Farley v. Kittson

120 U.S. 303, 7 S. Ct. 534, 30 L. Ed. 684, 1887 U.S. LEXIS 1976

• Court: Supreme Court of the United States
• Decided: February 7, 1887
• Docket: 6
• Status: Published

Opinion

Mr. Justice Gray,

after stating the case as above reported, delirered the opinion of the court.

A brief abstract of the pleadings will help to make clear wbat is presented for decision upon this record.

The suit was brought by Farley to enforce an agreement by which he and the defendants Kittson and Hill agreed to purchase, for their joint and equal benefit, the bonds, secured by mortgages, of two railroads, of one of which he was receiver, by appointment of the court, and of the other of which he was the general, manager, by appointment of the trustees named in the mortgages.

The bill alleged the making of the agreement; that its , object was, by means of the bonds so purchased, to purchase the railroads at sales under decrees of foreclosure -in suits then pending; that it was agreed that Kittson and Hill should conduct the negotiations for procuring the necessary funds and purchasing the bonds, and the plaintiff .should furnish such facts, information and advice, and render such assistance, from time to time, as should be required of him; that the plaintiff had knowledge, not possessed by the other parties, as. to who held the bonds and at what rate, and how they could be procured, and as to the nature and value of the railroads, and as to the pending suits for foreclosure, and his services and cooperation were indispensable to the success of the enterprise; that he performed the agreement on his part; that Kittson and Hill obtained the requisite funds from other persons, and purchased the bonds from the bondholders through one Kennedy, the .authorized agent of the latter, and afterwards purchased the railroads at sales under decrees of foreclosure; that pending the negotiations- for the purchase of the bonds, the plaintiff informed Kennedy' of his interest, and his connection with Kittson and Hill, in the project to purchase them; that the plaintiff at all times, to the best.of his knowledge'and ability, gave full and true answers and information to all inquiries made by Kennedy, or by any of the trustees or bondholders, or by any person interested in the property under his charge as receiver and as manager, and kept Kennedy fully informed of all matters coming to /his knowledge affecting the property, and in all things acted honestly and in good faith towards all persons interested in it; that Kittson and Hill had organized a new corporation, which was joined as a defendant; and that the defendants had thereby obtained a great amount of property and of profits, and had refused to account to the plaintiff for his share. The bill prayed for a discovery, an account, and other relief.

The individual defendants filed a plea, which, on the motion-. of the defendant corporation, was orderéd to stand as its plea also, consisting of three parts:

First. A restatement in detail of some of the facts alleged generally in the bill.

Second. Averments that the plaintiff never informed Kennedy or any-of the bondholders of his interest in the project for purchasing the bonds5 and thereby acquiring the mortgaged property, as alleged in the bill; and that neither Kennedy nor the bondholders knew, suspected, or had any information or belief, that the plaintiff had or claimed to have any interest in the project, until after the foreclosure sales.

Third. Averments that the making by the plaintiff of the agreement sued on, and his engaging in the enterprise of purchasing the bonds and thereby acquiring the railroads, were, as to that railroad of which he was receiver, unlawful, a breach of his trust as such receiver, and a fraud upon the bondholders and the court; and, as to the railroad of which he was general manager for the trustees under the mortgages, a breach of trust towards the trustees and the bondholders, and a fraud upon them; and that by reason of the fiduciary positions so occupied by him the plaintiff was not entitled to the aid of a court of equity to enforce the agreement or any rights growing out of it. • •

To this plea the plaintiff filed a general replication, and the hearing in the Circuit Court was upon the issue thus joined.

The pleader and the court below appear to have proceeded upon th'e theory that by a plea in equity a defendant may aver certain facts in addition to or contradiction of those alleged in the bill; and also not only, if he proves his averments; avail himself of objections in matter of law -to the case stated in the bill, -as modified by the facts proved; but even, , if he fails to prove those facts, take any objection to the case stated in the bill, which would have been open to him if he had demurred generally for want of equity.

But the proper office of a plea is not, like an answer, to meet all the allegations of the bill; nor like a demurrer, admitting those allegations, to deny the equity of the bill; but it is to present some distinct fact, which of itself creates a bar to the suit, or to the part to which the plea applies, and thus to avoid the necessity of making the discovery asked for, and the expense of going into the evidence at large. Mitford Pl. (4th ed.) 14, 219, 295; Story Eq. Pl. §§ 649, 652.

