UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK LAQUAN DEVOTA HARRIS, Plaintiff, -against- 23-CV-4440 (LTS) ROSEMARY VASALLO, Legal Aid Attorney; JUAN MERCHANT, Judge; NEIL ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO GREENWELL, Assistant District Attorney; REPLEAD SARAH HARRIS, Director, Cases (Alternatives to Incarceration); MEREDITH T; COURT OFFICER PERSONNEL, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action under the Court’s federal question jurisdiction, alleging that Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights. By order dated May 31, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth in this order, the Court dismisses this action, but grants Plaintiff 60 days’ leave to replead his claims in an amended complaint. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those
facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff’s complaint, which is challenging to read because of illegible handwriting, names the following defendants: (1) Judge Juan Merchant; (2) Assistant District Attorney (“ADA”) Neil Greenwell; (3) Legal Aid Attorney Rosemary Vassallo; (4) “Cases (Alternatives to Incarceration)” Director Sarah Harris; (5) “Court Officer Personnel”; and (6) Ms. Meredith T. The underlying events allegedly took place inside the New York County Criminal Court at 100 Center Street, between 2020 and 2023. Plaintiff alleges that: (1) one or more court officers sexually assaulted, “ambushed,” and “cuffed” him; (2) Judge Merchant and ADA Greenwell engaged in unspecified “misconduct”; (3) ADA Greenwell and Cases Director Harris violated “every policy”; (4) Plaintiff’s property, including $21,000 dollars and unspecified documents, was stolen; and (5) Plaintiff was “manipulated” and improperly “transferred.” (ECF 1 ¶ III.) Plaintiff seeks money damages. (Id.) Shortly after filing this complaint, Plaintiff filed two other complaints, one of which also
names as defendants Merchant, Greenwall, and Vasallo, among others. See Harris v. Denully, ECF 1:23-CV-4601, 1 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 30, 2023); see also Harris v. CYA Mgmt., ECF 1:23- CV-4599, 1 (S.D.N.Y. filed June 5, 2023).1 DISCUSSION A. Section 1983 claims The Court construes the complaint as asserting constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s complaint does not state any viable Section 1983 claims against any of the named Defendants.
Legal Aid Attorney Rosemary Vasallo Absent special circumstances suggesting concerted action between an attorney and a state representative, see Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 656 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Adickes v.
1 Plaintiff has previously filed a number of pro se cases in this court. See Harris v. Fuster, ECF 1:18-CV-10196, 11 (CM) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2019) (dismissing complaint for failure to state a claim and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction), recons. denied, (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2019); Harris v. Mt. Sinai St. Lukes , ECF 1:20-CV-00293, 7 (CM) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2020) (dismissing complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Harris v. Gittens, ECF 1:20- CV-1306, 8 (CM) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2020) (dismissing complaint for failure to state a claim and on immunity grounds); Harris v. Harris, ECF 1:19-CV-11658, 8 (CM) (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 2020) (dismissing complaint for failure to state a claim); Harris v. Denully, ECF 1:20-CV- 1307, 14 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2020) (dismissing complaint for failure to state a claim). S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970)), the representation of a defendant by private counsel in state criminal proceedings does not constitute the degree of state involvement or interference necessary to establish a claim under Section 1983, regardless of whether that attorney is privately retained, court-appointed, or employed as a public defender. See Bourdon v.
