Harris v. State

902 S.E.2d 574, 319 Ga. 133

• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
• Decided: May 29, 2024
• Docket: S24A0321
• Status: Published

Opinion

319 Ga. 133 FINAL COPY

S24A0321. HARRIS v. THE STATE.

PINSON, Justice.

Appellant Leslie Harris pleaded guilty to malice murder and

other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Michael An-

thony Davenport.1 She later moved to withdraw her guilty pleas, as-

serting that certain mental-health issues had prevented her from

entering a knowing and voluntary plea. The trial court denied the

motion, and she now appeals that decision. But the record supports

1 The crimes occurred on October 5, 2017. On January 2, 2019, a Rich-

mond County grand jury indicted Harris for malice murder (Count 1), felony murder predicated on aggravated assault (Count 2), armed robbery (Count 3), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime (Count 4). On September 27, 2019, Harris pleaded guilty to all counts except Count 2, which was nolle-prossed. Harris was sentenced to life in prison for Count 1, a concur- rent life sentence for Count 3, and a consecutive five-year sentence for Count 4. On November 14, 2019, Harris timely moved to withdraw her guilty pleas. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Harris’s motion on August 18, 2023. Harris timely filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals on August 25, 2023, which was transferred to this Court on November 1, 2023. See Harris v. State, Case No. A24A0445 (Nov. 1, 2023). The case was docketed to the term of this Court beginning in December 2023 and submitted for a decision on the briefs. the trial court’s conclusion that Harris’s plea was knowing and vol-

untary, so we affirm the trial court’s decision.

1. (a) Three days before her scheduled trial date, Harris en-

tered a negotiated guilty plea to malice murder, armed robbery, and

possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. At the plea

hearing, the State provided the following factual basis for the plea.

Harris and Davenport were in a tumultuous relationship high-

lighted by Harris’s physical abuse of Davenport and Davenport’s in-

fidelity. On October 1, 2017, four days before the murder, Harris and

Davenport were staying at a hotel when they got into an argument

and Davenport left and went to stay at a hotel next door. The State

explained that, according to Davenport’s family, “he was ending the

relationship for good at this point.” The State asserted that surveil-

lance footage showed that Davenport was alone at the hotel until

October 4, when he and a woman were seen going into his room.

Around 11:57 p.m., Davenport left his hotel room to throw away

trash. Around 12:27 a.m., on October 5, Harris was seen walking by

Davenport’s room while on her cell phone and going upstairs to the

2 hotel’s second floor. Around 12:50 a.m., the woman who was with

Davenport left his room and went to her car. At 12:52 a.m., Daven-

port’s hand is seen coming out of the hotel room and waving goodbye.

Soon after, the State asserted, the surveillance footage showed Har-

ris “bolt[ing]” toward Davenport’s room, having a conversation with

the woman outside of Davenport’s room for a couple of minutes, and

at 12:56 a.m., entering Davenport’s room. About 30 minutes later,

Harris left Davenport’s room carrying a large duffle bag which she

threw in the back of Davenport’s truck. Harris then got in the truck

and drove back to her hotel. She woke up her two daughters, packed

up her hotel room, loaded her belongings in Davenport’s truck, and

left by 2:00 a.m.

Early the next afternoon, a hotel clerk found Davenport’s body

lying on the floor of his hotel room. He was dead and had three gun-

shot wounds. The State asserted that based on the surveillance foot-

age, Harris was the last person to see Davenport before he was found

dead. According to the State, she shot him three times, stole his

property, including his truck, “and left him to die.”

3 Before the plea hearing, Harris and plea counsel completed and

signed a form called “Plea of Guilty (Nolo Contendere) Acknowledge-

ment and Waiver of Rights.” One of the questions on the form asked,

“To your knowledge, do you now suffer from any mental illness or

psychological disorder?” Harris initialed both “Yes” and “No” in re-

sponse to this question. During the plea colloquy, the trial court

asked about these conflicting answers, and Harris explained that

she had been diagnosed with depression and bipolar disorder. Harris

further explained that she did not know exactly when she was diag-

nosed but that she had been prescribed medication for her diagno-

ses. The trial judge ultimately circled “Yes” next to the question ask-

ing whether Harris suffered from “mental illness or psychological

disorder” and put her own initials to the side of the circle to confirm

the accuracy of the answer on the form.