The plaintiff may either set down the plea for argument, or file a replication to it. If he sets down the plea for argument, he thereby admits the truth of all the facts stated in the plea, and merely denies their sufficiency in point of law to prevent his recovery. If, on the other hand, he replies to the plea, joining issue upon the facts averred in it, and so puts the defendant to the trouble and expense of proving his plea, he thereby, according to the English chancery practice, admits that if the particular facts stated in the plea ai’e true, they are sufficient in law to bar his recovery; and if they are proved to be true, the bill .must be dismissed, without reference to the equity arising from any other facts stated in the bill. Mitford Pl 302, 303; Story Eq. Pl. § 697. That practice in this particular has been twice recognized by this court. Hughes v. Blake, 6 Wheat. 453, 472; Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 14 Pet. 210, 257. But the case of Rhode Island v. Massachusetts arose within its original jurisdiction in equity, for outlines of the practice in which the court has always looked to the practice of the Court of Chancery in England. Rule 7 of 1791, 1 Cranch; xvii, and 1 How. xxiv; Rule 3 of 1858 and 1884, 21 How. v, and 108 U. S. 574. And the case of Hughes v. Blake, which began in the Circuit Court, was decided here in 1821, before this court, under the authority conferred upon it by Congress, had established the Buies of Practice in Equity in the Courts of the Hnited States, one of which provides that “ if upon an issue the facts stated hn the plea be determined for the defendant, they shall avail him as- far as in law and equity they ought to avail him.” Bule 19 in Equity of 1822, 7 Wheat, xix; Rule 32 in Equity of 1842, 1 How. li. The-effect of this rule of court when the issue of fact joined on a plea is determined in the defendant’s favor need not, however,' be considered in this case, because it is quite clear that at a hearing upon plea, replication and proofs, no fact is in issue between the parties but the truth of the matter pleaded.

In a case so heard, decided by this court in 1808, Chief Justice Marshall said: “ In this case the merits of the claim cannot be examined. The only questions before this court, are upon the sufficiency of the plea to bar the action, and the sufficiency of the testimony to support the plea as pleaded.” Stead v. Course, 4 Cranch, 403, 413. In a case before the House of Lords a year afterwards, Lord Redesdale “ observed, that a plea was a special answer to a bill, differing in this from an answer in the common form, as it demanded the judgment, of the court, in the first instance, whether the special matter urged by it did not debar the plaintiff from his title to that answer which the bill required. If a plea were allowed, nothing remained in issue between the parties, so far as the plea extended, but the truth of the matter pleaded.” “ Upon a plea allowed, nothing is in issue between the parties but the matter pleaded, and the averments added to support the plea.” “ Upon - argument of a plea, every fact stated in the bill, and not denied by answer in support of the plea, must be taken for true.” Roche v. Morgell, 2 Sch. & Lef. 721, 725-727.

The distinction between a demurrer and a plea dates as far back as the time of Loi;d Bacon, by the 58th of whose Ordinances for the'Administration of Justice in Chancery, “a demurrer is properly upon matter defective contained in the bill itself, and no foreign matter; but a plea is of foreign matter to discharge or stay the suit, as that the cause hath been formerly dismissed, or that the plaintiff is outlawed or excommunicated, or there is another bill, depending for the same cause, or the like.” Orders in Chancery (Beames’s ed.) 26. Lord Redesdale, in his Treatise on Pleadings, says: “A plea must aver facts to which the plaintiff may reply, and not, in the nature of a demurrer, rest on facts in the bill.” Mitford PL 297. And Mr. Jeremy, in a note to this passage, com menting on the ordinance of Lord Bacon, observes, “The prominent distinction between a ‘plea and a demurrer, hére noticed, Is strictly true, even' of that description of plea which ,is termed negative, for it is the affirmative of the proposition which is stated in the bill; ” in other words, a plea, which avers that a certain fact is not as the bill affirms it to be, sets up matter not contained in thé'bill:' That" an objection to the equity of the plaintiff’s claim, as stated in the bill, must' be taken by demurrer and not by plea is so well established, that it has been constantly assumed and therefore seldom stated in-judicial opinions ; yet there are instances in which it has been explicitly recognized by other courts of chancery, as well as by this court. Billing v. Flight, 1 Madd. 230; Steff v. Andrews, 2 Madd. 6 ; Varick v. Dodge, 9 Paige, 149 ; Phelps v. Garrow, 3 Edw. Ch. 139; Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 14 Pet. 210, 258, 262; National Bank v. Insurance Co., 104 U. S. 54, 76.