Loughren, 386 F.3d 88, 90 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 324-25 (1981)); see also Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that legal aid organization ordinarily is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983). Defendant Rosemary Vasallo, who served as Plaintiff’s Legal Aid attorney, is a private party who is not alleged to work for any state or other government body. Plaintiff thus has not stated a claim against her under Section 1983. Judge Merchant Judges are absolutely immune from suit for damages for any actions taken within the scope of their judicial responsibilities. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK LAQUAN DEVOTA HARRIS, Plaintiff, -against- 23-CV-4440 (LTS) ROSEMARY VASALLO, Legal Aid Attorney; JUAN MERCHANT, Judge; NEIL ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO GREENWELL, Assistant District Attorney; REPLEAD SARAH HARRIS, Director, Cases (Alternatives to Incarceration); MEREDITH T; COURT OFFICER PERSONNEL, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action under the Court’s federal question jurisdiction, alleging that Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights. By order dated May 31, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth in this order, the Court dismisses this action, but grants Plaintiff 60 days’ leave to replead his claims in an amended complaint. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those
facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff’s complaint, which is challenging to read because of illegible handwriting, names the following defendants: (1) Judge Juan Merchant; (2) Assistant District Attorney (“ADA”) Neil Greenwell; (3) Legal Aid Attorney Rosemary Vassallo; (4) “Cases (Alternatives to Incarceration)” Director Sarah Harris; (5) “Court Officer Personnel”; and (6) Ms. Meredith T. The underlying events allegedly took place inside the New York County Criminal Court at 100 Center Street, between 2020 and 2023. Plaintiff alleges that: (1) one or more court officers sexually assaulted, “ambushed,” and “cuffed” him; (2) Judge Merchant and ADA Greenwell engaged in unspecified “misconduct”; (3) ADA Greenwell and Cases Director Harris violated “every policy”; (4) Plaintiff’s property, including $21,000 dollars and unspecified documents, was stolen; and (5) Plaintiff was “manipulated” and improperly “transferred.” (ECF 1 ¶ III.) Plaintiff seeks money damages. (Id.) Shortly after filing this complaint, Plaintiff filed two other complaints, one of which also
names as defendants Merchant, Greenwall, and Vasallo, among others. See Harris v. Denully, ECF 1:23-CV-4601, 1 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 30, 2023); see also Harris v. CYA Mgmt., ECF 1:23- CV-4599, 1 (S.D.N.Y. filed June 5, 2023).1 DISCUSSION A. Section 1983 claims The Court construes the complaint as asserting constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s complaint does not state any viable Section 1983 claims against any of the named Defendants.
Legal Aid Attorney Rosemary Vasallo Absent special circumstances suggesting concerted action between an attorney and a state representative, see Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 656 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Adickes v.
1 Plaintiff has previously filed a number of pro se cases in this court. See Harris v. Fuster, ECF 1:18-CV-10196, 11 (CM) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2019) (dismissing complaint for failure to state a claim and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction), recons. denied, (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2019); Harris v. Mt. Sinai St. Lukes , ECF 1:20-CV-00293, 7 (CM) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2020) (dismissing complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Harris v. Gittens, ECF 1:20- CV-1306, 8 (CM) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2020) (dismissing complaint for failure to state a claim and on immunity grounds); Harris v. Harris, ECF 1:19-CV-11658, 8 (CM) (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 2020) (dismissing complaint for failure to state a claim); Harris v. Denully, ECF 1:20-CV- 1307, 14 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2020) (dismissing complaint for failure to state a claim). S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970)), the representation of a defendant by private counsel in state criminal proceedings does not constitute the degree of state involvement or interference necessary to establish a claim under Section 1983, regardless of whether that attorney is privately retained, court-appointed, or employed as a public defender. See Bourdon v.
Loughren, 386 F.3d 88, 90 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 324-25 (1981)); see also Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that legal aid organization ordinarily is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983). Defendant Rosemary Vasallo, who served as Plaintiff’s Legal Aid attorney, is a private party who is not alleged to work for any state or other government body. Plaintiff thus has not stated a claim against her under Section 1983. Judge Merchant Judges are absolutely immune from suit for damages for any actions taken within the scope of their judicial responsibilities. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). Generally, “acts arising out of, or related to, individual cases before the judge are considered judicial in nature.” Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2009). “Even allegations of bad faith or malice cannot
overcome judicial immunity.” Id. (citations omitted). This is because, “[w]ithout insulation from liability, judges would be subject to harassment and intimidation . . . .” Young v. Selsky, 41 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1994). In addition, Section 1983, as amended in 1996, provides that “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Judicial immunity does not apply when the judge takes action “outside” his judicial capacity, or when the judge takes action that, although judicial in nature, is taken “in absence of jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 9-10; see also Bliven, 579 F.3d at 209-10 (describing actions that are judicial in nature). But “the scope of [a] judge’s jurisdiction must be construed broadly where the issue is the immunity of the judge.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978). Plaintiff fails to allege any facts showing that Judge Merchant acted beyond the scope of his judicial responsibilities or outside his jurisdiction. See Mireles, 509 U.S. at 11-12. Because
