Harrison v. Kaner

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedApril 17, 2023
Docket1:23-cv-00944
StatusUnknown

This text of Harrison v. Kaner (Harrison v. Kaner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Harrison v. Kaner, (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK GUINETTE HARRISON, Plaintiff, -against- 23-CV-0944 (LTS) DR. DOUGLAS KANER, D & R ORDER TO AMEND PHYSICIANS; DR. JOHN DOE, D & R PHYSICIANS; DENEFITS, LLC, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action invoking the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, and the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681. By order dated February 8, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.

BACKGROUND The following factual allegations are drawn from the amended complaint, which names as Defendants Dr. Douglas Kaner and Dr. John Doe, both of D & R Physicians, and Denefits, LLC. On an unspecified date, Plaintiff got lost on her way to Dr. Kaner’s office, presumably for an appointment for treatment. Plaintiff “hysterically” called that office, apparently to cancel the appointment, and explained that one of her siblings had just passed away, and she needed to organize the funeral. (ECF 3 ¶ I.) It is not completely clear what happened next, but Plaintiff alleges that she incurred a medical debt and was subjected to “constant harassment on [her] cell phone,” and that her “info was compromised.” (Id. ) In December 2022, Plaintiff applied for a “personal loan,” which was denied due to “unlawful[] tactics” and fraud. Plaintiff seeks to have negative information removed from her credit reports, and money damages. (Id. at 6.) An attachment to the complaint indicates that the amount of the debt at issue is approximately $23,000. (Id. at 10.) Plaintiff alleges that she resides in New York, that Denefits,

LLC resides in California, and that the medical defendants reside in New Jersey. DISCUSSION A. Federal claims The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) The FDCPA applies to consumer debt “arising out of . . . transaction[s] . . . primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5); Polanco v. NCO Portfolio Mgmt., Inc., 930 F. Supp. 2d 547, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[T]he FDCPA is triggered when the obligation is a debt arising out of a consumer transaction”). In cases where the FDCPA applies, it prohibits deceptive and misleading practices by “debt collectors.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. A debt collector is defined in Section 1692a(6) as: (1) a person whose principal purpose is to collect debts; (2) a person who regularly collects debts owed to another; or (3) a person who collects its own debts, using a name other than its own, as if it were a debt collector. See also Henson v.

Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718 (2017) (holding that entities that regularly purchase debts originated by someone else and then seek to collect those debts for their own account are not necessarily debt collectors subject to the FDCPA). Section 1692d of the FDCPA provides that “[a] debt collector may not engage in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt.” Conduct in violation of the statute includes, among other examples and without limitation, using violence or the threat of violence or other criminal means; using obscene or profane language “the natural consequence of which is to abuse the hearer or reader”; publishing a list of consumers who refuse to pay debts; or “[c]ausing a telephone to ring or engaging any person in telephone conversation repeatedly or continuously with the intent to annoy, abuse, or harass” the person called. 15 U.S.C. § 1692d. Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to state a claim under the FDCPA. Plaintiff

names as Defendants Denefits, LLC; Dr. Kaner; Dr. Doe; and D & R Physicians, but she does not specify who engaged in the alleged conduct. Insofar as Kaner, Doe, and D & R Physicians may have attempted, under their own names, to recoup a debt owed to them, they do not qualify as debt collectors under the FDCPA. See Section 1692a(6) Henson, 137 S. Ct. 1718. The Court grants Plaintiff leave to allege facts regarding the conduct of Denefits, LLC, and the manner in which it violated the FDCPA. Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) The FCRA, 15 U.S.C.

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Harrison v. Kaner, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/harrison-v-kaner-nysd-2023.