It 03}ly remains to apply these elementary principles of equity pleading to the case before us.

The averments in the first part of the plea, restating-in detail some of the facts alleged in the bill, were admitted by stipulation of counsel in writing to be true, and no controversy arose upon them.

The substance of the averments in the second part of the plea was that neither Kennedy, nor the bondholders whose' agent and representative he was, had any notice or knowledge that the plaintiff had or claimed to have any interest in the project set forth in the bill, until after the sales of the railroads under decrees of foreclosure. The matter of fact thus averred was- put in issue by the replication. The testimony of the plaintiff, (in connection with Kennedy’s letter to him,) which was uncontradicted, and was the only evidence upon the matter pleaded, shows that Kennedy, before the completion of the sale and purchase of the bonds, knew that the plaintiff was to have an interest in the project, although he may not have known the extent of. that interest, or that it had been already acquired. The want of any notice to Kennedy and the bondholders, averred in the plea, was thus disproved.

The plea, indeed, is supported by the affidavit of one of the defendants that it is true in point of fact. But the oath of the party to its truth in point of fact is added only for the same purpose as the certificate of counsel that in their opinion it is well founded in matter of law, in order to comply with the 31st Buie in Equity, the object of which is to prevent a defendant from delaying or evading the discovery sought, without showing that the plea is -worthy of the consideration of the court. Ewing v. Bright, 3 Wall. Jr. 134; Wall v. Stubbs, 2 Ves. & B. 354. An answer under oath is evidence in favor of the defendant, because made in obedience to the demand of the bill for a discovery, and therefore only so far as it is responsive to the bill. Seitz v. Mitchell, 94 U. S. 580. But a plea, which avoids the discovery prayed for, is no evidence in the.'defendant’s favor, even when it is under oath and negatives a material averment in the bill. Heartt v. Corning, 3 Paige, 566.

The allegations of the bill, that the plaintiff at all times, to the best of his knowledge, and ability, gave full and true answers to all inquiries made by Kennedy or any of the trustees or bondholders, or any person interested in the property under his charge as receiver and as manager, and in all things acted honestly and in good faith towards all persons interested in it, were not denied by the plea, and therefore, for the purposes of the hearing thereon, were conclusively admitted to be_ true. - So much of the plaintiff’s testimony, as tended to show that he intentionally concealed his interest from the stockholders and from the court, was outside of the averments of the plea, and therefore irrelevant to the issue to be tried.

The plaintiff having neither moved to set aside the plea as irregular for want of an answer supporting it, nor set down the case for hearing upon the bill and plea only, but having replied to the pleaj and the only issue of fact thus joined having-been determined by the evidence in his favor, it. is unnecessary to consider whether the averments of fact in the second part of the plea ought to have been supported by an answer, or whether, if proved, they would have made out a defence to the bill.

The averments in the third part of the plea, that, by reason of the plaintiff’s position as receiver and general manager of the railroads, his entering into the agreement sued on, and engaging in the enterprise of purchasing the bonds and thereby acquiring the railroads, were unlawful, and did not entitle him to the aid of a court of equity to enforce the agreement or any rights growing out of it, were averments .of pure matter of law, arising upon the plaintiff’s case as stated in the bill, and affecting the equity of the bill, and therefore a proper subject of demurrer, and not to be availed of by plea.

The result is, that the principal question considered by the court below and argued at the bar is not presented in a form to be decided upon the record -before us; and that, for .'the reasons above stated, and as suggested in behalf of the plaintiff at the reargument, the plea was erroneously sustained, and must be overruled, and the defendants ordered, in accordance with the. 34th Rule in Equity, to answer the bill.

Decree reversed, and case remanded, with directions to overrule the plea, and to order the defendants to answer the lili.