Plaintiff sues Judge Merchant for “acts arising out of, or related to, individual cases before him,” he is immune from suit for such claims. Bliven, 579 F.3d at 210. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Merchant because they seek monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii), and, consequently, as frivolous, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). See Mills v. Fischer, 645 F.3d 176, 177 (2d Cir. 2011) (“Any claim dismissed on the ground of absolute judicial immunity is ‘frivolous’ for purposes of [the in forma pauperis statute].”). Assistant District Attorney Neil Greenwell Prosecutors are immune from civil suits for damages for acts committed within the scope of their official duties where the challenged activities are not investigative in nature but, rather, are “‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.’” Giraldo v. Kessler,
694 F.3d 161, 165 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)); see also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269 (1993) (absolute immunity is analyzed under a “functional approach” that “looks to the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). In addition, prosecutors are absolutely immune from suit for acts that may be administrative obligations but are “directly connected with the conduct of a trial.” Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 344 (2009); see also Ogunkoya v. Monaghan, 913 F.3d 64, 70-72 (2d Cir. 2019) (holding that ADAs’ direction as to where criminal defendant would be arraigned was in preparation for a court proceeding in which the prosecutors were acting as advocates, and ADAs were therefore shielded by absolute immunity (citing, inter alia, Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at ___). Here, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Neil Greenwell are based on actions within the scope of Defendant’s official duties and associated with the conduct of a trial. Therefore, these
claims are dismissed because they seek monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(iii), and, consequently, as frivolous, 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(i). See Collazo v. Pagano, 656 F. 3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that claim against prosecutor is frivolous if it arises from conduct that is “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process”). Director Sarah Harris and Meredith T. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts showing the defendants’ direct and personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Spavone v. N.Y. State Dep’ t of Corr. Serv., 719 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2013) (“It is well settled in this Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in the alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). A
defendant may not be held liable under § 1983 solely because that defendant employs or supervises a person who violated the plaintiff’s rights. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.”). Rather, “[t]o hold a state official liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead and prove the elements of the underlying constitutional violation directly against the official . . . .” Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 620 (2d Cir. 2020). Plaintiff names Harris and Meredith T. as defendants in the caption of the complaint, but he does not clarify who they are or show that either of these individuals was personally involved in violating his constitutional rights. Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that court personnel subjected him to excessive force, but he provides almost no facts about what exactly happened and who was involved. The Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint to detail his claims. Plaintiff may consider contacting the New York Legal Assistance Group’s (“NYLAG”)
Clinic for Pro Se Litigants in the Southern District of New York, which is a free legal clinic staffed by attorneys and paralegals to assist those who are representing themselves in civil lawsuits in this court. The clinic is run by a private organization; it is not part of, or run by, the court. It cannot accept filings on behalf of the court, which must still be made by any pro se party through the Pro Se Intake Unit. A copy of the flyer with details of the clinic is attached to this order. B. State law claims Although Plaintiff has not invoked state law, a pro se litigant’s complaint generally must be liberally construed as including related state law claims. See McLeod v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 864 F.3d 154, 158 (2d Cir. 2017). A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims, however, when it “has dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Generally, “when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988)). Having dismissed the federal claims over which the Court has original jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction of any state law claims that Plaintiff may be asserting. See Kolari v. New York-Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Subsection (c) of § 1367 ‘confirms the discretionary nature of supplemental jurisdiction by enumerating the circumstances in which district courts can refuse its exercise.’”) (quoting City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997)). LEAVE TO REPLEAD District courts generally grant a pro se plaintiff leave to amend a complaint to cure its
defects, but leave to amend may be denied if the plaintiff has already been given an opportunity to amend but has failed to cure the complaint’s deficiencies. See Ruotolo v. City of New York, 514 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2008); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to replead his excessive force claim in an amended complaint. CONCLUSION Plaintiff’s complaint, filed IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), (iii). The Court grants Plaintiff 60 days’ leave to replead his claims under Section 1983 in an amended complaint. Plaintiff must submit the amended complaint to this Court’s Pro Se Intake
Unit within 60 days of the date of this order, caption the document as an “Amended Complaint,” and label the document with docket number 23-CV-4440 (LTS). If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint within the prescribed time and he cannot show good cause for such failure, the Court will enter judgment dismissing the action, and declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction of any state law claims Plaintiff may be asserting, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). An amended complaint form is attached to this order. The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). SO ORDERED.