When the trial court first asked Harris if she was taking her

prescribed medication while in jail, Harris said, “No. Some . . . . [I’m

s]upposed to take it every day, twice a day.” Later in the colloquy,

the court asked Harris a second time whether she was taking her

4 prescribed medication while in jail. Harris said, “Yes, I am,” and she

noted that she did not take it the day of the plea hearing because

she was brought to the court early in the morning, but she had taken

it the day before. The court also asked Harris whether she “fe[lt]

okay” and Harris responded that she did. When asked whether Har-

ris understood why she was in court that day, Harris first responded,

“For a trial.” When the court informed Harris that was not the case,

Harris said, “Oh, sentencing.” So the court asked Harris if she knew

what that meant, and Harris responded, “We’re here for sentencing.”

The court then asked Harris whether she wanted to admit to killing

Davenport or if she wanted to go to trial. Harris responded that she

“just want[ed] it over with” and was prepared “to admit it.” The court

then asked Harris whether she understood what would happen after

she was sentenced, and Harris responded, “I’m going to the [ ]

prison.” At various points throughout the plea hearing, the court

asked whether Harris understood why she was in court, how she

felt, and if she understood the different questions she was asked,

and Harris affirmed that she understood and that she felt “okay.”

5 The trial court also asked Harris whether she had an opportunity to

review her case file, discuss it with her attorney, whether she had

questions about it, and whether she was satisfied with her attorney’s

representation. Harris responded that she was able to review the

file, was able to discuss it with plea counsel, had no questions, and

was satisfied with her plea counsel’s representation.

The court also asked plea counsel about his interactions with

Harris, and plea counsel explained that he was able to have mean-

ingful conversations with Harris throughout his representation of

her and that she was able to assist in her own defense. Plea counsel

explained that he discussed Harris’s mental-health issues with her,

and that the two had discussed the case to their “satisfaction” and

“were able to effectively discuss what she was charged with, what

the possible defenses would be,” including their discussion of “the

possibility of self-defense in this case.” Based on those discussions,

Harris decided to “waive those defenses in order to accept the State’s

offer.” Plea counsel also explained that given Harris’s mental-health

diagnoses, he considered a competency evaluation, but ultimately

6 decided not to request one because he “believe[d] she [was] compe-

tent to go forward[ ] based off [his] conversations with her.”

During the plea hearing, the trial court asked, and Harris con-

firmed, that she was not under the influence of any drugs or alcohol,

and that she had not been forced or threatened in any way or prom-

ised anything to make her plead guilty. Harris further confirmed

that she understood the constitutional and legal rights she was

waiving by pleading guilty. The court also reviewed with Harris both

the maximum sentence she could receive should she proceed to trial

and the negotiated plea offer, which Harris acknowledged she un-

derstood.

Harris then admitted to killing Davenport and taking his

truck, pleaded guilty, and the Court accepted her plea, finding that

it was entered “freely, voluntarily, and knowingly.”

(b) On November 14, 2019, Harris timely moved to withdraw

her guilty pleas.2 On August 9, 2023, the trial court held a hearing

2 The deadline for filing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is the end of

the term in which a trial court enters a judgment of conviction and sentence is

7 on the motion and heard testimony from Harris’s plea counsel.3 Plea

counsel testified about his representation of Harris generally, in-

cluding his review of the evidence and the waiver-of-rights form with

Harris and their discussions about entering a guilty plea, as well as

his determination that she was competent to enter a plea. Plea coun-

sel testified that prior to the plea hearing, he discussed with Harris

the possible sentences she faced as well as the possible defenses that

were available to her, and that Harris had some concerns but ulti-

mately “wanted to go forward with it.” He also recalled Harris’s men-

tal-health diagnoses and explained that his standard practice would

have been to ensure that she understood what was going on, where

she was, and what she was pleading to, including the nature of the

charges and potential consequences of pleading guilty or going to

trial. Plea counsel also explained that he did not seek a competency

pronounced. See Powell v. State, 309 Ga. 523, 524 (1) & n.1 (847 SE2d 338) (2020). Harris’s motion to withdraw her guilty pleas was filed before that dead- line. See OCGA § 15-6-3 (5) (B) (terms of court for Richmond County begin on the third Monday in January, March, May, July, September, and November). 3 While Harris’s plea counsel filed the motion to withdraw her pleas, she

was represented by new counsel at the motion to withdraw hearing. 8 evaluation because “[Harris] didn’t appear to have . . . anything in-

volving, like, hallucinations or anything that would lead [him] to be-

lieve that she was not competent at that time to make a decision.”

