Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co.

195 So. 667, 189 Miss. 496, 1940 Miss. LEXIS 100

• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Decided: April 29, 1940
• Docket: No. 33674.
• Status: Published

Opinions

McGehee, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court on Suggestion of Error.

This case was first argued orally before, and submitted to, Division B of the Court for decision, and the judgment of the court below in favor of the appellee was reversed and the cause dismissed. On suggestion of error, a request was made of counsel to file additional briefs on the question of whether or not a clause contained in the fidelity bond sued on, requiring any claim thereunder to be made within fifteen (15) months after the termination of the suretyship for the defaulting employe, -was a condition precedent to liability. This point had been raised in the fourth replication filed in the trial court, by the appellee to the plea of the appellant, and that court had held that the right of action could not be defeated, “unless there is some forfeiture in the bond, or there is some stipulation that there will be no liability.” In the opinion rendered by Division B as aforesaid, as reported in 188 So. 539, it was said that three replications to the appellant ’s plea had been filed in the trial court. The substance of the first three replications was then set forth in the opinion, and it was held that the demurrers thereto should have been sustained. These three replications merely set forth anew, and also urged additional grounds for, the contention theretofore made by the appellee on a former appeal of the case to this Court, as reported in 169 Miss. 196, 150 So. 205; and to the Supreme Court of the United States, 292 U. S. 143, 54 S. Ct. 634, 78 L. Ed. 1178, 92 A. L. R. 928, to the effect that the rights of the parties under the fidelity bond sued on were governed by sections 2294 and 5131 of the Mississippi Code of 1930 and the decisions of our Court, instead of the laws of the State of Tennessee; whereas, the fourth replication raised for the first time the specific issue of whether or not, even under the Tennessee decisions, a compliance with the clause of the fidelity bond, relied on in appellant’s plea as a bar to recovery, was made a condition precedent to liability, as will be hereafter shown. In the opinion rendered by Division B on the present appeal, 188 So. 539, supra, no reference was made to this fourth replication, nor was the point involved therein specifically discussed or decided, on account of the fact that the briefs of counsel were largely devoted to reargument of the questions again raised by the first three replications, which had been settled adversely to the appellee’s contention by the decision of the United States Supreme Court, 292 U. S. 143, 54 S. Ct. 634, 78 L. Ed. 1178, 92 A. L. R. 928, supra, reversing the decision of this Court on the former appeal, as rendered in 169 Miss. 196, 150 So. 205, supra. Upon consideration of the suggestion of error and briefs thereon, the opinion rendered by Division B, as aforesaid, was withdrawn, the judgment of reversal set aside, the cause remanded to the docket for argument before Division A, and thereafter submitted for decision by the Court in banc.

The appellant Indemnity Company contends that the appellee was precluded by the law of the case from raising the issue presented by its fourth replication to the appellant’s plea, after the remand of the case to the Circuit Court of Boliver County for further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion rendered by the Supreme Court of the United States aforesaid; also, that under the laws of Tennessee its plea is good, and was sustained by the proof. To determine these two questions it is necés sary to first state the issue involved on the former appeal here, and the federal question presented to the Supreme Court of the United States when it reversed the former decision of this Court; and second, to review the decisions of the Tennessee Court and the law as stated by the text writers on the question of whether or not a noncompliance with the provision of the fidelity bond relied on as a defense to the suit is a condition precedent to liability, or whether a failure to comply therewith merely serves to postpone the right to sue.

On the former appeal the appellee had recovered a judgment against the appellant Indemnity Company for the sum of $2,703.79 because of the alleged default of TI. H. Harris, who was listed in a fidelity bond as the treasurer of the appellee, employed in its office at Memphis, Tennessee, and whose honesty and fidelity, was insured to the extent of any defalcations, committed in any position, anywhere, not exceeding the sum of $25,000, and which bond was entered into and consummated in the state of Tennessee, where the appellee then had its principal office, and where the appellant Indemnity Company maintained a local office.

The declaration alleged that subsequent to the execution and delivery of the contract of indemnity at Memphis, the appellee moved its office to Scott, Mississippi, where the defalcations of Harris occurred on various dates between May 9, 19291, and September 20', 1929, all in Bolivar County, Mississippi, where the appellee was then engaged in conducting a large planting* operation as its principal business. That these defalcations were not discovered in the exercise of due diligence until May 24, 1931, when notice was given immediately to the appellant. That within three months thereafter affirmative proof of the loss was filed with the appellant at its home office at Hartford, Connecticut; and the suit was filed within twelve (12) months of the filing of the proof of loss, as required by the policy.

