Hartz v. Cleveland Block Co.

95 F. 681, 37 C.C.A. 227, 1899 U.S. App. LEXIS 2486
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedJune 6, 1899
DocketNos. 688, 689
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 95 F. 681 (Hartz v. Cleveland Block Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hartz v. Cleveland Block Co., 95 F. 681, 37 C.C.A. 227, 1899 U.S. App. LEXIS 2486 (6th Cir. 1899).

Opinion

LUBTON, Circuit Judge,

after making the foregoing statement of facts, delivered the opinion of the court.

The hearing was upon the plea, a general replication, and the evidence taken in support of the plea. Such a plea is a special answer to the bill, and nothing is put in issue, so far as the plea extends, but the truth of the matter pleaded. Farley v. Kittson, 120 U. S. 303-315, 7 Sup. Ct. 534; Dalzell v. Manufacturing Co., 149 U. S. 315, 13 Sup. Ct. 886. The original plea was set down for argument as insufficient in law. The court permitted the plea to be amended. To the •plea, as amended, the complainant took issue by a general replication. Upon the evidence bearing upon the issue thus made the court found that the plea was supported, and dismissed the complainant’s bill. No error has been assigned upon the ruling of the court in sustaining the plea as sufficient in law. The only question thus -open is as to whether the court erred in holding that the plea was sustained by the evidence. If it was not supported, it should have been overruled, and the defendant ordered to answer. Dalzell v. Manufacturing Co., 149 U. S. 315, 326, 13 Sup. Ct. 886; Farley v. Kittson, 120 U. S. 303, 315, 318, 7 Sup. Ct. 534.

The evidence does not, in our judgment, support the plea. The plea avers that the contract was made “in or about 1888,” — a most vague and indefinite date. The evidence, if possible, leaves it still more uncertain, and leaves it probable that the conversation relied upon as constituting the agreement sought to be set up occurred some time in 1887. The plea makes no averment touching the duration of the alleged agreement. The evidence is that nothing was said [683]*683about the duration; and counsel for appellee, in order to take the case without the statute of frauds, have urged that under the evidence it was an agreement “which could have been terminated by either party at any time upon reasonable notice.” The prices to be paid Hartz for making such blocks as the block company had occasion for are shown to have been agreed upon for one year. This makes it altogether probable that the understanding of the parties was that the agreement under which Hartz was to get all the work needed by the block company was to continue hut for one year. From this it would follow that only during that year was he under any obligation to assign to them patents taken out for improvements in blocks. The greatest uncertainty in the evidence supporting the plea is that which relates to the consideration to be paid Hartz for his inventions. The expense incident to experimenting and developing new ideas was great. The cost of patterns, dies, and machinery for the practical manufacture of improved snatch and tackle blocks was out of all proportion to the other costs incident to the obtention of a mere paper patent. Who was to bear the cost of tools, materials, labor, etc., used in devising and perfecting such new inventions as might be suggested to the mind of Haría? Who was to pay for the plant necessary to the practical manufacture of new inventions? The plea avers that “defendant was to pay the costs and expenses of making and perfecting said inventions and obtaining said patents.” But Mr. Lyman, who represented his company in the making of the alleged agreement, in stating the bargain says Hartz “agreed to do any such work as was necessary to improve or change any block that we* might desire changed, or to make such new inventions as had been, the work of Mr. Ford in the past, free of cost to the block company, except the actual money outlay or cost of patents when procured,, we agreeing to give him the exclusive manufacture of the Mocks in consideration of such work.” He was asked if this expense to be reimbursed was to be confined “to the expense that attorneys, might charge,” and answered:

“It was confined to the aciual cash outlay for the obtainment of the patent. Q. Did that include nothing more Uian the expense that attorneys might charge? A. Whatever expense was necessary to obtain the patent. I don’t know what they are. Q. Wasn’t it talked over that: there would have to be various expenses in making' patterns and making experiments, to see whether-the invention was really a practical one, before the patent was applied for? Wasn’t that talked over between you and Hartz? A. Yes, sir; and Hartz didn’t desire any pay for that. Q. Did lie say he did not to yon? A. Ha did. (2- Is it not a fact that ho. presented accounts to you to cove,r the expense of patent 387.071, coveting just such items of expense, and that the block com pany reimbursed him for the same? A. Not to my knowledge.”

The fact was that complainant did undertake to get out a metal snatch block some time in 1888, being the device covered by patent No. 387,071, and that every expense incurred by him for material and labor in the course of his experiments, as well as the entire cost of tools, dies, patterns, etc., used in working out his ideas or in preparation for the practical manufacture of his improved tackle block was presented to the defendant company from time to time as the expense accrued, and paid. These items aggregated, including [684]*684attorney’s fees for securing a patent, the sum of $937.88. From week to week Hartz presented his expense bill, and had it paid; and, so soon as the patent issued, he assigned it to the block company. Now, is this court to find the contract to be one which required Hartz to incur the cost of experiments and of patterns, as claimed by Mr. Lyman, the secretary and treasurer of the company, and the officer who says he made the contract, or is it to find that the agreement was as construed by the parties themselves with respect to the patent which was assigned to the block company? If we construe the plea as averring an agreement under which Hartz was to experiment and perfect devices for improving snatch and tackle blocks, and to make such patterns, dies, tools, and machinery as were necessary to the manufacturing of such improvements, at his own expense, being reimbursed only to the extent that he'had paid out money for the actual procurement of a patent and by the profit he might make upon such improved blocks as the block company might choose to order from him, no such agreement is proven. The fact that he was reimbursed for all his outlay in perfecting the device covered by patent No. 387,071, which he did assign to the company in 1888, including cost of dies, patterns, and tools for making the blocks covered by that patent, and that such reimbursement was made from week to week, as the work was done or the expense incurred, without question or controversy, is a demonstration that that invention, at least, was devised, perfected, patented, and assigned under an agreement quite unlike that stated by Mr. Lyman.

The alleged agreement of 1887 or 1888 was not even the origin of the business relation of Hartz and the block company. The plea avers that those - relations had begun in 1886. The evidence shows that for years prior to 1886 the same relation had existed between those who became incorporated in 1886, and who, as a corporation, continued to have their metal blocks made by Hartz as theretofore. Hartz was an independent manufacturing mechanic, having his- own machine shop, and doing work at all times for all who applied.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
95 F. 681, 37 C.C.A. 227, 1899 U.S. App. LEXIS 2486, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hartz-v-cleveland-block-co-ca6-1899.