Plea counsel explained that he “never got [the] impression” that

Harris “didn’t know what was going on or that what she was doing

wasn’t voluntary.” Harris did not testify at the hearing and pre-

sented no other witnesses or evidence.

2. Harris contends that the trial court erred in denying her mo-

tion to withdraw her guilty pleas because her mental-health issues

prevented her from entering a knowing and voluntary plea.

“After sentencing, the decision on a motion to withdraw a

guilty plea is within the trial court’s discretion, and withdrawal of

the plea is allowed only when necessary to correct a manifest injus-

tice.” Powell v. State, 309 Ga. 523, 524 (1) (847 SE2d 338) (2020). We

have said that “withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injus-

tice if, for instance . . . the guilty plea was entered involuntarily or

without an understanding of the nature of the charges.” Id. (cleaned

up).

9 When a defendant moves to withdraw a guilty plea on the basis

that it was not knowing and voluntary, the State bears the burden

of showing that the plea was knowing and voluntary based on all the

relevant circumstances. Johnson v. State, 303 Ga. 704, 707 (2) (814

SE2d 688) (2018). To assess whether the plea was knowing and vol-

untary, the trial court must consider whether the plea was the result

of the defendant’s own free choice, made with sufficient awareness

of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. Green v.

State, 318 Ga. 610, 614 (II) (898 SE2d 500) (2024) (citing Brady v.

United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (I) (90 SCt 1463, 25 LE2d 747)

(1970)). These relevant circumstances and likely consequences gen-

erally include “the nature of the charge to which the defendant is

admitting guilt, the factual basis of the charge, the punishment to

which the plea will expose him, the terms of any negotiated agree-

ment with the government, and the rights the defendant will waive

by entering the plea.” Id. at 616 (II) (A) (1). When reviewing a trial

court’s determination that a defendant’s plea was knowing and vol-

untary, we review the court’s factual findings for clear error, but the

10 ultimate determination is reviewed de novo. See Ward v. Medina,

316 Ga. 345, 351 (2) (888 SE2d 84) (2023).

The record here supports the trial court’s determination that

Harris entered a knowing and voluntary plea. During the plea collo-

quy, the trial court questioned Harris to determine if she understood

why she was in court that day, whether she understood the nature

of the charges against her, possible sentences, and the rights she

was waiving by pleading guilty. In response, Harris said that she

wanted to “admit” to killing Davenport and was there for “sentenc-

ing,” which she understood meant she was “going to the [ ] prison.”

She also acknowledged that she understood the maximum sentence

she could receive should she proceed to trial and the rights she was

waiving by pleading guilty. Harris affirmed multiple times that she

understood that she was giving up her right to a jury trial, and that

she had discussed her case, including possible defenses, with her at-

torney to her “satisfaction.” Throughout the hearing, the trial court

asked Harris whether she “underst[ood] what’s going to happen if

[she gets] sentenced,” and whether Harris “agreed to” go to prison,

11 and Harris responded that she did.

The court also reviewed Harris’s waiver-of-rights form to con-

firm Harris’s understanding and knowledge of that form and the

rights she was giving up, and the court specifically clarified Harris’s

responses about her mental-health diagnoses and asked about her

medical history. When asked about the form, Harris described her

diagnoses and treatment for bipolar disorder and acknowledged that

she had not taken her prescribed medication the day of the plea

hearing, but that she had taken it the day before and “fe[lt] okay.”