The contract of indemnity was terminated on December 31, 1929, and the appellee had not made its claim until June 22, 1931, which was more than fifteen months after the termination of the contract of suretyship, but within thirty (30) days of the discovery of the shortage, according to the allegations of the declaration.

The appellant filed a plea to the declaration, to the effect that the cause of action could not be maintained for the reason that the contract contained the additional clause which provides that, “Any claim must be duly made upon the surety within fifteen (15) months after the termination of the contract of suretyship for the defaulting employee, . . .” And the plea averred that plaintiff did not make claim for its loss within the time above required. That, wherefore, the plaintiff should not have its action against the defendant for the reason that the fidelity bond sued on is a Tennessee contract, and is governed by the laws of that state. That, therefore, full faith and credit must be given thereto in the courts of Mississippi under the requirements of article 4, section 1, article 1, section 10, and section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, since there is no statute in Tennessee which prohibits the limitation aforesaid in such contracts of insurance or indemnity, and averred that the highest court of Tennessee, in the oases of Guthrie v. Indemnity Ass'n, 101 Tenn. 643, 49 S. W. 829; Phoenix Cotton Oil Co. v. Royal Indemnity Co., 140 Tenn. 438, 205 S. W. 128; City of Bristol v. Bostwick, 146 Tenn. 205, 240 S. W. 774, and other decisions of that court not cited in the plea, had held that such a limitation was valid and binding.

Instead of replying to this plea by saying that while it is true that the provision in the bond, non-compliance with which the defendant had set up therein as a defense, is valid and binding under the decisions of the Tennessee court, and not prohibited in such contracts by any statute of that state, it did not constitute a condition precedent to liability, since the contract did not so provide, nor provide for a forfeiture in the event of a failure to comply therewith — the plaintiff saw fit not to then file a replication to the legal conclusion contained in the defendant’s plea of the effect of the Tennessee decisions, or to plead the fact, to be disclosed by the evidence, that the contract contained no clause providing for a forfeiture for failure to make claim for the loss within fifteen (15) months after the termination of the contract of surety-ship, or clause making the filing of the claim within that time a condition precedent to liability, but demurred to the plea and assigned the following grounds:

“1 — The construction and validity of the provision in the contract requiring that any claim thereunder must be duly made upon the defendant, the surety, within fifteen (15) months after the termination of the surety-ship for the defaulting employee is not determined by the laws of the state of Tennessee but is determined by the laws of the state of Mississippi.

“2 — The statutes of limitations of the state where the suit is brought is the statute of limitations which governs the time within which actions may be brought, and the provision in the contract requiring1 that any claim thereunder must be duly made upon the defendant, the surety within fifteen (15) months after the termination of the suretyship for the defaulting employee is in violation of section 2294 of the Mississippi Code of 1930 (section 2491 of Hemingway’s 1917 Code of Mississippi), and in violation of the public policy of the state of Mississippi, and the courts of this state are not required to give full faith and credit to said provision under and in accordance with the requirements of article 4, section 1; article 1, section 10 and section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States as contended in defendant’s said plea.”

