Harris v. Town of Waltham

613 A.2d 696, 158 Vt. 477, 1992 Vt. LEXIS 79

• Court: Supreme Court of Vermont
• Decided: May 22, 1992
• Docket: 90-328
• Status: Published

Opinions

Dooley, J.

Taxpayers, Martin and Carolyn Harris, appeal from a decision of the State Board of Appraisers setting the value of their residence and surrounding land in the Town of Waltham for 1989 at $155,400. We affirm.

The Town assessed the taxpayers’ residence, outbuildings, and 130 acres at $98,738 in 1988. In 1989, the Town conducted a reappraisal because assessed values of land and buildings within the Town were substantially below fair market values as shown by property transfer tax returns for sales in towns in the immediate area. Land values were increased in accordance with a new schedule, and houses were generally increased 60% in value, after adjusting for physical changes in particular parcels.

Taxpayers appealed their 1989 valuation to the Board of Civil Authority (BCA). Their appeal letter stated that their land was overvalued as a result of the treatment of a parcel they had recently conveyed. Apparently both the parcel that was conveyed and the land they retained were valued at $160 per acre. Taxpayers’ position to the BCA was that the most valuable portion of their land was the parcel they conveyed and the remainder should be valued at less than $160 per acre. During the BCA hearing, the listers explained their position on this claim and also stated that taxpayers’ land was valued comparably to other land in the Town. The BCA rejected the appeal, stating: “Appeal denied. Assessment for land is similar to assessments of surrounding land.”

After the BCA hearing, taxpayers obtained the Town appraisal cards for other property within the Town and determined that the BCA statement “turned out not to be true.” They appealed to the Vermont Board of Appraisers stating that the appeal was “based on grounds of comparability.” In the Board hearing, they attempted to show that in thirteen respects listing decisions were less favorable to them than to the other landowners. They reduced this to five complaints; all, except one they described as minor, dealt with the assessment of the land. They presented no evidence of fair market value, either of their properties or the properties to which they compared, and did not claim that their property was listed above fair market value.

Taxpayers raise two issues here: (1) the BCA failed to state the reasons for its decision as required by 32 V.S.A. § 4404(c) and therefore the value should remain at 1988 levels; and (2) the Board’s findings on the fair market values of taxpayers’ property and the comparable properties are erroneous. The Board found that taxpayers had waived the first issue they raised, although it also concluded that the BCA had not complied with § 4404(c). Taxpayers argue that the Board’s decision on the violation of § 4404(c) is correct, but its waiver decision is erroneous. We conclude that the BCA did not violate § 4404(c) and accordingly do not reach the question of whether taxpayers waived this, issue.¹

To consider the first issue, a brief history of the statutory requirements, and their interpretation in this Court, is in order. Until recently, § 4404(c) provided in relevant part:

The board [of civil authority] shall, within ten days from the time of the committee report, certify in writing its findings in the premises, and shall file such findings with the town clerk who shall thereupon record the same in the book wherein the appeal was recorded and forthwith notify the appellant in writing of the action of such board, by certified mail. If the board does not carry out the requirements of this subsection, the grand list of the appellant for the year for which appeal is being made shall remain at the amount set before the appealed change was made by the listers, ....

This Court decided two cases dealing with the statute’s requirement that the BCA prepare findings. In Punderson v. Town of Chittenden, 136 Vt. 221, 388 A.2d 373 (1978), where the BCA issued a written decision without stating any reasons for the result, this Court held that the decision violated the statute because it did “not meet the underlying purpose of indicating to the parties, and to an appellate court, what was decided and upon what considerations.” Id. at 225, 388 A.2d at 376. Based on that conclusion, we ordered that the sanction specified in § 4404(c) be imposed.

The second case is Hojaboom v. Town of Swanton, 141 Vt. 43, 442 A.2d 1301 (1982), which involved a number of property tax appeals in the Town of Swanton. In that case, the BCA purported to make findings, but they were very sketchy and did not address completely the issues raised. For one taxpayer, they said only, “Nice looking property,” and “Discussed the land value of 140 per front foot a length.” Id. at 48, 442 A.2d at 1304. For another, the BCA found, “Swamp is poor land,” and explained its decision to slightly lower the value set by the listers as follows: “After considerable discussion of this and similar land motion was made and passed to do the following: 19.84 acre swamp x 400 and 25.02 acres at 651.” Id. at 52, 442 A.2d at 1306. We held that the findings were inadequate because they did not meet the essential requirement of informing the taxpayer of the reasons for the decision.

Following Hojaboom, the Legislature amended the statute. In the first sentence quoted above, the requirement of “findings in the premises” was changed to “notice of decision, with reasons, in the premises.” Where the second sentence imposed the sanction if the BCA “does not carry out the requirements of this subsection,” the new version imposes the sanction only if the BCA “does not substantially comply with the requirements of this subsection.” There is no question that the Legislature intended to overrule Hojaboom and Punderson at least in part. The sponsor of the amending legislation described the intent as changing those decisions, stating, “I would respectfully submit' to the committee that there is not a board of civil authority in the state that is capable of satisfying that standard.” Hearings on H.273 before the Senate Government Operations Comm. 4 (April 15, 1983) (testimony of Rep. Edward Zuccaro). This is our first occasion to consider § 4404(c) since the amendment.

The Board in this case quoted Punderson and found that the BCA decision did “not provide explanation to the Appellant of how precisely the final decision was determined.”² Taxpayers amplify that the BCA failed to state how it valued taxpayers’ buildings, as opposed to their land; did not specifically identify the “surrounding land” or itemize its value; and did not determine the fair market value of taxpayers’ land.