Plea counsel affirmed his belief that Harris was competent to pro-

ceed and that she was able to assist in her own defense based on

their conversations about her case and possible defenses. So it is

clear from the record of the plea hearing that the trial court consid-

ered Harris’s mental-health diagnoses and treatment and her abil-

ity to communicate with counsel and the court to conclude that she

understood the nature of the charges, rights she was waiving, and

consequences of entering her plea, and her responses and those of

plea counsel amply supported the court’s conclusion that Harris’s

12 plea was knowing and voluntary. See Oliver v. State, 308 Ga. 652,

655 (2) (842 SE2d 847) (2020) (holding that appellant was advised

of his rights and understood that he was waiving those rights by

pleading guilty where appellant signed a waiver-of-rights form and

the trial court entered an order contemporaneous with the guilty

plea finding the plea was “freely, understandingly, and voluntarily

made” (cleaned up)); Phelps v. State, 293 Ga. 873, 875-878 (2) (a), (b)

(750 SE2d 340) (2013) (concluding defendant’s completed waiver-of-

rights “questionnaire” was “evidence which, in conjunction with the

record of the plea hearing” demonstrated that defendant’s plea was

knowing, voluntary, and intelligent where defendant claimed,

among other things, that he was not mentally competent to enter his

plea).

Harris now claims that her mental-health diagnoses at the

time—depression and bipolar disorder—and the “irregularity” in

taking her medication at the time, did not allow her to “exercise rea-

sonable decision making” or “sufficiently understand the conse-

quences of her decision to plead guilty.” But the trial court probed

13 both Harris and her plea counsel about these diagnoses and their

potential effect on her understanding of the proceedings and the con-

sequences of her plea, as detailed above. The trial court asked Harris

about her mental-health diagnoses, including whether she was tak-

ing her medication in jail, and Harris described her mental-health

history and treatment. In particular, she affirmed that she was tak-

ing her medicine, including having taken it the day before the hear-

ing, and she affirmed that she had not taken it that day because she

was “brought over so early.” The record contains no evidence that

this schedule of taking her medication affected her ability to enter a

knowing and voluntary plea. And although Harris first said she be-

lieved she was in court “for a trial” and later, for “sentencing,” on

further inquiry from the court, Harris affirmed multiple times that

she understood she was in court “to admit” to killing Davenport and

that she understood she was “going to the [ ] prison,” had discussed

her case with plea counsel, and ultimately wanted to admit to killing

Davenport and taking his truck instead of going to trial. Before ac-

cepting Harris’s guilty plea, the trial court asked plea counsel about

14 his interactions with Harris and plea counsel responded that he was

able to have meaningful conversations with Harris and that she was

able to assist in her own defense, including in deciding to waive cer-

tain defenses and accept the State’s offer. And at the motion to with-

draw hearing, plea counsel testified that he believed Harris was

competent at the time she entered her plea and explained that his

standard practice would have been to ensure that she understood,

in relevant part, what she was pleading to, including the nature of

the charges and potential consequences of pleading guilty or pro-

ceeding with trial. The credibility of plea counsel’s testimony was for

the trial court to determine. See Johnson, 303 Ga. at 707 (2). More-

over, in denying Harris’s motion to withdraw, the trial court specif-

ically noted that Harris “admitted that there was a sufficient factual

basis for the charge, and that [s]he did in fact commit the offense of

murder, armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the com-

mission of certain crimes.”

On appeal, Harris cites medical journals in support of her ar-

gument, but none of those are part of the record that was before the

15 trial court. See Caine v. State, 266 Ga. 421, 422 (467 SE2d 570)

(1996) (dismissing direct appeal of guilty plea where claims about

involuntariness of plea could not be resolved by facts appearing in

the existing record). And Harris did not introduce any witnesses or

evidence that called into doubt her understanding of the proceedings

or the consequences of her plea.

In sum, the trial court did not err in determining that Harris

entered her plea of her own free choice, with sufficient awareness of

the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. The trial court

therefore acted within its discretion when it denied Harris’s motion

to withdraw her guilty pleas.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

16 Decided May 29, 2024.

Murder. Richmond Superior Court. Before Judge Wright.

Melissa Akins, Daniel K. Franck, for appellant.

Jared T. Williams, District Attorney, Joshua B. Smith, John M.

Kraft, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney

General, Beth A. Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Meghan H. Hill,

Clint C. Malcolm, Senior Assistant Attorneys General, Elizabeth H.

Brock, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.