The Circuit Court of Bolivar County having sustained this demurrer, the defendant Indemnity Company declined to plead further, and the judgment was thereupon rendered against it for the alleged defalcations of the plaintiff’s employee, Harris, in the sum hereinbefore men tioned. On the appeal here, as reported in 169 Miss. 196, 150 So. 206, snpra, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court, on the ground that section 5131 of the Mississippi Code of 1930, defining insurance, rendered the fidelity bond sued on a contract of insurance, and solvable under the laws of this state, though made in Tennessee, since the statute provides that, “All contracts of insurance on property, lives or interests in this state shall be deemed to be made therein;” and, further, that in view of the fact that section 2292 of said Code provides that, “All actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced within six years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after,” and section 2294 thereof renders null and void any change in this limitation by contract between the parties, the plea constituted no defense to the suit. In so holding that these statutes rendered the contract solvable under the laws of Mississippi instead of Tennessee, our Court was adhering to its former decisions in that regard, whereby the Court, as observed in the opinion referred to, had committed itself to the proposition that a contract of insurance on an interest in this state, although the contract be made in another state, was to be determined by the laws of our own state; and cited in support thereof the cases of Fidelity Mutual Ins. Co. v. Miazza, 93 Miss. 18, 46 So. 817, 136 Am. St. Rep. 534; Stuyvesant Ins. Co. v. Smith Motor Sales Co., 135 Miss. 585, 99 So. 575, which so held. Hence, the appellee was entitled to assume on that appeal that the only question presented to the Court here for decision on the declaration, plea, and demurrer was whether these Mississippi statutes and decisions would govern the rights of the parties to the contract of • suretyship sued on, or whether they were to be governed by laws of Tennessee, since the limitation in controversy would be unenforceable under the statutes and decisions of the state of Mississippi, if applicable, without regard to whether or not the limitation constituted a condition precedent to liability under the laws of Tennessee. Nei ther do the briefs, as officially reported in the case on the former appeal, 169 Miss. 196, 150 So. 205, supra, show that the contention was made therein that the provision in the bond, requiring any claim thereunder to be duly made upon the surety within fifteen (15) months after the termination of the suretyship for the defaulting employee, was a condition precedent to liability under the laws of Tennessee; nor is there a Tennessee case cited in the briefs. The only decisions of that Court referred to at all are those listed in the appellant’s plea, and they do not sustain the affirmative of that proposition, as will be hereinafter shown. In other words, the sole question presented by the plea and demurrer, and argued in the briefs at that time was the question of whether or not the laws of Mississippi could be integrated into this Tennessee contract. This was the issue presented by the declaration, plea and demurrer, and no other question was properly before the Court for decision.

Prom that decision the case was appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, and the sole grounds of error assigned were:

“The Supreme Court of Mississippi erred in holding that under section 5131 of the Mississippi Code of 1930 the bond or policy of insurance sued upon, made and to be performed in Tennessee, was to have been deemed to have been made in Mississippi and solvable under the laws of Mississippi because upon an interest in Mississippi, and therefore under section 2294, Mississippi Code of 1930, the provision of said bond of policy that claim thereunder must be made upon the surety within fifteen months after termination of the suretyship, valid under the Laws of Tennessee, was null and void because in conflict with the limitation on actions upon such contracts prescribed by the laws of Mississippi, in that said statutes in such construction and application were made repugnant to Article IV, Section 1 and Section 1 of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

2. “The Supreme Court of Mississippi erred in hold ing that the bond or policy sued upon was upon an interest in the state of Mississippi.”

The Supreme Court of the United States thereupon reversed the decision of this Court, and remanded the cause for further proceedings not inconsistent with its opinion. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U. S. 143, 54 S. Ct. 634, 78 L. Ed. 1178, 92 A. L. R. 928. Upon such remand the Supreme Court of this state remanded the ease to the Circuit Court of Bolivar County, without any further opinion.

The question at issue before the United States Supreme Court is clearly indicated in the syllabi of the case, as being a federal question only. Sec. 292 U. S. 143, 54 S. Ct. 634, 78 L. Ed. 1178, 92 A. L. R. 928, as follows:

“A state may, without violating the due process clause, limit or prohibit the making of certain contracts within its own territory; but cannot extend the effect of its laws beyond its borders so as to destroy or impair the right of citizens of other states to make a contract not operative within its jurisdiction, and lawful where made.

“2. A state may not, in an action based upon a contract lawful where made and operative, enlarge the obligations of the parties to accord with every local statutory policy solely upon the ground that one of the parties is its own citizen.

“3. A state may not, without violating the due process clause of the Federal Constitution, apply to an employee’s fidelity insurance contract, entered into in'another state, its own statute annulling any contractual limitation of the time for giving notice of claim, although the default occurred after the removal of the insured and his defaulting employee to the state in which the action is brought. ’ ’

