. The court rejected this position, finding that “regardless of which agency 23 caused the delay, it is attributable to the Government, not petitioner.” Id. (citing Sajous v.
24 Decker, No. C18-2447, 2018 WL 2357266, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2018)); see also Belqasim, 1 2025 WL 3466971, at *9 (finding delay caused by failure to find an interpreter attributable to the 2 government). Similarly here, the Court will not leave the Government unaccountable for its 3 inability to retain a competent interpreter. 4 The Court has been patient with Respondent and has delayed adjudication of Petitioner’s
5 petition based on the United States’ serial representations regarding the retention of a competent 6 interpreter. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 18 (Carbajal Decl.) ¶ 4 (asserting that Petitioner’s “case was reset 7 to August 18, 2025, to schedule an interpreter in the appropriate language”); Dkt. No. 17 (Sica 8 Decl.) ¶ 23 (asserting that Petitioner’s hearing was “reset . . . to September 2, 2025, to find 9 another interpreter”); Dkt. No. 26 (United States’ Status Report) at 1 (advising the Court on 10 September 17, 2025, that the “[immigration] court will continue to locate an interpreter in 11 [Petitioner’s] dialect”); Dkt. No. 42 (United States’ Status Report) at 1 (advising the Court on 12 November 4, 2025, that Petitioner’s hearing had been reset to November 26, 2025, “so that an 13 appropriate interpreter could be provided”); Dkt. No. 46 (United States’ Status Report) at 2 14 (advising the Court on December 1, 2025, that Petitioner’s hearing had been reset “to be held
15 within the next two weeks,” and that “[i]f an appropriate interpreter cannot be located, the 16 immigration judge stated that he will terminate the case without prejudice”); Dkt. No. 51 (United 17 States’ Status Report) at 1 (advising the Court on December 16, 2025, that Petitioner’s hearing 18 had been reset “to January 29, 202[6], so that an appropriate interpreter could be provided”); see 19 also Dkt. No. 20 (Order on Briefing Schedule) at 2 (declining to “accelerate the briefing 20 schedule” because “Petitioner will appear in immigration court on September 2, 2025,” where, 21 “[o]stensibly an adequate interpreter will be provided”); Dkt. No. 32 (Order on Status Report) at 22 2–3 (re-noting Petitioner’s motion for preliminary injunction and advising the Parties that “if an 23 adequate interpreter is not sourced for the October 28 hearing, the motions will not be re-noted
24 again in anticipation of another hearing absent a specific showing that an interpreter capable of 1 communicating with Petitioner has been afforded”); Dkt. No. 45 (Order) (directing the Parties to 2 submit status reports); Dkt. No. 50 (Order) (directing United States to submit status report). After 3 so many false starts and failed attempts, the Court’s patience has run out. 4 Therefore, the Court finds that the fifth Banda factor weighs in favor of granting a bond
5 hearing. 6 6. Likelihood That Removal Proceedings Will Result in a Final Order of Removal 7
8 The sixth Banda factor considers the likelihood that removal proceedings will result in a 9 final order of removal. Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1118. The United States asserts that “[i]t is too 10 early to assess this factor.” Dkt. No. 22 at 5. Petitioner asserts that the interpreter issue points 11 away from an ultimate result of removability. See Dkt. No. 14 at 17. Petitioner’s argument here 12 is misplaced because, as Petitioner argues in his habeas petition itself, the interpreter issue is a 13 threshold matter that must be resolved before removal proceedings can even commence. Put 14 another way, without an interpreter, there are no removal proceedings. Therefore, the interpreter 15 issue has no bearing on the ultimate outcome of Petitioner’s yet-unrealized removal proceedings. 16 Absent any consideration of the merits, then, the Court agrees with the United States that it is too 17 early to assess this factor. Therefore, the Court finds that the sixth Banda factor is neutral. 18 * * * 19 In sum, five of the six Banda factors weigh in favor of granting Petitioner a bond hearing, 20 none weighs in favor of Respondent, and one is neutral. The Court thus finds that Petitioner’s 21 detention has become unreasonable, “and that due process requires the Government to provide 22 him with a bond hearing.” Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1120; see Toktosunov, 2025 WL 3492858, 23 at *6 (collecting cases). 24 1 B. Appropriate Relief 2 Having found that Petitioner’s detention has become unreasonable, the Court will now 3 address his various requests for relief. Petitioner’s prayer for relief includes six parts: First, 4 Petitioner seeks his immediate release from custody. Dkt. No. 1 at 20. Second, in the alternative