Dated: July 10, 2023 New York, New York
/s/ Laura Taylor Swain LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN Chief United States District Judge UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_____CV_______________ (Include case number if one has been Write the full name of each plaintiff. assigned)
AMENDED -against-
COMPLAINT
Do you want a jury trial? ☐ Yes ☐ No
Write the full name of each defendant. If you need more space, please write “see attached” in the space above and attach an additional sheet of paper with the full list of names. The names listed above must be identical to those contained in Section II.
NOTICE The public can access electronic court files. For privacy and security reasons, papers filed with the court should therefore not contain: an individual’s full social security number or full birth date; the full name of a person known to be a minor; or a complete financial account number. A filing may include only: the last four digits of a social security number; the year of an individual’s birth; a minor’s initials; and the last four digits of a financial account number. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2. I. BASIS FOR JURISDICTION Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction (limited power). Generally, only two types of cases can be heard in federal court: cases involving a federal question and cases involving diversity of citizenship of the parties. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, a case arising under the United States Constitution or federal laws or treaties is a federal question case. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, a case in which a citizen of one State sues a citizen of another State or nation, and the amount in controversy is more than $75,000, is a diversity case. In a diversity case, no defendant may be a citizen of the same State as any plaintiff. What is the basis for federal-court jurisdiction in your case? ☐ Federal Question ☐ Diversity of Citizenship A. If you checked Federal Question Which of your federal constitutional or federal statutory rights have been violated?
B. If you checked Diversity of Citizenship 1. Citizenship of the parties Of what State is each party a citizen? The plaintiff , , is a citizen of the State of (Plaintiff’s name)
(State in which the person resides and intends to remain.) or, if not lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States, a citizen or subject of the foreign state of . If more than one plaintiff is named in the complaint, attach additional pages providing information for each additional plaintiff. If the defendant is an individual:
The defendant, , is a citizen of the State of (Defendant’s name)
or, if not lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States, a citizen or subject of the foreign state of . If the defendant is a corporation: The defendant, , is incorporated under the laws of the State of and has its principal place of business in the State of or is incorporated under the laws of (foreign state) and has its principal place of business in . If more than one defendant is named in the complaint, attach additional pages providing information for each additional defendant.
II. PARTIES A. Plaintiff Information Provide the following information for each plaintiff named in the complaint. Attach additional pages if needed.
First Name Middle Initial Last Name
Street Address
County, City State Zip Code
Telephone Number Email Address (if available) B. Defendant Information To the best of your ability, provide addresses where each defendant may be served. If the correct information is not provided, it could delay or prevent service of the complaint on the defendant. Make sure that the defendants listed below are the same as those listed in the caption. Attach additional pages if needed. Defendant 1: First Name Last Name
Current Job Title (or other identifying information)
Current Work Address (or other address where defendant may be served)
County, City State Zip Code Defendant 2: First Name Last Name
Current Work Address (or other address where defendant may be served)
County, City State Zip Code Defendant 3: First Name Last Name
Current Work Address (or other address where defendant may be served)
County, City State Zip Code Defendant 4: First Name Last Name
Current Work Address (or other address where defendant may be served)
County, City State Zip Code III. STATEMENT OF CLAIM Place(s) of occurrence:
Date(s) of occurrence: FACTS: State here briefly the FACTS that support your case. Describe what happened, how you were harmed, and what each defendant personally did or failed to do that harmed you. Attach additional pages if needed. INJURIES: If you were injured as a result of these actions, describe your injuries and what medical treatment, if any, you required and received.
IV. RELIEF State briefly what money damages or other relief you want the court to order. V. PLAINTIFF’S CERTIFICATION AND WARNINGS By signing below, I certify to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief that: (1) the complaint is not being presented for an improper purpose (such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation); (2) the claims are supported by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument to change existing law; (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and (4) the complaint otherwise complies with the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. I agree to notify the Clerk's Office in writing of any changes to my mailing address. I understand that my failure to keep a current address on file with the Clerk's Office may result in the dismissal of my case. Each Plaintiff must sign and date the complaint. Attach additional pages if necessary. If seeking to proceed without prepayment of fees, each plaintiff must also submit an IFP application.
Dated Plaintiff’s Signature
Telephone Number Email Address (if available)
I have read the Pro Se (Nonprisoner) Consent to Receive Documents Electronically: ☐ Yes ☐ No If you do consent to receive documents electronically, submit the completed form with your complaint. If you do not consent, please do not attach the form.