Moreover, the jurisdiction of that court was necessarily confined to the federal question presented by the appeal, that is to say, whether the Supreme Court of Mississippi had erred in holding that the Mississippi statutes referred to, instead of the laws of Tennessee, should govern this contract made in Tennessee. Judicial Code, sec. 237,. as amended, 28 U. S. C. A. sec. 344, Simkins’ Federal Practice (3 Ed.), section 953, page 283, Brinkerhoff, etc., Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S. 673, 680, 50 S. Ct. 451, 74 L. Ed. 1107, 1113. Most assuredly, the issue of whether a provision in a contract of indemnity requiring a claim of loss to be made within a specified time, was a condition precedent to liability could not be deemed a federal question. Having determined that the bond sued on was a Tennessee contract by virtue of having been executed and delivered in that state, and was not changed into a Mississippi contract by virtue of our statutes and decisions because of the fact that the defalcations occurred here where the services of the employee were being rendered, and that therefore the laws of Tennessee should have been applied by the state court in determining the effect of the provision of the contract, the non-compliance with which was set up in the plea of the indemnity company as a defense, it is to be assumed that the Supreme Court of the United States in so holding and in remanding the case for further proceedings had in contemplation that the plaintiff in the trial court would be required to reply to the plea, since its demurrer thereto had been held to be without merit, and that both the trial court and this Court would then be called on for the first time to construe and apply the laws of Tennessee in deciding whether a compliance with the provision set forth in the plea constitutes a condition precedent to liability.

It is true that this Court on the former appeal, 169 Miss. 196, 150 So. 205, 206, supra, when the appellee therein was relying solely on the issue raised by its demurrer, the grounds of which are hereinbefore fully set forth, erroneously assumed and stated that: “It is to be conceded that under the adjudicated decisions of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, cited in the plea, the provision for notice of fifteen months is a limitation of liability and not a limitation of action;” and that the Supreme Court of the United States, 292 U. S. 143, 54 S. Ct. 634, 78 L. Ed. 1178, 92 A. L. R. 928, supra, seemed to have been thereby caused to make the same assumption, without either court having discussed in their respective opinions the Tennessee decisions mentioned in the plea, and where the only issue raised by the plea and demurrer, or argued in the briefs, was the federal question of whether the law of Mississippi or that of Tennessee should govern the rights of the litigants. In other words, the demurrer, as appears from the grounds assigned therein, raised the sole question of whether or not the Tennessee decisions had any application, and did not present the question of the interpretation of the meaning and effect of those decisions. The demurrant was entitled to have determined the question of whether the laws of Tennessee should be applied before being required to argue what effect should be given to the laws of that state when applied. The appellant Indemnity Company recognized that the sole issue presented to the state Court on the former appeal was whether the Mississippi statutes and decisions could be integrated into what, according to its contention, was a Tennessee contract, as shown by its brief, 169 Miss. on pages 197 and 198, 150 So. 205 of the reported case on the former appeal.

It was held in the recent case of McGoldrick, Comptroller of the City of New York, v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 60 S. Ct. 670, 672, 84 L. Ed. 849, decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on March 25, 1940, that: “It is also the settled practice of this court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, that it is only in exceptional cases, and then only in cases coming* from the federal courts, that it considers questions urged by a petitioner or appellant not pressed or passed upon in the courts below. Blair v. Oesterlein Co., 275 U. S. 220, 225, 48 S. Ct. 87, 88, 72 L. Ed. 249; Duignan v. United States, 274 U. S. 195, 200, 47 S. Ct. 566, 568, 71 L. Ed. 996." And, in the course of its opinion, the Court further stated: “In the exercise of our appellate jurisdiction to review the action of state courts we should hold ourselves free to set aside or revise their determinations only so far as they are erroneous and error is not to he predicated upon their failure to decide questions not presented.” The question of whether or not the requirement of the bond in controversy was a condition precedent to liability, under the Tennessee decisions, not having been presented by the demurrer, or argued in the briefs on the former appeal, should not be deemed to have been decided by the state Court when it affirmed the judgment of the trial court in sustaining the demurrer; but rather that the Court merely assumed that the proposition was to be conceded in the absence of an argument by the appellee to the contrary — an argument which the appellee was not required to make until after the federal question presented by the demurrer should have been first disposed of adversely to its contention, since a favorable decision in all the courts sustaining the demurrer would have rendered immaterial the decisions of the Tennessee Court on the question of whether the provisions of the bond involved was a condition precedent under the laws of that state.

The ultimate decision reached having been adverse to the contention of the appellee on the federal question involved, he was then required for the first time to reply in the trial court to the plea which invoked the limitation of fifteen (15) months within which the claim for loss was to be filed, by pleading’ as an affirmative defense thereto that the limitation was neither made a condition precedent to liability by the terms of the contract, nor was there a forfeiture provided for in the bond, in event of failure to comply therewith.