5 to immediate release, Petitioner seeks to have an individualized bond hearing before an 6 immigration judge within 14 days. Id. At the hearing, “the government should bear the burden of 7 proving by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner’s continued detention is justified (i.e., 8 that he poses a flight risk or danger that cannot be mitigated). If the government cannot meet that 9 burden, Petitioner should be released on appropriate terms.” Id. at 20–21. Third, Petitioner seeks 10 to have the Court declare that his continued detention is unlawful and unconstitutional. Id. at 21. 11 Fourth, Petitioner seeks to enjoin Respondent from continuing to detain Petitioner in violation of 12 the law. Id. Fifth, Petitioner seeks reasonable attorney fees and costs. Id. Sixth, Petitioner seeks 13 other relief that the Court deems “proper in the interests of justice.” Id. 14 1. Release or Bond Hearing
15 “Courts in this district have refused to order immediate release, finding that ‘[t]here is no 16 authority’ to support a claim that a petitioner ‘is entitled to an order of release.’” Maliwat, 2025 17 WL 2256711, at *9 (quoting Juarez v. Wolf, No. C20-1660, 2021 WL 2323436, at *8 (W.D. 18 Wash. May 5, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 2322823 (June 7, 2021)) 19 (collecting cases). Therefore, the Court declines to order Petitioner’s immediate release. 20 2. Bond Hearing 21 Petitioner’s alternative request for relief is for the Court to order “a prompt individualized 22 bond hearing before an immigration judge . . . within 14 days of the Court’s order.” Dkt. No. 1 at 23 20. Where courts in this District have considered meritorious habeas petitions from asylum-
24 seekers who, like Petitioner, have been unreasonably detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), they 1 have generally ordered the Government to provide the successful petitioner with a bond hearing. 2 See, e.g., Banda, 358 F. Supp. 3d at 1120; Maliwat, 2025 WL 2256711, at *10; Toktosunov, 3 2025 WL 3492858, at *6. This case presents no basis for deviation. As to the timing of the 4 hearing, Petitioner requests that the hearing be scheduled within 14 days of this Order. Dkt.
5 No. 1 at 20. Although a 14-day timeline would be “[c]onsistent with the practice of this District,” 6 Toktosunov, 2025 WL 3492858, at *6 (collecting cases), the Court will allow 21 days here, given 7 the scheduling complications presented by the holiday season and in recognition of the 8 Government’s ongoing struggle to locate a competent interpreter for Petitioner. 9 “At a civil detention hearing, the Government must prove by clear and convincing 10 evidence that the detainee is a risk of flight.” Toktosunov, 2025 WL 3492858, at *6 (citing Singh 11 v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1204 (9th Cir. 2011), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. 12 Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018)); see also Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1144 (9th Cir. 13 2013) (holding that “the constitutionally grounded hearing requirements set forth in Singh are 14 also applicable [to bond hearings for those detained under § 1225(b)]”); Rodriguez Diaz v.
15 Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1199 (9th Cir. 2022) (explaining that the clear-and-convincing burden 16 in Singh was based on general principles of due process); Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1120. There 17 must be a contemporaneous record of the bond hearing. See Rodriguez, 715 F.3d at 1136. 18 Moreover, “[w]hen an immigration court determines that a noncitizen is not ‘a danger to the 19 community and not to be so great a flight risk as to require detention without bond,’ due process 20 requires a consideration of the noncitizen’s financial circumstances regarding ability to afford 21 bail, as well as alternative conditions of release.” Toktosunov, 2025 WL 3492858, at *6 (quoting 22 Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 1000 (9th Cir. 2017)). “A bond determination process that 23 does not include consideration of financial circumstances and alternative release conditions is
24 unlikely to result in a bond amount that is reasonably related to the government’s legitimate 1 interests.” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d at 991; see also Abduraimov v. Andrews, No. C25- 2 843, 2025 WL 2912307, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2025); Cantor v. Freden, 761 F. Supp. 3d 3 630, 640 (W.D.N.Y. 2025). 4 The Court is unaware of any authority that permits the Government to relax
5 Constitutional due process requirements on the grounds that it finds it difficult to comply with 6 them. That is to say, the Government’s inability to hold a hearing does not obviate the due 7 process violation inherent to Petitioner’s continued detention. See Cardozo, 2025 WL 2592275, 8 at *3 (ordering Petitioner released unless government provides petitioner with individualized 9 bond hearing within 14 days); Vargas v. Wolf, No. C19-2135, 2020 WL 1929842, at *11 (D. 10 Nev. Apr. 21, 2020) (ordering petitioner “released on appropriate conditions” if government is 11 unable to prove by clear and convincing evidence that petitioner is a flight risk or danger to 12 community). Therefore, in the event that the Government is unable to provide Petitioner with an 13 individualized bond hearing before the deadline imposed by this Order, the Government must 14 release Petitioner from custody, “under appropriate conditions of release.” Belqasim, 2025 WL
