Harte v. City of New Rochelle

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedOctober 20, 2024
Docket7:24-cv-04994
StatusUnknown

This text of Harte v. City of New Rochelle (Harte v. City of New Rochelle) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Harte v. City of New Rochelle, (S.D.N.Y. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK JAMES R. HARTE, Plaintiff, -against- 24-CV-4994 (LTS) CITY OF NEW ROCHELLE; ORTIZ, AN ORDER TO AMEND OFFICER MARSHAL OF THE CITY OF NEW ROCHELLE, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action invoking the Court’s federal question and diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, alleging that Defendants violated his rights. By order dated July 24, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.

BACKGROUND The following facts are drawn from the complaint, which names as Defendants the City of New Rochelle and Ortiz, “an Officer Marshal of the City of New Rochelle.”1 (ECF 1 at 1.) In October 2023, Defendant Ortiz executed a warrant of eviction at 192 Lyncroft Road in New Rochelle, where Plaintiff had lived with his wife and son. (Id.) A moving company was tasked with boxing up the family’s possessions – which included “very expensive personal properties, that was antiques, furniture’s, TV’s, plates, dishes, silver flatware’s, fur coats, clothes, jewelry,

1 The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. All other spelling, grammar, and punctuation are as in the original unless otherwise indicated. music instruments, and family heirloom that was in [Plaintiff’s] household for” 50 years – and taking them to Al’s Moving Storage. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, there “were no labels on the boxes and packages packed by the moving company,” and much of their property was either lost, “discarded . . . in the garbage,” or stolen. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that Ortiz “breached his fiduciary duty” by failing to supervise the eviction execution or secure and protect Plaintiff’s property. (Id. at 2-3.) Plaintiff attaches to the complaint a notice of claim and a police report that he filed about the incident. (Id. at 4-8.) Plaintiff asserts that Defendants violated his rights to due process. Plaintiff estimates the value of the missing property to be half a million dollars, and he seeks money damages in that amount. (Id.) DISCUSSION A. Federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims against “Officer Marshal Ortiz” Plaintiff asserts that Ortiz violated his constitutional rights, and he invokes 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a

person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). The Court construes the complaint as asserting a claim for a violation of Plaintiff’s procedural due process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects “against deprivations [of life, liberty, or property] without due process of law.” Rivera-Powell v. N.Y. City Bd. of Elect., 470 F.3d 458, 464 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard . . . at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Determining whether the process provided is adequate requires a weighing of: (1) the private interest affected; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation and the probable value of further safeguards; and (3) the governmental interest at issue. See Rivera-Powell, 470 F.3d at 466

(quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). A government official’s random and unauthorized act does not violate a person’s right to procedural due process if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy is available. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1986); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 540-43 (1981), overruled in part on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Hellenic Am. Neighborhood Action Comm. v. City of New York, 101 F.3d 877, 880 (2d Cir. 1996).

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Coppedge v. United States
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Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs.
436 U.S. 658 (Supreme Court, 1978)
Parratt v. Taylor
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468 U.S. 517 (Supreme Court, 1984)
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474 U.S. 327 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill
484 U.S. 343 (Supreme Court, 1988)
West v. Atkins
487 U.S. 42 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Wisconsin Department of Corrections v. Schacht
524 U.S. 381 (Supreme Court, 1998)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
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Salahuddin v. Cuomo
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Hill v. Curcione
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Bluebook (online)
Harte v. City of New Rochelle, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/harte-v-city-of-new-rochelle-nysd-2024.