The pertinent provisions of the fidelity bond in question are fully set forth in the opinion of this Court on the former appeal, 169 Miss. 196, 150 So. 205, supra, reference to which is here made to avoid the necessity of again reciting the same in detail; and from which it will be observed that the only conditions precedent to liability is that a loss be sustained, that the claim and proof of loss be filed with the home office of the Indemnity Com pany, and that the suit be filed within twelve months (12) after the making of the claim, and the filing of the proof of loss. These conditions were all duly complied with, and the failure to comply with the condition requiring the claim to be made within the fifteen months prescribed, only served to postpone the time for bringing the suit, and did not forfeit the right to recover a loss, provided the claim and proof of loss were submitted before the suit was filed, since a compliance with the latter provision was neither made a condition precedent to liability by the terms of the contract, nor was a forfeiture provided for therein for failure so to do, and one of which provisions must be either expressed or clearly implied from the terms employed, according to the decisions of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, in order to make a failure to comply with such a provision a condition of liability. Continental Fire Ins. Co. v. Whitaker, 112 Tenn. 151, 79 S. W. 119, 64 L. R. A. 451, 105 Am. St. Rep. 916; Johnson v. Scottish Union Ins. Co., 160 Tenn. 152, 22 S. W. (2d) 362; Smithart v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 167 Tenn. 513, 71 S. W. (2d) 1059; City of Bristol v. Bostwick et al., 146 Tenn. 205, 240 S. W. 779; Guthrie v. Conn. Indem. Ass’n, 101 Tenn. 643, 49 S. W. 829; Phoenix Cotton Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., 140 Tenn. 438, 205 S. W. 128; Blackman v. United States Casualty Co., 117 Tenn. 578, 103 S. W. 784. It is true that these cases hold that such a provision is legal and valid. However, the question here is not whether it is lawful, but what is its effect under the Tennessee decisions when given validity.

The same rule applies under the Mississippi decisions; Fidelity & Depos. Co. v. Merchants’ & Marine Bank, 169 Miss. 755, 151 So. 373, 154 So. 260; American Nat. Ins. Co. v. Waters, 133 Miss. 28, 96 So. 739; Employers’ Liability Assur. Corp. v. Jones Co. Lbr. Co., 111 Miss. 759, 72 So. 152; and under a decision of the Supreme Court of appellant’s domicile, Elberton Cotton Mills v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 108 Conn. 707, 145 A. 33, 62 A. L. R. 926; also, 5 Joyce on Insurance, sections 3282, 3283, and (2 Ed.), 548, 33 C. J. 14, section 661, 14 R. C. L. 1327, section 501, Cooley’s Briefs on Insurance (2 Ed.), vol. 7, section 1338 (a).

In the case of Continental Fire Ins. Co. v. Whitaker, 112 Tenn. 151, 79 S. W. 119, 122, 64 A. L. R. 451, 105 Am. St. Rep. 916, the suit was against a fire insurance company for a fire loss. The policy provided, among other things, that: “ ‘If fire occur the insured shall . . . within sixty days after the fire, unless such time is extended in writing,’ make proofs of loss. . . . ‘No suit or action on this policy for the recovery of any claim, shall be sustainable . . . until after full compliance by the insured with all the foregoing requirements, nor unless commenced within twelve months after the fire. ’ ’ ’ The Court said:

“No forfeiture is provided for in the policy for failure to furnish the proofs of loss within 60 days next after the fire, although there are many other acts referred to in the policy, and omissions also referred to therein, for which forfeitures are provided.

“In the present case the proofs of loss were furnished within 69 days after the fire, but not within 60 days. The suit was not brought until the expiration of 60 days from the filing of the proofs of loss, and it was brought within 12 months after the fire.