15 3466971, at *13. “Because DHS will monitor these conditions, this Court thinks it best to allow 16 DHS to impose those that it determines are necessary.” Hechavarria v. Whitaker, 358 F. Supp. 17 3d 227, 243 n.13 (W.D.N.Y. 2019). 18 3. Declaration 19 Courts in this District and other districts have found that prolonged detention violates due 20 process. The Banda factors are used to “determine when detention has become unconstitutionally 21 prolonged,” and “if a detainee is entitled to a bond hearing under Banda, it is because his 22 continued detention without one—as the text of Section 1225(b) allows—violates due process.” 23 Cardozo, 2025 WL 2592275, at *2. For the reasons stated in Section IV.A, Petitioner’s detention
24 has become prolonged. “When a court issues a writ of habeas corpus, it declares in essence that 1 the petitioner is being held in custody in violation of his constitutional (or other federal) rights.” 2 Harvest v. Castro, 531 F.3d 737, 741 (9th Cir. 2008). Therefore, the Court declares that Section 3 1225(b) is unconstitutional as applied to the facts of this case, and that Petitioner’s prolonged 4 detention under Section 1225(b) violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See
5 Toktosunov, 2025 WL 3492858, at *7. 6 4. Injunction 7 Having found that Petitioner’s ongoing detention is unreasonable, the Court may order 8 injunctive relief to protect Petitioner’s due process rights. See, e.g., Luz Marina V.N. v. Robbins, 9 No. C25-1845, 2025 WL 3701960, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2025) (granting petition for writ of 10 habeas corpus and enjoining and restraining respondents “from re-detaining petitioner unless 11 they demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence at a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a 12 neutral decisionmaker, that petitioner is a flight risk or danger to the community such that her 13 physical custody is legally justified”); Aguilera Barrientos v. Chestnut, No. C25-1490, 2025 WL 14 3677319, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025) (same); Garcia-Donis v. Noem, No. C25-3281, 2025
15 WL 3467385, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2025) (granting petition for writ of habeas corpus and 16 enjoining respondents from detaining petitioner under 8 U.S.C. § 1225). Therefore, Respondent, 17 his agents, employees, and all persons acting under his direction are control, are enjoined from 18 continuing to detain Petitioner in violation of the law, subject to the 21-day grace period 19 described above in Section IV.B.1. 20 5. Attorney Fees and Costs 21 Petitioner may file a fee petition, as set forth in the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 22 U.S.C. § 2412. 23
24 1 C. Additional Motions 2 Also pending before the Court are Petitioner’s motion for a preliminary injunction (Dkt. 3 No. 14) and the United States’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 16). Given the granting of 4 Petitioner’s motion for habeas corpus, Petitioner’s motion for a preliminary injunction (Dkt.
5 No. 14) is moot and is therefore DENIED on that basis. See Soryadvongsa v. Noem, No. C25-2663, 6 2025 WL 3126821, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2025) (granting habeas petition and denying motion 7 for preliminary injunction as moot); Flores Marquez v. Knight, No. C25-2203, 2025 WL 8 3527244, at *7 (D. Nev. Dec. 9, 2025) (same). The United States’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. 9 No. 16) is likewise DENIED. 10 // 11 // 12 // 13 // 14 //
15 // 16 // 17 // 18 // 19 // 20 // 21 // 22 // 23 //
24 // 1 V. CONCLUSION 2 Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus (Dkt. No. 1) is GRANTED. It is hereby 3 || ORDERED: 4 (1) The Government SHALL hold a bond hearing for Petitioner within twenty-one 5 (21) calendar days of this Order. In the event that bond is granted, Respondent is 6 ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner. 7 (2) If the individualized bond hearing is not conducted by January 13, 2026, 8 Petitioner SHALL be immediately released under appropriate conditions of release, 9 until it is determined that his detention is warranted under the Immigration and 10 Nationality Act and is in accordance with this Order. 11 (3) Respondent is ENJOINED from continuing to detain Petitioner after January 13, 12 2026, in violation of the law or in contravention of this Order. 13 (4) Petitioner and the United States SHALL file a status report on the status of 14 Petitioner’s bond hearing no later than January 14, 2026. The status report 15 SHALL detail if and when the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or 16 denied and, if denied, the reasons for that denial. 17 (5) Petitioner’s motion for preliminary injunction (Dkt. No. 14) is DENIED as moot. 18 (6) The United States’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 16) is DENIED. 19 Dated this 23rd day of December, 2025. 20 21 Mat Zo ana Lin 22 United States District Judge 23 24
ORDER ON WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS — 21