Whatever might have been the result under the Punderson standard, we conclude that the BCA met the present requirements of § 4404(c). Since the taxpayers’ sole claim to the BCA was that they had been discriminated against compared to certain other named landowners, a determination that their assessment “is similar to assessments of surrounding land” is a sufficient explanation to comply with the statute. The BCA simply rejected their discrimination claim.

All of taxpayers’ complaints to this Court about the BCA decision attack the quality of the decision.³ Their complaints that the BCA failed to address the value of their building or to find fair market value are unavailing since taxpayers raised no issue about the buildings in the BCA and did not attack the listers’ determination of fair market value. The other complaints involve the kind of detail that is no longer required after the amendments to § 4404(c).

The requirements of § 4404(c) are technical; taxpayers sfiffered no prejudice from any breach of them. Taxpayers’ rights are fully protected by the de novo appeal to the Board. There is no claim that the reasons given by the BCA, however sparse, do not represent its actual determination of the issues raised by the taxpayers. BCA at least substantially complied with the statutory requirements.

Taxpayers’ second argument is that there is no evidence to support the Board’s determination of fair market value of their property or the comparable properties. In support of this conclusion, they argue that they showed that the Town’s land schedule used an impermissible sliding scale method of valuation, unrelated to fair market value, and thus overcame the presumption of validity of the Town’s appraisal. Because the Town failed to support its valuation, taxpayers’ claim the appraisal must be overturned.

Taxpayers’ position here is very different from their position before the Board. At the Board hearing, the following exchange took place between the chairman and Martin Harris:

Potter: Mr. Harris would you, would this property sell for $155,000?

Harris: That’s not the question at hand.

Q: Yes it is to us.

A: No sir.

Q: It is to us. . . . This is what we have to work on.

A: No. There are two grounds on which I can base a complaint. One is, whether [it] is over fair market value____ And the other is whether it is being comparably treated. All the properties in this town are underappraised.

Q: ... In order to know whether it is overappraised or not you first have to find fair market value. . . .

A: My complaint is not that this property is assessed over fair market value. My complaint is the second of the two complaints which I’m entitled to make that I’m not being appraised comparably with other people.

Taxpayers were correct that property valuation involves a two-step process: determination of fair market value and equalization. Vermont Electric Power Co. v. Town of Cavendish, 158 Vt. 369, 372, 611 A.2d 389, 391 (1992). Taxpayers conceded fair market value before’the Board and based their claims solely on equalization. Having done so, they are in no position here to attack the Board’s finding of the fair market value of their property.

Affirmed.

1 The dissent argues that we should not reach this issue because the Town failed to preserve it below and we do not have the benefit of full briefing of the issue. We disagree.

The Town had no opportunity to preserve the issue below because the Board announced at the beginning of the hearing that although the BCA explanation was inadequate the taxpayers had waived the issue. Thus, the issue had already been decided when the Town filed its proposed findings and conclusions stating its position.

In this Court, the taxpayers fully briefed the issue, recognizing that they would have to prevail on it to obtain relief. We have heard “reasoned arguments” from the party against whom we decide the question. The Town chose to defend the Board’s decision on the grounds stated by the Board, a not uncommon situation in cases where we affirm a decision because the result is correct even though the reasoning is not. Further briefing of the issue by the Town would not aid our decision or reasoning.

The dissent suggests a narrow and inappropriate application of the “right result, wrong reason” principle that would cause us to reverse decisions we know to be correct for no good purpose. We often decide cases on grounds different from those used below with no consideration of whether our grounds were argued below. That result inevitably occurs when we overrule a decision of this Court since it was fruitless to present that ground to the lower court or agency. See, e.g., Watker v. Vermont Parole Board, 157 Vt. 72, 74, 596 A.2d 1277, 1278 (1991). Most visibly, it has occurred as we have developed state constitutional doctrine using grounds and distinctions not predicted by either the trial courts or the parties. See, e.g., State v. Wright, 157 Vt. 653, 654, 596 A.2d 925, 925 (1991); State v. Brooks, 157 Vt. 490, 493, 601 A.2d 963, 965 (1991). It would be particularly ironic if we were to apply it to property tax appeals where we routinely decide cases on issues never raised in the Board of Tax Appeals. See, e.g., Vermont Electric Power Co. v. Town of Cavendish, 158 Vt. 369, 373-74, 611 A.2d 389, 391-92 (1992) (Board of Tax Appeals affirmed for the right result, based on the wrong reason, with no indication that the Court’s reason was raised below).

2 The dissent argues that we should defer to the Board’s determination of the BCA’s compliance with § 4404(c). The Board’s determination is clearly-based, however, on the preamendment language as applied in Punderson. We do not defer to an agency where its decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute. Vermont State Employees’ Ass’n v. State, 151 Vt. 492, 493, 562 A.2d 1054, 1055 (1989).

3 The dissent also attacks the quality of the BCA decision, necessarily arguing that § 4404(c) requires not only that the BCA state its reasons but also that it have good reasons. Its citation to a decision about the findings of the Board of Tax Appeals, Saufroy v. Town of Danville, 148 Vt. 624, 538 A.2d 168 (1987), suggests that we should apply to the BCA the standards we use for Board findings so we don’t have “to speculate on how the [BCA] . . . reached its conclusion on fair market value.” We doubt that a town of 454 residents, National Survey, Vermont Yearbook 1991-92 at 498 (1991), whose volunteer citizen board of civil authority hears a property tax appeal and files its decision within an hour of the start of the hearing, will ever provide a detailed explanation of its reasoning to meet the dissent’s standards. In any event, we have no evidence that the Board failed to give a complete statement of its reasons in this ease. Further, the sophistication of the BCA’s statement matches the sophistication of the taxpayers’ appeal. The statute requires that the BCA state its reasons; not the reasons that would have been used by a professional body, with the time for careful decision-making, and based on a focused and detailed appeal.