“The rule laid down in Joyce on Insurance applicable to this state of facts is as follows: ‘If a policy of insurance provides that notice and proofs of loss are to be furnished within a certain time after loss has occurred, but does not impose a forfeiture for failure to furnish them within the time prescribed, and does impose forfeiture for a failure to comply with other provisions of the contract, the insured may, it is held, maintain an action, though he does not furnish proofs within the time designated, provided he does furnish them at some other time prior to commencing the action upon the policy. Arid this has been held to be true even though the policy provide that no action can be maintained until after a full compliance with all the requirements thereof.’ ”

The Whitaker case is directly in point. To the same effect is the case of Johnson v. Scottish Union Ins. Co., 160 Tenn. 152, 22 S. W. (2d) 362, decided on December 23, 1929. The other Tennessee cases hereinbefore mentioned either expressly made compliance with the provisions in question a condition precedent to liability, or provided for a forfeiture on failure to comply with the same. And in the case of Blackman v. United States Casualty Co., 117 Tenn. 578, 103 S. W. 784, 785 (relied on by the Indemnity Company in the case at bar), the policy not only made compliance with the provision in question a condition precedent, but further provided that £ £ failure of the insured to comply with any provision or condition herein shall forfeit all rights to indemnity.”

Under all of the Tennessee decisions referred to in any of the briefs of counsel, the failure to comply with similar requirements had not been held to defeat liability unless compliance therewith is made a condition precedent thereto, or unless a forfeiture is provided for.

This rule is recognized in 33 C. J. 14, section 661, where it is stated: “If giving notice and furnishing proofs in such time are made conditions precedent to liability on the part of the company, or if a forfeiture is provided for if they are not given in the time fixed, notice and proofs must be given as and when specified in the policy or no recovery may be had, and additional proofs furnished long after the time required hy the policy cannot be considered. The courts, however, are reluctant to construe provisions requiring notice and proofs of loss as in the nature of forfeitures, and, where the serving of notice or proofs within the specified time is not expressly made a condition precedent to recovery, and no forfeiture is provided for in case of default in service, notwithstanding forfeitures are stipulated for in case of breach of other requirements of the policy, the failure to serve notice or proofs merely postpones the time of payment and the time for bringing suit, and, if notice and proofs are subsequently served, insured or the insurance claimant may recover on the policy notwithstanding his delay, provided of course the time for suing on the policy has not expired. ’ ’

See, also, 14 R. C. L., section 501, page 1327, where it is stated: “On the other hand many courts take the position that the requirements in a standard insurance policy that the insured shall give notice and make proof of loss within a certain time are conditions precedent to the right to sue, but failure to comply with such requirements within the time stipulated does not avoid the policy or work a forfeiture in the absence of a stipulation in the policy to that effect. Such failure merely postpones the day of payment, provided notice is given and proof of loss is made tvithin such time as will enable the insured to bring his siát within the time limited by the policy. Especially is this true under a policy which requires notice to be given within a specified time but does not expressly provide that a failure to give such notice shall invalidate all claims under the policy, or where notice was in good faith given a broker through whom the policy was procured and the insurer suffers no loss through a delay due to the broker’s mistake. Though a forfeiture is not involved by failing to furnish proofs within the time stipulated they must be furnished within a reasonable time or no recovery can be had. ’ ’

In Cooley’s Briefs on Insurance (2 Ed.), vol. 7, page 5770, it is stated: “The weight of authority, however, seems to support the rule that neither a provision that the loss shall not be payable until after the stipulated proofs have been furnished, nor, the provision that no action shall be maintainable until after such compliance with the policy, will render the furnishing of proofs within the stipulated time a condition precedent. Rather do such provisions, by their phraseology, indicate an intention that the payment of loss shall be merely postponed until the proofs are furnished ... It would seem to follow, as a necessary corollary from the doctrine that delay beyond a stipulated time will only postpone the liability of the company or the enforcement of the claim, that it will be sufficient in such cases that the proofs are given before the bringing of the action. ’ ’

The case of Continental Fire Ins. Co. v. Whitaker, Tenn., supra, is cited as supporting that text.

In Couch’s Ency. of Ins. Law, vol. 7, section 1538 (a), it is said: “Nor will a clause providing for a forfeiture for failure to furnish proofs within a specified time be read into a contract, although the policy, in another place, provided that no action shall be brought until after ‘full compliance by the insured with all of the foregoing requirements. ’ In fact, when there is no express forfeiture provision in the policy, the failure to make proof in the time required thereby merely postpones the time of bringing the suit.”

The three Tennessee cases cited by the Indemnity Company in the case at bar in its plea that the failure to present the claim within fifteen months of the termination of the suretyship for the defaulting employee defeated liability, are: Guthrie v. Indemnity Ass'n, 101 Tenn. 643, 49 S. W. 829; Phoenix Cotton Oil Co. v. Royal Indemnity Co., 140 Tenn. 438, 205 S. W. 128; and City of Bristol v. Bostwick, 146 Tenn. 205, 240 S. W. 774.

In the Guthrie case the contract of insurance provided [101 Tenn. 643, 49 S. W. 830] : “It is expressly understood and agreed that no action shall be maintained nor recovery had for any claim upon or by virtue of this policy after the lapse of one year from the death of said insured, and, if said suit or proceedings for such recovery be not commenced within one year from the date of the death of said insured, it shall be deemed a waiver on the part of all parties concerned of all rights or claims under or by virtue of this policy, and as conclusive evidence against-the validity of such claim; and this policy shall be null and void and of no effect, and no person shall be entitled to damages, or the recovery of any money paid thereon. ’ ’

The contract now before us contains a provision: “No suit, action or proceeding shall be brought by the em ployer against the surety after the expiration of twelve months after the filing of the proof of loss as above required. ’ ’

Had this provision not been complied with, the decision in the Guthrie case would preclude a recovery by appellee. But that case has no application here, because the appellee complied with that precedent condition.

In the Phoenix Cotton Oil case, supra, the opinion of the Tennessee Court states [140 Tenn. 438, 205 S. W. 129]: "But [the contract of insurance] made it a condition precedent of such liability that the former should ‘upon the occurrence of any accident covered by this policy give immediate written notice thereof to the company.’ ” Then the opinion further states that, "By its express terms the giving of immediate notice was made a condition precedent to the right of recovery.”

In the case of City of Bristol v. Bostwick, supra, the provisions of the policy are not given. Therefore, these three cases are not in conflict with the other decisions of the Tennessee Court, such as the cases of Continental Insurance Co. v. Whitaker, 112 Tenn. 151, 79 S. W. 119, 64 L. R. A. 451, 105 Am. St. Rep. 916, and Johnson v. Scottish Union Ins. Co., 160 Tenn. 152, 22 S. W. (2d) 362, herein-before discussed, nor with the views of the text writers and the decisions of other courts, including this Court, as reflected in the cases of Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Merchants’ & Marine Bank, 169 Miss. 755, 151 So. 373, 154 So. 260; American Nat. Ins. Co. v. Waters, 133 Miss. 28, 96 So. 739; and Employers’ Liability Assur. Corp. v. Jones Co. Lbr. Co., 111 Miss. 759, 72 So. 152, hereinbefore cited.

The Supreme Court of the United States having held •that the law of Tennessee, and not that of Mississippi, governs the rights of the parties, the appellant takes the position that what was said in the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States on a point which we think was not raised by the demurrer then before the Court, "Is the law of the case and binding upon this Court, right or wrong;” notwithstanding’ the fact that neither the State Supreme Court nor the United States Supreme Court on the former appeal had occasion to consider other than the federal question raised by the demurrer as to whether our statutes, sections 2294 and 5131 of the Code of 1930’, should be integrated into a contract made in Tennessee, or whether the Tennessee decisions should control. When it was held that the law of Tennessee applies, it follows that it then became the province of the Circuit Court of Bolivar county, Mississippi, and of this Court, to determine what the law of Tennessee is as applied to the contract in question; and that for this purpose the case was remanded for further proceedings.

Finally, the Indemnity Company says that under a very recent case, Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. England, 171 Tenn. 104, 100 S. W. (2d) 982, 983, the Court has held that: “Proofs of claim is a condition precedent to bringing suit. 33 C. J. 74. And this is true even though it is not expressly provided in the policy that furnishing' such proofs is a condition precedent to suit, or that failure to submit proofs shall operate as a forfeiture of benefits.” We observe, however, that the Court only held that the right to bring a suit is postponed until the proof of loss is furnished whenever such proof is required and is not waived. That case is in line with the other authorities hereinbefore quoted from. But in the case at bar the proofs of loss required by the bond were furnished, before the suit ivas filed, and the suit was filed within twelve months thereafter, as required by the bond sued on. Hence, the question decided in. the case last above mentioned is not here involved. There is obviously a vital distinction between a postponement of the right to bring suit and being denied the right to recover at all, because the proofs of loss were filed late.

From the foregoing views, it follows that we are of the opinion that the appellee is not precluded either by the law of the case or the decisions of the Supreme Court of Tennessee from a recovery of the loss sued for, and that the judgment of the court below should be affirmed.

Affirmed.